

**The Nagasaki-Macao Trade between 1612 and 1618:
Carlo Spinola S.J. Procurator of Japan**

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DECLARAÇÕES

Declaro que esta dissertação é o resultado da minha investigação pessoal e independente. O seu conteúdo é original e todas as fontes consultadas estão devidamente mencionadas no texto, nas notas e na bibliografia.

O candidato,

Lisboa, 18 de Dezembro de 2013

Declaro que esta dissertação se encontra em condições de ser apreciada pelo júri a designar.

O orientador,

Lisboa, 18 de Dezembro de 2013

*A Martina,
che non lasciò ch'io mi perdessi*

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**THE NAGASAKI-MACAO TRADE BETWEEN 1612 AND 1618:
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RESUMO

A nossa dissertação tem como objetivo analisar os compromissos e as obrigações do procurador da Companhia de Jesus no Japão durante os anos em que Carlo Spinola foi escolhido para ocupar tal posição, a segunda em ordem de importância, conforme o jesuíta italiano Francesco Pasio.

O ofício de procurador era uma das posições que levavam os missionários da Companhia a lidar diretamente com as autoridades japonesas em Nagasáqui, uma vez que cabia ao procurador receber, verificar e distribuir os bens pertencentes à missão e que eram carregados no navio português de Macau. Além disso, o procurador, juntamente com outros padres superiores, tinha também incumbidas tarefas políticas relativas ao capitão-mor e aos Portugueses no Japão. Spinola assumiu o cargo quando o *bakufu* começou a mudar a sua atitude em relação à Igreja de Roma, devido a várias causas que, em parte, envolviam também a Companhia de Jesus, com consequências negativas para a missão.

Para fornecer uma compreensão profunda deste cargo, propomos uma comparação entre o procuradorado de Spinola e outros procuradores no Japão, tendo escolhido em particular o caso do Português João Rodrigues *Tçuzu*. Além disso, uma vez que o Japão era um caso particular dentro do Padroado Português, parece-nos pertinente efectuar outra comparação e apresentar também o caso - embora mais conciso - do procurador da província brasileira da Companhia de Jesus.

Através deste estudo de casos, tentaremos definir o procurador, tanto do ponto de vista prático - ou seja, os seus deveres, os seus compromissos e os seus recursos - como de uma perspectiva moral e filosófica - olhando para a literatura canónica produzida desde os primeiros tempos da Igreja Cristã.

Até agora, a historiografia sobre e de autoria jesuítica apenas aborda o cargo de procurador de forma marginal. O nosso trabalho vai preencher essa lacuna. Além disso, o estudo do papel do procurador permite-nos, inevitavelmente, uma melhor compreensão dos mecanismos de participação da Companhia de Jesus no comércio entre Macau e Nagasáqui, desde o seu início - selado por Alessandro Valignano - até ao seu fim - contemporâneo do término do procuradorado de Spínola.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Carlo Spinola, Japão, Macau

ABSTRACT

Our dissertation aims to analyse the commitments and obligations of the procurator of the Society of Jesus in Japan during the years when Carlo Spinola (1564-1622) was chosen to occupy such an important position, the second most important of the province, according to the Italian Jesuit Francesco Pasio.

The office of procurator, in fact, was one of the positions which took the missionaries of the Society to deal directly with Japanese authorities in Nagasaki, for it was the procurator who was in charge of receiving, checking and distributing the share of goods belonging to the province loaded in the Portuguese ship from Macao. Furthermore, the procurator, along with other important fathers, had to deal also with political matters regarding the *Capitão-Mór* and the Portuguese in the Japanese country. Spinola assumed the office when the *bakufu* was changing its attitude towards the Roman Church, owing to several causes which partly involved also the Society of Jesus or which bore negative consequences for the mission.

To provide a deep understanding of this office, we propose a comparison between Spinola's procuratorship and how this office was handled by the most famous procurator in Japan: the Portuguese Father João Rodrigues *Tçuzu*. Furthermore, since Japan represented a *unicum* within the Portuguese *Padroado*, we deemed necessary to offer a further example and present also a sketch – although more concise – of the procurator in the Brazilian Province of the Society.

Through this case study, we will try to define the procurator both from a practical point of view – i.e. his duties, his commitments, and his resources – and from a moral and philosophical perspective – that is the canonical literature regarding the relationship between the men of the cloth and commerce, which had been producing since the early times of the Christian Church.

So far, works about the Society of Jesus and written by the Jesuits themselves had been coping with the office of procurator only marginally. Our work will fill that gap. Moreover, a research about the procurator will inevitably lead us to a better understanding of the mechanics of the participation of the Society in the Macao-Nagasaki trade from its beginning sealed by Alessandro Valignano to its end, which basically corresponded with the end of Spinola's procuratorship.

KEYWORDS: Carlo Spinola, Japan, Macao

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Add.	Additional Manuscripts
AGI	Archivo General de Indias – Sevilla
AGS	Archivo General de Simancas – Simancas
AHAM	Anais de História de Além Mar
AHSI	Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesus
AHU	Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino – Lisbon
AJ	Armário Jesuítico
ANTT	Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo – Lisbon
APO	Archivo Portuñuez Oriental
Apologia	Alessandro Valignano, <i>Apologia en la qual se responde a diversas calumnias que se escrivieran contra los Padres de la Compañía de Japon, y de la China. Autor el Padre Alexandre Vilignano [sic] Visitador de la misma Compañía.</i> ¹
APTCJ	Archivo Provincial de Toledo de la Compañía de Jesús – Alcalá de Henares
ARSI	Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu – Rome
BA	Biblioteca da Ajuda – Lisbon
Barb. Or.	Barberini Orientale
BL	British Library – London
BMA	Bibliothèque Municipal Amiens – Amiens
BNP	Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal – Lisbon
BNP/FG	Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Fundo Geral
BNCR	Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Roma – Rome
BNCR/FGes.	Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Roma, Fondo Gesuitico
BPE	Biblioteca Pública de Évora – Évora
BPJS	Bulletin of Portuguese/Japanese Studies
Bras.	Provincia Brasiliensis
CC	<i>Cartas que os padres e irmaos da Companhia de Iesus que andao nos Reynos de Iapao escreverao aos da mesma companhia da India e</i>

¹ In BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-58*, ff. 1-98. An incomplete copy of Valignano's *Apologia* in BL/Add. 9858, ff. 81-102.

	<i>Europa des do anno de 1549 ate o de 66.</i>
CE	<i>Cartas qve os padres e irmãos da Companhia de Iesus, que andão nos Reynos de Iapão escreuerão aos da mesma Companhia da India, & Europa, desdo anno 1549. até o de 1580. Primeiro tomo, nellas se conta o principio, socesso, & bondade da Christandade daquellas partes, & varios costumes, & idolatrias da gentilidade.</i>
CEHE	<i>The Cambridge Economic History of Europe</i>
CHC	<i>Cambridge History of Christianity</i>
CHCh	<i>Cambridge History of China</i>
CHJ	<i>Cambridge History of Japan</i>
CJ	Cartório Jesuítico
DI	<i>Documenta Indica</i>
DJ	<i>Documentos del Japòn, 1547-1557</i>
Goa	Provincia Goana et Malabarica
HCJB	<i>História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil</i>
HEP	<i>História da Expansão Portuguesa</i>
Hisp.	Assistentia Hispaniae
Hist. Soc.	Historia Societatis
HJ	<i>Historia de Japam</i>
HP	<i>História de Portugal</i>
IHSJJ	<i>Introductio ad historiam Societatis Jesu in Japonia</i>
Jap. Sin.	Provincia Iaponiae et Viceprovincia Sinensis
LM	Livros das Monções
Lus.	Lusitania Assistentia et Provincia
MB	<i>Monumenta Brasiliæ</i>
MN	Monumenta Nipponica
NCMeH	<i>The New Cambridge Medieval History</i>
NCMoH	<i>New Cambridge Modern History</i>
Neap.	Provincia Neapolitana
NHP	<i>Nova História de Portugal</i>
OFM	<i>Ordo Fratrum Minorum</i>
PMGP	<i>Patente das Mercês, Graças, e Privilegios, de qve el Rei Dom Philippe nosso Senhor fez merce a estes seus Regnos. E adiante vai outra</i>


	<i>Patente das respostas das Cortes de Tomar</i>
Philipp.	Provincia Philippinarum
RAH	Real Academia de la Historia – Madrid
RAH/Cor.	Real Academia de la Historia, Coleccion <i>Cortes</i>
RAH/Jes.	Real Academia de la Historia, Coleccion <i>Jesuitas</i>
RC	Revista de Cultura, Macao
Relacion	<i>Relacion Breve dela jornada que el Padre Alonso Sanchez dela Compañía de Jesus hizo por horden y parecer del Señor Don Gonzalo Romquillo de Peñalosa governador delas Yslas Philipinas y del Señor Obispo y oficiales de su Magestad desde la Ysla de Luzon y ciudad de Manila alos Reynos dela China</i> ²
RPJ	<i>Regimento do Procurador que está em Jappão</i>
SJ	Societatis Iesu
Sumario	<i>Sumario de las Cosas de Japon</i>
TCJ	<i>Monumenta Historica Japonica – Textus Catalogorum Japoniae (1549-1654)</i>
TPI	<i>The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803; explorations by early navigators, descriptions of the islands and their peoples, their history and records of the Catholic missions, as related in contemporaneous books and manuscripts, showing the political, economic, commercial and religious conditions of those islands from their earliest relations with European nations to the beginning of the nineteenth century</i>
Vat.estr.or.	Vaticano Estremo Orientale
VLJ	<i>Vocabvlario da Lingoa de Japão com a declaração em Portugues, feito por alguns Padres e Irmãos da Companhia de JESU</i>

² In AGI, *Filipinas* 79, N. 10. A copy in RAH/Cor. 9/2663, ff. 381-409^v.

Introduction

‘Signori, è virtù politica sapere se si debbono ricercare i mezzi umani come se non esistessero quelli divini, e quelli divini come se non esistessero i mezzi umani’.¹ Thus spoke an anonymous abbot in Umberto Eco’s novel *L’Isola del Giorno Prima*. Although this novel begins in 1643, hence outside the temporal scope of the present work, it is a fair expression of a side of European early modern mentality. This quote, in fact, describes in sufficiently appropriate terms the theoretical justification upon which was founded the office of procurator of the Society of Jesus, namely the needs of the mission were more compelling than canon law and the statutes of the Ignatian Order.

The procurator of Japan in Nagasaki² is an integral part of subjects that are at the same time intertwined and exponentially bigger. The procurator was in charge of the economy of the mission, a fundamental aspect for the continuation and proliferation of the evangelization of Japan; Japan belonged juridically to the Portuguese *Padroado do Oriente*, whose economy was the stage where the procurator interpreted his role. The concept can be represented also schematically:



Despite the procurator’s undoubted importance, in the copious bibliography which had been published from the 1950s onwards with regard to the cultural presence

¹ Cf. Eco, *L’Isola del Giorno Prima*, p. 55.

² Actually, we should refer to this post as college procurator, but since the procurators themselves used to omit the substantive “college” we followed their examples. Moreover, during in 17th-century Japan the nomenclature of the Society of Jesus is hardly applicable.

of the Europeans (Portuguese for the most part, but also Spanish, Dutch and English) in Japan, the procurator of the Society of Jesus in Nagasaki had been studied only incidentally.³ In other words, if on the one hand the procurator of Japan has been studied synthetically in several works, on the other hand there is still the lack of an analytical, direct and dedicated study about it. In effect, until recently the procurators of Japan in Macao and Nagasaki had not been considered worthy of specific attention, whereas the silk trade, the profitable thread held by the Portuguese between the southern Chinese province of Guangdong and Kyūshū, had been receiving attention from European and Asian historians alike, such as Charles Boxer,⁴ Michael Cooper,⁵ Okamoto Yoshitomo⁶ and Takase Koichirō,⁷ only to cite the most significant.

As a matter of fact, it is difficult not to find references to the silk trade in almost every publication about the economy of the *Estado da Índia*.⁸ Recently, however, with few exceptions,⁹ this topic has aroused the interest mostly among Japanese historians, in particular Oka Mihoko's.¹⁰ Yet, in these works the focus is almost always on the trade between Macao and Nagasaki and the procurators are seen only as players in the game. In the last decade, however, two articles had been dedicated to the office of procurator in Japan. These two works are an introduction to the procurator both in general and in

³ We are referring in particular to Michael Cooper's biography of Father João Rodrigues *Tçuzu*. Rodrigues, in fact, most likely is the most famous Jesuit who filled the post of procurator both in Macao and in Japan, therefore Cooper inevitably touched topics relevant to that office. Cf. Cooper, *Rodrigues, O Intérprete. Um Jesuíta no Japão e na China*, Lisboa (Quetzal Editores), 1994.

⁴ See in particular Boxer, *Fidalgos no Extremo Oriente 1550-1770. Factos e Lendas de Macau Antigo*, Lisbon (Fundação Oriente e Museu e Centro de Estudos Marítimos de Macau), 1968 and *idem*, *O Grande Navio de Amacau*, Lisbon (Fundação Oriente – Museu e Centro de Estudos Marítimos de Macau), 1968. Whereas, for a wider and comprehensive approach to the century of Portuguese presence in Japan, see Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan 1549-1650*, Manchester (Carcanet Press Limited).

⁵ In addition to the aforementioned biography of João Rodrigues, see also Cooper, "The Mechanics of the Macao-Nagasaki Silk Trade", in *MN*, Vol. 27, No. 4, Tōkyō (Sophia University), pp. 423-433.

⁶ See Okamoto, 十六世紀日歐交通史の研究, Tōkyō (Hara Shobō), 1944.

⁷ See Takase, "マカオ=長崎間貿易の総取引高・生糸取引量・生糸価格", in *社會經濟史學*, 48 (1), pp. 51-84.

⁸ See for instance Subrahmanyam, *O Império Asiático Português 1500-1700. Uma História Política e Económica*, Lisbon (DIFEL Editora), 1995 and Souza, *The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630-1754*, Cambridge Mass. (Cambridge University Press), 1986.

⁹ We are referring in particular to the unpublished work by Ana Maria Leitão, *Do trato português no Japão, presenças que se cruzam (1543-1639)*, Master Thesis in História dos Descobrimentos e da Expansão Portuguesa, Lisbon, unpublished. See also Sousa, *The Early European Presence in China, Japan, the Philippines and Southeast Asia (1555-1590) – The Life of Bartolomeu Landeiro*, Macao (Fundação Macau), 2010.

¹⁰ See in particular Oka, "イエズス会日本貿易の虚と実", in *紀要*, 17, 2007, pp. 146-162 and *idem*, 商人と宣教師 南蛮貿易の世界, Tōkyō (Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai), 2010.

Japan during the second half of the 16th century,¹¹ and a thorough analysis of a text – which we are going to use in our work – that was written in 1629 by a former procurator of Japan.¹² The principal aim of these two articles, however, is not as comprehensive as the one we are assuming.

Our work does not revolve only around the procurator as an institution within the framework of the missions of the Society of Jesus. As a matter of fact, we have already specifically dealt with the side of the Society that equivocally bordered with secular matters in Japan in a recent work of us.¹³ With this dissertation, however, we took on the duty of exploring also the mentality of the men who assumed the honour and the burden of the office. Everything, however, gravitates around and towards the Italian Jesuit Carlo Spinola, whom we selected as our specific case for two reasons in particular.

Spinola's procuratorship began in autumn 1611, that is in a moment when the downfall of the Japan Jesuits had already started, yet the missionaries were still a couple of years away from being under the Tokugawa's fire. By analyzing Spinola's management of the office, we will be able to fill in the gaps left by two historians before us. Namely, Michael Cooper, who studied both the trade and the procurator but "left" Japan together with João Rodrigues in 1610, and Takase Kōichirō, a specialist on Jesuit trade in Japan. The Japanese historian has analysed the Society's profits from the silk trade from the 1590s to 1614, but he has not discussed trade after that date, in other words during Spinola's procuratorship. It is true that from the time of persecution, there is not as much documentation available as for the first quarter of the 17th century, yet, as we will see, it is still possible to give a fair amount of data with regard to incomes, expenditures and, in particular, debts.

The second reasons that led us to Carlo Spinola's time as procurator lies in the fact that the Italian Jesuit, despite his importance within the mission irrespective of the role of procurator, has not been given yet an accurate account of his life and deeds. Beside apologetic literature, in fact, before us only two historians, both of them Jesuits, had dedicated part of their work to Spinola's life. Nevertheless, either their work is

¹¹ See Faria, "The Functions of Procurator in the Society of Jesus. Luís de Almeida, Procurator?", in *BPJS* 15, 2007, pp. 29-46.

¹² See Oka, "A Memorandum by Tçuzu Rodrigues: The Office of Procurador and Trade by the Jesuits in Japan", in *BPJS* 13, 2006, pp. 81-102.

¹³ See Frison, "«El officio de Procurador al qual aunque tengo particular repugnancia». The Office of Procurator through the letters of Carlo Spinola S.J.", in *BPJS* 20, 2010, pp. 9-70.

rather old and inaccessible,¹⁴ or it is a schematic and generic article.¹⁵ Notwithstanding the relevance of these works, which remain excellent yet introductory guidelines, we will have the chance to clarify some aspects of Spinola's early years – such as his birthplace and the identity of his mother – which have been quite obscure and uncertain until now. Additionally, Carlo Spinola's case presents also another advantage for us. The Italian, in fact, filled the position of procurator also in Macao between 1601 and 1602. This fact gives us the opportunity to approach Jesuit involvement in the silk trade from both sides – Macao and Nagasaki – thus giving a more inclusive analysis of it.

In order to be as thorough as a dissertation requires, we will observe the procurator of the Society of Jesus through different lenses. The primary, of course, will be how the procurator was supposed to act in Nagasaki, what were his duties when the *Nao do Trato* berthed at Nagasaki's port and when it was about to leave for Macao, his obligations towards his confrères in Japan and the Portuguese merchants in Nagasaki and Macao and his role before and during the persecution. Furthermore, since all the supplies had to pass through the procurator and registered in his accounts, it was an office of vital importance for the mission. Consequently, being appointed to this position could – and actually did – cause competition and antipathy among fathers of different nationalities. This specific topic, the power struggle within the Japanese mission, will be observed from historical and sociological points of view. On the one hand we will answer historically to the question: why Portuguese fathers could not accept Spanish and Italian confrères? On the other hand, conversely, we will take advantage of conceptual apparatuses that generated the sociological problem: what kind of situations triggered biased intergroup relationships? As we will see, the desire to assume important roles for the mission arouse from causes extrinsic to the religious domain, namely the European political situation after the union of the Iberian Crowns and, precisely, the assignment of leading roles (visitor, provincial, vice-provincial, procurator...) within the Asiatic missions. Hence, in order to explain what caused disunity between Portuguese and Spanish fathers first, and later between Portuguese and Italians, we are going to give an historical sketch Europe and South-East Asia between 16th and 17th centuries. Moreover, to provide a deeper understanding of the attitude

¹⁴ See Pacheco (Yuuki), 鈴田の囚人 カルロ・スピノラの書簡, Nagasaki, 1964.

¹⁵ See Ruiz-de-Medina, “Un genovés nacido en Madrid. C. Spinola, científico, misionero y mártir”, in *Quaderni Franzoniani*, anno V, 2, n. 10, 1992, pp. 69-86 and *idem*, “Un Jesuita de Madrid arquitecto de la Iglesia de São Paulo, Macao”, in *RC 21* (II série – Portuguese edition), 1994, pp. 37-49.

assumed by the Jesuits, we will resort to contemporary sociological studies. We will see how 400-year old missionaries used to behave according to schemes that are now situated within tested intergroups behaviour. Our focus, then, will be directed to the very men who formed the missionary contingent. Through the letters of Jesuits both in Europe and in the *Estado da Índia*, we will see how an early nationalistic spirit permeated the missionaries and created dangerous idiosyncrasies between groups.

Keeping our focus on the men more than the institution or the offices, there is an aspect that unites all those who assumed the role of procurator, with maybe one important exception – João Rodrigues. All of them expressed over and over their loath toward the job they were carrying out. Whether it was *repugnância* or defining the procurator as a *negra ocupação*, this feeling of revulsion is a common thread that passes through the whole Assistancy of Portugal. An old Japanese proverb compares merchants to the Japanese folding screens (*byōbu*¹⁶), since both of them need to be bent in order to accomplish their duties: whilst the merchants bend their back to apprise the buyers and close the deal, the *byōbu* cannot stand if not correctly positioned.¹⁷ In a different way than Japan, European mentality, forged upon centuries of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology, reserved a different, yet as much scornful, treatment to merchants and trading activities. We are going to cope in particular with the ambiguous relationship between God and Mammon, i.e. between the world of faith and the dominion of money. Although we will see that the connection between Christianity and commerce is as ancient as the Bible itself, our focus will be more attentive in particular from the Early Middle Ages onwards, when the poverty of Jesus Christ assumed a concrete social value. The presence of money in theological literature is due mostly to the foundations of new religious orders – the *Ordo Praedicatorum* and the *Ordo Fratrum Minorum* – that worked separately from the Episcopal control and were forced to match their own rule with the economic and social conditions of a world, 13th-century Europe, where money had already begun to circulate widely. We will see how also in this early stage, there was openness towards compromise, openness that would fortify as the European mentality developed along the centuries and, by the second half of the 16th century, during the age of dissimulation and *raison d'état*, would lead the *Praepositi Generales* of the Society of Jesus to allow an activity that, as we will

¹⁶ 屏風

¹⁷ The proverb reads 商人と屏風は直ぐには立たぬ.

demonstrate, had always been prohibited to men of the cloth: trade, precisely the silk trade between Macao and Nagasaki. Thus, our analysis of the commercial activities of the Japan Jesuits will take into account also the critics against the Society of Jesus and the mentality where they generated from.

Still, despite dealing with the trade represented the main obligation of the procurator in Japan, the economy of the Japan Jesuits was not confined to that. Although Ignacio de Loyola had clearly stated that only probationary houses and colleges were authorized to possess landed property, the Japan mission owned estates, both in India's Province of the North and, only in a later stage, in the kingdom.¹⁸ As we will see, the possession of estates was allowed both by canon law and secular powers, and the same happened also for another commercial activity. As correctly stated by Serafim Leite, in fact, only 'uma coisa está vedada ao Jesuíta, e em geral a todo o eclesiástico [...]: é o comércio propriamente dito', that is 'comprar objectos para os tornar a vender. Com lucro, naturalmente'.¹⁹ Leite, in this occasion, put up a defense of his fellows in Brazil. As we will see, the Province of Brazil participated actively in the *industria açucareira*, yet it was different from what was happening in Asia. According to the canon law there is a clear distinction between a commerce that comprises manufacture between the buying and the selling, as happened in Brazil with the production and selling of sugar, and a mere exchange without any modifications in the product, the silk trade. The Brazil Jesuits had to face different problems with respect to their confrères in Japan. They did not trade in silk, yet, following the example of Portuguese merchants, they became competitive sugar planters and exporters. The procurators in Brazil, then, not only had to take care of economic issues without creating scandals for the Society, but, differently from Japan, they also had to care about how the Royal officials would react to their way of handle the Society's affairs. This and the other differences with the procurator in Japan that we will see in the last chapter of this work led us to believe that to enhance the scope of our work and to follow the selected approach, it was necessary to add a term of comparison to the procurator of Japan, which was as far in space as it was close in time.

¹⁸ Cf. Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise –The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond 1540-1750*, Stanford University Press, 1996, pp. 382-383.

¹⁹ Cf. *HCJB*^{II} IV, pp. 165-167. We had to use both the first edition (Lisboa/Rio de Janeiro 1938-1945) and the second (São Paulo 2004), which in the footnotes are differentiate respectively by [I] and [II].

To sum everything up, the main issues which we are going to face revolve around the economy of the Society of Jesus between the second half of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th and the Ignatian delegated to deal with it, i.e. the procurator. In order to provide an understanding as deeper as possible, we chose to adopt a comparative methodology. Following Marc Bloch's teachings with regard to comparative history, namely the application of the comparative method to parallel societies,²⁰ we are going to study Carlo Spinola's procuratorship in comparison with those who preceded him and with those who filled the post in a completely different situation, that of colonial Brazil.

Alongside with the procurator, the history of Christianity in Early Modern Japan will be directly addressed, since the procurator played a fundamental intermediary role between the mission and the Japanese country. In fact, before Spinola took on the position, during João Rodrigues's times, the procurator acted also as sales representative for the Japanese rulers in Nagasaki. Moreover, in several occasions, the procurator was involved in the negotiation of the textiles' price. Both duties generated harsh criticism by the exasperated General Claudio Acquaviva, who eventually ordered to stop handling capitals belonging to laymen, be that Portuguese or Japanese. Spinola assumed the office right when Acquaviva's order reached Japan and filled the position until his capture in 1618. In other words, Spinola's procuratorship covers exactly the lapse of time that saw the Province of Japan passing from a roughly normal situation to expulsion and harsh, deadly, persecution. Hence, we may affirm that the importance, as well as the need to study Spinola's procuratorship, lies, firstly, in the fact that it occurred in a delicate moment in the history of Japan, the first time of stability after almost two centuries of tumults. Secondly, we can consider his procuratorship as the last one that actually took its start from the regulations written by Alessandro Valignano back in 1591, for after Spinola's imprisonment these protocols were no longer applicable. As a matter of fact, from the second quarter of the 17th century, Jesuits fathers in Macao started to point out that even top quality silk was not as profitable a good as it was before, thus they started to look to other merchandises (gold and musk)

²⁰ Bloch stated that there are two research strategies within the domain called *histoire comparee*. The first strategy envisages the comparison between societies separated both in time and space, whose analogies, then, cannot be explained by direct influence or same origins. The second strategies deals with the study of parallel societies, geographically close and contemporaneous, hence continuously under each other influence and sharing the same origins. Cf. Bloch, "Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes", pp. 17-19. In our case, the Bloch's societies are represented by the ways the Society of Jesus implemented its structures in different territories, such as Japan and Brazil.

in order not to be too dependent on Chinese textiles and also because they were less likely to cause scandal.²¹

This topic leads us to the sources we are going to use. In order to achieve sufficient scientific results in the analysis of the office of procurator, we deemed it necessary to gather as many manuscript sources as limits of time and space allowed us. Thus, during the past four years, the research led us to visit almost all of the principal archives in Europe with regard to the Society of Jesus and the European expansion.²² We spent also a couple of weeks at Tōkyō's Sophia Daigaku, where, however, the research was mostly bibliographical.

At any rate, as we said, Japanese historiography coped with the Jesuits trade in Japan until Tokugawa's persecution broke out. Still, since our research aims to a comprehensive view of the procurator *and* the silk trade we found abundant documentation produced before and during the persecution in Japan. First of all in order of importance, Carlo Spinola's epistolary. For the most part, his epistles are in the Roman archive of the Society of Jesus, but there are some letters and official documents he signed as procurator scattered through Portugal, England, Spain and, curiously, France. With all probability, we have consulted all the surviving manuscripts by Spinola and their copies. Through Spinola's letters we were able to reconstruct his life, from his first year of novitiate to the martyrdom. It is obvious, however, that we could not do that only through his letters. One aspect about Carlo Spinola that has always puzzled historians is his birthplace and the exact date of birth. Whilst for the latter we can only advance our hypothesis based mostly on a linguistic deduction, thanks to the days spent researching in the old castle of House Spinola in Tassarolo, under the guide Oberto

²¹ Cf. *Informação do trato que temos da China Japão*, Macao, 10 February 1620. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], f. 235^v: 'O trato douro he ainda muito mais limpo e com outros grandes bens. Porque o que aqui chamão pão de ouro, tem doze onças e meya de nosso pezo, e hum destes paes custa aqui na China setenta cruzados, as vezes oitenta e oitenta e cinco, de modo que o seu preço he entre sesenta e noventa cruzados, porque ha nelle abaixar e alevantar, como nas mais cousas de mercadoria. E conforme ao que se vende em Japão, se ganhara no ouro a cincoenta ou sesenta por cento, pouco mais ou menos. E assi os ganhos do ouro poderão ser como os da seda, e tem outros bens mayores, porque avulta muito pouco, e em pouco se emprega muita prata, pois com cincomil cruzados se comprão sesenta pães douro, e as vezes mais, e estes se mettem em hum escritorio bem pequeno [...]. Como este ouro occupa tão pouco lugar, he facil de meneyar com pressa, vende-se, embarcar-se desembarcar-se quasi sem ser sentido. Em hum caso de necessidade, facilmente hum homem pode embarcar e desembarcar o ouro que tem mettido nas aljebeiras, no seo, nas mangas, sem que ninguem lho note'.

²² The research had been carried out in Portugal (Lisbon and Évora), Italy (Vatican City, Rome and Tassarolo), Spain (Madrid, Alcalá de Henares and Seville) and England (London). A detailed list of archives and funds visited follows in the Bibliographical References.

Spinola, we were finally able to give a certain answer to the question: “where was Carlo Spinola born?”

Letters by Spinola and other procurators, however, would have been useless manuscripts in the absence of other, even more important, sources. We are referring in particular to the *Regimento do Procurador que està em Jappão*.²³ This text, written by Visitor Alessandro Valignano in 1591, includes 34 articles defining in details the tasks and duties of the procurator of Japan in Nagasaki. Through the confrontation between Spinola’s management of the finance of the province and the 34 articles drawn up by Valignano, two things will appear clearly: the way Spinola abode by Valignano’s rules and how the visitor’s rules were still topical almost thirty years after they were conceived.²⁴ The drawing up of the *Regimento*, moreover, might be considered the starting point of the development process of the office of procurator. This process includes of course Spinola’s procuratorships in Macao and Nagasaki and ends with another *Regimento*, or better a memorandum, written in 1629 in Macao.²⁵

In order to achieve our goal, to provide a knowledge *tout court* of the procurator, we went looking for information regarding the procurators of the Society of Jesus in Asia and Brazil, as we said. Yet, it was unavoidably to end up searching for documents written and addressed to the *Companhia* in Europe. Although we are going to make use of some of these documents, we acknowledge that our thesis has two shortcomings in particular. The first is the small amount of space dedicated to the procurator in Brazil. Although, in fact, the last part has to be considered more as special chapter rather than a normal part of the dissertation, we recognize that there is still a lot to say about this topic, since, so far, Brazilian and Anglo-Saxon historians had been publishing several works with regard to the sugar production and the involvement of the Ignatians, but the procurators and their obligations appear only incidentally.²⁶ In any case, through the documentation gathered in Rome and Lisbon, the main features of the *procuradores* in

²³ As far as we know, two copies of the *Regimento* still exist. The original manuscript is in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 2, ff. 114-118^v and a 18th century copy in BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-66, ff. 37-41.

²⁴ Valignano, obviously, did not forget to write a similar *Regimento* also for the procurator of Japan in Macao. See *Regimento para o Procurador de Jappão que Reside na China. Este deu aqui o P. Vizitador Francesco Passio quando veio de Jappão*, BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-66, ff. 10-13^v.

²⁵ See *Couzas que podem servir para os Procuradores*, BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-8, ff. 635-649.

²⁶ The author that gave more space to the procurator is Paulo de Assunção in his Ph.D. thesis *Negócios Jesuíticos: A Administração dos Bens Divinos*. Differently from the Brazilian case, there are works about the Jesuits’ procurators in other regions of Latin America, such as Peru and Argentina. Cf. Cushner, *Farm and factory the Jesuits and the development of agrarian capitalism in colonial Quito, 1600-1767*, New York (State University of New York Press), 1982.

colonial Brazil will be delineated nonetheless and we do not exclude to expand our knowledge of the Brazilian Province of the Society in the future.

Secondly, we think that also the European colleges of the Society of Jesus might have been given more space. As a matter of fact, we deal with the procurators in Europe only marginally and through comparisons made by Rodrigues and Spinola themselves. It is true that we do not fail in starting our comparison from the fundamental treatises of the *Companhia de Jesus*, such as the *Constitutiones* or the *Epitome Instituti Societatis Iesu*, thus we will be providing the needed information as to how the office of procurator was conceived by the founders of the Society. Yet, some of the sources we have found, the notebook of the Évora procurator in particular,²⁷ probably deserved more space and attention. In our defence, however, if on the one hand this lack may influence the general knowledge on the procurator in the Early Modern Era, on the other hand we think we fully respected our obligation toward both the history of Christianity in Early Modern Japan and the history of the Portuguese Expansion.

* * *

A few technical notes. Since our dissertation is based on European sources, we followed the Gregorian calendar, even for documents produced either before 1582 or for those who kept following the Julian calendar. In a few cases, we deemed it necessary to provide also the Japanese date and the *nengō*, i.e. the name of the period, but in these occasions explications are provided in notes.

With regard to the transliteration of Japanese words, names and topography, we followed the Hepburn system, therefore we altered the 16th and 17th-century spellings to the actual version. We opted to follow the Hepburn also for those words which are now present in English dictionaries. Consequently, although now for well-known words like daimyo, shogun and Kyushu the long-vowel indicators are omitted, we decided to do otherwise and keep the indicator (*daimyō*, *shōgun*, *Kyūshū*) for the sake of pronunciation and out of respect for the Japanese language. In Japanese names the Japanese order, in which the family name comes first, is retained and in the Annex section there are lists both for Japanese anthroponyms and Asiatic toponyms, which are

²⁷ See *Varias Lembranças Pera hum Procurador*, BNP, FG 4254, ff. 1-138^v.

modernized coherently with the rest in their transliteration, but not in their use. Then, those places that have changed their name since the 17th century, such as Miyako/Kyōto and Edo/Tōkyō, we decided to call them as they were used to in the past.

European names are rendered according to today's most common use, despite the numerous variations that appear in the sources,²⁸ and in accordance with the nationality of the subject. With the popes, however, we opted to follow the Anglo-Saxon version of their names.

With respect to the bibliographical references in the footnotes, we tried not to weigh them down too much and, except here in the Introduction and when in the text we propose further literature, we limited the information to the author's last name, the title of the book/article/essay and the pages. Other information is provided in the Bibliographical References section at the end of the text.

Quotations from the Bible are all taken from the Douay-Rheims Catholic Bible, which is available also online at <http://drbo.org/index.htm>.

²⁸ Carlo Spinola, for instance, was called also *Carlos Spinola* or *Carlos Espinola*, whereas for Alessandro Valignano it is easy to find his surname spelled *Valignani* and his name *Alexandre*.

PART 1
HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALIZATION

CHAPTER I

THE UNION OF THE IBERIAN CROWNS AND THE EUROPEAN AND ASIAN STATUS QUO IN THE 16TH CENTURY

I. 1. The Old Continent divided

In 1968, the English historian Sir John H. Elliott published a work in the wake of and in response to Braudel's *Mediterranée*. As Elliott confessed in the introduction, his idea was to give back to the *mentalities* – religion, cultures and ideas – the space they deserved in the historic theorization regarding 16th century Europe. Elliott's book is entitled *Europe Divided* and started from the assumption that the fracture of Christendom in that century rebounded on the very political status of the European countries.

As a matter of fact, Europe in the 16th century was essentially divided. This statement must not be read through a Manichean lens, since Europe in 1500 was not divided between two opposed parties. There were nuances that evade a bipolar connotation, but still a division was in place. The 95 theses sent by the Augustinian German monk, Martin Luther, to the Archbishop of Mainz, Albert of Brandenburg, in October 1517, in fact, must be interpreted both for their religious and political repercussions. Luther, in fact, was not perpetrating the reformation of the Roman Church – he never actually used the word *reform*. His theses were part of a common practice of the monastic orders of the late medieval period which, in order to renew the state of the clergy, wished to enact some reforms. Luther's theses were an invitation to an academic debate on the power of indulgences and the doctrine that legitimated them, not a reform of the entire church.²⁹ Furthermore, the Augustinian did not represent a *unicum* in the academic debates of that time. As it has been stated, in fact, the document

²⁹ Cf. *CHC*, p. 3 and Prosperi, *Storia Moderna e Contemporanea. Volume primo. Dalla Peste Nera alla Guerra dei Trent'anni*, pp. 196-197.

Luther signed in 1517 was not revolutionary. Theses against the indulgences had been being published since the end of the 15th century.³⁰ Yet, Luther spread his ideas in a time when the protests against the fiscal burdens imposed by Rome on the German churches – the *Gravamina Germanicae nationis* – were gaining strength, and the selling of new papal indulgences by the Dominican Johann Tetzel was the straw that broke the camel's back. Moreover, Luther could rely on the high and fast spreadability of his theories through the new printing technology.³¹ Therefore, something that initially was only a request to debate a specific doctrinal issue, soon assumed political connotations, in particular after Luther burned the excommunication bull *Exsurge Domine* in 1520, a deed that has been considered as the spark which gave birth to the Reformation.³² Soon the German monk found several supporters among the German nobility who saw his rebellion as an opportunity to take away from Rome the management of the church properties in Germany. Frederick of Saxony, Luther's prince, decided to support the monk, in order to establish his territorial rights in front of Carlos V. As an elector of the emperor, the elector of Saxony was able to gain a hearing for Luther at the imperial diet in Worms (1521). There, Luther confronted with the imperial delegate instructed that the papal dispositions should be put into practice. On this occasion, Luther took the debate to another level. He did not submit to the political authority, Emperor Carlos V, but neither did he bow to the religious rule of the pontiff. He could not go back on his theses, because he had to remain faithful to the imperative of his conscience.³³

Although Rome's power had already been contested before and a loss of ascendancy was taking place, this is the core of the question which would lacerate Europe once and for all: the refusal to submit to a power which was incontestable until a few moments before. The questioning of established powers inevitably produced the bewilderment of the traditional order and thus the problem regarding to whom the people were to send their obedience arose: ought one obey his king or was he still supposed to follow the precept of the apostles and obey God, rather than men?³⁴

This issue was faced in the Council of Trent (1542-1563) and produced the traditional doctrine of *potestas indirecta* elaborated by the Jesuit Cardinal Roberto

³⁰ Cf. Febvre, *Martinho Lutero: um destino*, pp. 88-89.

³¹ On the German social restlessness see Febvre, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-103.

³² See *NCMH*, p. 69.

³³ Cf. Prosperi, *op. cit.*, p. 202 and Bonney, *The European Dynastic States 1494-1660*, p. 16.

³⁴ Acts of Apostles 5:29: 'But Peter and the apostles answering, said: We ought to obey God, rather than men.'

Bellarmino, but already anticipated by the School of Salamanca. Bellarmino based his theory on what Thomas Aquinas stated about the subordination of temporal purposes to spiritual ones and described the Christian believer as a man subject both to temporal sovereignty and to the pope.³⁵ Yet, a straightforward subordination of secular to ecclesiastical authority was ruled out by considerations of political theology and factual reality. With regard to church interference with temporal matters, Bellarmino basically follows the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria who conceived the existence of two distinct orders – the spiritual and worldly – ruled by two *potestates* – civil and ecclesiastic – both independently authorised.³⁶ Consequently, according to both Vitoria and Bellarmino, just as an emperor is not allowed to rule over the whole humankind, the pope does not possess temporal authority outside his own territory.³⁷ Bellarmino took the debate farther by stating that although the pontiff's power outside the boundaries of the Holy See is purely spiritual, that does not impede him from intervening in temporal matters when exceptional situations arise, such as the welfare of Christendom or the preservation of the Church of Rome.³⁸

In a time when the pope put himself as a political subject who wished to operate a monopoly upon the souls of his boundless domain, it is easy to imagine how the overlapping of the two jurisdictions, spiritual and secular, had repercussions also in international relationships. The point basically can be resumed with the following question: should foreign policy follow the interests of the country or should it abide by religious obedience when the two did not coincide?³⁹ The political division created by the two confessions was a factual attack on the European society, a society which until then was safely ordered under the protection of religious unity. But now, after Luther and after Emperor Carlos V's attempts to re-establish the European status quo, the uniformity of Christendom was only a memory and it began to appear clear that also the political order, both national and international, would soon follow.⁴⁰

³⁵ Cf. Filoramo, *Il Sacro e il Potere. Il Caso Cristiano*, pp. 178-182.

³⁶ Cf. Höpfl, *Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1640*, p. 53-55.

³⁷ Cf. Frajese, "Una teoria della censura: Bellarmino e il potere indiretto dei papi", pp. 139-152 and Fabbri, *Roberto Bellarmino e Thomas Hobbes - Teologie Politiche a Confronto*, pp. 43-45.

³⁸ See Fabbri, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

³⁹ Cf. Höpfl, *op. cit.*, p. 6 and Elliott, *La Europa Dividida 1559-1598*, pp. 43-45.

⁴⁰ Carlos's various attempts to find a common ground to allow both Lutherans and Christians to live together were all disastrous. In addition, when the Christian theologians gathered at Trent finally agreed to welcome also Protestant theologians it was already too late. The most of the issues, such as the principle of *sola fide*, in fact, had already been settled without taking in consideration any Lutheran point of view. This basically meant that the fracture between the two confessions was already irreconcilable.

Regarding the interior peace and uniformity of a country, in 1591 a Carmelite theologian, the Spanish Pedro Cornejo, advised all the Christian sovereigns to:

‘no permitir en sus Reynos y Señoríos otra [religion] que la Católica Romana, ni tener paz ni amistad con los hereges, pues jamas Republica es ni fue bien gouernada, ni pacificada donde la dissension y diuersidad de fees reyna, ni naturalmente lo puede ser. Y la causa es, porque todos los nacidos, capaces de razon, creen naturalmente auer vn Dios, principio y causa de todas las cosas, y cada vno cree y tiene por cierto y firme, ser el verdadero aquel en quien el cree, adora, y tiene por tal: y los otros estar ciegos y engañados. Y [...] donde ay este rancor y fuego interior, ni puede auer amistad buena, ni paz durable’.⁴¹

Politically, Europe was following this direction. In Germany, peace was reached at Augsburg in 1555, after a decade of intermittent civil and religious wars. In the early 1550s, Carlos V entrusted his brother Fernando to negotiate a system for the coexistence of Catholics and Lutherans in the Empire. Fernando, knowing that he was going to rule Germany without the resources of the Netherlands and Spain, opted shrewdly for a compromise which basically resulted in granting the princes the right to impose their own confession on their subjects. This principle was later summarized by a German law professor with the famous expression *cuius regio, eius religio* (‘whose the regime, his the religion’). For the Imperial crown this concession meant a heavy defeat, a formal abdication of authority of the princes over a field which Carlos V had always considered to lie peculiarly within the emperor’s prerogatives.⁴²

Moreover, also Rome lost something in the Peace of Augsburg. The papacy, in fact, starting from the pontificate of Boniface VIII (1280-1290) had been preoccupied with the risk of a schism following the divisions between European countries and the intensification of secular control over the church. In order to obtain formal recognition of its pre-eminence, the papacy established a direct relationship with the European monarchies based on special agreements called concordats, through which the popes bartered away their benefices to princes and feudal lords, but also to important merchant families, in return for recognition of the supreme authority of the church and also for political support. These concordats had two strictly related consequences for the Roman Church:

⁴¹ See Cornejo, *Compendio y Breve Relacion de la Liga y Confederacion Francesa*, ff. 8-8^v and Elliott, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁴² Cf. *NCMoH*, pp. 193-195; Koenigsberger, Mosse and Bowler, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 240-241 and Prosperi, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-236.

1. by granting the prerogative to choose the ecclesiastical body over the secular powers – as happened in France and England, the popes lost their influence over the episcopates outside their lands;
2. on the eve of Reformation, in comparison with other European countries Germany was rather fragmented, a fact that conferred great authority to the pope, in particular of economic sort (the grievances we saw before). Yet, when whole provinces followed their political rulers and moved away from Rome's aegis, it appeared clear that the concordats stipulated in order to give back political power to the church, in the long-term weakened it.⁴³

Between the diet of Worms of 1521 and the diet of Augsburg of 1555, then, Europe saw first the birth of the authority of conscience with Luther's alleged statement 'Hir stehe ich; ich kann nicht anders', and then the rising of the political principle that secular princes were allowed to impose their confessions on their lands. The idea that sprouted from the diet of Augsburg would seem to have been incorporated and reformed by the strategic theorizations of the Jesuits. The Society of Jesus recognised from its inception that an engagement with the world of secular rulers was inescapable. The founders had never doubted that the Society's missions would require the patronage of secular authorities or that, when called upon, members of the Society would render services to rulers as was appropriate to men of the cloth. Yet, one of the defining issues in early modern political thought concerned the loyalty of the people when secular and ecclesiastical rulers came into conflict. According to the Society of Jesus, the church was a *respublica perfecta* as any secular commonwealth. It was, then, legitimate for the Society to foster a resolution to this issue that subordinated political to 'spiritual' authority.⁴⁴ In a few words, the Jesuits acknowledged that the secular lords were irreplaceable for the survival and sustenance of the *Companhia*, yet they also recognized that the secular authorities could not wield their power without the legitimation of the Roman Church, which, consequently, was still coated with a layer of spiritual superiority. Accordingly, Cardinal Bellarmino described the Catholic Church as a *respublica Christiana* born out of the confrontation with the Protestant Churches and the emerging early modern state. Bellarmino used this expression to indicate both

⁴³ The *Reyes Catolicos* – Fernando and Isabel – for instance had the power to appoint bishops in their lands. This right was then conferred in perpetuity to Carlos V and his successors by his former tutor, Pope Adrian VI, in 1523. Cf. Bonney, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-3 and also Prosperi, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-178.

⁴⁴ Cf. Höpfl, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7.

the church as opposed to secular commonwealths and the Catholic Church insofar as it incorporated and in certain cases ruled over the various secular *respublicae*.⁴⁵

We would like to suggest a reflection on this point. According to the founder of the Order, Ignacio de Loyola, the Society must work to convert to the Jesuit persuasion persons of considerable importance by serving them as spiritual counsellor or court confessor, although they were supposed to be unswerving supporters of Papal supremacy.⁴⁶ Once the Ignatians became acquainted with the Japanese advanced civilization, they adopted a strategy which, would seem to be partly ascribable to the mentality that led to Augsburg's precept. Once the missionaries grasped the fundamental features of the Japanese society, as its rigid hierarchy, they decided to put into practice Loyola's advice,⁴⁷ and directed their efforts at the conversion of the *daimyō*.⁴⁸ Although, during the first phase of proselytization the Ignatians targeted also the lowest strata of the Japanese society, starting from the mid-1560s the conversion of the lords was considered as the fastest and most secure way to obtain a great number of conversions among the commoners and also a way to assure support for the mission which was at the same time political, economic and territorial. This strategy was not shared by everyone within the Society of Jesus and found even more opponents outside the Ignatian Order. Contrarily to what the Society fostered, in fact, the Friars Minors, the harshest opponents of the Jesuits in Asia, considered the conversion of the *daimyō* not as the first step in the evangelization of Japan, but secondary to the conversion of the poor and pariahs.⁴⁹ Fray Juan de Zamora, a Franciscan sent to Japan, stated that 'pobres simples predican, pobres leprosos convierten y pobres nos sustentan y pobres se bautizan, porque *pauperes evangelizatur*'.⁵⁰ The Franciscans often developed their strategies by following a path opposite to the one chosen by the Jesuits, and this is

⁴⁵ Cf. Tutino, *Empire of Souls. Robert Bellarmine and the Christian Commonwealth*, p. 14.

⁴⁶ Cf. Bonney, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

⁴⁷ Loyola in his foundational text remained ambiguous on this point. Although, in fact, he prohibits the Jesuits to mingle in wordly business (*negotia saecularia*), which included both the conduct of lawsuits and the management of finances, he also stressed the importance of preserve the benevolence of the key figures within the secular world. See *Constitvtiones Societatis IESV et Examen Cvm Declarationibvs*, pars X, section 11, note b, pp. 364-365: 'In primis conservetur benevolentia Sedis Apostolicæ, cui peculiariter inservire debet Societas, deinde Principum Sæcularium, & Magnatum, ac primariæ auctoritatis hominum, quorum favor, aut alienation animi multum facit, vt ostium divino servitio & bono animarum aperiatur, vel præcludatur'. See also Höpfl, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

⁴⁸ For Japanese words' definition and characters refer to the Glossary.

⁴⁹ See *Tratado que os religiosos de S. Francisco espalharam em Goa em Baçaim no ano de 1598 contra os Padres da Companhia de Jesus que andam na conversão de Japão*, BL/Add. 9858, ff. 61^v-78^v, in particular ff. 65 and 78.

⁵⁰ Cf. Correia, *A Concepção de Missionação na Apologia de Valignano. Estudo sobre a Presença Jesuíta e Franciscana no Japão (1587-1597)*, p. 99.

particularly true regarding the object of their conversions. Fray Jerónimo de Jesus namely wrote that:

‘El santo Comissário⁵¹ estando siempre pensativo y solícito acerca del modo que tendrá para predicar en Japon la ley de Dios evangélica, parece que le reveló el Señor que, para ir acertado, había de ir por passos contrarios de los por donde iba la Compañia. La Compañia buscaba a las cabeças, porque cogido un Grande, cogían a sus vassalos [...]. El santo Comissario, por el contrario, buscaba a pobres.’⁵²

The attacks of the Franciscans on the Society of Jesus relied on a system of thought that belonged to the medieval mentality, a system that enhanced tradition to the detriment of the adaptation promoted by the Ignatians. An uncompromising system grew time before the confessional dissensions mentioned at the opening of the chapter. On the contrary, the Society of Jesus was founded in 1540 – between Luther’s rebellion and the summoning of the Council of Trent. The Society presented itself in a Europe which had drastically changed over the latter forty years both in political disposition and in mentality, in a Europe where political means were used to reach religious purposes, and vice versa.⁵³ Thus, to be the ultimate army at the pontiff’s disposal, the Ignatians had to develop a progressive and pliable constitution to pursue God’s glory both inside and outside Europe. This kind of mentality could only be born in a time where Christendom had been violated and shattered and, in particular, had seen princes of the Holy Roman Empire decide what confession their people were to follow. However, it is still too soon to venture out to Japan, first we must see what was happening in the Iberian Peninsula.

I. 2. Portugal heredado y conquistado por Felipe 2

Three years after the diet of Augsburg and two after his abdication, Carlos V died. Earlier, in September 1556, he handed over the title of Holy Roman Emperor to his brother Fernando I, who was eventually accepted and duly elected in February 1558. Yet, as early as October 1555, the emperor had already renounced Burgundy in favour

⁵¹ Fray Pedro Baptista.

⁵² See Pérez, *Fr. Jerónimo de Jesús: Restaurador de las Misiones de Japon: sus Cartas y Relaciones (1595-1604)*, p. 77, *apud* Correia, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

⁵³ Luther deliberately courted political controversy as part of his strategy for spreading his teaching. In 1520, in fact, he addressed the Catholic princes directly in his *Appeal to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* in which he adroitly listed a range of grievances they felt in their relations with Rome. Cf. Bonney, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

of his son Felipe, whereas the Spanish kingdoms in the Old World and the New followed in January 1556.⁵⁴

The first two decades of reign had been years of great difficulty for Felipe II of Spain. In the 1560s he had to keep a defensive attitude owing to a peculiar succession of events – the revolt of the Granada Moriscos and the Netherlands, the outbreak of the French wars of religion, and the stepping up of the Turkish naval attack.⁵⁵ Although at Lepanto in 1571 the *Lega Santa* summoned by Pius V momentarily managed to keep at bay the Ottomans, the 1570s were also sombre years overshadowed by the failure to subdue the revolt in the Netherlands, and by the royal bankruptcy of 1575-1576. Yet, the mineral resources of the New World came to his rescue. The introduction of the amalgam of mercury in the refining of Peruvian silver started to yield results in the 1580s, when ships from Spanish America managed to supply Spain with two or three million ducats a year.⁵⁶ This abundance gave Felipe real freedom of manoeuvre, which included plans for the recovery of the northern Netherlands, a maritime attack against England, the intervention both in the civil wars in France and, finally, in the Portuguese dynastic crisis.⁵⁷

I. 2. 1. The Portuguese crown between regency and kingship (1564-1578)

Until now the 16th century European status quo has been described, but few words have been spent on the Portuguese kingdom. During that century, Portugal kept a neutral profile within lacerated Europe. Its neutrality was enhanced by its geographical position and by expansionist strategies which, between the 15th and 16th centuries, favoured the Atlantic Ocean over the continent as the instrument to ameliorate its own

⁵⁴ Although Felipe II became king of Naples in 1554, it was after his marriage with Mary Tudor Queen of England in 1555 that Carlos V began to give up his dignities. As early as October 1555 he renounced both the dignity of sovereign of the *Orden del Toisón de Oro* and the Low Countries. Finally, in January 1556 Felipe received also the crowns of Castile and Aragon. Cf. Bonney, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-124 and Bouza, *D. Felipe I*, p. 40.

⁵⁵ Elliott, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-187.

⁵⁶ Cf. Braudel, *Civiltà e imperi nel Mediterraneo nell'età di Filippo II*, vol. 1, pp. 509-510. Contrarily to what happened with silver, after 1550, the flow of gold to Europe started to diminish. Accordingly, at the turn of the 16th century a gram of gold was worth 10,5 grams of silver. Around 1550, on the other hand, it was worth 11,1, whereas around 1600 11,8 and 14,3 fifty years later. See Braudel, *Espansione europea e capitalismo 1450-1650*, p. 42 and pp. 67-68.

⁵⁷ Elliot, *Imperial Spain 1469-1716*, pp. 268-70, Marques, *A Parenética Portuguesa e a Dominação Filipina*, pp. 38-39 and Braudel, *Mediterraneo*, vol. 2, pp. 1183-1184.

political importance.⁵⁸ These circumstances took Portugal to an unwanted isolationism and to lack of influence in European diplomatic contests. This condition came into being in particular owing to the premature death of almost all the sons and brothers of D. João III, which limited the chances of signing alliances through marriages, alliances already lessened by the Protestant schism. Basically, in fact, the House of Avis had but an option: to choose between marriages within Portugal or with its neighbours, the Habsburgs, a practice already used more than once. France too might have been an option, but during the reign of D. João III, it was considered more as an enemy in the Atlantic than an ally.⁵⁹ Only two years before D. João III's death, there was already a clear sense of danger about the future of the Portuguese Royal family. The 'political disorientation'⁶⁰ of the House of Avis appears in all its drama if we consider that when the king died, the sole legally available heir within the House was his grandson, a boy of only three years old.⁶¹ This boy, Sebastião, would come to be known as the Desired (*O Desejado*) and around him would be created a messianic myth, but, with regard to this work, he shall only be considered as the penultimate Portuguese king before the Spaniards took over his kingdom.

As we have just said, Sebastião inherited the Portuguese crown from his grandfather, D. João III, whose nine heirs all died prematurely. The last of them, João, got married to Carlos V's daughter, Joana of Austria, in 1552 and two years later Sebastião was born, just a few days after his father's death. Only three years later, in 1557, also D. João III died and the Portuguese crown eventually fell on the head of the three-year old Sebastião. Hence, at that time the problem was not finding an heir, but rather to find an apt regent to accompany the young king until he came of age to rule.⁶²

⁵⁸ Cf. *HP III*, pp. 42-43.

⁵⁹ Cf. Costa, "O Império Português em meados do século XVI.", pp. 89-90. The French-marriage would actually have been quite favourable for the Portuguese Empire, since a joint pact with France would have guaranteed peaceful and profitable relations in Brazil. However, although also the Holy See favourably saw this marriage, eventually the project was abandoned. Cf. *HP III*, pp. 542-543.

⁶⁰ See Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 91. Cf. also *HP III*, p. 69.

⁶¹ We might still add that D. João III had another grandson, the prince Carlos, son of Felipe II and his daughter Maria, who would die in captivity by the hand of his own father.

⁶² Despite the disorientation of the House Avis, it must be said that it was not a lucky House either. Beside Sebastião, in fact, there was also another legit heir, D. Duarte, the 5th Duke of Guimaraes. He was another grandson of D. Manuel, son of the homonymous D. Duarte 4th Duke of Guimaraes, brother of D. João III and D. Henrique. D. Duarte, however, died in 1576, but if he would have been alive after Sebastião's demise in Morocco, Felipe II's claim to the Portuguese Crown would have been null and the succession would have been ensured.

Initially, following an informal meeting of the *Conselho Régio*, the regency was assumed by Catarina of Austria, wife of the late João III, who, also during the reign of her husband played an important and influent role within the Portuguese kingdom. Yet, her political implication combined with her lineage – sister of Carlos V and aunt of Felipe II – aroused the suspicion of part of the Portuguese aristocracy, who saw this “Castilian regency” as a threat to the political autonomy of the Portuguese crown.⁶³ Notwithstanding the unease of the aristocracy, however, the first to grant full support to Catarina was Cardinal Henrique, her brother-in-law and future king of Portugal.

As the Portuguese saying goes: *De Espanha nem bom vento, nem bom casamento*. The Portuguese aristocracy had more than one reason to suspect Catarina of partiality for Spain. As a matter of fact, the sole direct cousin of Sebastião – Carlos – resided in Spain and he was the son of Felipe II and his first wife, D. Maria de Portugal. Furthermore, it was not the first time that Castile patently showed designs on Portugal. One of the first crises to undermine the Luso-Castilian relations happened between 1383 and 1385, when a bitter struggle took place between João of Avis, one of the bastard sons of D. Pedro I, and the followers of the queen consort of Portugal, Leonor Teles de Meneses, wife of Fernando I. The struggle began with the death of King D. Fernando I in October 1383,⁶⁴ when the question of the Portuguese succession assumed particular relevance. The king, in fact, left behind only an 11 year old heiress, Beatriz, who had been promised first to a younger son of Juan I of Castile but eventually married to Juan himself. The marriage contract stipulated that she and Juan I reign jointly over Portugal until their (potential) son reached the age of fourteen, at which point he would inherit the kingdom. In the meanwhile, Queen Leonor was to govern as regent. Yet, if no heir were fathered, then the Portuguese crown would pass directly to the kings of Castile. Therefore, Juan I, who was twenty five at the time, had only to let things follow their own course and Portugal would be his.⁶⁵ Yet, the election of Leonor as regent, probably conceived by João Fernandes Andeiro Count of Ourém, provoked some resentment in the court both for her alleged scandalous behaviour with Andeiro and for her identification with Castile, which earned her the epithet of *a aleivosa*, the traitor. The growing political tensions within Portugal led the aforementioned João of Avis to

⁶³ Cf. Polónia, *D. Henrique o Cardeal-Rei*, pp. 139-140 and *HP III*, pp. 530-531 and 541-542. For a more comprehensive study with regard to Catarina of Austria see Buescu, *Catarina de Áustria. Infanta de Tordesilhas. Rainha de Portugal*, A Esfera dos Livros (Lisbon), 2007.

⁶⁴ With regard to D. Fernando I see Gomes R. Costa, *D. Fernando*, Lisbon (Temas e Debates), 2009.

⁶⁵ Cf. Baleiras, *Leonor Teles, Uma Mulher de Poder*, pp. 110-158.

embrace arms. In December 1383, he had Andeiro murdered, then assumed control of Lisbon, and the *câmara* acclaimed him *regedor e defensor* of the kingdom, while Leonor fled to Santarém. Avis's patriotic coup d'état, however illegitimate, had the effect of stirring Juan I. The Castilian king proceeded to annex the royal arms of Portugal to his banner and entered the country by force. As would happen in other moments of Portuguese history, like the Habsburg annexation, the Portuguese were not all united beneath the same banner. Around João of Avis gathered a disparate coalition of some great and many lesser nobles, the metropolitan clergy and most of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the north, the home of the old seigniorial nobility, supported the legitimist claim of Castile.

The hostilities began in early 1384. The initial victories of Avis's forces both in the south and in the north attracted new followers to the national front, whereas the failing attempt to break Lisbon's walls and the plague led Juan to call back his armies in September. João then felt confident enough to summon the Cortes – the assembly of the three estates: the aristocracy, the clergy and the people – at Coimbra in 1385, in order to legitimize his claim to the throne and, consequently, to frustrate any legitimate tentative to regain the throne by Leonor or Juan I. Thus, although a definitive military confrontation was yet to come, on 6 April João of Avis was unanimously proclaimed João I, king of Portugal.⁶⁶

It is hard to ignore here some resemblances between this crisis and the one which would take place almost two centuries later. In both cases, we find difficulty in finding a proper heir to the throne (Beatriz and Sebastião) and the prompt intervention of the Spanish Crown in the attempt to annex Portugal to its dominion. However, the results of the two cases, as is known, are not comparable. After being acclaimed king of Portugal by the Coimbra Cortes, João had still to fight the remaining legitimists in the north while preparing to force back a new invasion from Spain. But thanks to the aid of

⁶⁶ Cf. *HP II*, pp. 523-524, *NHP IV*, pp. 523-528, *TNCMH*, pp. 643-645, Disney, *A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire*, vol. 1, pp. 117-120 and Subrahmanyam, *O Império Asiático Português 1500-1700. Uma História Política e Económica*, pp. 49-50. For a wider approach to D. João I see Coelho M. H. da Cruz, *D. João I*, Lisbon (Temas e Debates), 2008. It has been pointed out that the close connection between the Houses of Avis and Habsburg-Trastámara not only created an anti-Castilian attitude in Portugal, but was also used by Felipe's advocates, who, during the negotiations for the succession to the Portuguese crown, reminded the oath of D. Manuel I in 1499 as heir to the crown of Castile and Aragon and, in particular, the succession rights that could have been claimed by Felipe's son, D. Carlos, if this one was still alive in 1578. See Bouza, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

Richard II of England⁶⁷ he was able to put an end to the invasion and to confirm Avis's rule. Two centuries later, however, history would not repeat.

As we saw, at the death of D. João III, his grandson, Sebastião, was acclaimed king of Portugal, with his grandmother, Catarina, as regent.⁶⁸ Catarina, however, first in 1560 and then again in 1562 expressed the desire to renounce the regency, for the burden was heavier than she could bear, and indicated her brother-in-law, Henrique, as substitute.⁶⁹ To choose Henrique – Catarina stated – was an unobjectionable decision, for he was not only the oldest relative of Sebastião, but he was also a seasoned man both in spiritual and secular matters.⁷⁰ The reactions to her decision were not homogeneous. If the principal heads of the Portuguese nobility saw the displacement as a shift from a pro-Castilian to a more patriotic front, Filipe II's reaction was totally unfavourable. Accordingly, he recommended Catarina to keep her post along with the aid of Henrique. In 1562, however, the Cortes convened and Henrique's nomination was legitimately accepted by the end of the year. He would keep the regency for six years, until the completion of the young monarch's fourteenth year in January 1568, assisted by the *Conselho de Estado*, whereas the tutorship of the king was left in Catarina's hands.⁷¹ The Cortes, in fact, tackled also matters regarding the education and the spiritual formation of the young king. With regards to the former, it was proposed that D. Sebastião should be educated according to the Portuguese custom, trying to keep him away from Castilian habits.⁷²

Henrique during his regency tried to handle both the marriage policy and international relations with the prospect of moving the Portuguese kingdom away from Spanish influence. His intention was to give Portugal an independent position in the international theatre. He tried to achieve this by arranging Sebastião's marriage with Marguerite de Valois, a proposal already advanced by the Cortes. Yet, owing to Felipe

⁶⁷ In May 1386, D. João and Richard II formalized an agreement reached two years before. Under the terms of this treaty, Richard II agreed to provide Portugal with military assistance against Castile, whereas the Portuguese naval strength was to be put at English disposal. The two kings also agreed upon granting reciprocal trading rights to their respective citizens in each other's territory. See Russell, *The English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the time of Edward III and Richard II*, *passim*.

⁶⁸ For a biography of Sebastião see Cruz M. A. Lima, *D. Sebastião*, Lisbon (Temas e Debates), 2009.

⁶⁹ Cf. *NHP* V, pp. 742-744.

⁷⁰ Cf. Polónia, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-147.

⁷¹ *Ivi*, pp. 148-50.

⁷² See *NHP* V, p. 744: 'Vista à portuguesa, com seu camareiro mor; coma à portuguesaa; cavalgue à portuguesa; fale à portuguesa; todos seus actos sejam portugueses; e com isto lhe fareis hábito para que tenha grande amor ao reino e coisas dele'.

II and to the pillaging of Madeira by some French corsairs, the plan was aborted.⁷³ Felipe II had personal reasons to hinder this marriage. Before he actually entered the negotiations for the Portuguese Crown after Sebastião's and Henrique's deaths, in fact, the king of Spain had already set his eye on the Portuguese kingdom. What attracted the Spanish monarch was the strategic position played by the Portuguese kingdom in the Atlantic commercial routes, both in relation to the Spanish Indies and to the North Europe.⁷⁴ Felipe, furthermore, tried to find suitable matches for Sebastião, while keeping the Portuguese court in the dark about it. Eventually, however, King Sebastião postponed any decisions regarding his marriage, basically showing that a marriage was against his will.

Once he sat on the throne, D. Sebastião I proved to be more interested in liberating North Africa from the Muslims than in keeping his house alive. In 1574, he visited Ceuta and Tangier, according to the Jesuit father Amador Rebelo 'para ver aqueles lugares e sua disposição para os efeitos que ele entendia e fabricava em seu ânimo.'⁷⁵ The military proposals of the young king never found the consent of either Catarina or Henrique.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, in 1576 Sebastião announced to the city of Lisbon about his plan to stop the Muslims' advance and met his uncle Felipe II, hoping to receive military support from him.⁷⁷ In the meanwhile, he took administrative and financial measures in order to better prepare the *jornada de África*. In February 1578, Henrique wrote a letter to his nephew earnestly trying to dissuade him from pursuing that folly crusade. Henrique had in mind in particular the interest of House Avis and wrote that 'em nenhuma maneira o devia fazer, não tendo filhos, porque maior inconveniente é aventurar sua pessoa a algum perigo, e não poder tomar o lugar, que atalhar a não virem os Turcos meter-se nele.'⁷⁸ Notwithstanding this letter, however, once the king had at his disposal all the resources he needed for the *jornada* he left

⁷³ Cf. Polónia, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-173 and *NHP V*, pp. 744-745

⁷⁴ As we said, in the 1560s and the 1570s Felipe was occupied in dealing the revolt of the Spanish Netherlands. If Felipe was to take possess of the Portuguese routes, he would have cut out the rebellious provinces from the salt and spices' commerce they were entertaining with Portugal. Furthermore, the union with Portugal would have had also positive repercussions for Castile within the territories divided by the treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Zaragoza (1529). It was decided that vessels belonging to one country were not allowed to sail through the other country's territories, but with the union this ban would have been revoked. See Bouza, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-59.

⁷⁵ *Apud NHP V*, p. 748.

⁷⁶ Sebastião's scorn and violent reprimands towards those counselors who did not agree with him are well known. Cf. Polónia, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-184.

⁷⁷ See Palacio, "Un español Rey de Portugal", pp. 187-188.

⁷⁸ *Apud Polónia, op. cit.*, p. 188.

Lisbon for Morocco. On 4 August D. Sebastião I perished in the infamous battle of Alcácer Quibir.⁷⁹ On 24 August the confirmation of his demise arrived in Lisbon and only four days later Cardinal Henrique was acclaimed as D. Henrique I, king of Portugal.⁸⁰

I. 2. 2. Avis's dynastic crisis and the Habsburg seizure of Portugal

The intricate situation in which the Portuguese Crown fell owing to the death of its legitimate king is well known, thus neither time nor words will be wasted in describing it thoroughly. Furthermore, the main problem within the Portuguese court is clearly illustrated by stressing two simple features of D. Henrique I. When Henrique ascended to the throne he was already a sick, 66-year old man and the most powerful ecclesiastic of the realm.⁸¹ The issue, then, was obviously the lack of a direct heir and the trouble of producing one.⁸² The need to compensate for this deficiency was even more urgent in consideration of Castile's pressure. Felipe II, in fact, as soon as he received news of Sebastião's death, sent to Lisbon his representative Christóvão de Moura.⁸³ Officially Moura should support the *Rei-cardeal* to find a way to secure the line of descent, but in reality Felipe II did not approve D. Henrique's retrocession from the ecclesiastical state in order to get married and procreate an heir.⁸⁴ Accordingly, he wrote to Gregory XIII that he had pretensions to annex the adjoining realm and, thus, he advised the pope not to concede to Henrique the papal dispensation.⁸⁵ The pontiff for

⁷⁹ See *HP III*, pp. 544-546 and *NHP V*, pp. 748-752.

⁸⁰ See *NHP V*, pp. 752-753.

⁸¹ Christóvão de Moura – Felipe's *privado* in Portugal after Sebastião's demise – described to his king the condition of the Portuguese court with bitter irony: 'Yo soy llegando aquí de pocos días, y heme topado diferentísimo gobierno del pasado, porque había un rey mochado y fácil, y con priuados de la misma edad y sustancia, y hállome ahora con un rey viejo y recatado y con ministros de la misma manera y en tiempo que me cuentan los pasos y las palabras, y todo se les antoja conforme al miedo que tienen de Castilla.' *Apud* Labrador, "A Função Inedradora da Casa Real Portuguesa de D. João I a D. Filipe I (1385-1598)", p. 35, n. 56.

⁸² There was, of course, also the problem of ransoming all the nobles and soldiers – almost 10'000 people – held captive in Morocco. The ransom represented a real blow to the crown's coffers, which had already been scraped to the bottom by Sebastião to arrange the expedition. Felipe II joined Henrique in the process, but not out of generosity, it was a shrewd manoeuvre to gain consensus and political support by Portuguese aristocracy. See *NHP III*, p. 750, Polónia, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-198 and Palacio, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

⁸³ See Marques, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁸⁴ See Polónia, *op. cit.*, p. 204, Marques, *ibid.* and Gattoni, *Gregorio XIII e la Politica Iberica dello Stato Pontificio (1572-1585)*, pp. 77-78.

⁸⁵ See King Felipe II to Pope Gregory XIII, 25 October 1578. AGS, *Secretaria de Estado 931*, f. 98: 'Yo escrivo a Don Juan de Çuñiga mi embaxador que diga a Vuestra Sanctidad lo que del entenderá sobre las cosas de Portugal. A Vuestra Sanctidad suplico le oyga y crea como a mi mismo y tenga por cierto que la causa que me ha movido a advertir a Vuestra Sanctidad de lo que se me offrece sobre aquella materia es

his part diplomatically limited the statements to quotes on S. Thomas's writings with regard to the possibility of conceding the dispensation to presbyters like Henrique.⁸⁶

In any event, in March 1579, D. Henrique convoked the Cortes. The agenda included Henrique's marriage and the election of an heir in case the king should die before the closing of the Cortes, as eventually happened. Accordingly, five governors were nominated.⁸⁷ In the meanwhile, Rome was informed by his correspondent in Portugal – Antonio Sauli – that Spain had already started to gather troops in Galicia and Badajoz. Consequently, Gregory XIII warned Spain not to proceed *manu militari* with Portugal. Felipe II, in fact, was trying to have his claim acknowledged as the most valid one while Henrique was still alive. He attempted to achieve that by limiting the dispute on the succession to the king's decision, instead of passing through the juridical examination of each claim. Moreover, the deployment of the troops was a clear sign that he would not tolerate a decision against his claim.⁸⁸ While a powerful menace was gathering at Portugal's borders, the king was getting older and weaker and the situation was worrisome not only for the Portuguese people, but also for those who lined up with Henrique as did the Jesuits. Sebastiano Sabino, the procurator of the Portuguese assistancy, accordingly wrote that:

'temo non ci serrà più tempo et che già serranno finiti i nostri favori et privanze con il Re di Portugallo, perché questo Re par che corra in fretta verso la morte, è vecchio et fiaccho, et quasi di continuo sta con alcuna indisposizione, per il che et per li grandi peccati che hora vivono sopra la terra, dubito che presto [God] se lo chiamarà per sé; dopo sua morte non so quel che serà.'⁸⁹

In January 1580, in fact, the Cortes opened another session in Almeirim, but only twenty days later, on 31 January, D. Henrique died.

por lo que toca al serviço de Dios y al bien dela Christiandad y por dessear, como hijo obediente suyo, por la grande reverencia y amor que tengo a Vuestra Beatitud, que no vea en tienpo cosa ninguna que se pueda notar, como estoy cierto que no succederá, teniendo Vuestra Sanctidad tan Sancto zelo al serviço de Dios. Y, conociendo la obligaçión que, a esto, le pone el lugar que por el representa en la tierra. También dirá Don Juan a Vuestra Sanctidad, de mi parte, la pretensión que yo tengo a aquel Reyno de que he querido dar cuenta a Vuestra Sanctidad'.

⁸⁶ See Gattoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

⁸⁷ João Telo de Meneses, Francisco de Sá, João de Mascarenhas, Jorge de Ataíde and Diogo Lopes de Sousa.

⁸⁸ See Gattoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95, Bouza, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-85 and Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, pp. 271-273.

⁸⁹ Procurator Sebastiano Sabino to General Everard Mercurian, Lisbon, 31 May 1579. ARSI, *Lus.* 68, f. 152. See also *DI XI 1577-1580*, p. 591.

The five governors, then, had to evaluate the claims of five candidates, but basically only two of them had strong rights: Dona Cat  rina of Braganza, as the sole survivor of D. Duarte’s offspring and granddaughter of D. Manuel, and Felipe II, son of Manuel’s oldest daughter, Isabel. To those two, can be added D. Ant  nio *Prior do Crato*, who, although the bastard child of D. Manuel’s third son, Lu  s, had the support of large parts of the Portuguese people.⁹⁰ As we mentioned before, Portugal was not united in supporting one of the candidates. They all had their own supporters and Felipe made no exceptions. There was in fact a part of both the Portuguese aristocracy and the clergy that sensed greater patronage potential from a monarch already so powerful.⁹¹ And also amongst the mercantile bourgeoisie tied-up with overseas commerce there were those who saw the union of the crowns as an opportunity to create a wide open space between the Portuguese and Spanish Indies.⁹² The short reign of Henrique, in fact, is situated in a time of intense international economic crisis. The 1570s saw the interruption of the flow of European precious metals, which consequently affected the cereal trade and caused both an even stronger dependence on the Peruvian silver and the research for new sources of auriferous supplies in the Portuguese domains overseas. The Portuguese empire, in fact, suffered from certain structural weaknesses, the most important being the lack of silver-mines. Portugal had an empire essentially based on a series of commercial transactions. It needed silver to purchase Asian spices, which represented a great part of its international trade, within which the African trade played a substantial part. The defensive politics assumed by D. Jo  o III with regard to North Africa – i.e. confining the Portuguese dominion within just three coastal *fortalezas* – meant access to the wheat-lands of southern Morocco was lost. Thus, Sebasti  o’s crusade represented a further and harsh blow to the Portuguese economy.⁹³ Increasingly, therefore, Portugal was forced to turn to Spain for silver and well before

⁹⁰ A thorough analysis of the claims of the candidates is in *HP III*, pp. 552-559. Regarding Felipe II’s claims see also Bouza, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-107. The other two candidates were Emanuele Filiberto of Savoy, son of D. Beatriz and Carlos III and Ranuccio Farnese, son of D. Maria and Alessandro Farnese.

⁹¹ Cf. Labrador, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

⁹² AGS, *Secretaria de Estado 401*, pp. 257-259. ‘Que as Navega  es de todo o descoberto, assim no oriente, como no ocidente, ser  o comuns somente a estas duas Na  es Castelhana e Portuguesa [...]’. *Apud* Bouza, *op. cit.*, p. 157. Cf. also *HP III*, pp. 564-565, Elliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-271, Marques, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁹³ Cf. Braudel, *Mediterraneo*, vol. 2, pp. 1265-1266 and Disney, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 176-177. Furthermore, it is worth to add that as early as the 1540s Portugal’s share of European pepper imports fell and the spice trade with the Flanders had become uneconomic. The *feitoria* at Antwerp, in fact, was therefore closed and Portuguese maritime trade to northern Europe declined. Cf. Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial*, vol. 4, pp. 216-217.

1580 the prosperity of Lisbon had come to depend on that of Seville.⁹⁴ Felipe II's Spain, in particular, in conjunction with the revolt of the Netherlands experienced its second bankruptcy in 1575, when the king suspended payments to the bankers, and the growing threat on the Christianity exercised by the Ottoman Empire, which eventually led to Lepanto in 1571.⁹⁵

Nevertheless, the death of the *Rei-cardeal* weakened the juridical power of the Cortes, which had to face the juridical insubordination of the Castilian candidate and his military menace as well. Eventually, in fact, the Cortes was suspended in March. It has been said that the strategy adopted by Henrique somehow favoured Felipe's claim to the throne.⁹⁶ After the unsuccessful attempt to find a bride, in fact, during the Cortes the king directed his efforts almost exclusively against António. Henrique's aversion – deepened after Rome in November 1579 granted its support to the *Prior do Crato*⁹⁷ – was formalized by the royal banishment issued on 24 November 1579. Contrarily to what Henrique expected, however, the banishment radicalized the divisions within the Portuguese society. António, in fact, enjoyed the support of the Portuguese nationalist fringe against the foreign conqueror.⁹⁸ After the banishment, however, António fled the

⁹⁴ Cf. Godinho, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-219. With regard to this strict economic relation between the Andalusian port and Lisbon, it is worth to remind that one of the (unkept) promises Felipe II made during the campaign for the Portuguese crown, was exactly to relocate Seville's *Casa de Contratación* in Lisbon. As often happens with political games, however, this promise was never put into practice. Cf. Bouza, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158. Furthermore, according to Braudel, if Felipe would have moved the administrative centre of the monarchy from Madrid to Lisbon, he would have probably avoided disasters like the *Invencible Armada*. Although, in fact, Madrid was the right place whence to look upon Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, Lisbon leaned out to the Atlantic Ocean, closer than Madrid to the new dynamics of the world. Cf. Braudel, *op. cit.*, pp. 1272-1273.

⁹⁵ Cf. Elliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-271. By 1575, the need of the Spanish monarchy to have recourse to the Genoese bankers for short-term credits took the floating debt to almost of 15'000'000 ducats. On 1 September 1575 Felipe II promulgated an edict under which all *asiento* contracts concluded since 14 November 1560 were declared null and void. The discontinuance of payment of the mercenary armies in the Netherlands caused the broke out of mutiny and plundering. On 5 December 1577, the king was obliged to conclude a new agreement with the Genoese bankers. The crisis of 1575-7 again confirmed the supremacy of the Genoese banks over Spanish public finance. Consequently, Felipe II made repeated attempts to smash the Genoese hegemony and asked Spanish bankers to play a greater part in the *asiento* contracts. Cf. CEHE V, pp. 374-375 and Braudel, *Espansione europea e capitalismo 1450-1650*, pp. 57-58.

⁹⁶ Cf. Braudel, *Mediterraneo*, vol. 2, pp. 1266-1269 and Marques, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁹⁷ Cf. ANTT/Bulas, *Maço 37*, doc. n.º 24, *Breve do Papa Gregório XIII que principia Minime voluíssemos no qual certifica ao Cardeal Rey D. Henrique que a sua tenção e mente he concorrer para o augmento e quietação de seu Reyno e vassallos e a sentir as suas justas pretensões*, apud Gattoni, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

⁹⁸ *Ivi*, pp. 99-101. Portuguese oppositions against the Habsburg did not end with the official acclamation of Felipe as king of Portugal and was not limited to political or military manoeuvres. In the 1580s, in fact, Portuguese opponents had been able to enlist French and English support by offering concessions in the Brazil trade and there had even been intimations of territorial concessions. Cf. Schwartz, "The Economy of the Portuguese Empire", p. 31.

country only to return later. On 16 June 1580, notwithstanding the decisions of the five governors, António had himself acclaimed as D. António I of Portugal in Santarém. In that very month, Spanish troops crossed the Portuguese border transforming the psychological pressure into physical threat. Although the supporters of D. António put up some resistance, they were no match for the Spanish army. Lisbon surrendered at the end of August, forcing D. António to flee leaving the country in the hands of the Spaniards.⁹⁹ As promptly stressed by the historian Fernando Bouza, both Felipe's accession to the Portuguese throne and the following sixty years of political union of the two crowns were marked by a flexible dichotomy between lawful negotiation and violence of weapons. This dichotomy was never concealed even during Avis's dynastic crisis. As Felipe's former ambassador to the Portuguese court explained, in fact, the negotiation should be carried out with weapons in hands.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, Simone Contarini, the Venetian ambassador to Madrid, in his account of the Spanish court plainly stated that the kingdom of Portugal was 'heredado y conquistado por Felipe 2',¹⁰¹ and, considering the sum of money he spent in the ransoming of the Portuguese nobility, we can also add *comprado*, bought.

On 16 April 1581, however, the Cortes met in Tomar to recognize Felipe II as D. Filipe I of Portugal. In front of the Cortes as the new king, Filipe – from now on we are going to use the Portuguese nomenclature – granted general pardon to all except for the *Prior do Crato* and his main supporters.¹⁰² Following the counsel of Christovão de Moura,¹⁰³ the king swore to 'guardar todos os foros, vsos, & costumes, priuilegios, & liberdades concedidos a estes reinos pelos Reis delles',¹⁰⁴ i.e. that Portugal would be ruled according to its laws and customs and that the important offices within the Portuguese administrative structure, both political and ecclesiastical, would be assigned to Portuguese nationals. For instance, if forced to absent himself, Filipe would confer the vice-royalty onto a member of the royal family or onto a native. Moreover, the customs barriers – *puertos secos* – between Spain and Portugal were to be abolished,

⁹⁹ Cf. *HP III*, pp. 561-563.

¹⁰⁰ AGS, *Secretaria de Estado 410*, 8-10: 'a negociação se faça com as armas na mão'. *Apud* Bouza, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

¹⁰¹ Cf. *Gobierno de Phelippe 3.º su Magestad, sus Reinos, y fuerças, su consejo, y la condicion de sus honbres grandes, y ministros, de su Potencia, com sus rentas y conceciones sacadas por menor*, BNCR/FGes. 1159, f. 63^v.

¹⁰² See *Provisão sobre o Perdão Geral aos Partidários do Prior do Crato*, BNP, F. 2521.

¹⁰³ Cf. Labrador, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.

¹⁰⁴ See *PMGP*, f. 87. See also Palacio, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

although Portugal was to keep its own coinage.¹⁰⁵ In any case, the *Provincia Cerrada*, i.e. the correspondence between the geographical and political borders of the Iberian Peninsula, was finally achieved and would be governed by the articles signed at Tomar during the country's sixty years of union with Spain.¹⁰⁶ Besides the political and economic reasons that led the Habsburgs to pursue the annexation of Portugal, there were also the Spanish humanists who nourished the concept of *Hispania*. The different people of the Iberian Peninsula, they postulated, shared the common identity of *hispani*, they were both the cultural and natural heirs of the Roman *Hispania* and of the *Reconquista* and the annexation of Portugal was seen as the last step for the restoration of the unified Iberian provinces beneath the Roman Empire.¹⁰⁷

Three months after the acclamation of the new king in Tomar, precisely on 29 June, the king made his glorious entrance in Lisbon, finally cleansed of the plague.¹⁰⁸ He would remain in the Portuguese capital until February 1583, when the death of his heir, Diego, compelled him to leave for Castile. He appointed his nephew, the Archduke Alberto, Governor of the country and thus started the kingship of the *Rey ausente*.¹⁰⁹

After having briefly surveyed the European political and religious status quo in general, and, more in detail, the complicated situation of the Iberian Peninsula, it is time to move towards the Eastern side of the *Estado da Índia*.

¹⁰⁵ The *puertos secos* would be re-imposed in 1593, along with the creation of a 3% duty on seaborne trade (*Consulado*) intended to provide for naval defence. The two taxes yielded considerable sums. In the 1600s, the *puertos* brought in the royal coffers more than 24 million réis, whereas the *Consulado* more than 50. Cf. Rooney, "Hapsburg Fiscal Policies in Portugal 1580-1640", in *The Journal of European Economic History*, 23 (3), p. 553.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Elliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 273-274 and Schaub, *Portugal na Monarquia Hispânica (1580-1640)*, pp. 11-12. The principle of the absolute Portuguese exclusivism within the Habsburg monarchy has been elected as the key piece of the Spanish politic behind the *Estatuto de Tomar*. See Bouza, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Pujol, "Un Rey, Una Fe, Muchas Naciones. Patria y Nación en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII", p. 41. For a wider and deeper debate on *Hispania* see also Belenguer, Arrieta and Fernández, *La Idea de España en la Edad Moderna*, Valencia (Real Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País), 1998.

¹⁰⁸ See Palacio, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

¹⁰⁹ During *o Portugal dos Filipes* the king, whether Filipe I, II or III, was absent for almost fifty-eight of the sixty years of Habsburg rule. Accordingly, the Cortes convened only three times: in Tomar in 1581, briefly in 1583 to swear allegiance to the future Filipe II and in 1619 when Filipe II visited Lisbon.

CHAPTER II

PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS EMPIRE WITHIN THE HABSBURG CROWN

II. 1. The Cortes of Tomar: Filipe I of Portugal and the enactments with regard to the *Ultramar*

Fernand Braudel, quoting a German historian, defined the lapse of time between 1579 and 1592 as the *royal silver cycle*.¹¹⁰ It is within these years – he said – that we are to find the turning point of the 16th century. According to the French historian, in fact, the annexation of Portugal to the crown of Spain opened the great battle for control of the Atlantic and world domination. As a matter of fact, with the incorporation of the kingdom of Portugal and its *Ultramar*, Filipe became king of the largest kingdom of the century. Beneath his sceptre stretched out the most different lands and oceans. In Europe he possessed the whole Iberian Peninsula, Naples, Sicily and the southern provinces of the Flanders. Over the oceans he now owned Cape Verde and the African dominions of Portugal and both the Spanish and the Portuguese Indies, which basically meant that, as Lope de Vega wrote, ‘el mundo [...] se puede andar por tierra de Felipe’.¹¹¹ The unification of the peninsula, hence, turned out to be a vital step on Spain’s road to global mastery and marked a decisive shift in Europe’s centre of gravity from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. In fact, the long-running struggle with the Ottoman in the Mediterranean Sea started to wane after Lepanto and following the bankruptcy of 1575, Filipe was eventually able to aim aggressively at the whole world.¹¹² The Catholic Monarchy – defined *catholic* because *universal* – represented the dialectical relationship of identity and otherness. Filipe’s monarchy, in fact, navigated

¹¹⁰ See Braudel, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 1262. The expression is taken from Fitzler H. A. M., “Der Anteil der Deutschen an der Kolonialpolitik Philipps II von Spanien in Asien”, in *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 28, 1935, pp. 243-281.

¹¹¹ Vega, “Comedia Famosa de la Otava Maravilla”, *Acto primero*, f. 153^v: ‘Tiene el de Portugal, por quien me atreuo, / â dezir, por ser cosa clara, y vista, / que el mundo, sin que en esto me anticipe, / se puede andar por tierra de Felipe’.

¹¹² Cf. Braudel, *op. cit.*, pp. 1262-1263 and Parker, “David or Goliath? Philip II and his world in the 1580s”, pp. 245-266.

its way through opposite dynamics, which often turned into harsh conflicts. Thus, in Europe and in the seas the Catholic Monarchy was at odds with the Protestant countries, the Netherlands and England. In the Overseas Empire, the European identity came into conflict – culturally and physically – with other identities that challenged it, permeated it, absorbed it and eventually refused it. Yet, this clash of identities was not confined to fixed Manichean categories. As we will see, in fact, it is easy to find aversion between two identities also in those groups held together by the same origin and the same goals.¹¹³

Anyway, as we saw before, at his acclamation by the estates at the Cortes of Tomar, Filipe I assured his Portuguese constituency that the two kingdoms, and the two empires, would be kept administratively and conceptually separate. Namely, Filipe was trying to put into practice the principle of *composite monarchies*, a principle in accordance with which a ruler could separately rule distinct kingdoms without establishing an evident hierarchy between them. But could the same be done with two overseas empires? The two spheres of influence had been settled with the treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Saragossa (1529) and Filipe's intention was to respect those decisions, although, as we will see, the king's voice did not reverberate so loudly in the Indies.¹¹⁴

The *Mercês de Tomar*, i.e. the agreement reached between Filipe and the Cortes, were based on the *Artigos de Lisboa*, the oath taken by King. D. Manuel in 1499 to recognize his son, Miguel da Paz, as heir to the crowns of Portugal, Castile and Aragon. According to these *Artigos*, in case D. Manuel or his son inherited the two Spanish crowns, Portugal's independent existence would be maintained. The Portuguese particularism attested in 1499 was ratified by Filipe in 1579 and thenceforth it was one of the pillars of the negotiations in Tomar.¹¹⁵ With regard to the political rule of the

¹¹³ On the Catholic Monarchy, its complexity and differentiations, the circulation of ideas and objects within as well as the first globalization see Gruzinski, *Les quatre parties du monde. Histoire d'une mondialisation*, Éditions de La Martinière, 2004.

¹¹⁴ Accordingly with the expression coined by Prof. Subrahmanyam in "Holding the World in Balance: The Connected Histories of the Iberian Overseas Empires, 1500–1640", p. 1360.

¹¹⁵ See *PMGP*, f. 87: 'Memorial das graças e merces qve Elrei meu senhor concederá a estes reinos, quando for jurado por Rei, & senhor delles, em que inclue as que lhe concedeo o serenissimo Rei Dom Manuel, anno de mil, & quatro centos, & nouenta & noue.' Accordingly, the *Capitvlos do Stado dos Pouos*, the fourth chapter precisely, reads: 'Posto que Vossa Majestade herdou estes reinos & senhorios de Portugal, nem por isso se vnirão aos de Castella. Mas os herdou principalmente & de per si. Pelo que lembramos & pedimos a Vossa Majestade que estes reinos fiquem sempre inteiros, & sejam per si, & em

country, the *Conselho de Portugal* was created, which was to cooperate directly with the king, provided that he was residing in Portugal. Filipe granted that no foreigner was to be admitted into the circle of government, namely ‘todos os cargos superiores, & inferiores, assi da justiça, como da fazenda, & do governo dos lugares, se proveja a Portugueses, & não a estrangeiros.’¹¹⁶ The exclusion of foreigners from public offices was of course extended also to the ecclesiastical domain following the directives of the *Iuris Patronatus Regum Portugaliae*, that is, crown control over administrative positions and the ecclesiastical organization of the empire.¹¹⁷

This list of concessions is not just an unfruitful quotation of juridical sources. As will appear clearly farther on in the work, the vigorous defense of Portuguese prerogatives and also the fair assignment to Lusitanian persons important offices – a sort of rendering therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s¹¹⁸ – transcended the boundaries of the Cortes. Or, since this is one of those cases when it is really difficult to ascertain what came first, we can phrase the concept with these words: the Portuguese sense of belonging to what they always had been considering their own – i.e. the Portuguese empire – and to a condition that had been laboriously conquered – the Portuguese discoveries and the *Estado da Índia* – was so strong that often a conflict of competence arose.

In Tomar this *self-preservation instinct* allowed the three estates to carve out room for independence within the architecture of the Habsburg monarchy. Portugal was a part of it, but was not absorbed by it.¹¹⁹ In view of that, it is obvious that the Cortes

tudo, & per tudo se ajão de reger & gouernar, per suas leis, ordenações, foros, & costumes, como atequi se fez, & vsou.’ *PMGP*, ff. 91^v-92. Cf. also Bouza, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-92.

¹¹⁶ Cf. *PMGP*, f. 87^v, Cap. IIII. See also chapter V and VI. Cf. also Schaub, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

¹¹⁷ See *PMGP*, ff. 87^v-88: ‘Cap. IX – Que todas as prelacias, abbadias, beneficios, & pensões, se darão a Portugueses. E o mesmo se entende no cargo de Inquisidor moor, & nas Comendas, & pensões dellas, & officios das ordens militares, & no Priorado do Crato. E finalmente em todas as cousas Ecclesiasticas, assi como atras fica dito nas seculares.’ With regard to the Papal bulls that established the Portuguese patronage see *Demonstratio Iuris Patronatus Portugaliae Regum respectu omnium Lusitane ditionij Orientalium Ecclesiarum, qua ipsum ius ad omnes presentandos etiam titulares pro eij regionibus Episcopos stabilitur, idemque ad mittendos Evangelicos operarios in easdem regiones exponitur ceteros omnes extraneos missionarios merito a Sancta Sede esse removendos ostenditur; argumentisque omnibus, que in contrarium addicci possunt, occurritur*, BNCR/FGes. 1309, ff. 7-22^v; for an introduction to the concept of Royal patronage within the Catholic monarchy see Boxer, *The Church Militant and the Iberian Expansion 1440-1770*, pp. 77-9 and Souza, *The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea 1630-1754*, pp. 23-25.

¹¹⁸ Mt 22:21: ‘They say to him: Caesar’s. Then he saith to them: Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; and to God, the things that are God’s.’

¹¹⁹ We are avoiding here to take part in the debate around the concept of Habsburgs’ *dual* or *plural monarchy*. Even though I recognize that also before the annexation of Portugal the Spanish monarchy was not a fixed and defined unity, since it included also the crowns of Aragon, Naples, Sicily and so on, I do

required the future king to adopt the same regard with respect to commerce in the *Ultramar*. The 7th chapter of the Cortes reads:

‘Cap. VII. – Que os tratos da India, & de Guiné, & de outras partes pertencentes a este reino, assi descubertas, como por descobrir, não se tirem delles, nem aja mudança, do que ao presente se vsa. E que os officiaes, que andarem nos ditos tratos, & nauios delles, sejam Portugueses, e naueguem em nauios Portugueses.’¹²⁰

As already done by D. Afonso V, who in 1472 claimed to be ‘Rex Portugaliæ & Algarbiorum citra & ultra Mare in Africa’, while the periplus of the Cape of Good Hope was still years to come, also in the *Mercês* granted by King Filipe I we see that the Portuguese Crown secured for itself the possession of the *terræ incognitæ*. We consider it relevant to stress this point. As is known, the Treaty of Tordesillas gave birth to the Iberian dispute on the Eastern side of the globe, the only area where Portuguese and Spaniards did not agree about the allocated boundaries. In fact, since Spanish ships had reached the East by sailing westwards and – according to Tordesillas’s dispensations – could claim what they discovered, it was now necessary to draw a line corresponding to that of Tordesillas’s in the East.¹²¹ The main bone of contention was the Maluku Islands, the much-coveted source of some of the most valuable oriental products. In 1529 at Saragossa, Emperor Carlos V and King D. João III agreed that the islands should remain with Portugal, but that an indemnity of 350’000 ducats should be paid to Spain.¹²² This new treaty did resolve the Maluku’s contend, but on the other hand left the Spanish Crown with a bitter taste of dissatisfaction for its ambitions in East Asia.¹²³ Thus, when the *Adelantado* Miguel Lopez de Legazpi left New Spain in November 1564, he carried

not deem it relevant to enter in that debate in this work. For a discussion on this topic see Pinto, *No Extremo Da Redonda Esfera: Relações Luso-Castelhanas Na Ásia, 1565-1640 – Um Ensaio Sobre Os Impérios Ibéricos*, PhD thesis, Lisbon, 2011 (photocopied), pp. 152-166.

¹²⁰ *PMGP*, f. 87^v. It has to be said, however, that Filipe was less scrupulous about respecting Portuguese autonomy and interests in the *Carreira da Índia* than might first appear. From the early 1580s, in fact, he authorized sale of *juros* (bonds) at 7% against future revenues from the Indian customs. Filipe assigned most of the sums raised to financing the wars in Flanders. Cf. Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia Under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640*, p. 26.

¹²¹ With regard to the disputes on Tordesillas’s meridian see Laguarda, “Las longitudes geográficas de la membranza de Magallanes y del primer viaje de circunnavegación”, pp. 135-177.

¹²² It is worthy to underline that these treaties had almost exclusively political repercussions with a few consequences for the religious status of the pertinent territories. Hence, according to this principle, although Castile gained the temporal dominion on the Maluku Islands, the spiritual one remained within the Bishopric of Malacca. Cf. BPE, *Cód. CXVI/2-11*, n.º 12, ff. 1-1^v.

¹²³ Cf. *NCMoH I*, pp. 429-430; and Valladares, *Castilla Y Portugal en Asia (1580-1680) – Declive Imperial y Adaptación*, pp. 1-12. Regarding the Portuguese-Spanish rivalry in Asia in the first half of the 16th century Albuquerque and Feijó, “Os Pontos de Vista de D. João III na Junta de Badajoz-Elvas”, pp. 527-578 and Pérez-Bustamante, “La Expedición de Ruy López de Villalobos a las Islas del Pacifico”, pp. 611-626.

with him precise instructions from the Mexican *Real Audiência* about ascertaining whether Japan was geographically within Portugal's sphere of influence or Spain's.¹²⁴ As soon as the Spaniards reached the Asian archipelago of the Philippines, moreover, they started to send reports about the idea of conquering those territories – China,¹²⁵ in particular, but later also Japan – which had already been claimed by the Portuguese, and those reports did not end during the union of the crowns.¹²⁶ Furthermore, this prospect was pleaded also by those religious orders close to the Spanish *Patroazgo*, in particular the Friars Minors and Augustinians.¹²⁷ On the one hand the political authorities of Manila were trying to remove the Portuguese from the Chinese trading port of Macao and take over the silk trade with Japan. On the other hand, the Franciscans were trying to gain access to continental China and, later, to Japan. Politics, religion and commerce, then, travelled aboard the same ships.¹²⁸ With regard to the Franciscans' activity in

¹²⁴ Cf. Bernard, “Les débuts des relations diplomatiques entre le Japon et les Philippines (1571-1594)”, pp. 106-107. It is relevant to stress that, with the exception of Filipe I of Portugal who acknowledged the Portuguese monopoly over Japan, the Habsburg court considered Japan geographic position as belonging to its half of the world also during the 17th century. In 1633, in fact, Filipe III wrote to his ambassador in Rome, the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo, that he wished to see missionaries of various orders entering in Japan and ‘que estas entradas se hagan no solo por la India Oriental, sino tambien por las Occidentales en cuy demarcaçion cae el Xapon y las Philipinas (que es por donde ay mas facilidad y comodidad para hazerlas los Religiosos de mi Corona de Castella).’ AGI, *Filipinas* 80, N. 164, f. 1. For a general approach to the complicated relation of the two Iberian countries in Asia see also Lourido, “Portuguese e Espanhóis em Macau e Manila com os Olhos na China”, pp. 23-45. For a brief description of the uneasiness within the Indian province of the Society of Jesus created by Legazpi's arrival see *DI VII 1566-1569*, pp. 159-161.

¹²⁵ Regarding the first Spanish attempts to reach the see Ollé, *La Invención de China - Percepciones y Estrategias Filipinas Respecto a China durante el Siglo XVI*, pp. 97-103.

¹²⁶ See, for instance, the letter sent to Filipe I by Juan Pacheco Maldonado in the early 1570s: ‘It is necessary, on the arrival of the said five hundred soldiers, at the said islands [Luzon], to effect immediately the purpose for which they were brought- namely, to subjugate, settle, and explore both the said island of Luzon, and those regions nearest China: the Japans, the Lequios [Ryūkyū], and the island of Escauchu [Cochinchina]; this is a very important matter.’ See *TPI III*, pp. 302-3. In April 1586, in Manila, representatives of the church, military, crown, and citizenry met to discuss again the conquest of China. Everyone present agreed it ought to be done. What needed to be discussed instead was how, i.e. the funding, the weaponry, the troops and so on. See “Memorandum of the Various Points Presented by the General Junta of Manila”, in *TPI VI*, pp. 197-198.

¹²⁷ See Provincial Alessandro Valignano to General Acquaviva, Goa, 1 April 1585. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 10 [I], ff. 26-26^v. Cf. also *DI XIV 1585-1588*, pp. 7-8. With regard to the first reactions to the Spanish intrusion in Portuguese territories see Ollé, “A inserção das Filipinas na Ásia Oriental, 1565-1593”, pp. 8-10.

¹²⁸ The first Franciscan missions from the Philippines to China were actually filling a gap left by the Portuguese *Padronado*, since by the end of the 1570s there was no missionary in China. On the other hand, as we already said, Filipe I never encouraged to violate the monopoly of the Society of Jesus for the evangelization of Japan. Cf. Costa, “A rivalidade luso-espanhola no Extremo Oriente e a querela missionológica no Japão”, pp. 479-80. It is true, however, that at this early stage Filipe was allowing his agents, although men of the cloth, to violate the pact sealed with Portugal and this situation was of help neither for the Portuguese nor for the Spanish, since the Chinese authorities did not allow Spaniards in Macao. Cf. Provincial Valignano to the Governor of the Philippines Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa, Macao, 14 December 1582. AGI, *Patronato* 24, R.57, f. 1. *Apud* Gil, *Los Chinos en Manila. Siglos XVI y XVII*, p. 460.

China, as early as June 1581, Filipe wrote a letter to ‘el poderoso, y muy estimado Rey de la China’, stating his desire to see the Friars accepted and protected in the Middle Kingdom.¹²⁹ Although with this letter Filipe wanted clearly to establish his influence on the Indies, it has to be said that he personally promoted those missions directed towards territories still evangelically virgin.¹³⁰ As for the commerce between the Spanish and Portuguese Indies, however, Filipe stood by what he swore in Tomar. In 1585, in fact, he wrote to his Viceroy in Goa, Dom Duarte de Menezes, that:

‘asi pella via das Philipinas como por qualquer outra da Nova Espanha não passem nem vão nenhum Castelhanos as ditas partes da China e Japão e mais portos e lugares dellas onde os portugueses tem seu trato, e navegação nem os ditos Castelhanos pella via das Phelipinas, e Nova Espanha tenham nenhum trato nem comersio nas ditas partes da China por si nem por outrem.’¹³¹

The same provision was therefore forwarded to Macao, where it was announced on 18 August 1586, and to Manila, where it arrived only in May 1587.¹³² Another *alvará*¹³³ forbidding the ‘navegação e comercio da India oriental e partes dellas pertencentes à Coroa de Portugal pera as Indias occidentales da Coroa de Castella’ would be issued in March 1594.¹³⁴ Notwithstanding these efforts, however, the huge distance that separated the centre of power where the decrees were issued and the Indies caused the king’s regulations to be systematically violated, as appears clearly from the correspondence exchanged between Lisbon and Goa in the 1590s.¹³⁵ It was exactly the outside of the Iberian Peninsula that Filipe had to deal with, since there was the chance that his claim would not be acknowledged in the Portuguese *Ultramar*. In particular, Filipe wanted to find the whereabouts of António, since he feared that the *Prior do Crato* might have left

¹²⁹ See King Filipe I to Emperor Wan Li, Emperor of China, Santarém, 5 June 1581. AGI, *Patronato* 24, R.54, ff. 1-1^v.

¹³⁰ Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão e o Episcopado de D. Luís de Cerqueira*, pp.183-189.

¹³¹ See *Provisão firmada por D. Duarte de Menezes, Vice-Rey da India, que defende que assim pela via das Philipinas, como por qualquer outra da Nova Hespanha, não passem, nem vão nenhuns Castelhanos ás partes da China, Japão...*, Goa, 29 April 1586. BPE, *Cód. CXVI*, 2-5, ff. 72-72^v.

¹³² *Ivi*, f. 72^v.

¹³³ See Glossary.

¹³⁴ See *APO III*, pp. 453-454.

¹³⁵ See *APO III*, pp. 276-277 and 423-424, and Costa and Gaspar, *Portugal y Oriente: El Proyecto Indiano del Rey Juan*, pp. 316-321. As it is obvious, the violation of the rules was not confined to the sole Spaniards – the Portuguese too used to trade between Macao and Manila – or to the first years of the Habsburgs’ rule. In 1621, in fact, the Dominicans in Manila wrote polemically to Filipe II that ‘las cédulas que V. Magestad envia, no las envia para que se guarden, sino para que sirvan no mas que de coco.’ See *Carta de dominicos sobre estado de la Orden en Filipinas*, Manila, 21 July 1621. AGI, *Filipinas* 80, N. 69, f. 1^v.

Portugal to rally a revolt against the Spanish king. Although he was hiding in France,¹³⁶ there were rumours that he had taken ship for India and the Orient. Dispatches, then, were swiftly sent to Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa in the Philippines, instructing him to forestall António at Macao, and, by getting there first with the news, obtain the sworn allegiance of its citizens.¹³⁷ As a trusted head of the expedition, Ronquillo chose the Spanish Jesuit Alonso Sánchez.¹³⁸

II. 2. An embassy from Manila: Father Alonso Sánchez S. J. in China

The governor bestowed on Sanchez not only the assignment of informing the colony of Macao about the succession to the Portuguese Crown, but also of gathering information about the Chinese empire and coast. Ronquillo chose the Spanish father for two reasons: on the one hand, he had remained impressed by the dialectics of the Jesuit expressed during the synod in Manila in 1582; on the other hand, however, by sending a Spanish Jesuit he achieved a twofold result: first, he was sure of sending a reliable agent faithful to the Spanish Crown; second, Sanchez was a Jesuit, that is to say he belonged to an order strongly related to the Portuguese *Padroado*, which also had a stronghold in the city of Macao. Thus, Ronquillo thought that Sanchez would have fewer problems than other emissaries on entering Macao.¹³⁹ The embassy left Manila on 14 March 1582,¹⁴⁰ but before describing how Sanchez carried out his duties in the *Cidade do Nome de Deus*, we have to take a detour to another Chinese entrepôt, the city of Guangzhou, the first and most important Chinese port founded during the Tang Dynasty to receive the tributes for the empire. It was in this city, in fact, that for the first time since his departure Father Alonso Sanchez shared with someone else one of the reasons that led Ronquillo to organize the embassy.

When the first Portuguese vessels made their entrance into the Asian seas, they found fervent and peaceful commercial activities which were not supported by an

¹³⁶ See for instance António's letter to the Queen of France, La Rochelle, 13 July 1582. BL/Add. 24217, ff. 15-15^v.

¹³⁷ Cf. de la Costa, *The Jesuits in the Philippines 1581-1768*, p. 38.

¹³⁸ See Provincial Antonio Sedeño to General Acquaviva, Manila, 12 June 1582. ARSI, *Philipp.* 9, ff. 8-8^v. See also the letter from the Bishop of the Philippines to Filipe I, Manila, 18 June 1583. AGI, *Patronato* 25, R. 8.

¹³⁹ Cf. Ollé, *La Invención de China*, p. 105. There are three accounts related to China by the hand of Father Alonso Sánchez written between 1583 and 1588. The second one, probably written in 1584, is in AGI, *Filipinas* 79, N. 13. See Ollé, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-66.

¹⁴⁰ *Relacion*, f. 1^v.

adequate military force. Also at this early stage, it was clear that if the Portuguese were to take over the Asian commercial routes, they had to establish secure ports to be used as naval bases and commercial warehouses through the employment of physical force. During the govern of Afonso de Albuquerque (1509-1515), the Portuguese conquered: Goa (1510) – the future capital of the *Estado da Índia*; Malacca (1511), the key to the centre of the Indonesian spices and a loyal Ming tributary, and Ormuz (1515), whose conquest gave them control of the Persian Gulf.¹⁴¹ With those ports the Portuguese snatched away the monopoly of the important spice routes of the Indian Ocean from the Muslim empires, with the exception of the Red Sea. In fact, the Portuguese Crown's basic objective in the foundation of the *Estado da Índia* was exactly to dominate Asian maritime trade in spices and to force existing trading activities to pay for permission to trade in the Indian Ocean.¹⁴²

Afterwards in the 1520s, they tried to adopt the same aggressive scheme in the South China Sea, but the Ming coastal defenses managed to repel the attack.¹⁴³ After this failure, however, and the subsequent expulsion ordered by the Ming dynasty, the Portuguese Crown officially withdrew from that region. The overseas' strategy of the Avis, however, allowed Portuguese private entrepreneurs to take over the commercial liaisons with China. Between the 1530s and '50s, they kept visiting the South China Sea until they gained the trust of the Guangzhou's mandarins after having helped to cleanse the mouth of the Pearl River of the pirates' menace.¹⁴⁴ These two phases saw an evident change in attitude both in the Portuguese strategy and seafarers. Those who reached the Chinese coast before the 1520s were products of the early *Estado da Índia*, which was

¹⁴¹ With regard to the Portuguese entrance in the Indian Ocean see Subrahmanyam and Thomaz Reis, "Evolution of Empire: The Portuguese in the Indian Ocean during the Sixteenth Century", pp. 298-331 and Disney, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 145-168.

¹⁴² The *Estado's* revenues, besides the customs-houses, came initially from the collection of *cartazes* (sea licenses) and, in particular, from the sail of various inter-Asian maritime trading routes, like the Macao-Nagasaki silk trade. Cf. Souza, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-14 and Schwarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁴³ Cf. Boxer, *O Império Marítimo Português 1415-1825*, pp. 59-64, *HEP I*, pp. 175-177 and Disney, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 140-144. In 1524 and 1525 new restrictions were published imposing punishments on those found trading with, borrowing money from, and provoking disturbances with foreign merchants. The intention of the ban was to suspend foreign trade, not shut down trade among Chinese up and down the coast, which went on in full view of Chinese officials along the coast. Cf. Brook, *The Confusions of Pleasures. Commerce and Culture in Ming China*, p. 123. See also Subrahmanyam, *O Império Asiático Português*, pp. 142-143.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Costa, "A Coroa portuguesa e a China (1508-1531) – do sonho manuelino ao realismo joanino", pp. 54-57. With regard to Portugal-China early contacts see Barreto, *Macau: Poder e Saber. Séculos XVI e XVII*, pp. 35-95; Ptak, "Sino-Portuguese Relations, circa 1513/14-1550's", pp. 19-38; Loureiro, *Fidalgos, missionários e mandarins. Portugal e a China no século XVI*, in particular pp. 270-283, and Carioti, "The Portuguese Settlement of Macao: The Portuguese Policy of Expansion in the Far East, in Light of the History of Chinese and Japanese Intercourse and Maritime Activities", pp. 29-31.

still focused on the ancient fight against the infidel Muslims. Hence they tried to inhibit the Muslim trade. On the other hand, the men who sought and found Chinese tolerance managed to put that kind of conflict behind them and instead of fighting, preferred to cooperate closely on a local level with Chinese and Indians because they became more interested in taking over the intra-Asian trade.¹⁴⁵

Canton, as Guangzhou was then known in the West, was situated on the banks of the Pearl River at quite a distance from the mouth of the estuary and had already served as a major port for foreign shipping for a millennium before the arrival of the Europeans.¹⁴⁶ Between the establishment of the Ming Dynasty and the eunuch Zheng He's seven expeditions, the Chinese government withdrew from maritime commerce.¹⁴⁷ Regardless of the official antitrade posture, however, merchants along the harbour-studded coast of Fujian engaged actively in trade with South-East Asia during the 15th century. Among the merchants and investors in this illegal trade profit expectations ran

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Wills, *China and Maritime Europe*, pp. 19-25. The change in attitude of the Portuguese Crown took place with the ascent to the throne of D. João III. The new king sent precise instructions to his officers in Asia to 'trabalhar por tornar ao primeiro estado [de entendimento] e de se conservar boa paz e amizade' with the Ming Empire. The new international politic contemplated the interaction with private Portuguese traders in the *Estado* and tolerance instead of aggressiveness towards other mercantile communities, which would become other diplomatic targets beside the centre of the Chinese dynasty. Cf. Alves, *Um Porto entre Dois Impérios. Estudos Sobre Macau e as Relações Luso-Chinesas*, pp. 58-59.

¹⁴⁶ The first Portuguese diplomatic mission dispatched to Guangzhou was sent by D. Manuel in 1515. It was headed by Tomé Pires, a former apothecary and scribe of the Malacca factory and first Portuguese to ever have written about the Japanese archipelago in his famous *Suma Oriental*, the most important source on the trade of maritime Asia at the beginning of the Portuguese arrival. See Cortesão (ed.), *A Suma Oriental de Tomé Pires e o Livro de Francisco Rodrigues*, Coimbra (Imprensa da Universidade). As for why an apothecary was chosen to play such a significant role, see Barreto, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-64.

¹⁴⁷ The first Ming ruler, Zhu Yuanzhang (1368-1398), to gain full control over the border and the coasts trade from coastal port cities, forbade all private trade with foreign countries. From 1405 onward, the Ming sent seven large fleets under Zheng He via Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. The Chinese ships visited several countries and as soon as overseas rulers started to send regular tributes to China, the Ming imperial government saw fit to withdraw from its overseas ventures and again reinforce the maritime prohibitions, in order to concentrate its military forces on the land borders. Thus the tribute system that the early Ming emperors imposed on China's neighbours, ostensibly to achieve political stability by establishing proper relations between them and the Middle Kingdom, in effect prohibited their own subjects from linking up with foreigners. The reasons for China's withdrawal of its large government fleets are not fully understood. However, it has been speculated that the difficulty in dealing with the numerous embassies and the cost of receiving them, which was higher than the revenue, might have been a strong reason for the withdrawal from the expeditions. Anyway, defiant Chinese traders in the Malay Archipelago sought protection from local rulers and continued their activities as before. The Ryukyu connection is also of interest in this respect. Fujianese families moved over to the island kingdom situated between China and Japan and not only became the main transporters of goods between China, Ryukyu, and Japan but also formed a link with Southeast Asia. Thus the interplay between legal (tributary) and outlawed (private) ventures kept the Fujianese maritime tradition alive. This illegal activity, together with the arrival of the Portuguese, who were lured to China's coasts by Chinese smugglers, gave rise to a wave of piracy along the China coast during the 1550s. Cf. Blussé, *Visible Cities*, pp. 15-16; Zhihong, "China's Overseas Trade Policy and Its Historical Results: 1522-1840", pp. 5-6 and Wills, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-20. A study with regard to the Ryukyu foreign relations in the early Modern times based on sources in classical Chinese is Ptak, "The Ryukyu Network in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries", pp. 7-23.

high. Consequently competition intensified and so did rivalries and turf wars. Furthermore, the matter was complicated by the famine-troubled decades of the 1540s and 1550s, when *wakō*¹⁴⁸ bands raided where they could not trade.¹⁴⁹ As is known, the Portuguese managed to play this situation to their own vantage by filling the commercial gap existing between China and Japan, but we shall return to this later on.

As we said before, the Chinese accepted Portuguese merchants starting from the 1550s. Seasonal trading between the two parties, in fact, had become a regular occurrence by 1549 and it would receive further confirmation by the mid-1550s, when Ming officials permitted the Portuguese to use sites on the Guangdong coast. It was between 1555 and 1557, in fact, that the *fidalgo* Lionel de Sousa secured permission from officials at Guangzhou to establish a Portuguese port at Macao, in those days only a village near the mouth of the Pearl River.¹⁵⁰ Although the settlement was restricted to a small peninsula, representative merchants were allowed into Guangzhou. It was in Canton, in fact, that the Portuguese had to go in order to participate in the China trade. There a bi-annual fair was held which the Portuguese were allowed to attend,¹⁵¹ and it is where Sánchez arrived after having left Manila.

It took almost two months of voyage to get there (they arrived in Canton in the morning of 2 May), yet as soon as they met with the ‘Aytao’,¹⁵² Sánchez received an unexpected comfort when he heard that some Portuguese and Jesuits were in the city.¹⁵³ The words used by Sánchez when he met with a fellow Jesuit deserve to be quoted verbatim:

‘Estávamos ya tan flartos [*sic*, fartos] del trato destes chinas y de sus bilezas y lisonjas y engaños que, quando bemos los portugueses, aunque bien diferentes de los nuestros en la fayción, hábito y lenguaje, los abrazamos como quien bee a los Ángeles. De mi, especialmente, bien se puede sospechar la alegría y consuelo que sintiria quando, en tierras

¹⁴⁸ See Glossary.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Ptak, “Sino-japanese maritime trade, circa 1550: merchants, ports and networks”, pp. 283-285; Brook, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-123 and *CHCh VII*, pp. 440-510.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Souza, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁵¹ The fair was normally held about December-January and in May-June. Contracts were often made for a year in advance, but alternatively, contracts and advance payments might be made at one fair for deliveries at the next. See Boxer, *O Grande Navio de Amacau*, pp. 4-5. For a description of the fair see Boxer, *Seventeenth Century Macau in Contemporary Documents and Illustrations*, pp. 78-79.

¹⁵² See Glossary. A recent paper regarding piracy in the Asian seas which provides an up-to-date bibliography is Ollé, “De Limahon (Lin Feng 林風) a Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功): A Reacção Pirática Sino-japonesa à concorrência Ibérica na Ásia Oriental (séculos XVI-XVII)”, in Costa and Gaspar (eds.), *O Estado da Índia e os Desafios Europeus*, pp. 139-162.

¹⁵³ Cf. de la Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.

tan estrañas y yendo como presso, a lo menos sin saver en qué pararía, me bi tan de repente con otro Padre de la Conpañía, principalmente con el amor y regalos que me mostró y hizo.’¹⁵⁴

The words we have quoted convey an emotion that almost everyone in his life must have experienced: the relief in seeing a known face, or also someone who belongs to the same place as we do, in a hostile environment. The feeling of familiarity kindled in Sánchez by the Western features of the Portuguese is no different from what we can feel when, after a long time, we come to hear our own language spoken in a foreign land. Familiarity, moreover, means also safety and protection, probably the reason why Sánchez compared the Portuguese to angels against the Chinese officers. Also Erasmus, when dealing with dynastic marriages and the role played by princesses in them, stressed that being married to ‘men who have no similarity of language, appearance, character, or habits’, is ‘as if they were being abandoned to exile’.¹⁵⁵ Yet, affiliation to the same religious order could not compete always with the sense of belonging to the same land or crown. As we shall see later, the cohesion within a group is never as strong as the cohesion within its subgroups. A crown, in fact, may very well unify geographic borders, but people always stay more faithful to what they perceive more intimately their own. The father Sánchez met with, however, was both a subject of the Catholic Monarchy and an Ignatian. Although the Spaniard did not call him by name, it is known that he met with the Italian ‘Padre Doctor’ Michele Ruggeri. The emotion Sánchez felt at their first meeting would fortify as the two got to know each other and would remain strong also when Sánchez had to leave for Macao some months later. While in the Portuguese harbour, in fact, he remained in contact with Ruggeri and another Italian Jesuit, Francesco Pasio. Sánchez’s letters to his fellows showed palpably longing and profound friendship. Ruggeri described them as ‘llenas de amor y caredad’, since they were written by a ‘persona que nos amaba y deseava que azentasemos en estos Reynos tan axenos de nos’.¹⁵⁶ Meeting with two Italian Jesuits was not only a source of comfort for Sánchez. Actually, he must have felt quite relieved not to have stumbled on a Portuguese. As he wrote, in fact:

¹⁵⁴ *Relacion*, f. 12.

¹⁵⁵ See Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, On the Marriage Alliances of Princes, p. 243.

¹⁵⁶ See Father Michele Ruggeri to Alonso Sánchez, Zhaoquing, 7 February 1583, AGI, *Filipinas* 79, N.11, f. 1.

‘Este Padre ytaliano [Michele Ruggeri] es de condición blanda y semejante a los chinas [...], ha estudiado tres o quatro años la lengua manderín y entiende algo della [...]. A solo este Padre, por ser ytaliano y nacido en Nápoles, donde primero que entrase en la Conpañía era doctor en leyes y havia servido a su Magestad en arregimientos, descubríle los negocios a que yba a Macán y mostré todos los papeles y relaciones del subceso de Portugal, más a ninguno de los portugueses lo quise descubrir en casi dos meses que estuve en Cantón.’¹⁵⁷

As written in the *Relación*, Sánchez found it convenient to have a neutral confrère to talk to. As we read in the quote, Ruggeri came from the kingdom of Naples, which back then included also the southern region of Puglia, where he was born. The Spaniards, actually the Aragonese, had been present in southern Italy since the first half of the 15th century. Starting with Alfonso V, uncle of Fernando *el Católico*, the Spanish monarchs used Naples as a base to establish their hegemony in Italy and the establishment in the Partenopean city of the *Consejo de Italia* – whence all the matters inherent to Naples, Milan and Sicily were sent to Madrid – came as a sanction to this policy. Naples and the Neapolitans, thus, were considered closer to the Spanish identity than the other Italian people. It is not a coincidence, in fact, that the Calabrian philosopher Tommaso Campanella in his famous treatise the *Monarquía de España* wrote that ‘España no tiene pueblo más amigo que el italiano. Por eso, para mantener esta amistad es necesario que halague con beneficios a napolitanos y milaneses’.¹⁵⁸ Then, although Sánchez was part of a royal embassy, neither he nor anyone could foresee how Portuguese authorities would react to the news he was bringing. Conversely, he was assured by the historical past of the loyalty of the Neapolitan subjects of the Catholic Monarchy. Besides, the mistrust felt by Sánchez towards the Portuguese community, both laymen and men of the cloth, was shared also by Ronquillo, who regarded the Portuguese Jesuits in Macao as passionate regarding political matters as any layman.¹⁵⁹

However, Sánchez and the other Ignatians were also concerned about the Chinese authorities. Although, in fact, the Portuguese were now accepted on the Chinese coast, the same could not be said for the Spaniards from Manila. Knowing that Portuguese and Spaniards were now ruled by the same king would enhance the rights

¹⁵⁷ See *Relacion*, f. 13^v.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Campanella, *La Monarquía de España*, p. 55, *apud* Sánchez, “Españoles e Italianos. Nación y lealtad en el Reino de Nápoles durante las Guerras de Italia”, p. 431.

¹⁵⁹ See Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa to King Felipe I, Manila, 8 April 1584. In Colín, *Labor Evangelica de los Obreros de la Compañía de Jesús en las Islas Filipinas*, vol. 1, pp. 313-4: ‘[...] de los mismos padres portugueses que residen en Macau no se puede fiar cossa alguna que aunque son religiosos no son menos apasionados en este caso que los seglares’.

granted to the Portuguese also to the Spaniards or, as was feared, would the Portuguese merchants be degraded to the same rank as their Iberian cousins?¹⁶⁰ Sánchez's words describe bluntly his diffidence towards the Portuguese and Chinese alike:

‘[...] si acaso los chinas, a los quales yo decía que yba a Macán a ver a otros hermanos de mi religión [...], supieran por otra parte que yo yba con las nuevas y a tratar de la unión de que ellos an gustado tan poco, assí por esto como por tenernos por espías nos fuera muy mal, y los portugueses, con la disposición que entonces tenían, quizás les ayudaran.’¹⁶¹

According to Sánchez, moreover, Alessandro Valignano, another trustworthy Italian, advised Ruggeri and Pasio not to show familiarity in public to Sánchez. The Spanish, in fact, once he had learned that Valignano was back at Macao, wrote to him in confidence of the purpose of his mission asking him how to behave in Guangzhou.¹⁶² Valignano probably did not want Canton-based Jesuits to get too involved with the Spanish embassy in order not to jeopardize both Sánchez's mission and the whole of Christianity in China.¹⁶³ As the visitor would confess to Ronquillo de Peñalosa, in fact, the preservation of Macao was possible only through peaceful relations with Chinese officers. Yet, the Spaniards had not enjoyed a good reputation with the Ming Dynasty since their first appearance in the South China Sea and the situation got even worse with the news of the union of the Iberian crowns.¹⁶⁴ The Middle Kingdom, in fact, feared the expansionistic crave of the Spanish and it seems that the Portuguese were probably the ones to inspire such fear.¹⁶⁵

In any case, the embassy left Guangzhou headed for Macao by the end of May to receive the city's submission to Filipe I King of Portugal. The Sunday following

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Father Francesco Pasio to Father Alonso Sánchez, Zhaoqing, 6 February 1583. AGI, *Filipinas* 79, N.11, ff. 4^v-5: ‘esta gente es muy rica y sobervia y la gente de Castilla muy mal acreditada con ellos y creo que no le recivan’.

¹⁶¹ See *Relación*, *ibidem*.

¹⁶² See de la Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

¹⁶³ Cf. *Relación*, ff. 13^v-14.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Visitor Valignano to Governor Peñalosa, Macao, 14 December 1582. AGI, *Patronato* 24, R.57, f. 1^v: ‘y como los mandarines sean tan percatados en su gobierno siempre tuvieron mucha sospecha de ver engradecer este pueblo especialmente despues que supieron dela venida delos Castellanos alos Luzones y de su conquista, por lo qual sintieron mucho el ver que tantas vezes de quatro años a esta parte llegassen aqui padres descalços y otros castellanos como V. S. sabra por ellos mismos que padecieron [...], y agora que entendieron esta nueva union delos estados de Portugal y Castilla tienen esta sospecha mucho mayor’.

¹⁶⁵ According to Father Alonso Sánchez, moved by the dread of losing their privileges in Guangzhou, the Portuguese instructed the Chinese interpreter to describe the Spaniards as ‘ladrones y espías, que yban a saver el lenguaje y puertos de su tierra y [...] heran una mala gente que andaba a rrobar Reynos agenos y matarlos Reyes naturales dellos y que, en quantas tierras entravan, se alzaban con ellas’. Cf. *Relación*, ff. 14-14^v. See also Boxer, *O Grande Navio de Amacau*, pp. 38-39.

Sánchez's arrival, Portuguese officers (Captain Major João de Almeida, four *regidores* and other Macanese elders) and ecclesiastic eminences (the Patriarch of Ethiopia Melchior Carneiro and Macao's Bishop Leonardo de Sá)¹⁶⁶ of Macao gathered in the residence of the Society of Jesus. After the meal, Sánchez was finally able to announce what was happening in Portugal:

'[L]es dixe con brevedad lo que Dios abía hecho. Como havia juntado los rreynos de Castilla y Portugal y, tratando blandamente el subceso del negocio y dissimulando las guerras y sacos, mostrandoles con esto algunos papeles en que no havia inconbeniente [...]. Y como Su Magestad tenía más de portugués que de castellano y que mostraba querer tener allá su corte, como entonces tenía, habiendo tomado el traje y servicios y predicadores de los portugueses y, al fin, todas las razones que sobre esto abía y a ellos podían saborearles algo el bocado, añadiéndoles las que havía para que [...] entendiesen quan bien les estava y quantas más fuerzas tendrían agora para defenderse de tantos enemigos de que estavan cercados en toda la Yndia y estenderse por las tierras de ellos, de que agora no tienen sino solas las playas y, particularmente para gozar de cossa tan rica como tenían al ojo y en las esperanzas en esto de la China.'

¹⁶⁷

The diplomatic shrewdness of Father Sánchez is admirable. As we saw earlier, he was not sure as to how the Portuguese of Macao would react to the news he was bearing. Therefore, he did not confess to his Portuguese hosts that before Tomar Dom António had put up some resistance and there had been armed conflicts between the Spanish *tercios* of the Duke of Alba and the Portuguese army. He knew that such information may jeopardize the whole mission to the point of creating an enclave of resistance in Asia. On the other hand, however, he was not lying. He was just concealing details of the truth. Sánchez, in other words, was putting into practice a common diplomatic strategy of his age, the dissimulation, which, according to the Neapolitan philosopher Torquato Accetto, was nothing but 'un velo composto di tenebre oneste e di rispetti

¹⁶⁶ Dom Melchior Carneiro (Coimbra, 1519 - Macao, 1583) entered the Society of Jesus in Coimbra on 25 April 1543. In 1555, he was appointed Bishop of Nicaea and coadjutor with the right of succession to the Patriarch of Ethiopia. In the same year, he set out for the Indies. He labored there on the Malabar coast until 1567, when he was sent to Macao, where he was appointed first Bishop of Japan and China *ad interim*, since the bishopric of Macao was established only on 25 January 1576 with the papal bull *Super Specula Militantis Ecclesiae* and the first nominee to the diocese in 1578 was Dom Leonardo de Sá (?–1597). Cf. Teixeira, *Bispos e Governadores do Bispado de Macao*, Macao, 1940, pp. 77-83 and Costa, *O Cristianismo*, pp. 224-233.

¹⁶⁷ See *Relación*, ff. 16-16^v. Cf. also de la Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 46 and Astrain, *Historia dela Compañía de Jesús en la Asistencia de España*, vol. IV, pp. 452-454.

violenti: da che non si forma il falso, ma si da qualche riposo al vero, per dimostrarlo a tempo'.¹⁶⁸

After Sánchez had presented the official dispatches, he asked the Portuguese to take the oath of allegiance on behalf of the city. They asked for some time, since they wanted to hear from the viceroy of Goa first, but a public oath-taking was excluded in order not to arouse the suspicions of the Chinese. Both the captain major and the bishop wrote to Governor Ronquillo that the Chinese suspicion and dislike of the Spaniards had increased considerably upon hearing of the union of the crowns. Hence all communication and exchanges, both of men and merchandise, were to be kept to a minimum.¹⁶⁹ The Portuguese were conscious that the only way Macao could be preserved was by doing exactly what the Chinese officials told them, because the city was completely dependent on the trade and hence on the good will of the Chinese.¹⁷⁰ Notwithstanding their hesitations, however, Macao eventually swore allegiance to the Spanish monarchy.

Governor Ronquillo, then, was not wrong in choosing Sánchez as Spain's chief ambassador.¹⁷¹ Yet, Sánchez could not wait for the city to give the official oath. Chinese officers, in fact, were growing restless with the Spanish embassy. Valignano mobilized the confrères to arrange a way to get Sánchez out of the reach of Ming officers. The junk¹⁷² Sánchez boarded, however, in mid-July was wrecked off the coast

¹⁶⁸ See Accetto, *Della Dissimulazione Onesta*, cap. IV – La simulazione non facilmente riceve quel senso onesto che si accompagna con la dissimulazione. Cf. also Villari, *Elogio della dissimulazione – La lotta politica nel Seicento*, pp. 1-48.

¹⁶⁹ See Bishop Leonardo de Sá to Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa, Macao, 4 July 1582 and João de Almeida to Ronquillo, Macao, 15 July 1582. Both letters in Colín, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 294-298. See also de la Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47 and Ollé, *La Invención de China*, pp. 110-111.

¹⁷⁰ Alessandro Valignano reiterated these concepts in the letter to Ronquillo he wrote in December. See AGI, *Patronato* 24, R.57, *Ibid.*: '[...] es cosa de mucha importancia assi la conservacion dessas Islas Philipinas como la desta Ciudad y puerto de Amacao, y para dezir lo que siento desta por agora no se puede en ninguna manera conservar sino estando bien con los Chinas hasta que se le pueda dar a su tiempo remedio y seguridad.' Also a Spanish Jesuit, the Rector of Macao's college Pedro Gomes, agreed with these opinions. See his letter to Ronquillo of 30 January 1583 in AGI, *Patronato* 25, R. 13, ff. 1-1^v.

¹⁷¹ Alonso Sánchez's unique intellectual qualities were patent also when he still was in Spain. There is a description of him sent to Rome in 1574 that states that Father Sánchez was, to the writer opinion, 'el más raro ingenio que he visto; porque en sus estudios está tan bien en ellos ahora, como cuando los acabó de oír, que habrá cuatro años; gran talento para predicar y alguna inclinación á ello, y para tratar con prójimos y para gobernar. Recio y fuerte para cualquier trabajo, gran celador del Instituto de la Compañía, muy sólido y macizo en lo esencial de la religión [...]. Es muy afable y de gran conversación, de gran obediencia, humildad, pobreza y gran castidad. Es muy aficionado á letras, grande poeta en castellano. Finalmente, entiendo in Domino ser para mucho más de lo que ahora hace, con ser harto'. See Astrain, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 532-533.

¹⁷² According to Lourenço Mexia SJ, the compiler of the *Carta annua de Japão do anno de 80*, a junk, *junko* in Portuguese, was a ship slightly smaller than the *nao do trato*. Cf. ANTT/AJ, *Livro* 28, f. 129^v.

of Formosa (present-day Taiwan) owing to a hurricane and the distraction of the pilot.¹⁷³ After having spent some weeks there, the castaways managed to get back to Macao by way of a lifeboat.¹⁷⁴ This delay, among other things, offered Sánchez the possibility to behold the ‘reducción de Macao a la obediencia de Felipe II’¹⁷⁵ on 18 December 1582.¹⁷⁶ Through the aid of Ruggeri, the Spanish embassy received safe-conduct to leave for Manila, where they eventually arrived by the end of March 1583.

II. 3. The Society of Jesus and the Macao-Nagasaki juncture

The ship with Sánchez aboard that was wrecked near Formosa was no common ship, both in terms of destination and of officials. In effect, it fits within the dynamics of the annual voyage sent from Macao to the southern Japanese port of Nagasaki, which we are going to deal with in detail later. The owner of the ship, on the other hand, was a notorious Portuguese *casado*¹⁷⁷ called Bartolomeu Vaz Landeiro, a trader who arrived in the *Estado da Índia* in the service of the crown in 1557 and moved to Macao in the 1570s.¹⁷⁸ He was one of those early pioneer magnates who took advantage of the lack of a strong and solid Portuguese political founding at Macao.¹⁷⁹ The earliest settlers in Macao, in fact, governed themselves without any control or direction from Goa or Lisbon. After the oath of allegiance to Filipe I, however, it was decided to arrange the form of local government according to the other cities of the monarchy. Confirmation of this procedure was obtained by a decree signed by the viceroy at Goa on 10 April 1586, and at the same time the *Cidade do Nome de Deus das partes da China* was granted the same privileges as those possessed by the cities of Évora in Portugal and Cochin.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷³ See *HJ III*, p. 287.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. *Relación*, f. 17, *HJ III*, pp. 286-7, Ollé, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112 and Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 39. For a detailed description of the castaways’ vicissitudes in Formosa see *Carta que o padre Pero Gomes escreueo de Amacao a outro padre acerca do seu naufragio que fez indo da China pera Iapão a treze de Dezembro, de 1582*, in *CE*, vol. II, ff. 82^v-85^v and *Pontos do que me alembrar*, in *TCJ*, pp. 387-393.

¹⁷⁵ See Astrain, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 453.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Ollé, *op. cit.*, 114-115.

¹⁷⁷ Married settler.

¹⁷⁸ A recent biography of this intriguing figure of the 16th-century trading society, which made use both of European, Chinese, and Japanese sources is Sousa, *The Early European Presence in China, Japan, the Philippines and Southeast Asia (1555-1590) – The Life of Bartolomeu Landeiro*, Macao, 2010. See also *Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Bartolomé Báez Landero contraídos en Filipinas, China e isla de Macán, y otras de Asia durante 28 años*, AGI, *Patronato* 53, R. 2 and Letter of Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa to Filipe I, Manila, 21 June 1583. AGI, *Filipinas* 6, R.5, N.53, f. 1^v

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Souza, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Boxer, *Seventeenth Century Macau in Contemporary Documents and Illustrations*, p. 4 and *idem*, *Portuguese Society in the Tropics. The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda, 1510-1800*, p. 44. Afterwards, Macao’s citizens demanded that the city received the same rights and privileges

Subsequently, the crown issued an *alvará* establishing that no private entrepreneur was allowed to export or import silk to Japan outside the contract signed by the Macanese.¹⁸¹

Based at Macao before the founding of the *Senado da Camara* (municipal council), Landeiro managed to establish his fortune from astute dealings with Ming officials at Guangzhou. In the first half of 1580, in fact, Chinese authorities incapable of defending the region on their own sought Landeiro's help to get rid of Chinese pirates ravaging the settlements along the Pearl River. Macao's merchants played an important military role within the South China Sea. Fighting the pirates, in fact, not only ensured the Portuguese presence in Macao and good diplomatic relations with Chinese authorities, but eliminated possible competitors and trade enemies. On the other hand, the Ming dynasty made good use of the Portuguese naval force, and at the same time held on to a precious commercial partner, who was filling China with huge quantities of silver needed to restore the finances of the empire. Landeiro, in other words, belonged to the most powerful and wealthy Macanese elite.¹⁸² This fact is highlighted also by another detail. As we said, he was the owner of the large ship that was wrecked near Formosa. This junk, captained by André Feio, was laden with most of the merchandise, silk in particular, the citizens of Macao had sent to Japan.¹⁸³ The fact that the biggest stash of Macao's merchandise had been loaded onto Landeiro's junk instead of the *nao do trato* is undeniable proof of the Portuguese prominence within the Macanese community and of the lack of royal regulation for the voyage. At any rate, Landeiro's main source of income generated from trade with southern Kyūshū. The Portuguese merchant was, in fact, a real asset for the Society of Jesus in Japan, where, apparently, he came to be known as the king of the Portuguese.¹⁸⁴ He not only granted safe passages from China to Kyūshū, but proved also to be a useful tool for the

as Porto, yet the crown in 1595, 1596 and 1709 ratified the 1586-concession. See Boxer, *Fidalgos no Extremo Oriente*, pp. 20-21. It has been stated that it was in particular due to the fear of a Spanish intrusion in the commerce with China that the Macanese founded the Senado of Macao. Cf. Lourido, *op. cit.*, p. 27 and bibliography cited therein.

¹⁸¹ See for instance *APO III*, pp. 545-546: 'por justos respeitos do bem comum dos moradores da cidade do Nome de Deos das partes da China, por esta minha ley mando e defendo que da publicação della em diante nenhuma pessoa de qualquer sorte e condição que seja não leue nem mande a Japão ceda alguma fora do contrato que se fizer na dita cidade, pelo grande perjuizo que os moradores della disso recebem, sob penna de ser perdida toda a ceda que for achada fora do dito contrato'.

¹⁸² Cf. Sousa, *op. cit.*, p. 31-38.

¹⁸³ At least in the first half of the 1580s, the Portuguese used to embark the silk for Japan in two different ships. Cf. *Sumario*, p. 336.

¹⁸⁴ See *Relación*, f. 21: 'Y ansi los xapones donde el ba muchas bezes con sus navíos le llaman el Rey de los Portugueses.'

evangelization of important Japanese *daimyō*. To better understand the relationship between a private trader and the Ignatians, however, we shall travel some years back in time, to the days of Fernão Mendes Pinto and the first Jesuits in Asia.

II. 3. 1. *Frutos and Fructificatio: merchants and missionaries' interplay*

In the second half of the 17th century, the Jesuit António Vieira (1608-1697), one of the most influent and known Ignatian scholars who worked in the Brazilian “vineyard”, wrote that if there were not merchants who went looking for earthly treasures in the East and West Indies, who would transport thither the preachers who take heavenly treasures? ‘Porque pelo fruto espiritual que vão fazer os Missionarios’, – he continued – ‘vem de lá os frutos temporaes’.¹⁸⁵ The policy of the Portuguese Crown was described also by the soldier-chronicler, Diogo do Couto: ‘Os Reys de Portugal sempre pretenderão nesta conquista do Oriente unir tanto os dous poderes, spiritual e temporal, que em nenhum tempo se exercitasse um sem outro’.¹⁸⁶ The Florentine merchant Francesco Carletti could not agree more. In his *Ragionamenti del Mio Viaggio Intorno al Mondo* with regard to the Spaniards he wrote that ‘dove non sentono ricchezze, non vi si accostano, le quali servono per allettare li soldati a far la strada con l’arme a’ religiosi e a difenderli dalli barbari’.¹⁸⁷ The merging of geo-political, economic, and religious motivations was the core of the *Padroado Real* over the missionary activities outside Europe, but the relationship between the Roman Church and the mercantile world, or between God and Mammon, was much older than the Royal Patronage. Also from a philological point of view, in fact, Christianity has been drawing expressions from the trading lexicon since its oldest days. The notion of *lucrum animarum* (gain souls), for instance, is a concept of evangelical origin,¹⁸⁸ that was

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Vieira, *Historia do Futuro*, pp. 274-275: ‘senão os interesses temporaes, que traz as náos da India por estes espirituas, que levaõ, quando vem carregadas dos aromas, & especies aromaticas daquellas partes? [...] As vossas Missões são hum paraíso, de que se não colhem frutos de arvores, senão frutos de frutos: *cum pomorum fructibus*. Porque pelo fruto espiritual que vão fazer os Missionarios, vem de lá os frutos temporaes, com que Portugal se enriquece, & se vão faltando os segundos frutos, he porque tambem vão faltando os primeyros de que elles nascem’.

¹⁸⁶ Diogo do Couto, *Década VI*, Livro 4, cap. VII, f. 79 of the 1614 edition. *Apud* Boxer, “Missionaries and Merchants of Macao, 1557-1687”, p. 216. See also Ames, *Renascent Empire? The House of Braganza and the Quest for Stability in Portuguese Monsoon Asia, ca. 1640-1683*, pp. 59-60

¹⁸⁷ See Guglielminetti, *Viaggiatori del Seicento*, p. 14.

¹⁸⁸ 1Cor. 9:19-22: ‘For whereas I was free as to all, I made myself the servant of all, that I might gain the more. And I became to the Jews, a Jew, that I might gain the Jews. To them that are under the law, as if I were under the law, (whereas myself was not under the law,) that I might gain them that were under the law. To them that were without the law, as if I were without the law, (whereas I was not without the law

revitalized between the 11th and 13th centuries along with the nascent of an eremitic and monastic religiosity.¹⁸⁹ This new type of religiosity aimed in particular at the evangelization and monasticization of the ecumene. It is in this specific context that the lexicons of *fructificatio* were born, lexicons that included the concept productivity meant both as spiritual – i.e. the growth in number and quality of the *fideles* – and material, which resulted from careful management of the monasteries' estates.¹⁹⁰

This strict connection between God and Mammon was strongly felt also in the Asiatic seas. As we have just seen, António Vieira deemed ineluctable the interaction between merchants and missionaries in order for the Portuguese Crown to achieve results (*frutos/fructificatio*) both in economic and spiritual terms. The Society of Jesus, on its part, was obliged also to negotiate patronage, passage, and protection within the territories it was trying to proselytize. It has been stated, in fact, that the Society's successes in the overseas missions depended on how well the missionaries were able to master the intricacies of what sociologists call the *inter-organizational field*,¹⁹¹ that is, the opportunities and constraints rising from the interplay among the major colonial agencies, which in Asia were represented surely by military authorities and various indigenous institutions, but also by the *Padroado* and the *Padroazgo*.¹⁹²

Notwithstanding Filipe's several reassurances to his Portuguese subjects with regard to the indissolubility of the Portuguese monopoly of the Asiatic commercial trades, the crown's prohibitions were seldom observed by both the Portuguese and Spanish communities.¹⁹³ Likewise, the papacy in the 1580s had to deal actively with the evangelization of the Asiatic missions. In the 1580s, Pope Gregory XIII took several steps to return the control over the propagation of Christianity into the hands of the church. In order to free evangelization from the royal patronages, the pontiff started to

of God, but was in the law of Christ,) that I might gain them that were without the law. To the weak I became weak, that I might gain the weak. I became all things to all men that I might save all'.

¹⁸⁹ The concept did not stop to inspire men of the cloth also in the second half of the 17th century. In the translator preface of a philosophical text printed in 1653, the anonymous author wrote to the Genoese's *Congregatione della Pietà* 'Oh di qual negotio sei Congregatione! doue i Paradisi sono tue Indie, le tue merci sono anime, I tuoi talenti sono virtù, il tuo tesoro è Dio'. Cf. Nieremberg, *La Differenza Fra il Temporale, e L'Eterno*, translator preface, n. pag.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Todeschini, *I Mercanti e il Tempio – La società cristiana e il circolo virtuoso della ricchezza fra Medioevo ed Età Moderna*, p. 180, n. 74.

¹⁹¹ With regard to this concept see Cropper (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations*, Oxford Handbooks Online, 2008.

¹⁹² Cf. Harris, "Jesuit Scientific Activity in the Overseas Missions, 1540–1773", pp. 72–73.

¹⁹³ Between 1586 and 1598 the order was reiterated almost on a yearly basis: in 1586, 1587, 1590, 1591, 1593, 1594, 1595, 1596, 1597 and 1598. See BPE, *Cód. CXVI*, 2-5, ff. 72-72^v; *APO III*, pp. 80, 276-7, 423-4, 482, 604, 670, and 869-70 and AGI, *Patronato* 25, R. 56.

think about a congregation of cardinals appointed *ad conversionem infidelium*. At the same time, he found in the Society of Jesus and its peculiar fourth vote *circa missiones* the perfect device to give back to Rome the control over the missions.¹⁹⁴ Even though the patronages' rights contemplated the selection of the missionaries to be sent to the Indies,¹⁹⁵ on 28 January 1585, the pontiff issued the Bull *Ex Pastoralis Officio* through which he granted to the Society of Jesus the monopoly of the Japan and China missions. On his part, Filipe I, although in 1581 he invited the king of China to receive Augustinians and Franciscans missionaries in his empire,¹⁹⁶ in April 1585 he corroborated the wording of the bull with a *real cédula*, hence justifying the monopoly of the Society of Jesus in Japan.¹⁹⁷ However, the following year, on 15 November 1586, the new Pope Sixtus V, a former Franciscan and not as fond of the Ignatians as Gregory XIII, issued the Brief *Dum ad uberes fructus* thus raising the *custodia de San Gregorio Magno* in the Philippines to a province with the right to start missions in China and other Asian countries.¹⁹⁸ It is evident how secular and spiritual powers merged together in order to obtain mutual benefits. For instance, when the Brief *Ex Pastoralis Officio* was published in Manila in July 1586,¹⁹⁹ the reaction of the Spanish community was unanimous:

'Sucedio tambien en el mesmo tiempo publicarse en las Filipinas un breve de Gregorio XIII de feliz recordaçion, en que (por causas que le movieron de mucha consideraçon e importancia) prohibe la entrada en Iapon al *negocio delas almas* alos religiosos que no fueron dela Compañía. Estas dos cosas parecieron pessadas assi alos seglares delas Filippinas (porque les cerrava la puerta de todo su trato y *ganança temporal*) como alos Religiosos de otras Ordenes, por çerrarsela el Papa para el *trato delas almas*.'²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Prosperi, *Tribunali della Coscienza – Inquisitori, Confessori, Missionari*, pp. 578-581.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Tamburello, "La crisi del Patronato cattolico portoghese nello scacchiere dell'Asia estremorientale nei secoli XVI-XVII", p. 343.

¹⁹⁶ See AGI, *Patronato* 24, R. 54.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. BA, *Cód. 51-VIII-18*, ff. 240-240^v. *Apud* Costa, "A Rivalidade Luso-Espanhola no Extremo Oriente e a Querela Missionológica no Japão", pp. 518-519. The *cédula* was received and published in Goa on 12 April 1586.

¹⁹⁸ Cf. Correia, "A Apologia de Valignano e a Defesa do Padroado e dos Direitos da Coroa Portuguesa na Ásia Oriental", p. 172. In the years following its publication, the Brief *Dum ad uberes fructus* would represent the basis upon which the Franciscans would found their claim upon the evangelization of Japan. This brief, in fact, made no mention whatsoever about Gregory XIII's bull or the Japan mission. The lack of further clarification from Rome took the Friars Minors to play this ambiguity to their advantage by interpreting the brief as if it included both China and Japan. Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão e o Episcopado de D. Luís Cerqueira*, pp. 210-211.

¹⁹⁹ The brief was published by the Jesuit Antonio Sedeño on 2 July. Cf. Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

²⁰⁰ See *Apologia Societatis Contra Calumnias ipsi irrogatas a F. Joanne de Santa Maria Provinciali Franciscanorum in Indiis Occidentalibus*, BNCR/FGes. 1246, f. 299^v. The italic is ours.

Following the publication of an accusatory treatise against the Society of Jesus and the evangelization of Japan by the hand of Fray Martin de la Ascensión OFM in 1597,²⁰¹ eminent Ignatians felt compelled to respond in kind. The most famous answer is Alessandro Valignano's *Apologia*,²⁰² since the Italian was the main target of the Friar Minor. However, responses appeared also in Europe. This quote, however, is taken from a memorandum that in 1599 was sent to Filipe II of Portugal by Baltasar Barreira, the procurator of the Portuguese Assistancy in the Spanish Court.²⁰³ Also from this small quote it appears clearly that missionaries and merchants were actually in the same boat, as the saying goes. Their aim was the same, the *fructificatio*, although different in specie, and they shared also the opponent, which was identified in the Portuguese patronage and in the Society of Jesus.

The close relation between these two capital figures of the European expansion was even stronger in the first century of the *Estado da Índia*. It is certain that the Society's overseas missions would have been impossible in the absence of private trade and colonial enterprises. Yet, it is also true that the strategic alliance with Jesuit missionaries was useful also for Portuguese merchants, who were for the most part practical people in need of scholars who could deal with Asian high officers, and who thus became necessary as soon as Portugal came into contact with advanced cultures, such as China and Japan. The very settlement of Macao appears to be ascribable to a partnership which was at the same time political, commercial and evangelical. Amongst the members of this enterprise, find place giant figures of 16th century European expansion and culture, such as the Portuguese merchant and writer Fernão Mendes

²⁰¹ Cf. *Tratado que os religiosos de S. Francisco espalharam em Goa em Baçaim no ano de 1598 contra os Padres da Companhia de Jesus que andam na conversão de Japão*, Macau, 16 November 1597. BL/Add. 9858, ff. 61-80. A compilation of treatises written by Fray de la Ascención in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 40.

²⁰² *Apologia en la qual se responde a diversas calumnias q se escrivieran contra los PP. da la Compañía de Japon, y de la China. Autor el Padre Alexandre Vilignano [sic] Visitador de la misma Compañía* in BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-58. Although it is a text well known and quoted, there are in particular two monographs that focus on the *Apologia*. Correia, *A Conceção de Missionação na Apologia de Valignano. Estudo sobre a Presença Jesuíta e Franciscana no Japão (1587-1597)* and Alessandro Valignano, *Apologia de la Compañía de Jesus de Japon y China (1598)*, edited by Alvarez-Taladriz, Ōsaka (Eikodo), 1998.

²⁰³ This particular office was created successively to the annexation of Portugal to Spain. This type of procurator was delegated to deal at court matters inherent the Portuguese Assistancy. The court displacement from Lisbon to Spain (Valladolid first and then from 1606 Madrid) and the centralized and bureaucratized nature of Filipe's government obliged the Society to have a father at court in order to have its claims heard and answered. Cf. Zubillaga, "El Procurador de la Compañía de Jesús en la Corte de España", pp. 1-4.

Pinto and the Navarre Jesuit Francisco Javier, the first Ignatian to set foot in Japan in 1549.

II. 3. 2. First economic activities of the Society of Jesus in Asia

It is in the 1550s that Macao started to gain prominence within the regular international commerce in the South China Sea. In 1554, the Portuguese reached an understanding with the Chinese to settle an exchange hub on the island of Sanchuan, some fifty miles to the southwest of Macao, but it was moved to Lampacau (Langpokao) in 1554. Although Lampacau remained their exchange hub until 1558 at least, from Western sources we know that Fernão Mendes Pinto and the vice-provincial of the Society of Jesus in India, Melchior Nunes Barreto, were in Macao around 1555.²⁰⁴ There are, however, Chinese documents that state that Portuguese merchants had been in Macao since the early 1550s asking Chinese officers at Guangzhou to authorize the displacement of the settlement from Lampacau to Macao. According to Barreto this kind of request could come into being only after a thorough analysis of the physical and commercial geography of the mouth of the Pearl River, therefore after at least two decades of analysis and trading activities in the zone. In the mid-1550s, however, most of the Portuguese merchants in the South China Sea converged in the Lampacau-Macao axis and Macao began to emerge more as a permanent establishment than just a stop between Guangzhou and Japan.²⁰⁵

The reasons that allowed Macao to become one of the most important commercial hubs of the *Estado da Índia* involve China, Japan, and the Portuguese trading community together. Since it is quite a complicated matter yet relevant to our work, a brief summary will be presented.

In the mid-1540s, the Ming appointed a special officer in order to get rid of the illegal trade – Sino-Japanese for the most part, but with a relevant Portuguese and Asiatic participation – and of the piracy along the coasts of Fujian and Zhejiang. As a consequence of those naval raids, between 1547 and 1549 the international trading community that had gathered there was forced to move toward the mouth of the Pearl River. At the same time, a more private partnership, between Portuguese traders and one

²⁰⁴ See CE, I, ff. 32^v-37. Cf. Boxer, *Seventeenth Century Macau in Contemporary Documents and Illustrations*, pp. 3-4, *idem*, *Fidalgos*, pp. 15-16 and Barreto, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17 and 25-28.

²⁰⁵ Cf. Barreto, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-34.

of the most influential Chinese merchant-pirate of his age, Wang Zhi, moved firstly to Hirado in Japan and some years later, in 1555, converged to Macao.²⁰⁶ While busy attempting to suppress piracy, the Ming had also inner problems to solve. The Middle Kingdom, in fact, was passing through a half-century of fiscal crisis. The transition between the 15th and 16th century saw the Ming cut to half legal silver production. Consequently, there was a shortage of the supply of silver needed by the government, which stimulated the growing trade with Japan in the second quarter of the 16th century.²⁰⁷ It was at that moment that China began the process that would lead it to be ‘a bomba aspirante do metal branco de todo o mundo’.²⁰⁸

Yet, the commercial relations between the Ming and Japan were not exactly friendly. After Japan underwent the two unsuccessful Mongol invasions (1274 and 1281), the Japanese started to pay more attention to coastal defences and naval force and were no longer ready to admit that they were Chinese vassals. This situation got even worse due to Japan’s political disunity following the end of Kamakura *Bakufu*²⁰⁹ and the division between the northern and southern courts during the so-called *Nanbokuchō Jidai*,²¹⁰ when the Chinese had no official political counterpart in Japan with whom to establish a formal agreement. Also after the foundation of the Ashikaga *Bakufu* and the establishment of the *kangō bōeki*,²¹¹ Japan’s political status did not precisely fit with the Chinese tributary scheme. Yet, Ming’s persistence to establish friendly relations led Japan to send eleven tributary missions between 1433 and 1549. The Chinese, for their part, dispatched seven missions between 1404 and 1419, but then only one in 1534. Despite these numbers, however, the tributary voyage between the two empires was stopped three times in the 15th and 16th centuries: between 1453 and 1496, between 1523 and 1539 and eventually ended with the last official embassy that left Japan in 1547. Following the precious research of Wang Yi-T’ung, it is quite surprising that the Ming Dynasty tolerated official intercourse with Japan for so long. Besides *wakō*’s piracy, in fact, Japanese embassy personnel often behaved with outrageous insolence on Chinese soil, not respecting Ming’s instructions and threatening Chinese officers if Japanese requests were not met. This kind of misbehaviours always caused troubles and

²⁰⁶ Cf. Barreto, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-84, *CHCh VII*, pp. 494-495 and *CHCh VIII*, pp. 341-342.

²⁰⁷ Cf. Brooks, *op. cit.*, p. 94

²⁰⁸ See Godinho, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 217.

²⁰⁹ See Glossary.

²¹⁰ See Glossary.

²¹¹ See Glossary.

the interruption of official exchanges, as happened between 1523 and 1539. Also when intercourse was renewed, uneasiness and mutual suspicion did not vanish. It seems that the interruption of official intercourse, then, has to be ascribed to these three reasons: *wakō*'s plunderings, Japanese embassies' disrespect for Chinese accepted custom and Japan's unstable internal conditions.

After 1453, and in particular following the chaos of the Ōnin wars (1467-1477), which basically gave birth to the *Sengoku Jidai*,²¹² there was a shift in the management of the embassies from the *bakufu* to influential families of western Honshū and Shikoku. In the ten years preceding the last embassy, trade with China had been conducted largely by the Ōuchi family at Hakata and the Hosokawa at Sakai.²¹³ When the envoys sent by the two families, who were both self-proclaimed official ambassadors, happened to meet in China, they often adopted violent behaviour which Ming officers interpreted as acts of piracy, therefore depriving them of the seal for official commerce. Given such chaotic circumstances, when the last Japanese embassy left China in 1549, the Ming decided to close official relations with Japan.²¹⁴

Alongside these intercourses, however, from the 1530s until at least the 1570s an illegal commerce between Japan and China flourished. The recent discovery of great silver deposits in Japan gave rise to a spontaneous illegal trade carried out both by Japanese smugglers and merchants from the provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong who sought to carry away the silver produced in Japan to China.²¹⁵ As early as 1543, as is known, they were joined by the Portuguese,²¹⁶ who were quick to learn

²¹² See Glossary.

²¹³ The Ōuchi family of Suō was a powerful family which established its rule in the western Honshū province since the early Kamakura period (1185-1333). During the Muromachi *bakufu* (c. 1336-1573), the Ōuchi were first appointed *shugo* of both Suō, today's eastern part of the Yamaguchi Prefecture, and the neighbouring province of Nagato, and then by the 1420s of the northern Kyūshū provinces of Buzen and Chikuzen. Although, the family began to lose power and control over its territories owing to the Ōnin war, in the first half of the 16th century, the Ōuchi controlled not only these four provinces, but also the provinces of Iwami and Aki until 1551. An introductory essay about the Ōuchi is Matsuoka and Arnesen, "The Sengoku Daimyo of Western Japan: The Case of the Ōuchi", pp. 64-100.

²¹⁴ Furthermore, a rebellion in the Ōuchi domain brought the family to its downfall and then to the loss of the official seal to commerce with China. Cf. Wang Yi-T'ing, *Official Relations between China and Japan, 1368-1549*, pp. 2-4 and pp. 60-81. Cf. also Matsuoka and Arnesen, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65 and Carioti, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-29.

²¹⁵ Cf. Atwell, "International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650", pp. 68-70; Brown, *Money Economy in Medieval Japan. A Study in the Use of Coins*, pp. 61-63, and Kobata, "The Production and Uses of Gold and Silver in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Japan", pp. 251-253.

²¹⁶ With regard to the Portuguese arrival in Japan see Schurhammer, "O Descobrimento do Japão pelos Portugueses no Ano de 1543", pp. 485-580; Arimizu, "Os Primórdios das Relações Históricas Luso-Japonesas. Discussão sobre uma Hipótese de Intermediação dos Piratas Sino-Japoneses", pp. 259-266 and Flores, "Os 'Descobridores' do Japão", pp. 5-16.

how thorny the official relations between the Middle Kingdom and Japan were.²¹⁷ As we know, after the Ming had tried to repress illegal trade on its Eastern coast, Wang Zhi took refuge in Hirado, a place the Portuguese acknowledged as the best harbour in Japan,²¹⁸ and would frequent assiduously in the 1550s.²¹⁹ According to Japanese studies, it seems that Wang Zhi established his first outpost in Kyūshū as early as 1542 upon invitation of the *daimyō* of Hizen, Matsuura Takanobu, who built his fortune upon trade with foreign countries. The Matsuura, however, were not the only ones involved in commercial activities. Their principal rivals were the Ōmura of Nagasaki. Between 1560 and 1564 the two families fought to ensure the Portuguese vessels and their shipments of Chinese merchandises and firearms would anchor in their ports. It is likely that Wang Zhi acted as intermediary between Matsuura Takanobu and the Portuguese with whom he used to deal in China. Wang Zhi's residence in Hirado, in fact, provided the perfect docking for the Portuguese, as well as an irreplaceable partner who helped them to open another place for affairs in Asia.²²⁰

Yet, in the 1550s Portugal's partnership with Wang Zhi started to represent a problem. On the one hand, the Portuguese did not want the Ming to treat them as pirates and, on the other hand, they did not want an intermediary with a fixed base in Japan. It is exactly in those years that Portuguese merchants started to settle in Macao, without official permission though. In order to obtain Chinese consent, they proved their loyalty to the Ming by siding with them in offensives against pirates and they also distanced themselves from Wang Zhi by establishing friendly relations with the Ōmura of Nagasaki. The Portuguese approach to the Ming dynasty, the Chinese need for silver and private economic interests in the international trades stressed the need for a free port in South-Eastern China that was not inextricably dependant to the Guangzhou fair. The Ming eventually responded to the Portuguese demands for a *chão*, a permanent

²¹⁷ Cf. *DI III 1553-1575*, p. 319: 'esta discordia de entre os chinas e japões é grande meio para os portugueses que quizerem ir ao Japão, porque como os chinas não vão lá para tratar com suas fazendas, têm grande meio os mercadores portugueses para lá fazerem seus proveitos temporais.'

²¹⁸ Cf. *CC*, ff. 156-156^v: 'Firando, por ser terra de melhor porto que ha em Iapão, e quando os Portugueses vem a esta terra, a elle vem'. See also f. 137^v, f. 142 and f. 177^v.

²¹⁹ See *Avisi Particolari Del'avviamento Che Iddio da alla Sva Chiesa Catholica Nell'Indie, et Spetialmente nelli Regni di Giappon, con informatione della China, Riceuuti dalli Padri della Compagnia Di IESV, questo Anno del 1558*, pp. 22-24.

²²⁰ For a more detailed account on Hirado's history before and during the Portuguese presence, see Carioti, "Hirado, postazione internazionale dell'Estremo Oriente, nella I metà del secolo XVII", in *Il Giappone*, vol. XXXVII, pp. 55-68 and vol. XXXVIII, pp. 47-67.

settlement, at Macao and in 1557 the City of the Name of God was born, in the same year of Wang Zhi's surrender to the authorities.²²¹

With the establishment of Macao, the *Estado da Índia* finally set a fixed and secure foot in China. Before Macao was founded, however, we saw that the mouth of the Pearl River already functioned as an obligatory passage for the merchants who wanted to trade between China and Japan. At that moment, in fact, what the Portuguese were lacking was a port similar to Macao in Japan.²²²

In the Portuguese mercantile community established at Macao in the mid-1550s, we find examples of those faithful merchants who, as heirs of a mentality which was giving way to more practical and financial ways of life, sometimes put the *lucrum animarum* in front of their own gain. Fernão Mendes Pinto, a former novice himself who helped financially the Japan mission in the early days,²²³ Bartolomeu Vaz Landeiro, who lost a significant amount of money to help the fathers spreading Christianity in Kyūshū,²²⁴ and Duarte da Gama, who helped the mission with alms during the six years he was in Japan,²²⁵ may be included in this illuminated group. Although during the first decade of the proselytization of Japan the sites frequented by the merchants and the missionaries did not exactly overlap,²²⁶ the importance of such traders is undeniable, but the same can also be said for the shrewdness of the missionaries within the aforementioned inter-organizational field. As we saw, the *daimyō* Matsuura Takanobu, and the likes of him, were willing to harbour the Portuguese ships in their domains. It was a secret to nobody that Japanese southern *daimyō* welcomed the first missionaries not so much out of sympathy with the Christian belief as from the economic benefits of

²²¹ Cf. Carioti, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-37. With the Portuguese settled at Macao, the commercial voyages to Japan finally consolidated in fixed stops. The concessionaires started the voyage in Goa, whence in April or May they sailed for Southeast Asia (Insulindia) where they bought spices. Afterwards, they had to go to Malacca to acquire the trading rights between Malacca and Macao. They normally arrived in China by the end of July. There they loaded their ships with merchandises and goods bought at the annual fair of Guangzhou, an operation that took enough time to let the monsoon end and then forced the ships to remain at Macao until the following year.

²²² Cf. Costa, *Portugal e o Japão. O Século Namban*, pp. 21-24.

²²³ Fernão Mendes Pinto offered 300 ducats to Javier to build the first Jesuit residence and the first church in Yamaguchi. See *DI III 1553-1557*, p. 143 and Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier. His Life, His Times*, vol. IV: Japan (1549-1552), pp. 271-272. Before this help, Javier had already received from Pedro da Silva, Captain of Malacca, a quantity of pepper to sell in Japan, in order to maintain the missionaries and to build a church. Cf. Ruiz-de-Medina, “«El Trato del Japón» y los Jesuitas”, p. 313.

²²⁴ Cf. Boxer, “Missionaries and Merchants of Macao, 1557-1687”, pp. 215-216 and Sousa, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

²²⁵ See CC, ff. 109-109^v.

²²⁶ During Javier's years, the main centre of evangelization was in Yamaguchi, in Honshū, not in the southern island of Kyūshū.

the trade with the Portuguese.²²⁷ They had quickly and correctly identified the Jesuits as influent figures with the Portuguese merchants, but this comprehension worked also the other way around. Before Nagasaki became the terminal port of the Portuguese ships from China in 1571, the Jesuits tried to persuade the merchants to patronise the ports of those *daimyō* who were favourably inclined to their faith.²²⁸ With the exception of Funai – where the mission started in 1553 and in 1555 a hospital was founded – between the 1550s and the 1560s the Ignatians suffered several setbacks.²²⁹ The residences of Yamaguchi, Hakata and Hirado were shut down. As a matter of fact, in 1558 Matsuura Takanobu, believing that the Portuguese would still visit his harbours even without him being a patron of the Christian faith, expelled the missionaries and they reacted by directing the ships to other territories.²³⁰ In 1561, while the Portuguese were seeking a port which could serve as a base both for commercial and evangelical enterprises,²³¹ another *daimyō*, Ōmura Sumitada,²³² entered the competition to harbour the trade with the foreigners. The Superior of the Japan Mission, Father Cosme de Torres knew that it was recommendable to find a place in North-Eastern Kyūshū, therefore he sent a brother to inspect the eastern coast of the island. Afterwards, an agreement between Sumitada and Cosme de Torres was reached. The Japanese lord not only accepted the proposal for opening trade with the Portuguese at Yokoseura (near the modern port of Sasebo), but, eager to found a Christian community in his fiefdom, he donated to the missionaries half of the port town, so that the Christians could reside there without any disturbances. Furthermore, he promised to share the incomes from the

²²⁷ Cf. *HJ I*, pp. 270 and 298-299.

²²⁸ The description of the events in Bourdon, *La Compagnie de Jésus et le Japon 1547-1570*, pp. 420-431. See also Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 215 and *CHJ IV*, pp. 321-323. Between 1549 and 1571, the Portuguese ships arrived at Tanegashima, Hirado, Funai, Yokoseura, Satsuma, Fukada and Kuchinotsu. From 1571 onwards, with just two exceptions in 1579 and 1582, both at Kuchinotsu, the ships from China always docked at Nagasaki. Cf. *Lista dos annos, viagens, e Capitaes moores do trato de Jappão*, in BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-66*, ff. 41^v-42^v transcribed in Boxer, *Fidalgos*, pp. 273-276.

²²⁹ Cf. Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-29.

²³⁰ Cf. BNL/FG 4534, f. 112: ‘O remedio que humanamente se alcança [...] hé que não venhão Portugueses a este porto, porque tem grande proveito este senhor dos mercadores que lhe vem ao porto.’

²³¹ Although, the Portuguese merchants had elected Hirado as the most suitable harbor in Kyūshū, in 1561 following the murder of Captain Major Fernão de Sousa and his men in Hirado in front of a *Shintō* shrine, they had to move elsewhere.

²³² Ōmura Sumitada (1533-1587) was the second son of the *daimyo* of Arima, Haruzumi Sengan (1483-1566), but was adopted by Ōmura Sumiaki (?-1551) when he was four years old in order to seal an alliance between the two families. In the 1570s, he was beleaguered and nearly destroyed by a confederation of external and internal enemies led by his own brother Arima Yoshisada (1521-1577) and by Ryūzōji Takanobu (1529-1584). Owing to the Ryūzōji's expansionistic ambitions, Sumitada came into contact with the missionaries of the Society of Jesus, as he considered them as the means to come into possession of the Western military technology. Cf. Ribeiro, *Samurais Cristãos. Os Jesuítas e a Nobreza Cristã do Sul do Japão no Século XVI*, pp. 65-68. For a brief survey on the House of Ōmura see Elison, *Deus Destroyed*, pp. 88-91.

trade with the fathers and to exempt the Portuguese ships to pay the mooring fees.²³³ Moreover, he accepted the Christian faith with the name of Dom Bartolomeu.²³⁴ Both in 1562 and in 1563 the Portuguese dropped anchor in Yokoseura,²³⁵ but the idyll ended that very year. Owing to an uprising incited by Buddhist monks, the port of Yokoseura was turned into a heap of ashes. The confusion caused by the revolt, moreover, put the deals of that year in danger. Although the transactions had already been completed, in fact, the Japanese merchants were not able to check whether they had received as much silk as the quantity of silver they had paid. Apparently, the Portuguese tried to take advantage of the revolt to cheat the Bungo merchants, who did not react well. They killed some Portuguese and took the Jesuit Cosme de Torres and Luís Fróis prisoners. Eventually, however, the Portuguese paid off their debts and the Jesuits were freed.²³⁶

Although the situation ended well for both parties, the need for a safe port both for missionaries and for merchants became even more pressing and a solution was needed. In 1565, the Portuguese ship came back to Fukuda, also situated in Ōmura's territory. In 1567, however, the Great Ship of Tristão Vaz de Veiga went to Kuchinotsu in Arima, which represented a hard economic blow for Sumitada. Apparently, in order not to see the incomes of the trade with the Portuguese slip through his fingers, Ōmura himself went to Kuchinotsu to confer with Cosme de Torres. It is not clear whether Torres's subsequent actions were consequential to Sumitada's visit, still in that very year, the Spanish Jesuit sent Brother Luís de Almeida to proselytize the territory of a leading

²³³ Cf. CE, I, f. 109, Bourdon, *op. cit.*, pp. 433-434, Fujita, *Japan's Encounter with Christianity. The Catholic Mission in Pre-Modern Japan*, pp. 50-51 and Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 26-27. For a description of the port see CC, ff. 245^v-246^v.

²³⁴ Cf. Bourdon, *op. cit.*, pp. 419-452 and Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30. Although it is commonly stated that Sumitada was the first *daimyō* to have received the Christian faith, this statement has to be specified. When Sumitada received the sacred sacrament in 1563, in fact, his rank was that of *kokujin* [Glossary], which in the Japanese hierarchy is a lower rank than the *daimyō*. As Valignano wrote: 'En las partes de Shimo, en el señorío de las tierras de Omura, después de haber gastado algunos Padres cerca de trece años en Japón [...], llegaron a estado que convirtieron a un *kunishu* llamado Omuradono, hermano del *yakata* [Glossary] o rey de Arima [Arima Yoshinao].' *Sumario*, p. 272. As a matter of fact, it is highly probable that Sumitada wanted to acquire the Portuguese trade also to rise in rank. Valignano's quote is also a good example of the change happened from the 1580s in Jesuit understanding and communication of Japanese ranks and hierarchy. Before Valignano, in fact, the missionaries used European nomenclature (king, marquis, dukes...) to identify the Japanese hierarchy. Yet, Jesuit reports in the 1580s resorted to the use of Japanese words with the consequent disappearance of European titles. Cf. Pinto, "Japanese Elites as Seen By Jesuit Missionaries. Perceptions of Social and Political Inequality among the Elites", pp. 32-33.

²³⁵ In 1562, the Jesuits not only arranged for the Great Ship to come to Yokoseura, but also caused another *nao* and a Portuguese junk from Macao to be brought round from Hirado, where they had already berthed, to Sumitada's harbor. Three more Portuguese ships visited Yokoseura in 1563. Cf. *CHJ IV*, pp. 322-324.

²³⁶ See *Libro Primero del principio y progreso de la Religion christiana en Jappon, y dela especial providencia de que Nuestro Señor usa con aquella nueva Iglesia*, BL/Add. 9857, ff. 100^v-102^v.

vassal of Sumitada.²³⁷ Along with D. Bartolomeu's baptism, in fact, also his liege man Nagasaki Jinzaemon Sumikage received the sacrament and took the name of Bernardo. Bernardo's domain was situated on a long promontory on the Hizen coast, whence his family probably took their name.²³⁸ Only two years later, in 1569, Father Gaspar Vilela was invited there to baptize Bernardo's retainers and he also received the ground upon which a Buddhist temple – 'um pagode' – was erected to build a church, the famous *Todos os Santos*.²³⁹ These pieces of information all refer to Bernardo's territory, which was a small castle-town, *jōka-machi*,²⁴⁰ about a kilometre and a half away from the harbour-city, which only came into being a couple of years later, both bearing the name Nagasaki. Japanese and European sources regarding the birth of this new town differ. The former, which were compiled in the late 18th century, state that in 1571 Ōmura sent a retainer by the name of Tomonaga Tsushima to lay out the plan of the town and it was on the basis of this survey that the core of the town was edified.²⁴¹ The oldest European source, Luís Fróis's *História de Japam*,²⁴² on the other hand, asserts that through the suggestion of an imprecised father, D. Bartolomeu gave the promontory to divide among the Christians.²⁴³

Regardless of whether Nagasaki was a *Civitas Lusitanorum* or just a Japanese settlement with Portuguese influence,²⁴⁴ the Jesuits had finally found the perfect situation. They received a territory from a converted lord where they could at the same time mend the Japanese Christendom gathered there and deal with the Portuguese merchants. Yet, in Nagasaki, the interaction between trading souls and trading goods

²³⁷ See *CE*, I, f. 252: 'O anno passado [1567] mandou o Padre Cosme de Torres ao Irmão Luis Dalmeida a Nanguaçaqui o Senhor do qual vassallo de dom Bertolameu ja era Christão, onde o irmão fez muitos Christãos.' See also f. 253^v.

²³⁸ Nagasaki (長い崎) literally means long point of land, long promontory.

²³⁹ Cf. *CE*, I, f. 302^v and Boxer, *Christian Century*, pp. 99-100. With regard to Nagasaki, its story and foundation as a Portuguese settlement see Pacheco, "The Founding of the Port of Nagasaki and its Cession to the Society of Jesus", pp. 303-323, Curvelo, "Nagasaki, an European Artistic City in Early Modern Japan", pp. 23-35 and Elison, "Nagasaki: The Early Years of an Early Modern Japanese City", pp. 63-102.

²⁴⁰ 城下町

²⁴¹ Cf. Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-306 and Elison, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

²⁴² See *HJ II*, pp. 376-377.

²⁴³ Fróis' account is quite vague in details and this haziness might indicate lack of knowledge of the events in question. The sequence of the events, however, was described along the same lines also by Valignano in his *Apologia*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-58, f. 74^v and by Father Pedro Morejón as quoted in *Sumario*, I, p. 78, n. 52.

²⁴⁴ The debate took place in Elison, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-74 and in the review of the book where Elison's essay is published by Oliveira e Costa in the *e-Journal of Portuguese History*, Vol.7, number 2, Winter 2009 http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/html/issue14/html/jcosta.html

achieved a whole new level and this kind of symbiosis began with a man who united the two spheres in himself: Luís de Almeida.

Almeida was presumably born around 1525 in Lisbon, where he studied medicine and the humanities. He left for Goa in 1548 with the royal diploma to operate as a surgeon. In the *Estado da Índia* he engaged in business activities that took him to Malacca and, in 1553, to Hirado at the behest of the Portuguese trader-adventurer Duarte da Gama.²⁴⁵ In the mid-1550s, he was already quite known in Macao as one of the merchants involved with the Japan trade.²⁴⁶ In 1555, in fact, he went again to Hirado on board Duarte da Gama's ship. By that time, he was already a patron of the Society of Jesus's mission in Japan. In September, the Jesuit Baltasar Gago informed the confrères of the Portuguese Assistancy that Almeida had offered alms to a hospital for the poor in Bungo and sent 100 *cruzados* invested in musk (*almíscar*) to the Ignatians in Lisbon to have a retable made by artists there in Europe.²⁴⁷ Evidently, Almeida was not content with himself just helping the mission with his financial means, since in that year he started taking the spiritual exercises and began his novitiate.²⁴⁸ In 1556, he was received into the Society by Cosme de Torres, but was ordained as priest only in 1580 in Macao.²⁴⁹

His deeds in Japan included in particular tireless evangelization, having visited almost all Jesuit territories in Japan, as well as the medical activity he carried out in the hospital of Funai.²⁵⁰ Yet, what interests us more is what he left behind when he began his novitiate. As Fróis wrote:

‘Luiz de Almeida [...] foi o primeiro portuguez que em Japão foi recebido, e tudo o que tinha deixou à Companhia para sustentação dos Padres e Irmãos, e remedio dos pobres christãos; porque não tinham naquelle tempo os Padres outra couza mais, que as esmolos que os portuguezes lhe davão quando chegavão com seos navios a Japão, e do collegio de Goa erão providos do vinho das missas, seos vestidos, livros e alguns ornamentos.’²⁵¹

²⁴⁵ Cf. Faria, “The Functions of Procurator in the Society of Jesus. Luís de Almeida, Procurator?”, p. 37 and Bourdon, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-306.

²⁴⁶ Cf. Barreto, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

²⁴⁷ See CC, ff. 107-107^v.

²⁴⁸ See CC, ff. 108^v-109.

²⁴⁹ See *HJI*, p. 59, n. 3.

²⁵⁰ With regard to Almeida's activity once he entered the Society of Jesus see Carvalho, “Luís de Almeida, medico, mercador e missionário no Japão”, pp. 105-122. See also *DJ*, pp. 30-31 and p. 47.

²⁵¹ See *HJI*, pp. 59-60.

As confessed by Fróis, the Japan mission depended internally on the financial means of the College of Goa and externally on the alms and other economic aids from the Portuguese traders. As we saw, Almeida was one of those traders and his last deed as such was to bestow his fortune on the mission. Furthermore, in 1554 D. João III granted the Jesuits in Japan a royal donation of 500 *cruzados*²⁵² to be paid out of the Malacca customs,²⁵³ although this kind of help was often paid tardily.²⁵⁴ Fortunately for the missionaries, there were also impromptu aids. In 1556, the Portuguese Brother Pero de Alcáçova received from the Governor of Malacca Francisco Barreto two casks of silk, which, according to Luís Fróis, would grant the Japan mission an income of almost 1'000 *cruzados*.²⁵⁵

At any rate, the Ignatians with a minimum of experience in Japan always complained about the scarcity of financial resources. They used to complain both about the officers of the crown in the *Estado*, who did not comply with their jobs, and about the great poverty of the Japanese, due to the continuous wars between lords.²⁵⁶ Although *kirishitan daimyō*²⁵⁷ like Ōtomo Yoshishige²⁵⁸ managed to offer the

²⁵² In a later source – *Catalogus Tertius Seu Redituum Provinciae Indicae* – we see that the alms amounted to 600 *pardaus de oro*. See *DI VIII 1569-1573*, p. 481. One *pardau de ouro* was worth 360 *réis*, but in the second half of the 16th century it fluctuated between 360 and 400 *réis*. The *cruzado* was a Portuguese golden coin, principally used in Asia as currency exchange, whose value was fixed at 400 *réis* in 1517. Cf. Martini, *Manuale di metrologia ossia misure, pesi e monete in uso attualmente e anticamente presso tutti i popoli*, p. 279 and Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 313-314.

²⁵³ Cf. Bourdon, *op. cit.*, p. 374. Francis Xavier wrote that he could afford to remain in Japan more than two years thanks to the 'esmolas que ho cristianíssimo Rey de Portugal nos manda dar nestas partes'. Moreover, he added that when he left Lisbon for Goa, D. João III gave him 'pasamte de mil cruzados'. See *DJ*, p. 311.

²⁵⁴ In 1575, the year following his arrival in India, Alessandro Valignano complained with the general about the difficulty in collecting the subvention. Namely he wrote that '[I]e residenze che sono in Tanà et in Damano, con quelle di Coulam et della Costa di Travancor et Malacca, Malucco et Giappone vivono tutti d'una elemosina che li dà il Re di Portogallo ogn'anno, la quale, come che si ha da riscuotere da mano delli fattori et ufficiali de Sua Altezza, sono ordinariamente mal pagati et ci danno che fare'. See Alessandro Valignano to General Mercurian, Cochin, 4 December 1575. ARSI, *Goa* 47, ff. 42-58^v. Quote in f. 45^v. Transcribed in *DI X 1575-1577*, pp. 143-219. Four years later, he wrote again about this topic complaining that in the past six years the donation was issued not even in one occasion. See Valignano to Mercurian, Kuchinotsu, 5 December 1579. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 8 [I], f. 241. Sabino Sebastiano, from his part, criticized the fact that the secular officers who were supposed to deliver the subvention were not interested in doing so and neither were they zealous Christian believers. See *DI XI 1577-1580*, pp. 588-589.

²⁵⁵ See *DI III 1553-1557*, pp. 528-529.

²⁵⁶ With regards to the poverty of the Japanese people, both low and highborn, Valignano dedicated a paragraph in the *Sumario de las cosas que pertenecen a la Provincia de la Yndia Oriental*. Namely, he wrote that the Japanese '[s]on assi mismo por una parte tan pobres que es cosa de espanto ver con quan poca cosa se sustentan aun los reyes y señores, los quales tienen de tal manera repartidas sus tierras entre sus vassallos que aunque son dellos en todo servidos sin hazer nengun gasto quedan todavía poca renta comunmente'. See Rego, *Documentação para a História das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente*, vol. XII - Índia, p. 528.

²⁵⁷ 切支丹大名

missionaries annual revenues from their territories, the Japan mission always suffered from a pathological lack of financial means. For this reason the fortune the missionaries got hold of when Almeida became one of them was promptly and actively put at the service of the mission.

According to Gaspar Vilela, Almeida handed over to Cosme de Torres the important sum of 2'500 *cruzados*.²⁵⁹ Torres could not ignore the critical situation of the finances of the mission; he knew that with just the royal alms he could not look after Christendom, however small it was at that time, and he was also aware that Almeida's inheritance would not last forever. Hence, after having consulted with the former merchant, in 1557 he decided to invest the money, 'para que crescendo os ganhos, podessen sustentar os operarios'.²⁶⁰ Also at that early stage of the Portuguese presence in Japan, the trade that guaranteed a secure and profitable income was the *trato da seda*, i.e. the silk trade which basically can be described as the exchange of Japanese silver for Chinese silk. The following description, drawn from Vilela's letter to the General, shows us the earliest phase of the silk trade, that is before the *armação* contract was stipulated. Although the present work deals more specifically with an advanced stage of the trade, it is useful to be included it here, since it shows another example of the fervid

²⁵⁸ Ōtomo Yoshishige Sōrin (1530-1587), son of Ōtomo Yoshiaki (1502-1550), was the *daimyō* of Bungo from 1550 to 1578, when he handed over the rule to his son, Yoshimune, and was baptized, on 28 August. He When he took over the domain, he ruled over two provinces, Bungo e Higo, but when he retired, Ōtomo's domain included also Chikugo, Chikuzen and Buzen. He always kept a positive and helpful behaviour towards the Portuguese and the Jesuit missionaries. Cf. Schwade, "D.Francisco de Bungo e o seu projecto de fundar uma cidade cristã em Hyūga (Fiunga)", pp. 41-48 and Schurhammer, "Ein fürstlicher Gönner des hl. Franz Xaver: Ōtomo Yoshishige, König von Bungo", in *Varia*, Rome-Lisbon, 1965, pp. 327-334.

²⁵⁹ In the same year, Francisco Cabral wrote to Borja that Almeida's contribution to the mission amounted to four or five thousand *cruzados*. Cabral's letter is characterized by a strong criticism regarding the fathers participation in the trade and the use of silk robes, hence it not unlikely that he was exaggerating the numbers. Cf. Father Francisco Cabral to General Francisco de Borja, Nagasaki, 5 September 1571. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [II], f. 21. However, in another source, an inquiry about whole the missionaries of the Indian province ordained by General Diego Laínez, with regard to Luís de Almeida we read that 'levaria cinco mil cruzados consigo. Fez lá [in Japan] espirital, casa, igrejas, e sustenta os padres [...]'. Cf. *DJ*, p. 261. So, the doubt remains. Must we believe to Torres who was writing with the awareness of engaging in a forbidden practice and then might have sweeten the pill or should we trust a general inquiry redacted in Cochín and a critic who wrote fifteen years later? Be as it may, Almeida's donation to the mission granted him the second place in the list of the benefactors of the Japan mission. See *Titulo dos benfeitores principaes em Jappão*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, f. 98: 'O Padre Luiz de Almeida foi também hum dos primeiros benfeitores de Jappão, o qual sendo mercador honrado e rico se meteo la em Jappão na Companhia e lhe deixou esmola quatro ou sinco mil taeis os quais andarão empregados na carreira de China para Jappão, e dos ganhos delles se sustentavão os Padres e ministros daquela Christandade por não terem outra couza de que se sustentar'.

²⁶⁰ Cf. Father Gaspar Vilela to General Francisco de Borja, Goa, 3 November 1571. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [III], ff. 78-78^v.

relation between those two agents of the Portuguese Crown in the *Estado da Índia* and the earliest involvement of the Society of Jesus:

‘Todos os annos parte do porto de China hum navio caregado de seda [...] e miudezas²⁶¹ para Japão, cuja capitania he dada por el rei de Portugal a alguns fidalgos por seus sirvisos e que cada ano vai hum capitão novamente na nao que vai fazer a tal merqansia, do que tira ho capitão soo de huma viagem, com fretes a seu, 60 mil cruzados a mais.²⁶² Neste navio que digo, vai ho dinheiro da Igreja entregue a hum Portugues que leva e tras a modo de feitor²⁶³ este dinheiro, e vende-se toda a seda que vai na nao juntamente por mão de 4 mercadores [...]. Depois de vendida, ho dinheiro que nos cabe da seda que se vendeo se recolhe para sustentação dos Padres e Irmãos, a ho mais se torna a mandar a China.’²⁶⁴

According to Vilela, the beginning of the Jesuits’ participation in the silk trade was conceived as a one-time solution, but it is certain that between 1556 and the 1570s the missionaries participated on more than one occasion.²⁶⁵ Torres saw Almeida’s donation as a great opportunity to raise the finances of the mission and the investment actually paid off. The 2’500 cruzados invested in silk generated an income of 18’000-20’000 *cruzados*.²⁶⁶ At that time, the Japan mission belonged to the Society’s Indian province, which, on the one hand, meant that it had to maintain no colleges, seminars, or

²⁶¹ See Glossary.

²⁶² Alessandro Valignano, some thirty years later, would write that from a ‘viage de Japon [se] saca quarenta o cincuenta mil ducados’ and would compare the incomes of a Japan voyage with that of a fortress. See *Sumario*, p. 340. Cf. also Boxer, *Christian Century*, p. 106. These numbers are not corroborated by Jan Huyghen Van Linschoten who in 1598 wrote that the *Capitão-Mór* of the Japan voyage might easily earn between 150 and 200’000 ducats. Cf. Boxer, *Fidalgos*, p. 19. Linschoten’s estimate, however, seems a bit exaggerated even if compared with what wrote the Italian Jesuit Celso Confalonieri in 1622: ‘a cidade sempre a comprou [the Japan voyage] a oito mil ducados e [...] este anno rendeo sesenta nove mil ducados de fletes aos renderos, e foy dos piores annos.’ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 18 [I-II], f. 20. Takase in his article dedicated to the quantitative analysis of the Nagasaki-Macao trade demonstrated that there is no concordance throughout the documentation that covers almost the whole century of Portuguese presence in Japan. According to his study, which does not aim exactly to the quantification of the incomes of the Captain, the amount of investments made by the Portuguese in silk and other merchandises ranged from 400’000 ducats in the last quarter of the 16th century to more than 1’000’000 in the first thirty years of the 17th century. Cf. Takase, マカオ=長崎間貿易の総取引高・生糸取引量・生糸価格, pp. 51-60

²⁶³ See Glossary.

²⁶⁴ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [III], ff. 78^v-79.

²⁶⁵ In the aftermath of Almeida’s donation, the Japan mission invested twice in the silk trade, in 1557 and in 1559. Cf. Luís de Almeida to Melchor Nunes Barreto, Funai, November 1559, in *DJ*, p. 227: ‘Nos, o anno que V. R. se de qua foi [1556], não mandámos nada á China. O segundo anno muito pouco. Só este anno se mandou.’

²⁶⁶ Vilela wrote two letters of the same tenor to General Borja, one in November 1571 and the other in January 1572. In the first one he claimed that the income amounted to 18’000 *cruzados*, whereas in 1572 he wrote that ‘[f]oi este dinheiro crecendo, se vierão ajuntar 20 mill cruzados’. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [III], f. 88^v.

probationary houses at its own expenses.²⁶⁷ On the other hand, however, the two-thirds of that income were redirected to the headquarters in Goa, and only 6'000 *cruzados* were utilized for the needs of Japan alone. Although the number of Jesuits in Japan from Javier's arrival in 1549 to Vilela's letter in 1571 never exceeded fifteen units,²⁶⁸ 6'000 *cruzados* would not last forever. By that time, the annual expenses of the mission amounted to 2'000 *cruzados*, for just eight residences and fifteen Jesuits,²⁶⁹ hence it was clear what the mission needed: steady financial help from Rome, Lisbon or Goa or to keep on with what Cosme de Torres started.²⁷⁰

Participating in any trade whatsoever was an activity forbidden by the church from its very beginning. Later we will have the opportunity to face directly this topic, but even now we see what kind of attitude the missionaries took towards it. Vilela wrote this letter to Borja so that the general could ease his mind about the matter. Yet, as a matter of fact, criticism against Jesuits' participation in the trade arrived soon after 1556 and consequently Torres asked Provincial António de Quadros how they were supposed to proceed.

News about Jesuit participation in the silk trade had already reached Europe, otherwise Vilela would not have written such detailed information. Moreover, we may also infer that what Vilela wrote did not correspond to the truth. Firstly, from his words a reader might gather that the investment happened only once. Furthermore, Vilela wrote that the Japan mission received 6'000 *cruzados* out of the total 18'000 and he also explained that the expenses amounted at 2'000 *cruzados* per year. It is true that in 1571 the expenses were higher than in the 1550s, yet it is still hard to believe that they were able to endure fifteen years with just that capital. Probably they kept receiving alms from Portuguese merchants and Japanese converts, yet it is likely that the Society

²⁶⁷ To help us understand the expenses implied in being a territory *per se* there is an interesting document wrote in Macao in 1612 by the Italian Visitor Francesco Pasio. Pasio wrote a *formula* (recipe) to Acquaviva describing what kind of conditions had to be satisfied in order for someone to fund a residence. Namely, Pasio thought that the minimum amount of money needed were 1'000 *taéis*, that is 1'500 *cruzados*, 'dos quaes a metade se arriscaram pera com os ganhos della se sustentar a residencia e a outra metade ficara sem se arriscar, pera que perdendose huma metade, fique a outra.' See *Formula de aceçitar [sic] Residencias da Companhia em Japão e China, feita pello Padre Francisco Pasio Vizitador e aprovada per N. R. P. G. Claudio*, in RAH/Jes. *Legajo* 21, 9/7236 [I], ff.

²⁶⁸ For a diachronic analysis of the number of Jesuit in Japan from the outset with Javier to Hideyoshi's death in 1598, see Costa, "Os Jesuítas no Japão (1549-1598) – Uma análise estatística", pp. 17-47.

²⁶⁹ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [III], ff. 78^v-79. In the 1572-letter, maybe in the attempt of arousing sympathy in Rome, Vilela changed the expenses value a little bit: nine houses and three thousand *cruzados* per year. Cf. ARSI, *ivi*, f. 88^v.

²⁷⁰ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [III], f. 88^v.

engaged in the silk trade also during the 1560s. If it were not so, we would not be able to explain the following.

The oldest information produced in Rome against the Jesuits and the silk trade is a letter written in 1567 by the third superior general to António de Quadros, which was probably conceived as response to the pontiff's prohibition for all the missionary orders operating in the Portuguese *padroado* of engaging in any trade whatsoever.²⁷¹ Similar prohibitions, moreover, had been established by the Portuguese Crown even before the Portuguese arrived in India. Since at least the reign of D. Afonso V in the 15th century Portuguese kings had forbidden both men of the cloth and *fidalgos* to engage in commercial activities under threat of excommunication, because 'nom convem a seus estados'.²⁷² The same prohibition was reproduced also in the *Ordenações Manuelinas*²⁷³ and was also re-issued in the most important legislative code of the Catholic Monarchy, the *Codigo Philippino*.²⁷⁴ Although these are juridical texts, collections of laws inherent to the most different fields of the Portuguese and Spanish societies, also in here it appears a feature of the mentality that marked Europe from the Middle Ages until the Early Modern times: the consideration of commerce as a blameworthy activity and the consequent illicit act that came by being a part of it. Accordingly, during the reign of D. João III, the strong bond that tied House Avis to the commerce in the Flanders and in India appeared as something below the royal dignity. Partly due to difficult and erroneous economic managements and partly to the murmuring created by this kind of mentality, from the 1550s it can be noted a change in the royal policy with regard to the trade, namely the Portuguese factory in the Flanders shut down, there was a sensible decrease in tonnage of the ships engaged in the Cape route and the crown, in order to stimulate the participation of privateers in the commerce in the *Estado da Índia*, started to loose its strict control over the financial exchanges and established the system of concessions.²⁷⁵ Although at first the *fidalgos* preferred to sell their commercial rights to third parties in order to obtain lower, but ideologically unexceptionable, revenues, by

²⁷¹ The prohibition was issued by Pope Pius IV on 4 October 1563. See Borges, *The Economics of the Goa Jesuits 1542-1759. An Explanation of Their Rise and Fall*, p. 58.

²⁷² See *Ordenações do Senhor Rey D. Afonso V*, livro IV, titulo XXXXVII – Do Clerigo, ou Fidalgo, que compra pera reguatar, pp. 175-176

²⁷³ See *Ordenações do Senhor Rey D. Manuel*, livro IV, titulo XXXII – Do Fidalgo ou Clerigo ou qualquer outra pessoa que compra pera reguatar, pp. 78-80.

²⁷⁴ See *Codigo Philippino ou Ordenações e Leis do Reino de Portugal*, livro IV, titulo XVI – Que os Clerigos e Fidalgos não comprem para regatar, p. 798.

²⁷⁵ Cf. Costa, "O Império Português", pp. 102-103 and Subrahmanyam, *O Império Asiático Português*, pp. 123-125.

the time the Habsburgs had entered in Lisbon the situation was rather different, as demonstrated by this text:

‘Estes fidalgos, com esta sua tão apregoada nobreza, que parece não deveriam atender a outra coisa senão às armas e às letras – que são aquelas artes que detêm a primazia – são quase todos comerciantes, embora se mostrem inimigos mortais de tal nome, visto costumarem chamar comerciante a todo aquele que pretendem apelidar de pessoa baixa. E, no entanto, o que parece bem estranho, são comerciantes mais baixos do que tendeiros e a maior parte das riquezas que possuem ganharam-nas com o comércio’.²⁷⁶

For the European nobility participating in commerce or handling money was considered an activity that did not befit to their status. Nevertheless, however, eventually the allure of the gain proved to be stronger than the old traditions.

The power that comes with the amassing of capitals was watched with disdain not only in Europe. Economy has always had a bad relationship with the laws and with who made those laws, notwithstanding the place or time. Pre-modern Japan, for instance, represents a further example.

The foundation of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1603, would assure almost three centuries of peace throughout the Japanese archipelago with just the exception of the Ōsaka campaigns in 1614-1615, until the arrival of the U.S. Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1853.²⁷⁷ Only two years after the shogunate was born, Tokugawa Ieyasu gave up the *shōgun* seat and assumed the title of *ōgosho*, retired *shōgun*.²⁷⁸ By doing that, on the one hand Ieyasu granted the inheritance of the title and dodged commitments with the court; on the other hand, he was free to plan a socio-political order functional to the edification of a peaceful country, the so called *bakuhau taisei*.²⁷⁹ The Tokugawa *Bakufu*, in particular through the deeds of the first two *shōgun*, yearned to find a social justification for samurai’s hierarchic supremacy during a period when swords and spears were no longer useful, at least in the battlefields. Since the *Sengoku Jidai*, in fact, public authority – *kōgi*²⁸⁰ – was maintained in particular through military power, but also through political legitimization in front of the traditional authority as

²⁷⁶ See “Uma descrição de Portugal em 1578-80”, *apud NHP V*, p. 324.

²⁷⁷ With regard to the battle at the Ōsaka castle see Totman, *Tokugawa Ieyasu Shogun*, pp. 163-168.

²⁷⁸ 大御所

²⁷⁹ Cf. Leupp, *Servants, Shophands, and Laborers in the Cities of Tokugawa Japan*, pp. 9-12. See also Glossary.

²⁸⁰ 公儀

symbolized by the office of the *tennō* and through the *daimyō*'s ability to acquire power by gaining access to sources of wealth within his domain. Yet, it was with Toyotomi Hideyoshi and the first Tokugawa's *shōgun*,²⁸¹ that the general recognition of the *kōgi* as a status was achieved.²⁸² Since with the Tokugawa shogunate there was almost no need to demonstrate superior military force, the *bakufu* transformed the Japanese society in a "feudal" political system 'that froze life, deplored all innovations and made rigid distinctions within a very complex hierarchy of status divisions among retainers'.²⁸³ The Japanese society, following Hideyoshi's decrees of 1588,²⁸⁴ and 1591²⁸⁵, came to be divided into four hereditary status groups usefully called *shinōkōchō*,²⁸⁶ with the merchants relegated to the last step of the social pyramid. The quadripartite society had its ideological foundation in the Neo-Confucian philosophy²⁸⁷, according to which the *giri*,²⁸⁸ the duty or social obligation, represented one of the fundamental principles. The *chōnin*, however, respected another principle, that of *ninjō*,²⁸⁹ the human feelings. During the day, they hoarded cash, whereas at night they were the rich dwellers of the *kuruwa*,²⁹⁰ the authorized quarters of the city where the social distinctions did not count anymore and the only thing which could ensure anything was money, those capitals that samurai and nobles were not allowed to handle.

Differently from Europe, then, where the change in mentality corresponded also to a change in attitude toward commercial activities and handling money, in Japan the rigidity of the society generated a situation in which the merchants were despised and often deprived of both rights and resources, yet they were still essential because apart for them nobody had access to financial capitals.

²⁸¹ In the Japanese historiography this period corresponds roughly to early *Kinsei* 近世 period. It follows the *Chūsei* 中世 period and precedes the *Kindai* 近代. As to what years these periods correspond, Japanese historians did not reach an agreement yet. To get an impression of the different theories see Hall, Nagahara and Yamamura (eds.), *op. cit.*, Introduction, pp. 11-14.

²⁸² With regard to this topic see Sasaki and Toby, "The Changing Rationale of Daimyo Control in the Emergence of the *Bakuhatsu* State", pp. 271-294.

²⁸³ See Maruyama, *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, pp. 10-11.

²⁸⁴ The "sword-hunt", *Katanagari* 刀狩. For an analysis and the transcription of the edict see Berry, *Hideyoshi*, pp. 102-106

²⁸⁵ The "warrior-peasant separation", *Heinō Bunri* 兵農分離. Cf. Berry, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-111.

²⁸⁶ The locution is an abbreviation for *bushi* 武士 – the warrior elite, *nōmin* 農民 – farmers, *shokunin* 職人 – craftsmen, and *chōnin* 町人 – merchants.

²⁸⁷ Also called Zhu Xi philosophy (*shushigaku* 朱子学) from the name of its most important representative, the Chinese Zhu Xi (1130-1200), or simply Song philosophy (*sōgaku* 宋学) from the name of the Chinese dynasty (960-1279) when it was born.

²⁸⁸ 義理

²⁸⁹ 人情

²⁹⁰ 廓

We saw, then, what kind of relationship existed between the European laity and money. We can already foreshadow that for the men of the cloth the situation was even more complex. The aforementioned letter by General Borja, in fact, reads: ‘Ansi mismo de quanto nos descontenta el modo de sustentarse los nuestros en Japon con aquella grangearia poco segura, y menos edificativa; y como si ubiesse otra manera mas segura nos consolaramos todos’.²⁹¹ He also wrote to Cosme de Torres, inquiring the Spaniard about rumours he had heard regarding fathers dressed in silk and engaged in commercial activities. The letters arrived in Japan in 1571 when the post of superior had already taken over by the former soldier Francisco Cabral. The Portuguese reported to the superior general how to the increasing participation in the silk trade corresponded pervasive laxity and the infringement of the vote of poverty.²⁹²

Besides the unavoidable uneasiness regarding the involvement in a secular practice, both Rome and Lisbon grew worried about the financial situation of the mission. The 1570s was a busy decade in this regard. In January 1570, Borja invited the fresh-appointed visitor, Gonçalo Álvares, to use the Japan mission’s capital to buy estates in India, in order to stop the participation in the trade.²⁹³ The same year, D. Sebastião conceded to the mission an annuity of 500 *pardaos* in the Caranjá Island in Bassein.²⁹⁴ Exactly one year later, the Portuguese monarch corroborated this idea by granting the mission licence to buy real estate in India up to the value of 600’000 *réis*,²⁹⁵ whereas on 26 February 1574 he augmented his grandfather’s subvention of 500 *cruzados* paid in the Malaca customs to a perpetual annual alms of 1’000 *cruzados* for the foundation of a college in Japan.²⁹⁶ Between 1574 and 1584 the Ignatians in Japan bought three villages (*aldeias*) in the Province of the North in India,²⁹⁷ in order to derive income from the renting of lands and the management of granaries (Table 1).²⁹⁸ The

²⁹¹ See General Francisco de Borja to Provincial António de Quadros, Rome, 8 October 1567. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-56, f. 198. See also *Sumario*, I, p. 42*.

²⁹² See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [I], f. 21. See also *Sumario*, I, pp. 42-43 and *VMP*, I, pp. 205-209.

²⁹³ See *DI VIII 1569-1573*, p. 189.

²⁹⁴ See Valignano’s *Sumarjo de todos os collegios, e casas, residencias, e pessoas, rendas, e gastos, que tem a província da Companhia na India feito no anno de 1586*, in BNCR/FGes. 1274, f. 12^v.

²⁹⁵ See *DI VIII 1569-1573*, pp. 406-407.

²⁹⁶ The text in RAH/Jes. *Legajo 21, 9/7236 [III]*, f. 959.

²⁹⁷ *Provincia do Norte* was the name given to the Portuguese fortresses and claimed territories in northern India, namely Diu, Daman and Bassein.

²⁹⁸ The three villages, situated in the island of Salsette, were Ponvém, bought in 1574 for 1’400 *pardaos*, Condotim, bought in 1577 for 4’000 *pardaos* and Mulgão, bought in 1584 for 5’000 *pardaos*. See *Lista do que rendem as fazendas que os Padres da Provincia de Japam tem neste Norte nas quatro Aldeas de El Rey Dom Sebastiam da glorioza memoria passado no anno de 1571*, AHU, Cód. 1659, ff. 143-148 and *Titulo dos bens de raiz de Jappão*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 94^v-97^v. In addition to the three *aldeias*,

Caranjá revenue and two of the three villages were bought partly with the money the Goan College owed to the Japan mission and partly with the money Luís de Almeida handed over to Torres back in 1555, whereas the third *aldeia* came into Jesuit possession after Pope Gregory XIII with the Brief *Mirabilia Dei* conceded the annual allowance of 4'000 *cruzados* paid off the *officii collectoriae iurium Camere Apostolicae in Hispanie regnis*.²⁹⁹

The royal licence issued by D. Sebastião in 1571 did not contrast the dictates of the Roman theology; yet Portuguese legislature had to pass through several stages before D. Sebastião could issue that licence. *O Desejado*'s permit, in fact, allowed the Japan mission to buy *fazendas* both normal and *reguengas*. The *reguengos* were those lands conquered and then incorporated within the royal possessions for which the tenant was supposed to pay an annual tribute, called *foro*, to the king. According to the Portuguese legislature, the Society of Jesus paid the *foro* for the *aldeias* it had acquired in the Province of the North, although initially the tax was deducted from the payments the Society received in the Malacca customs (see Tables 2 and 3).

We have already alluded to the relationship between the faithful Christians and the trading world and more will come later. Commerce, however, was not the only inconvenient activity in which the Roman Church became involved. This topic started much before the Jesuit Japan mission was founded and it still stirs (apologetic) historiography.³⁰⁰ The Jesuit historian Serafim Leite, for example, wrote that the Roman Church 'pode possuir bens, e sempre os possuiu'.³⁰¹ As a matter of fact, during the

there was another village, Mulgão, which was illegally incorporated within Jesuits' estates. As a consequence, the Goan government placed the *aldeia* under scrutiny but the Society eventually won the controversy. See Teixeira, *Baçaim e o seu Território: Política e Economia (1534-1665)*, pp. 338-339. Moreover, it would seem that the Ignatians came in possession of high-value territories, since the Portuguese community in Bassein made some complaints. In 1579, Valignano wrote to Mercurian to give to the general a detailed account on the finances of the Japan mission. With regard to the purchase of other *aldeias* he wrote that: 'né meno si può comprare nell'India, perché ancora nell'India non se ritruova altra cosa stabile sotto la giurisdittione de S. A. che alcune ville nelle terre di Bazzaino, le quali sono si poche per li molti portughesi che ivi sono, che per comprare quel poco ch'ivi habbiamo si causò molta mormoratione, & molto scandalo, lamentandosi molti che noi occupavamo per noi tutta quella terra'. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 8 [I], f. 240^v. For a wider description of Jesuits' possessions in the Province of the North in the early and later modern era see Borges, "Jesuit Economic Interests in the Portuguese Province of the North till the mid-18th century", pp. 49-56. For the incomes of the Japan mission from its outset to the mid 17th century see Rodrigues, "Local Sources of Funding for the Japanese Mission", pp. 115-137.

²⁹⁹ See BNCR/FGes. 1274, ff. 12^v-13. For a list of the payments issued in Madrid from 1603 up to 1639 see *Registro de la recaudación de la renta pontificia para el Japon, que se paga en la Nunciatura madrileña*, RAH/Cor. 9/2665, ff. 115-167^v.

³⁰⁰ See HCJB^{II} IV, pp. 165-166.

³⁰¹ See HCJB^{II} IV, p. 167.

Early Middle Ages the popes were the greatest landowners of all.³⁰² By that time, the canon law began to allow land possession also to a high degree, but the problems arose when the secular powers mingled with Rome's possessions and broke the *ecclesiasticam immunitatem*. With regard to this sensitive matter of jurisdiction, Pope Honorius III wrote an 'epistula decretal' decreeing excommunicated anyone who just 'induzem costumes contra a liberdade Ecclesiastica',³⁰³ and the concept was later revived by Boniface VIII.³⁰⁴ With regard to the Portuguese Kingdom, several accords (*concordias*) were signed between the reigning house and the Holy See in order to discipline such matters. The first *concordia* we know of was signed between D. Sancho II and Pope Gregory IX on 25 November 1238, in which the king swore to 'goardar, et pòr em execução os artigos da liberdade Ecclesiastica'.³⁰⁵ D. Sancho's oath was not respected in its interity by King Dinis I, who, on 1 July 1317, declared that religious orders and monasteries were not allowed to inherit land properties, because it would be a detriment to the reign.³⁰⁶ The same was established by the first king of the House of Avis, D. João I, who also established that any property acquired without the king's licence had to be handed over to the crown within a year from the issue of the charter.³⁰⁷ Basically, D. João I was trying to ascertain through a juridical lens the amount of territory legally and illegally possessed by the church in Portugal, which then logically led to the incorporation within Avis's territories of the illegal areas. At first, D. João I did not include the *reguengos* within the territories the church could possess. Some years later, however, João, along with the infant Duarte, signed a *concordia* that

³⁰² The Church first became a significant landowner during the pre-Carolingian period, from about the fall of Rome until the mid-eights century. This stage was followed by a threefold increase of those holdings from 751 until 825. During the third stage, centred in the 10th century, the first serious attacks upon Church property occurred. Some property was secularized, but such losses were often offset by additional generous donations of land. In the fourth stage, from the mid-tenth to the mid-eleventh century, the attrition of Church property was temporarily halted and even reversed, especially in Spain, southern France and, somewhat later, Italy. Cf. Herlihy, "Church Property on the European Continent, 701-1200", pp. 81-105.

³⁰³ See *Parecer Sobre a Lei do Reino sobre esta Matéria de Imunidade Eclesiástica*, ANTT/AJ, Livro 13, f. 103.

³⁰⁴ *Ivi*, f. 108.

³⁰⁵ See *Raccolta di Concordati su Materie Ecclesiastiche tra la Santa Sede e le Autorità Civili*, p. 59 and *Parecer donde se intenta concluir que o Príncipe Secular não tem jurisdição sobre as pessoas e bens Ecclesiasticos*, ANTT/AJ, Livro 13a, f. 196^v.

³⁰⁶ See *Ordenações de D. Dinis, D. Afonso IV e D. João I sobre os Mosteiros e Igrejas não comprarem Rendas*, ANTT/AJ, Livro 13, ff. 50-50^v.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

extended the church rights also to those territories,³⁰⁸ therefore enabling almost a century later D. Sebastião to give the 1571-licence.

In addition to canon and Portuguese law, however, we have to take into account also the internal statute of the Society of Jesus, the Constitutions drawn up by Ignacio de Loyola. In a later emendation of the chapter regarding the ‘pobreza y cosas consiguientes á ella’ we read that only probationary houses and colleges were authorized to possess landed property.³⁰⁹ Yet, the Japan Mission/Vice-province owned estates, those in India we have just seen, but also, from the 17th century, in the kingdom.³¹⁰

At any rate, the earnings that came from Salsette were used to buy sacramental wine, oil and the provision (*matalotage*) for those missionaries en route from Goa to Japan.³¹¹ In the summary Alessandro Valignano wrote in Goa in 1586, we also find the total amount of expenditure in Portugal, India and Macao made on account of the Japan Vice-province. The Italian father wrote that that expenditure amounted to 1’072\$000 *réis* (2’680 *cruzados*), which alone represented almost one third of the whole income of the vice-province (3’303\$000 *réis*, 8258 *cruzados*).³¹²

Between 1572 and 1573, however, the Society of Jesus lost two valuable members. First, the Superior General Francisco de Borja and then Gonçalo Álvares, who died en route for Japan in July 1573.³¹³ Their replacements, in particular with

³⁰⁸ See *Concordias feitas perante el Rey Dom João, e o Infante Dom Duarte seu filho e todos os Prelados de Portugal e Cabidos*, ANTT/AJ, Livro 13, ff. 82^v-84^v.

³⁰⁹ See *Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinae Et Hispanicae Cum Earum Declarationibus*, p. 189: ‘Alterar lo que toca á la pobreza sería alargar la mano á tener alguna renta ó posesion para el uso proprio, ó para Sacristía, ó para fábrica, ó para algun otro fin, fuera de lo que toca á los Colegios y Casas de probacion’. Cf. also *HCJB*^I I, p. 41, and IV, pp. 165-168 and Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise - The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond, 1540-1750*, pp. 382-383.

³¹⁰ By 1635 the Japan Province and the Colleges of Old St. Paul’s, Bassein, Taná and Damão could claim the land revenues of 29 villages, district centres or village wards in the Northern Province. Situated in the southwestern part of Goa territory near the Salt River were three other villages whose income became vital to more than one Jesuit facility: the town of Assalona (modern Assolna) and its two neighbours, Velim and Ambelim. Despite these exceptions, the restriction to possess estates was not removed until 1892 (24th General Congregation). Alden, *ibid.* With regard to estates in the kingdom, see *Auto de posse, que tomou o P. Jorge de Gouvea como procurador de Japão das cazas da Cordoaria Velha, e das que estão a Sam Paulo, e das que estão na rua dos fornos iunto ao troco año 1615*, ANTT/CJ, Maço 86, ff. 1-4.

³¹¹ See Rego, *op. cit.*, p. 543 and BNCR/FGes. 1274, ff. 13^v-14.

³¹² See BNCR/FGes. 1274, f. 14^v: ‘Somão as ojtó adiçõis de cima que se gastão em Portugal, na India, e na China, a conta de Japão [...] hum conto e setenta e quatro mil réis, os quais descontados dos tres contos trezentos e tres mil e nove centos réis, que somão as rendas de Japão, ficão dous contos duzentos e vjnta [sic] nove mil e nove çentos réis’.

³¹³ See *DI VII 1566-1569*, pp. 16*-17* and *DI IX 1573-1575*, p. 295.

regard to Álvares, would open a new phase in the history of the Society of Jesus and the evangelization of Asia that will take us closer to the main subject of this work.

TABLE 1

ACCOUNTS OF THE *ALDEIAS* IN THE PROVINCE OF THE NORTH
BELONGING TO THE JAPAN MISSION BOUGHT AFTER THE 1571-*ALVARÁ*

Village	Revenues	Expenses	Net Yield	Equivalence
Ponvém	434 <i>pardaos</i> , ³¹⁴ 3 <i>larins</i> ³¹⁵ and 16 <i>bazarucos</i> ³¹⁶	363 <i>pardaos</i> , 1 <i>larim</i> and 15 <i>bazarucos</i>	70 <i>pardaos</i> , 3 <i>larins</i> and 1 <i>bazarucos</i>	25\$200 réis 63 <i>cruzados</i>
Condotim	396 <i>pardaos</i> , 2 <i>larins</i> and 2 <i>bazarucos</i>	206 <i>pardaos</i> , 3 <i>larins</i> and 7 <i>bazarucos</i>	189 <i>pardaos</i> , 3 <i>larins</i> and 15 <i>bazarucos</i>	68\$000 réis 170 <i>cruzados</i>
Mulgão	404 <i>pardaos</i> and 1 <i>larim</i>	310 <i>pardaos</i> , 3 <i>larins</i> and 7 <i>bazarucos</i>	130 <i>pardaos</i> , 2 <i>larins</i> and 15 <i>bazarucos</i>	46\$800 réis 117 <i>cruzados</i>
Marol	1480 <i>pardaos</i> , 3 <i>larins</i> and 14 <i>bazarucos</i>	851 <i>pardaos</i> , 3 <i>larins</i> and 4 <i>bazarucos</i>	728 <i>pardaos</i> , 3 <i>larins</i> and 10 <i>bazarucos</i>	262\$000 réis 655 <i>cruzados</i>
SUBTOTAL			1020 <i>pardaos</i> and 3 <i>larins</i>	367\$200 réis 918 <i>cruzados</i>
Expenses for the procurator of the villages			184 <i>pardaos</i>	66\$240 réis 166 <i>cruzados</i>
TOTAL			836 <i>pardaos</i> , 3 <i>larins</i> and 1 <i>bazaruco</i>	301'000 réis 752 <i>cruzados</i>

Source: *Lista do que rendem as fazendas que os Padres da Provincia de Japam tem neste Norte nas quatro Aldeas de El Rey Dom Sebastiam da glorioza memoria passado no anno de 1571*, AHU, Cód. 1659, ff. 143-148

³¹⁴ As specified earlier (see note 226), during the 16th century the *pardao de oro* had not a fixed valued, fluctuating between 360 and 400 réis. In this case, I made the equivalences by fixing the value at the minimum, i.e. 1 *pardao de oro* = 360 réis.

³¹⁵ The *larim* was a silver coin which was worth between 60 and 100 réis. See *Glossario Luso-Asiático*. In this case, four *larins* made for one *pardao*.

³¹⁶ Ancient small coin used in the Portuguese India with different values, but when first coined in 1510 it was worth two réis. It was made of different metals, such as copper, tin, and lead. See *Glossario Luso-Asiático*.

TABLE 2.1

REVENUES OF THE THREE *ALDEIAS* IN 1586

Village	Gross revenue	Net revenue	Equivalences
Ponvém	280 <i>pardaos</i>	280 <i>pardaos</i>	100\$800 <i>réis</i> 252 <i>cruzados</i>
Condotim	480 <i>pardaos</i>	480 <i>pardaos</i> ³¹⁷	172\$800 <i>réis</i> 432 <i>cruzados</i>
Mulgão	650 <i>pardaos</i>	500 <i>pardaos</i> ³¹⁸	180\$000 <i>réis</i> 450 <i>cruzados</i>
TOTAL	1'410 <i>pardaos</i>	1'260 <i>pardaos</i>	453\$600 <i>réis</i> 1134 <i>cruzados</i>

Source: Alessandro Valignano, *Sumarjo de todos os collegios, e casas, residencias, e pessoas, rendas, e gastos, que tem a provincia da Companhia na India feito no anno de 1586*, BNCR/FGes. 1274, ff. 12^v-13^v.

TABLE 2.2


REVENUES OF THE THREE *ALDEIAS* IN 1615

Village	Gross revenue	Net revenue	Equivalences
Ponvém	564 <i>pardaos</i> , 1 <i>larim</i>	564 <i>pardaos</i> , 1 <i>larim</i> .	203\$100 <i>réis</i> 508 <i>cruzados</i>
Condotim	399 <i>pardaos</i> and 2 <i>larins</i>	399 <i>pardaos</i> and 2 <i>larins</i>	144\$000 <i>réis</i> 360 <i>cruzados</i>
Mulgão	541 <i>pardaos</i> , 2 <i>larins</i> and 20 <i>bazarucos</i>	372 <i>pardaos</i> , 1 <i>larim</i> and 20 <i>bazarucos</i>	134\$000 <i>réis</i> 335 <i>cruzados</i>
TOTAL	ca 1'505 <i>pardaos</i>	ca 1'336 <i>pardaos</i>	481\$000 <i>réis</i> 1202 <i>cruzados</i>

Source: *Titulo dos bens de raiz de Jappão*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 94^v-97^v.

³¹⁷ The incomes from Ponvém and Condotim did not pay the *foro*. As I mentioned before, the *foro* was not collected because the respective value – 60 *pardaos* for Ponvém and 80 for Condotim – was levied on the 1'000 *cruzados* that the Society received in the Malacca customs. Cf. AHU, Cód. 1659, ff. 143-144 and BNCR/FGes. 1274, f. 12^v.

³¹⁸ Valignano complained that out of the 650 *pardaos* of revenue, the Japan Vice-province had to pay 150 *pardaos* as *foro* to the Basseim customs, although the Jesuits obtained an *alvará* stating that also that annuity should have been levied in Malacca. Yet, as appears clearly in Table 3, also twenty years later the situation would remain unchanged. Cf. BNCR/FGes. 1274, f. 13^v.



Source: BNCR/FGes. 1274, ff. 12^v-13^v and BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-66, ff. 94^v-97^v.

II. 3. 3. The Japan Jesuits and the *armação* contract

In the summer of 1579, the Procurator of the Portuguese Assistancy in Lisbon, the Italian Sebastiano Sabino, wrote a worried epistle to General Everard Mercurian informing the Belgian about a habit that was infecting the Society of Jesus.³¹⁹ Sabino was reporting what he had heard from Father Afonso Pacheco, the mission procurator sent to Europe to enlighten the Society about what kind of modifications had been conceived in and for the Province of India after the arrival of the new Visitor, Alessandro Valignano. Pacheco reported that the fathers in India, included the Father Superior in Japan Francisco Cabral, were akin to ask D. Henrique I a licence to buy a share of the silk which was sent yearly from Macao to Nagasaki. They believed it was easier for the province and less detrimental for the crown to acknowledge their participation in the silk trade instead of bestowing further donations, since the one they already had by the Portuguese kings was seldom collected.³²⁰

As showed earlier, the Curia Generalizia was already aware of the interference of the missionaries of the Society of Jesus in the Macao-Nagasaki trade. As a matter of fact, Gonçalo Álvares had been instructed to divert the incomes of the Japan mission towards those financial instruments that were considered licit means of earning by Rome. Owing to Álvares's death, however, it was necessary to appoint rapidly a substitute. One of the principal duties assigned to Father Alessandro Valignano along with the appointment as 'Visitatorem Societatis nostræ in universa India Orientali'³²¹

³¹⁹ See Procurator of the Portuguese Assistancy Sebastiano Sabino to General Everard Mercurian, Lisbon, 20 August 1579. ARSI, *Lus.* 68, f. 227^v: 'mi pare si vada introducendo nella Compagnia, sotto alcun colore, simil peste de religione'.

³²⁰ Sabino was informing Mercurian not only about the silk trade. The college of Santo Antão and the residence of São Roque, both in Lisbon, in fact, had previously received a royal permit to import from India cargos of indigo and other spices, as well as the exemption to pay the customs fees and the freight charges. ARSI, *Ibid.* See also Father Emmanuel Teixeira to General Francisco Borja, Cochim, 10 February 1571. ARSI, *Goa 12 [I]*, f. 67^v: 'A cassa de São Roque de Lixboa ajudamos aqui quoanto podemos, em lhe negociar hum alvytre ou esmola que S. A. d'El-Rei de Portugal lhe faz pera ajuda do edifficio daquela cassa, e asi os ajudaremos quanto nós poderemos enquoanto V. P. outra cousa não ordenar. Este ano de 70 largou S. A. o contrato que tinha das especearias a todas as pessoas que em Portugal lhe paguasem certos direitos. Escreverão-nos os Padres de Portugal lhe mandasemos empregado todo o dinheiro que poderemos, como fizemos mandando-lhe hos mil pardaos que aqui tomamos a cambyo empregados com outro emprego que já estava feito. Mas com este largar das especiarias parece-lhes aos homens ficar já isto em puro tracto; e, conforme a iso, falão quá niso, e pode ser que ajudando-se de em Portugal andar a Companhia no paço. Se a V.P. parecer que isto pede avisar-se disto em Portugal pera que, se for posivel, mudar-se este alvitre ou esmola em outra cousa, como se ffez a dos Collegios de Coimbra e Santo Antão, parecia quá conveniente e quasi necessario, segundo o que vemos e ouvimos'.

³²¹ Patent of appointment in ARSI, *Hist. Soc.* 61, f. 3. See also *Sumario*, p. 9* and *VMP*, I, pp. 35-36.

was to look after the economic conditions of the India Province, along with the faculty to allow the silk trade or to put an end to it.³²²

During the sea voyage from Cochin to Goa, Valignano wrote a long document in which he gave to Mercurian a summary account of the state of the province following point by point the general's instruction he had received in Lisbon the year before (1574). They are a total of 32 points, which give us an idea of the subjects that appeared important to the head of the Society. The 22th point is the one regarding the silk trade, a matter that Valignano knew better than to face it alone.³²³ Yet, Valignano's knowledge was based solely on what his fellows had written or informed him about, not on his own experience; hence he did not want to express any definite opinion.³²⁴

Therefore, in December 1575, he gathered the most influent fathers of the province in Choraó to analyse several urgent issues. The 45th query (*pregunta*) regarded whether or not the Jesuits were to cease to participate both in the spice commerce in the Maluku Islands, in which was tangled up the College of São Roque in Lisbon, and in the trade between Macao and Nagasaki.³²⁵ With regard to the latter, although it was eventually decided that it was not advisable to modify anything before Valignano could judge the situation *in loco*, two opinions came out, one liberal and one orthodox. The former was supported by eleven out of thirteen fathers and basically stated that the commerce was to be allowed, provided that it was limited to the minimum necessary to maintain the missionaries, who were actually in need of further subventions beside the alms of 1'000 *cruzados* conceded by D. Sebastião.

The liberal party added also a more practical point, which rebounded directly into the evangelization process since it included the passage from Macao to Japan. As we saw, the papist missionaries bound for Japan used to cross the Chinese Sea aboard the Portuguese *Nao do Trato*, a channel quite expensive, even for the ministers of God. Inside these carracks, there were specific and costly rooms (*cámaras*), where the passengers could put their belongings. However, the merchants were granted a *cámara*, whose size was accorded to the amount of *fretes* they paid on the loaded goods. The tax

³²² See *Apologia*, f. 87: 'Y en el año de 73 siendo yo embiado de Roma por nuestro P. General Everardo Mercuriano, por Visitador dela India, y Japon entre los otros puntamientos truxe este, es a saber que examinasse con mucha diligencia la preciosa necesidad que havia desta ayuda con facultad de pirlmitirla o quitarla en todo o em parte, conforme alo que pareciesse necessario'.

³²³ See ARSI, *Goa* 47, ff. 42-58^v and *DIX* 1575-1577, pp. 143-219. Cf. *VMP*, I, pp. 48-51.

³²⁴ Cf. for instance what he wrote to General Mercurian in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [I], f. 306.

³²⁵ See ARSI, *Goa* 47, ff. 17-35^v and *DIX* 1575-1577, pp. 228-313.

on the goods was never as expensive as the purchase of a *cámara* alone. Therefore, the Ignatians looked to the trade not only as a means of support but also as a cheaper way to reach Japan. Although it is likely that adding an economic reason in order to justify a dubious economic activity did not find favourable responses, also here it emerges how the economic management of the evangelization was one of the crucial points for its success.

The orthodox faction, on the other hand, considered the meddling in the trade immoral and urged to abandon it as soon as possible. They preferred to slow the proselytization by diminishing the quantity of the missionaries to an affordable number until other ways of financing the mission were found, instead of mingling in such unfit activities.³²⁶

Valignano, for his part, felt compelled to explain his own position in a private letter to Mercurian. He confessed that he would rather line up with the orthodox party, yet he carefully avoided to express definitive statements and postponed any decision to the time when he could judge with his own eyes.³²⁷

Nevertheless, he did not want to waste time either. Hence, he sent Mercurian the proceedings of the *consulta* at Choraó and a letter to Cabral in Japan asking the Portuguese several things, among which appeared also a request for delucidations about the silk trade. In order to provide judicious answers, Cabral convened a consultation in Kuchinotsu by the end of 1576. With regard to the capital needed in Japan, the meeting deliberated that 15'000 *cruzados* per year would be enough to cover both the missionaries' (5'000 *cruzados*) and the buildings' expenses (10'000 *cruzados*). Furthermore, the fathers complained about how uncertain the royal subvention in Malacca was and concluded by stating that the mission would be better off if it could have a fixed share of 90 *picols*³²⁸ of silk in the trade with Macao.³²⁹

The general idea that came out of Kuchinotsu was shared also by Francisco Cabral. During his first ten years in Japan, Cabral stressed in more than one occasion

³²⁶ Cf. ARSI, *Goa* 47, ff. 30-30^v and *DI X 1575-1577*, pp. 294-295.

³²⁷ See Visitor Alessandro Valignano to General Everard Mercurian, Choraó, 30 December 1575. ARSI, *Goa* 47, ff. 103-108^v. Quotation in f. 107: 'Quanto al tratto della Cina sto in dubbio per le lettere che di là scrivono; tuttavia mi par migliore la 2da opinione, ma non si farà mutatione finché habbi visitato quelle parti, benché, come già scrissi, al presente il tratto è nullo o molto poco, perché persero tutto il capitale'. See also *DI X 1575-1577*, pp. 360-387.

³²⁸ See Glossary.

³²⁹ Cf. *Sumario*, pp. 42*-43* and *VMP*, I, pp. 229-230.

that financial support was even more urgent than to have more missionaries and he also solicited Valignano not to send more missionaries until a stable income was found.³³⁰

Once Valignano had received both Kuchinotsu's answers to his questionnaire and Cabral's letter, he forwarded them to Rome, where they arrived by the end of 1578. The answer provided by Mercurian roughly exemplifies the attitude the Curia would maintain during the years towards the silk trade: at first a strong objection, then, after having received further data about it a more rational opening.³³¹ The general, in fact, had already sent his answers to the proceedings of the consultation of Chorao and he had proved to be contrary to the participation of the Society in any trade whatsoever. Yet, when he received Cabral's letter to Valignano and the records of the Kuchinotsu meeting he wrote:

'Quanto al trato delos nuestros de Iapon, me ocurre dizir a V. R. que aunque en las respuestas dela congregacion se determino que del todo se quitasse, todavia vistas las razones que el Padre Francisco Cabral escribe en su carta a V. R., me parece que pueda suspender la execucion hasta otro aviso nuestro que daremos luego que ternemos informacion de V. R. acerca de lo que iuzga de ver se hazer en el dicho negocio'.³³²

Valignano only received Mercurian's answers in 1580, when he had already reached Japan.³³³ As a matter of fact, after leaving Goa, the visitor spent ten months in Malacca, and eventually arrived in Macao on 6 September 1578.³³⁴ There, in the Portuguese *entrepôt*, the Italian changed radically his opinion about the Jesuits' participation in the trade and he also moved the first official steps for that participation to be acknowledged by the Macao's mercantile community and eventually by the political and religious authorities in Europe.

It did not take long for the Italian Jesuit to evaluate objectively in what conditions the Japan mission was. Although in Chorao he aligned himself with the group of Jesuits opposite to the commerce, three months in Macao were enough to make him change his mind. To be precise, in a letter to Mercurian written in December he wrote that unless the alms for the mission would be as high as six or eight thousand

³³⁰ See Father Cabral to General Mercurian, Nagasaki, 1578. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 8 [II], ff. 201-204^v.

³³¹ Cf. *Cousas que pertencem à Vice-Provincia do Jappão*, BPE, *Cód. CXVI/2-11*, n.º 44, pp. 7-8. A copy of this document also in BL/Add. 9860, ff. 265-268.

³³² See General Mercurian to Visitor Valignano, Rome, 4 December 1578. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, f. 2^v.

³³³ Cf. *Sumario*, p. 42*.

³³⁴ Cf. *VMP*, I, pp. 36-37.

cruzados per year, it would be impossible to step out of the silk trade. Japan – Valignano wrote – was a country weakened and impoverished by civil wars, whose endemic poverty obliged the fathers to sustain on their own the heavy burdens of the mission, such as the expenditures of each residence, churches’ ornaments, alms to the poor and presents to *daimyō* and other lords, who ‘no hazen ninguna cosa sino por interes’.³³⁵ According to Valignano, the fathers in Japan were in need of about 6-8’000 *cruzados* per year, which although represents almost a half less than what established in Kuchinotsu two years before, the visitor would more or less confirm this assessment also after he had spent more than a year in Japan.³³⁶ Notwithstanding this difference, however, also Valignano came to the conclusion that participating in the silk trade was inevitable, since, as he said, the Japan Jesuits were ‘fundati nell’aere’,³³⁷ that is to say that they completely lacked financial stability. It is around this time that the Italian gave the first apology of their involvement:

‘[E]mbian los Padres por sus procuradores forasteros cada anno ocho o diez mil cruzados a comprar ceda aqui em la China, la qual se viende despues en Japon con la ceda delos otros, de que va a Japon cada anno cargada una nave, y con las ganancias deste caudal hazen los Padres todos aquellos gastos, y aunque esto todo lo saben todos los Portugueses, toman lo bien, porque ven claramente que no se puede dotra manera aquella Cristandad conservar y que lo menos que se gasta es con los Padres, los quales viven en Japon muy parcamiente, y aunque este modo de tratar es muy contrario ala professio de religiosos, todavia neste caso, parece que cede el Jus politico al natural y ala caridad cristiana, porque realmiente no se puede la cristianidad desta manera conservar, y por esto el tratar de quitar este trato no puede ser sino alcançandose primeiro modo y renta para se poder sustentar.’³³⁸

There is a part of this quote in particular that merits our attention. Before entering the Society of Jesus in 1566, Alessandro Valignano had acquired the doctorate *in utroque iure* at the University of Padua in 1557 and being a jurisconsult would marked his

³³⁵ See Visitor Valignano to General Mercurian, Macao, 1 December 1578. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 8 [I], ff. 213-216^v. Quote in f. 215.

³³⁶ On 5 December 1579 he wrote that the Japan mission needed at least 6’000 *cruzados*, whereas in 1580 he slightly raised the bar by stating that the minimum amount of money needed amounted to 7’000 *cruzados*. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 8 [I], f. 240^v and f. 273^v.

³³⁷ *Ibid.* Valignano probably took the inspiration for this expression by contrasting it to the parable where Jesus, to explain the importance of listening and put into practice, compares and contrasts two builders: one wise and one foolish emphasizing how important is to have a strong foundation. Matthew, 7:24-26: ‘Every one therefore that heareth these my words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a rock. And the rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and they beat upon that house, and it fell not, for it was founded on a rock. And every one that heareth these my words, and doth them not, shall be like a foolish man that built his house upon the sand’.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 215-215^v.

activity as visitor in Asia.³³⁹ In this specific case, in fact, he was more worried about the civil repercussions of their participation in the trade rather than the infringement of a complex theological system. In other words, it looks like that when it came to deal with such secular matters Valignano's juridical background was more compelling to him than his religious side. As a matter of fact, he acknowledged that participating in the silk trade was unbecoming for men of the cloth, yet the shortage of incomes caused the *ius positivum* (man-made laws) to fall in front of the *ius naturale*, i.e. those natural laws that provide an objective reference that allows us to determine whether our decisions and actions are right or wrong and thus moral and the Christian charity.

As shown above, since the 15th century the Portuguese Crown had been prohibiting the nobility and the clergy as well from involving in commercial activities and the same law continued to be enacted also during *o tempo dos Filipes*. We saw that Valignano received from Mercurian the authority to sanction the participation in the trade, hence in this letter his intention was not to bend the canon law, rather to suggest that the civil law was subordinated to necessity, not the other way around.

If, on the one hand, Valignano did not want to go against the virtue of obedience, which for the Ignatian Order was irrespective of whether it was the civil or the ecclesiastical polity,³⁴⁰ on the other hand for the Italian and the Jesuits *lato sensu* there was a hierarchy also between *ius* and *lex*, with the former as prior. Although the two were normally treated as interchangeable, unlike *lex*, *ius* was permeated with the generic notion of *what is right*. It would seem that Valignano used this *ius-lex* scheme to describe the interaction between *ius naturale* and *ius positivum*.³⁴¹

In this specific case, Valignano wanted to grant to the community of Jesuit missionaries what in the Thomist universe is called *securitas* (safety) or *salus* (welfare), a condition that was also called the common good. The Jesuit philosopher Francisco

³³⁹ Cf. *Sumario*, pp. 4*-5* and Luca, "Alessandro Valignano: Un Profilo", pp. 43-44.

³⁴⁰ The Ignatians basically followed the Fourth Commandment, which was understood to include not only the duties of children to their parents but the duty of all inferiors to obey their superiors. According to this interpretation, the Jesuits were 'likewise commanded to carrye the like love, obedience, and reverence to our spiritual fathers, and to al our Superiors; as be Bishops, priests, religious men, and prelates of the Church; kings, princes and secular powers [...]. Hereby are also al parentes and superiours warned, what love and special care they are bound to carry towards their children, and to al such as be their subjects'. See Gabriel Loarte, *The Exercise of a Christian Life*, apud Höpfl, *op. cit.*, p. 53. It would seem that this feature of the Society was a collateral cause of the nationalistic rivalries that plagued the Jesuits in the *Estado da Índia*, which will be part of the third chapter.

³⁴¹ Cf. Höpfl, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-270.

Suárez, for instance, described it as a community where individuals should be able to live in peace and justice, with such a sufficiency of worldly goods as the preservation and convenience of bodily life demands.³⁴² Judging from these quotes, it does not seem preposterous to think that this was the philosophical basis upon which Alessandro Valignano planned his next moves.

Although he spent less than a year in Macao, Valignano concluded an agreement with the mercantile community for the formal participation of the Japan Jesuits in the Macao-Nagasaki silk trade, the so called *armação* (o *armación*) contract.³⁴³ The *armação* was a type of commercial contract known in Europe as *commenda*. The *commenda* was the dominant institutional form of conducting long-distance trade from the Early Middle Ages, when its use became widespread in the Mediterranean, until the early seventeenth century, when it was gradually replaced by the rise of joint stock companies in Europe, such as the English and Dutch East India Companies. The basic economic features of the *commenda* contract included a sedentary investor (*commendator*) who delivered capital or goods into the possession of a travelling associate (*tractator*). If the *tractator* invested capital of his own to that of the *commendator*, the contract is commonly referred to as *societas maris* or bilateral *commenda*. The *tractator*, then, took the capital away with him, generally overseas, and on expiration of the time or voyages specified in the agreement made between the parties, he returned to the home port to render account and divide the profits with the *commendator*. The profits were divided according to a ratio agreed upon in the original contract.³⁴⁴

With regard to the silk trade there are several documents, since a large number of missionaries spent some ink writing about it. Unfortunately, the original papers of the contract which were preserved in the archive of the city are no longer available. Yet, there are three manuscript sources in particular that had been helping historians to put the pieces together. Namely, in chronological order:

³⁴² Cf. Francisco Suárez, *Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore in Decem Libros Distributus*, pars III, cap. II.7, apud Höpfl, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

³⁴³ See *Apologia*, ff. 87-87^v.

³⁴⁴ Cf. CEHE, pp. 49-53 and Pryor, "The Origins of the *Commenda* Contract", pp. 5-8.

1. *Apologia en la qual se responde a diversas calumnias que se escrivieran contra los PP. de la Compañía de Japon, y de la China.*³⁴⁵
2. *Informação da armação ou contrato da Companhia em que os moradores de Amacao mandão a sau çeda a Japão.*³⁴⁶
3. *Informação do trato que temos da China e Japão.*³⁴⁷

It is not clear when the silk trade between Guangdong and southern Japan exactly started. On the other hand, it is likely that Portuguese merchants started to import Chinese silk soon after their arrival at Tanegashima, otherwise it would be difficult to explain why, as early as 1556, the Jesuits believed the silk trade to be such a profitable commerce.

The *armação*, however, is a further development of the silk trade. As we saw, the Portuguese Crown started to grant concessions to privateers to trade in the *Estado* from the 1550s onwards. In the first phase of the Macao-Nagasaki trade, those who received the crown appointment to make the voyage to Japan went on their own ships from Goa or Malacca to Macao, where they negotiated with local merchants the percentage of freight charges (*fretes*) they were to receive for the transportation of the silk. Each of the merchants would then load the goods he could send, with silk as the first choice. This commercial scheme, however, had a big flaw. Those who were part of the initial freight contract, in fact, were allowed to load their merchandises before the others. The captains, in order to obtain the highest percentage of freight dues, privileged to make deals with Macao's wealthiest merchants, a group of not even fifteen persons, who were therefore allowed and had the capital to load almost all the silk Japan needed. Consequently, the less wealthy were left only with less profitable merchandises (*miudezas*³⁴⁸) and without the high-profit game. The inequity of this scheme along with

³⁴⁵ See Abbreviations.

³⁴⁶ Father Manoel Dias to General Acquaviva, Macao, 18 April 1610. ARSI, *Jap. Sin* 14 [I], ff. 341-342. Another copy in APTCJ, *Caja* 102, n.º 19

³⁴⁷ Eminent fathers of the Japan Province to General Muzio Vitelleschi. Macao, 10 February 1620. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], ff. 234-237^v. Except where otherwise stated, all the information provided about the *armação* comes from these three sources. With regard to the *armação* contract, beside the manuscript documentation provided, see Cooper, "The Mechanics of the Macao-Nagasaki Silk Trade", pp. 423-433, although the Jesuit historian limited his work to a brief historical introduction and then he went straight on to the translation of Manoel Dias's manuscript. For a shorter explanation of the *armação* contract see also Boxer, *Christian Century*, pp. 117-121, Moran, *The Japanese and the Jesuits. Alessandro Valignano in sixteenth-century Japan*, pp. 117-128 and Sousa, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-22.

³⁴⁸ See Glossary.

the growth of the city gave birth to general discontent and in the 1570s led the Patriarch Melchior Carneiro, who at that time was acting as *bispo de anel* for Macao, since the Macanese bishopric would be created only by the end of the decade, to try and organize a way to distribute with equity the investments and, in particular, the profits from those commercial journeys. Hence, the silk shipped to Japan started to be sent by corporate agreement ‘em que todos, pobres, laicos’ – the socially disfavoured and the institutions such as the *Misericórdia*, as well – ‘metessem seu pouco, e a este contrato chamão aqui armação’,³⁴⁹ and the share of silk allotted to each merchant was called the *bague*.³⁵⁰

For negotiations in the sale of merchandise to run smoothly, in due time the eldersmen who administered the city (*Vereadores*) met with all its residents and they all elected three men as their procurators (*commendatores*) in order to draw up the *armação* contract with the captain of the voyage (*tractator*) on behalf of all the people. Often enough, the elected were the eldersmen themselves and they were appointed in particular to accomplish numerous tasks. Through the listing of these tasks, the mechanism of the whole Japan trade will appear clearly:³⁵¹

1. After they have assessed the amount of silk it could be sold in Japan at high profit margin, they were supposed to arrange with the captain on the amount of silk to be laden on the ship and they will pay him a 10% freight rate, provided that the captain will not carry in his carrack more than the contracted amount of silk, under penalty of a *certum quid*. In order to recompensate him for the possible loss and to discourage him from not respecting that condition, he would receive another payment from the citizens called *alças*, which fluctuated between three and four thousand *cruzados*. Another condition stipulated that even if the merchants of Macau were not able to collect the amount of silk assessed by the procurators and agreed upon in the *armação* contract, the city

³⁴⁹ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 341. The meaning of the Portuguese word *armação* is not directly linked to the trading business. Its use in this specific field would seem to derive from the expression: found a company *por armação*, which means that the merchants involved in a common trade were given the opportunity to arm of their own accord the ships they will be using without any intromission by the officers of the crown. This kind of contract was also used as a way to improve the defenses of the shipments from the attacks of Dutch and English vessels, as suggested by the Viceroy Dom Miguel de Noronha in October 1633. Cf. *Carta De El-Rei [Filipe III]* to the Viceroy of India, Lisbon, 20 December 1633. *Livro das Monções 18* (1633), f. 106.

³⁵⁰ See Glossary.

³⁵¹ The following list is taken both from Manoel Dias’s letter and from the *Informação* of 1620. The bibliography consulted regarding the *armação*, in fact, relied exclusively on Dias, whereas farther and detailed information are to be found in the source from 1620.

had to pay the *fretes* on all the the amount of silk agreed in the *armação*, not on the factual amount of silk laded.

2. The procurators, then, had to divide the amount of silk among all the Portuguese men in the city and some foreigners.³⁵² The allocation of the share was based on the capital and the expenses of each merchant, who was calculated as a household. Ideally, the *bague* assigned to a household was supposed to yield revenue sufficient to support the family for a year in keeping with his station. Although the maximum quote per merchant was 12 *picols*, we will see that the Society of Jesus was an exception.
3. The same elected procurators made also a rough estimate of the public expenses incurred by the city in the yearly transaction, so that the participants in the *armação* paid a variable surcharge (2%-4%) depending on the approximate amount required by the city to cover expenses.
4. Together with the captain of the ship, the procurators had to keep a strict watch that only the carrack, and no other ship, shipped to Japan with silk, in order not to compromise the *armação*'s profits. The watch had to be even greater in those years when the Great Ship did not sail.
5. Besides prohibiting silk exports to Japan, the procurators and the captain ensured also that no silver belonging to Japanese entered the Macanese harbour.
6. The three elected had to appoint a factor (*feitor*) to go to Japan and actually sell the silk, a registrar (*escrivão*) and an accountant (*contador*) to help the *feitor* keep track of the deals, a guard (*escutilheiro*) who held the silk locked away and other minor officers all to be paid through the *armação*.

³⁵² Manoel Dias exactly wrote: 'estes tres eleitos repartem estes dous mil picos de çeda por todos os homens portugueses que ha nesta çidade, e alguns de outras nações como Chinos'. Unfortunately, the Jesuit did not explain on what basis some foreigner had right to the *bague* and others not. This is an interesting topic, in particular if related to a law issued by D. Filipe I on 7 July 1591 and confirmed by Filipe II in 1605, which stated that 'ningun estrangeiro, ni otro qualquiera prohibido por estas leyes pueda tartar, y contratar en las Indias, ni dellas à estos Reynos, ni otras partes, ni passer á ellas, si no estuviere habilitado con naturaleza, y licencia nuestra. Y solamente puedan vsar della con sus caudales, y no los de otros de sus naciones, assi en particular, como en conpañía publica, ni secreta'. See *Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias*, tome IV, book IX, chapter 27: *De los Estrangeros, que pasan á las Indias, y su composición, y naturaleza, que en ellas pueden adquirir para tratar, y contratar – Ley primera. Que ningún Estrangero, ni persona prohibida pueda tratar en las Indias, ni pasar á ellas*. It is likely that the Portuguese settlers in Macao let some Chinese merchants enter the *armação* in order not to exacerbate Ming authorities, who, on the other hand, found a way to keep the Chinese commerce with Japan alive.

7. In Japan, the silk was sold in bulk (*por pancada*) at a price agreed between the Portuguese and the representatives of the commercial communities of Nagasaki, Miyako, Edo, Ōsaka and Sakai, hence it was not a selling between individuals. It was the same purchasing method adopted in the Guangzhou fair where the Portuguese bought the Chinese silk. The *pancada* was an ancient way of sealing contracts known to different times and civilizations. In South-East Asia, it was used also in the Philippines when the Spaniards traded with the *sangleyes*, the Chinese merchants.³⁵³

We briefly saw in seven points how the Japan trade was carried out. Now, we need to focus in detail on the Society of Jesus and see through what kind of conditions the Ignatians entered and participated in the *armação*.

First of all, there is a doubt in the history immediately preceding the formal participation in the contract of the Jesuits. As we saw earlier, Valignano sealed the agreement with the city for the formal participation of the Japan Jesuits in the trade almost as soon as he got there. It is commonly stated that he signed the contract in 1578, but it would seem more likely that he waited for the carrack to return from Japan to have a complete vision of the trade, which happened on 2 February 1579.³⁵⁴ In any case, by the terms of the contract signed by Valignano the Jesuits were allotted a share of 50 picols out of 1'600, which was the maximum cargo shipped annually. However, in a later missive and then in the *Apologia*, Valignano confided to Mercurian that he decided to formalize their participation in the *armação* in order to limit the fathers' trade to a quantity that would not create any scandal with the mercantile community of Macao.³⁵⁵

³⁵³ When Father Alonso Sánchez was sent to Spain in 1586 as procurator of Manila, he proposed to the king to adopt the *pancada* system also in the Philippines. According to Sánchez, the king had to forbid the *sangleyes* to sell their goods retail, instead it was the city itself, through its elected procurator, that had to buy the merchandise in bulk at an established price. Filipe agreed with Sánchez and in 1589 ordered Governor Gómez Pérez das Mariñas to adopt the wholesale system. In any case, the establishment of the *pancada* caused several claims and protests and was slowly abandoned until the official abolition in 1696. Cf. Gil, *Los Chinos en Manila. Siglos XVI y XVII*, pp. 54-56.

³⁵⁴ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 8 [II], ff. 217-217^v: 'Aos dous de fevereiro, dia da Gloriosissima Virgen N. Senhora, chegou a deseada nao de Japão a este porto, com a qual alegamos todos [...] e ainda que se perdeo muito fato, todavia parte pola alegria de ser de tão grande perigo salvada a nao, parte porque se recompem os danos com a venda da seda e mais meudesas que fiquavão, não se sintio nada, todavia sintimos muito a perda do iumquo que foi de Sião pera Japão'.

³⁵⁵ Cf. Visitor Valignano to General Mercurian, Nagasaki, 6 August 1580. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 8 [II], f. 273^v: 'agora estava reducida la cosa con el contrato alo mejor que se podia y que son necesarios cada año alo menos siete mil ducados para sustentar lo que esta hecho, y el gasto va creciendo cada año, mas que aviendo comodidad para se sustentar de otra manera a todos nos parecia muy bien que se quitasse'. Cf. also *Apologia*, f. 87^v: 'trate tambien con esta Ciudad de Macao, sobre que este empleo de seda, se hiziesse de cierta y determinada quatidad, con su voluntad, y beneplacito, para que quedasse como una renta cierta

As a matter of fact, with this deal the *bague* of the Society of Jesus was almost four times bigger than the wealthiest merchant in Macao (50 *picols* against 12). Nevertheless, the sources tell that before reaching Macao the visitor had received a patent from the viceroy to participate in the *armação* with a share of 90 or 100 *picols*, which was excluded from the *pancada*. In other words the Jesuits had the right to sell their portion whenever they wished, which evidently gave them the possibility to exploit the fluctuations in the Japanese market.³⁵⁶ Taking into account the high interests around the Japan trade, it is obvious that this kind of privilege would arouse a lot of complaints when the *armação* contract was drawn up. In order not to put the Society in a very bad light, Valignano contrived a way to obtain what the royal patent granted without indispose the Macanese mercantile community.³⁵⁷ In the purchase of silk at Macao he granted that the Japan Jesuits were allotted a share of 50 *picols*, but then he made the *Vereadores* add a clause to the contract. This clause established that if, by any chance, the Japan market did not buy all the silk shipped in the carrack, the 50 *piculs* belonging to the Society would always be considered as sold ‘por el precio dela primera *pancada*’,³⁵⁸ which was the highest ruling price in the official exchange. Furthermore, the factor would give the Jesuit procurator in Nagasaki another 40 *picols* for the price they were bought at Macao. So if on the one hand the missionaries could sell them in another occasion for a higher price than the *pancada*’s or store them for the following year, on the other hand the factor would not come back to Macao with unsold silk.³⁵⁹

This privilege was exploited by the critics of the Society, the Friars Minors, who, among other things, accused the Japan Jesuits to be the ones who established the *pancada*-price with the Japanese merchants, an accuse that was an obvious reference to

de manera que no uviesse en ello mudança, y si hiziesse con la moderacion devida, y satisfacion del pueblo’.

³⁵⁶ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 341 and ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], f. 235. The sources do not agree on the exact amount of *picols* granted to the Society. Since Francisco Cabral sent requests for 90 *picols*, it would seem more likely that the crown responded to such demand. In 1617, however, Father Valentim Carvalho wrote again that they were entitled to receive 100 *picols*, but confessed also that in more than one occasion the *Vereadores* allowed the missionaries to load up to 70 *picols* in accordance with the needs of the mission. Cf. Carvalho, *Apologia do Japão*, p. 59. On the other hand, there were also years when the Captain Major could not buy the 1’600 *picols* of silk at Guangzhou, as happened in 1579 and 1580, which caused a big loss of earnings for the missionaries. Cf. *Sumario*, p. 335.

³⁵⁷ At least in two occasions, in 1579 and in 1580, in fact, Valignano admitted that he sealed the contract in order to decrease the Jesuits’ participation in the silk trade. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 8 [I], f. 241 and f. 273^v.

³⁵⁸ See *Apologia*, f. 87^v.

³⁵⁹ This was not the only privilege the Jesuits had in the *armação*, although it was the greatest. As it has been shown in the third point above, in addition to the *fretes* of 10%, the *armação* contemplated a supplement on the merchandise to repay the city of the expenses for the trade. Although it was variable, the Jesuits obtained that they would pay a fixed rate at 3%, whether that the common merchants paid the 2% or the 4%.

the role of intermediary often played by the procurator at Nagasaki, and added that they would sell the silk for a higher price in order to make better gains.³⁶⁰

With regard to the incomes from the trade at Nagasaki, Valignano did not skimp on the details. Writing from Kuchinotsu in December 1579 he described to Everard Mercurian the specifics of the economy and the financial activities of the Jesuits in Japan. He wrote that the whole capital of the mission amounted to 20'000 *taéis*,³⁶¹ roughly 30'000 *cruzados*.³⁶² Half of this capital was invested in Chinese silk. To be exact, about 8'000 *cruzados* in silver were sent from Nagasaki to Macao to buy the 50 *picols* of silk, an investment which yielded an income of little more than 2'000 *cruzados*.³⁶³ The remaining 7'000 derived from the unsold silk the Portuguese factor handed them over, whose quantity may vary and yielded the same income as the 50 in the *armação*.³⁶⁴ Thus, by summing the approximate sum of 4'000 *cruzados* with the incomes from the three *aldeias* in the Province of the North, which in 1586 amounted roughly to 1100 *cruzados*, we see that in the 1580s the Japan Jesuits had a total income of little more than 5'000 *cruzados*.³⁶⁵ The other 15'000 *cruzados*, in fact, were divided between the residences and houses of the mission in gold and silverware.³⁶⁶

This capital notwithstanding, Valignano knew that everything was constantly exposed to danger. The Italian Jesuit explained clearly to Mercurian the disastrous consequences of the loss of a cargo, which he estimated to be as high as 20'000

³⁶⁰ Cf. Carvalho, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

³⁶¹ See Glossary.

³⁶² According to nearly all the sources consulted, *scudi* or *escudos*, *cruzados* and ducats (*ducados*) were coins of the same value and were therefore used interchangeably. Their ratio to the Portuguese *réis* was 1:400, whereas to the *tael* 1,5:1. In this letter, Valignano referred to *scudi* and it would not be preposterous to hypothesize that the reason why he decided to adopt that currency was only because he was writing in Italian. As a matter of fact he wrote about *our currency*. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 8 [I], f. 240: 'arriva la summa di tutto quello ch'habbiamo in questo giorno presente in questo giorno presente ventimila taeli, che ridutti alla nostra moneta fanno giustamente il numero di trentamila scudi'.

³⁶³ In the *Apologia* Valignano explained that each *picol* was bought for 90 *taéis* (135 *cruzados*) and sold in Japan for 140 (210 *cruzados*). Cf. *Apologia*, f. 89^v. This means that – arithmetically – to buy the 50 *picols* of the contract 7'000 *cruzados* would have been enough. Accordingly, the sale in Japan would generate an income of 10'000 *cruzados*, to which we have to subtract the expenditures to buy the 50 *picols* (6'750 *cruzados*), the *fretes* (1'000 *cruzados*) and the 3%-surcharge (300 *cruzados*) and we obtain the total income which amounted to 1'950 *cruzados*. Fair warning, this is only an esteem that does not take into consideration all the variable that might occurred and it is based on fixed data that were evidently approximate and were used only to convey a general idea.

³⁶⁴ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 8 [I], f. 240.

³⁶⁵ In the *Sumario*, written only four years later, Valignano made some changes in the numbers. Namely, he wrote that they invested 10-12'000 ducats in silk which granted an income of 5-6'000 ducats. See *Sumario*, pp. 310-311.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*: 'Gl'altri quindicimila scudi stanno ordinariamente in oro et in argento ripartiti in diverse case & residentie, delli quali circa duemila stanno in argentaria che serve per le chiese como sono calici, candelieri d'altare, turribuli & altre simili cose'. Cf. *Sumario*, pp. 109-110.

cruzados, and insisted on the indigence of Japanese lords and commoners alike. In the 28th chapter of the *Sumario* he expatiated upon this topic,³⁶⁷ and stressed that until that moment they had succeeded in converting important lords, *kunishu* as Ōmura Sumitada in 1563, Arima Yoshisada (André) in 1576 and Arima Harunobu (Protásio) in 1580,³⁶⁸ but not as powerful as to receive the protection and the eventual real estates they needed in order to step off the silk trade. For that matter, up to the 1580s, few of the more significant Japanese personages had become Christians. D. Francisco of Bungo, for instance, turned Christian only after his retirement, although he maintained the grasp over his fief, whereas Ichijō Kanesada³⁶⁹ was deprived of his domain and sought assistance from the very Jesuits.³⁷⁰ At any rate, in the 1580s both Valignano dream and nightmare actually came true.

II. 3. 4. Possession: The cession of Nagasaki to the Society of Jesus

Two years after his arrival in Japan, Valignano called together a big mission conference. Since at that time was quite troublesome and expensive to gather all the important fathers of the mission in the same place, the *consulta* took place three times in three different places between 1580 and 1581: one in Usuki, one in Nagasaki and the last one in Miyako.³⁷¹

The triple conference, whose conclusions were eventually drawn at Nagasaki, is of capital importance within the history of the Jesuits mission in Japan, because it was the first successful tentative of organizing the mission according to precise project guidelines contrived by Valignano on the basis of the fathers experience and of his two years on the Japanese soil. As a matter of fact, the *consulta* established that Japan ought to be considered and organized the same way as an ordinary province of the Society,

³⁶⁷ Cf. *Sumario*, pp. 312-315.

³⁶⁸ Arima Harunobu (?-1612) was the second son of Arima Yoshisada. He inherited the title of his father in 1571 and was at first a prosecutor of the Christian faith. Cf. Ribeiro, *Samurais Cristãos*, p. 87.

³⁶⁹ Ichijō Kanesada (1543-1585) was related to D. Francisco and ruled over Tosa. When he lost his domain in 1574, he fled to Bungo where he expressed the desire to become Christian. He received the sacrament in 1575 with the name Paulo. He tried to recover his domains, but never succeeded. Cf. *Sumario*, p. 280, n. 35.

³⁷⁰ Cf. Elison, *Deus Destroyed*, p. 103.

³⁷¹ With regard to the *consulta* cf. *VMP*, I, pp. 7-50. In Usuki, beside Valignano, were present the following Jesuits: Father Francisco Cabral as Superior of the Japan mission. Father Lourenço Mexia, Father Luís Frois, Father Melchior de Figueiredo, Father João Baptista, Father Pero Ramon and Father Antonino, Father Gonçalo Rebelo and Father Francisco de Laguna. In the second meeting in Shimo, Father Gaspar Coelho and Father Luís Almeida, and, finally, in Miyako Valignano met with Father Organtino Gneccchi Soldo and other Jesuits there.

although it would not reach that hierarchic station until 1611. Namely, the government of the mission was divided among three fathers, each of whom was appointed as superior of a specific geographic area and all the facilities of the Society therein, with a fourth father as ‘Superior Universal de Japão’.³⁷² Furthermore, the fathers decided to found two seminars for the education of Japanese and Portuguese, since ‘este era unico e verdadeiro remedio pera se poder insenar e acrescentar a Christandade de Japão’.³⁷³

Amongst the many topics debated, two in particular are relevant to the present work, namely the 13th – *Del remedio que se ha de procurar para la sustentacion temporal de Jappon* – and 14th – *Si es bien tener los lugares de Nangasaque y de Monguy*.³⁷⁴

With regard to the 13th point, the fathers agreed that it was unfit for men of the cloth to participate in a trade, moreover since this one was put to risk by the hazards of the sea. Nevertheless, other means of maintenance seemed nowhere to be found. The *consulta*, in fact, established that the mission in the current situation was in need of 8’000 *cruzados* per year, but if further colleges or residences were to be opened, then the annual income could not be inferior to 12’000 *cruzados*.³⁷⁵

The awareness of the uncertainty of an income that had to weather storms and *tufones*, led some of the fathers, among whom there was also Luís Almeida, to propose the purchase of rice fields that could yield a profit, called *ryōchi*.³⁷⁶ Besides being an obvious and certain source of food, the fathers were well mindful that in Japan *daimyō*, *kunishu*, *samurai* and so on received their income in *koku*³⁷⁷ of rice.³⁷⁸ Despite the opposition of the majority of fathers (18 out of 26, Valignano included), who thought

³⁷² Cf. *Carta annua de Japão do anno de 80 pera nosso padre geral em Roma*, in ANTT/AJ, Livro 28, f. 121^v.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁴ In the Roman archive of the Society of Jesus are to be found both the proceedings of the Usuki conference and the definitive outcome compiled in Nagasaki in 1581 and Valignano’s own impressions about the topics discussed signed on 6 January 1583. See *Consulta feita em Bungo pollo Padre Alexandre Valignano Visitador da Yndia no mes doutubro do Anno 1580, acerca das cousas de Japão*, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 2, ff. 4-34^v (also in BL/Add. 9852, ff. 71-88), *Consulta hecha en Jappon por el Padre Alexandro Valignano Visitador dela Compañia dela Yndia, en el año de 80 y 81*, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 2, ff. 42-69 and *Resoluciones que el Padre Visitador da acerca delas preguntas dela consulta que hizo en Jappon en diversas partes el año de 1581*, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 2, ff. 70-86^v (also in BNCR/FGes. 1482). For an outline of the whole conferences see VMP, I, pp. 7-50 and Fujita, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-100.

³⁷⁵ Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 2, ff. 60-60^v.

³⁷⁶ 領地. Valignano described thoroughly the *ryōchi* in the *Libro Primero del principio y progreso de la Religion christiana en Jappon, y dela especial providencia de que Nuestro Señor usa con aquella nueva Iglesia*, BL/Add. 9857, f. 27.

³⁷⁷ See Glossary.

³⁷⁸ See *Sumario*, pp. 312-317.

that by acquiring those rice fields they would take the risk of being compared to wealthy lords and were also concerned about wasting any more money besides the sum invested in the trade, from later sources we know that eventually the Japan Jesuits came in possession of an unspecified number of *ryōchi*.³⁷⁹ Also the 14th item regarded the acquisition of a territory, yet much bigger than simple rice fields.

As we saw earlier, Ōmura Sumitada was the first lord to welcome the Christian faith along with the Chinese goods taken by the Portuguese. Yet, unlike many of the *daimyō* whose friendliness toward the Portuguese was motivated solely by the prospect of financial gain, Dom Bartolomeu took the Roman faith seriously. There was, of course, the basic and comprehensible instinct of survival in his decision to welcome the Portuguese ships, since his territories were continuously under attack and, therefore, his lordship was precarious, yet he displayed his faith without any fear and made large donations to the papist missionaries. In 1562 he conceded part of Yokoseura to shelter the Christians and in 1563 he received the baptism. In 1574, four Portuguese ships came to help Dom Bartolomeu against the forces of the Isahaya domain.³⁸⁰ The contribution to success persuaded Ōmura to destroy all the symbols of the local faith and to require all his subjects, under pain of exile, to turn Christian.³⁸¹ In 1580, however, Dom Bartolomeu went even further.

Around that time he was about to be reduced to fealty by Ryūzōji Takanobu, the *daimyō* of Saga (Hizen). At that time, in Kyūshū was waging a struggle for predominance between Ōtomo Sōrin of Bungo, Ryūzōji and the *daimyō* of Satsuma Shimazu Yoshihisa.³⁸² Dom Bartolomeu could not actually compete against them, he was not a dominant lord. He received his power (economical and military) through the trade with Macao and consequently he was quite worried when in 1579 following

³⁷⁹ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 2, f. 62 and BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-66, f. 37^v. In the *Resoluciones*, Valignano wrote that he was against acquiring *ryōchi* owing to the dangerous political situation of Japan. Yet, he conceded that ‘si en algun lugar de Christianos que paresciesse seguro huviesse alguna obligacion entre el Señor dela tierra y la Compañía de manera que o la Compañía no podiesse escusar emprestarle algun dinero, o ellos offresciessen reochi para pagar lo que deven, en tal caso paresce que se podrian comprar, mas esto no se haga sino raramente, y quando paresciere que no puede escusar’. See ARSI, *Ibid.*, f. 80. Eventually, what had been suggested by Valignano was underwritten also by General Acquaviva, who deemed this solution better than to wait for economic help from Goa or Europe. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, f. 10^v.

³⁸⁰ Cf. VMP, I, pp. 285-286 and Elison, *Deus Destroyed*, pp. 91-92.

³⁸¹ Cf. Elison, “The Evangelic Furnace: Japan’s First Encounter with the West”, pp. 130-131. With regard to the whole Ōmura family see Ribeiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-86.

³⁸² Yoshihisa (1533-1611) was the son of the true founder of the Shimazu power in the 16th century, Shimazu Takahisa (1514-1571), who was able to conquer the Ōsumi province and was close to annex also Hyūga. Yoshihisa, however, managed to consolidate that power by completing the annexation of Hyūga and by winning crucial battles against the Ōtomo and Ryūzōji.

Ryūzōji's attacks, the Great Ship of Captain Leonel de Brito, on account of the threat to its security, chose Kuchinotsu in Arima over Nagasaki.³⁸³ The fear of losing his own territories to Ryūzōji, who seemed to be interested especially in Nagasaki and had invaded Ōmura in 1577 and 1578, connected with his desire to have the Portuguese arrive at his ports led Dom Bartolomeu to a big step.³⁸⁴

As we saw, in 1569 Father Vilela founded the Church of *Todos os Santos* and two years later Nagasaki was factually born. Although at first it was a port 'incognito, y despoblado', when Valignano arrived in Japan in 1579 there were already about four hundred houses.³⁸⁵ This is clear evidence of the growing importance of the city, both as a refuge for the Christians exiled from various regions, such as Shimabara, Gotō Rettō, Hirado, Yamaguchi and Hakata, and as a practical harbour for the Portuguese. Between 1571 and 1578, in fact, the *kurofune*³⁸⁶ berthed at least five times at Nagasaki's docks, but not in 1579, as we saw.³⁸⁷ In order to secure his fief from external attacks and to ensure always having the Great Ship in one of his port, Sumitada offered to the Society to take the port of Nagasaki for the church along with the an adjoining village called Mogi, on the sole condition that the ship would pay him an annual due of 1'000 ducats:³⁸⁸

'Don Bartholomeu Señor de Omura y su hijo Sancho,³⁸⁹ teniendo respecto a lo mucho que devemos alos Padres dela Compañía, hago livre donacion para sienpre ala dicha Compañía y al Padre Visitador della del pueblo de Nangasaqui con todas las tierras y campos que son en sus confines sin quedar nada y asi doy desde agora la posse dellas y asi los dichos Padres dela Compañía podran meter por Capitan del dicho lugar quien ellos quisieren y tirarlo del carguo y a qualquiera que fuere por ellos elegido. Doi facultad para poder matar y hazer toda la justiciã necessaria para el buen govienro dela tierra y castigo delos que quebrantaren las leyes della. Tambien entrego y doi para sienpre lo que suele pagar la nave delos portugeses por el tiempo que esta en el dicho puerto, reservando para mi los derechos della y de todos los mas navios que llegaren al dicho puerto, los quales yo mandare recadar por mi oficiales, los quales no se entrometeran en ninguna cosa que

³⁸³ Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 35-36.

³⁸⁴ Cf. *CE*, I, ff. 466^v-467 and Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-315.

³⁸⁵ See *Apologia*, ff. 74^v-75. According to the Pacheco, the sources present a succession of events that seem to indicate that already from 1568 Nagasaki was considered as the future port. Cf. Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-311. With regard to his interpretation of the facts see pp. 321-322.

³⁸⁶ See Glossary.

³⁸⁷ Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 32-35 and Okamoto, 十六世紀日歐交通史の研究, pp. 469-470.

³⁸⁸ Cf. *VMP*, I, pp. 411-418, Boxer, *Christian Century*, pp. 100-101, Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-316 and *CHJ IV*, pp. 326-331.

³⁸⁹ Ōmura Yoshiaki (1570-1616).

toque la justiça o al gobierno del dicho lugar y dela misma manera doi para sienpre alos Padres los lugares de Mongui, con todas las tierras y canpos que a ellos pertence. Y para señal que nunca avra mutacion en la dicha donaçion, mas sera perpetuamente valiosa, hizo esta carta aseñada por mi y por mi hijo alos veintisete da 4.^a luna del octavo año de Tenxo.³⁹⁰

Don Bartholomeu - Don Sancho.³⁹¹

Although this document attests the cession of Japanese soil to foreigners, which was something quite unprecedented, later sources suggest that it should be considered more as a donation. In effect, the Ōmura conceded revenue by which they supported the missionaries working in their dominions. As Valignano explained in 1598, part of the deal was that the Jesuits remained as obedient and subject to D. Bartolomeu as before but were to be given the ships' anchorage fees, whereas D. Bartolomeu reserved for himself the dominion over the land and continued to collect the tariff duties on the goods.³⁹² Differently from the small and pre-existent town of Yokoseura, however, the fathers in Nagasaki became preeminent figures of a city born out of interest and faith. Also for the merchants, in fact, the situation was different than at Yokoseura. At Nagasaki, the Portuguese were offered a safe port, but their ships and other merchants' as well had to pay dues to the Japanese lord. Dom Bartolomeu, in fact, surrendered part of the territorial sovereignty over the harbour, but guarded for himself a substantial flow of income from the trade of those ships.

Among the Jesuits, this donation was discussed often and at length at the triple conference. All the fathers that took part to the conference were veterans and connoisseurs of the turbulent Japanese islands. Therefore, nobody could deny that

³⁹⁰ 9 June 1580. *Tenshō* 天正 is the name given to the era between 1573 and 1592 according to the Japanese tradition of inaugurating a new period by assigning to it a name which was at the same time commemorative and apotropaic. This custom, called *nengō* 年号 or *gengō* 元号, was introduced from China around the 7th century and remained in force until the *Meiji Jidai* (1868-1912), when it was established that to the reign of an emperor ought to correspond the name of an era, *issei ichigen no sei* 一世一元の制.

³⁹¹ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 23, f. 9. The Japanese text of the document is unfortunately not extant. For an English translation of the donation, see Pacheco, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-314 and Elison, *Deus Destroyed*, pp. 94-95. According to Alvarez-Taladriz, the Japan Jesuits came in possession of Nagasaki ten years earlier, whereas this act might be seen or as a renewal of the old contract or as a way to give back to the fathers the city that might had been expropriated in the 1570s. Cf. *Sumario*, pp. 70*-71*, n. 179.

³⁹² See *Apologia*, f. 79: 'D. Bartolame diò alos Padres lo que les diò en el puerto de Nangasaqi rezervando para si el dominio, y los derechos delas mercaderías [...]; pues los Padres con todo el pueblo, y perto de Nangasaqi, que le davan tan obedientes, y sugetos como siempre, y ni ellos tenia fuersas para le contrariar, ni havia peligro, que lo hiziessen fuera desto, el darles aquella renta, no fue mas que gratificar alos Padres y començar de cumplir de alguna manera con la obligacion, que tenia conforme ala doctrina de S. Pablo, de sustentar el ministro del Evangelio en su tierra'.

having jurisdictional power over a city was quite positive for the mission, mainly for safety issues, economical reasons and political importance:

1. Wars between neighboring territories broke out rather frequently, thus it was advisable to have a city fortified and easy to protect thanks to its geomorphology where to store the most part of the mission capital;
2. Nagasaki could serve as a refuge for exiled Christians;
3. The incomes from the city and the harbour in the selling seasons might not have been enough to sustain the mission, but it helped nonetheless;
4. They could leave the territories donated whenever it might seem to them convenient to do so, although coming in possession of Nagasaki and Mogi had also a positive repercussion onto the political reputation of the fathers and onto the relationships with other lords.³⁹³

Valignano privately wrote to Mercurian that he accepted Dom Bartolomeu's offer only after having agreed on the fourth point.³⁹⁴ The instable political situation of Japan obliged the visitor to consider all the scenarios and the inconveniences that may appear in the course of time from holding such an important commercial junction.³⁹⁵ As a matter of fact, history proved him right. In 1587, in fact, the Japanese hegemon Toyotomi Hideyoshi took over the jurisdiction over Nagasaki and issued the first decree of expulsion of the Christian missionaries.

³⁹³ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 2, ff. 62^v-63. See also Valignano's *Resoluciones* about the 14th item at ARSI, *Ibid.*, f. 80^v.

³⁹⁴ Pacheco stressed out that it was Ōmura Sumitada's idea to concede the port to the Society, not the contrary. Cf. Pacheco, *op. cit.*, p. 321. As wrote by Valignano, in fact, as soon as he reached Nagasaki, Dom Bartolomeu wanted to talk with him regarding the cession, which would probably indicate that the Christian lord was in desperate need to resolve that intricate situation. The Japanese sources regarding the topic, all compiled after the expulsion of the missionaries, do not clarify the issue, although the most of them state that Ōmura decided to donate Nagasaki to the Society of Jesus upon pressing requests by the fathers. The Jesuits, on their part, had also to ask the general to obtain from the pope a brief which would absolve them of the formal irregularity of the involvement in capital jurisdiction. In other words, they were asking the pope to extend to the Society of Jesus the specific authority to engage in civil and criminal jurisdiction in the territories donated. The requested permission was granted by Pope Gregory XIII in November 1583, although owing to the demise of the pope, a formal brief was never published. Cf. Elison, *Deus Destroyed*, pp. 97-100.

³⁹⁵ Cf. Pacheco, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

II. 3. 5. Expropriation: Toyotomi Hideyoshi's proscription of the Christian faith and the seizure of Nagasaki

When Francis Xavier reached Japan in 1549, the *shinkoku*³⁹⁶ was passing through one of the most chaotic moments of its history. Its structures had been shaken to the foundations by decades of social upheaval and warfare. In the second half of the 15th century, the Japanese country had entered a time of military competition among the local *daimyō*, with complete transfer of power from the central administration to local magnates. As a matter of fact, the two main pillars of the archipelago, the *tennō* and the Ashikaga *Bakufu*,³⁹⁷ had been undermined and stripped of all factual power. In effect, although the imperial house continued to carry out the ceremonial function of nominating and legitimating the successive *shōgun*, this title had become so meaningless that nine rulers were nominated in less than fifty years. Both the *tennō* and the *shōgun* remained in their palaces in Miyako, but the 'Flower Capital of myriad of ages is now a lair of foxes and wolves [...]. The revolution of the Ōnin years destroys both the law of Buddha and the law of kings'.³⁹⁸

This age of decadence began in 1467, when a quarrel over succession in the Ashikaga *Bakufu* gave origin to the Ōnin disturbances (1467-77),³⁹⁹ a series of wars fought intermittently in and around the capital, between the coalitions of shogunal officials and *shugo daimyō*.⁴⁰⁰ Although this may be considered as the ostensible cause for the outbreak of civil warfare, the real cause of the war was the decline in the authority and power of the *bakufu* and the rise of the *shugo daimyō* as regional military overlords.

The Ōnin disturbances are commonly accepted as the starting point of the *Sengoku Jidai*, the era of the warring states. This period is mostly distinguished by the shattering of centralized authority by large regional hegemony (*Sengoku daimyō*), who gained independent political and economic control over the lands they held or had

³⁹⁶ 神國

³⁹⁷ The second warrior government, which ruled between 1338 and 1573.

³⁹⁸ Quotation from the Ōnin-ki (The Ōnin Chronicles, 応仁記), *apud* Berry, *Hideyoshi*, p. 2.

³⁹⁹ 応仁の乱

⁴⁰⁰ See Glossary.

annexed. During that time of wars, in effect, power over land devolved specifically upon those able to muster and control military force.⁴⁰¹

The case of Ōmura Sumitada, from this point of view, is quite exemplary. As we saw, he was totally autonomous in his decision of creating and donating to foreigners a new settlement in order not to succumb to his hostile neighbour. As far as the Jesuits were concerned, this status quo had both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the absence of a strong central government allowed the missionaries to search for hospitality in different fiefs, since, if one *daimyō* showed hostile to the Roman faith, they could easily take their chances in the next fief. On the other hand, however, the lack of political and administrative stability exposed the whole mission to destruction overnight, if the lord that welcomed the missionaries was ousted by another lord. It might also happen that the complex and flexible pattern of alliances could easily lead a lower lord to switch his allegiance to a stronger and unchristian lord and thus endangering the mission.⁴⁰² As a matter of fact, the individual proprietor had but three alternatives to safeguard his holdings: to become militarily irresistible; to seek protection by alliance with others like himself or to subordinate to some superior lord. Sumitada, we might say, moved between the second and third options.⁴⁰³

The absence of a political authority that could establish order and sanction whomever tried to subvert it and the resulting dictatorship of arms shattered the fixed hierarchic structure of the country and led to the disruption of normality. In their attempt to describe the chaos of Japan in that time, the missionaries referred to it as ‘o reino mais sujeito a desinquietações que parece haver no Universo’.⁴⁰⁴ This situation is exemplified by the principle of *gekokujō*,⁴⁰⁵ the overthrow of a superior by persons of inferior status. It was through the deeds of ‘the famous triumvirate of “Great Unifiers”’,⁴⁰⁶ Oda Nobunaga,⁴⁰⁷ Toyotomi Hideyoshi⁴⁰⁸ and Tokugawa Ieyasu,⁴⁰⁹ that

⁴⁰¹ Cf. Berry, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁴⁰² See *HJ III*, pp. 183-184. Cf. Boxer, *Christian Century*, pp. 42-43, Costa, *O Japão e o Cristianismo no Século XVI*, pp. 52-56.

⁴⁰³ Cf. Hall, “Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Revolution”, p. 10.

⁴⁰⁴ See *HJ II*, p. 350.

⁴⁰⁵ 下克上

⁴⁰⁶ Cf. Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁴⁰⁷ With regard to Oda see Lamers, *Japonius Tyrannus: The Japanese Warlord Oda Nobunaga Reconsidered* and Costa, “Oda Nobunaga e a Expansão Portuguesa”, pp. 258-272.

⁴⁰⁸ Regarding Toyotomi Hideyoshi the most relevant work remains Berry, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰⁹ There are two biographies about Ieyasu for the English readers, namely Sadler, *Shogun. The life of Tokugawa Ieyasu* and Totman, *Tokugawa Ieyasu Shogun*.

the chaos of *Sengoku Jidai* was eventually brought to an end. The main architects of the political unification of Japan under military rule were products of the *gekokujō* principle themselves and they probably could not have been able to rise if it was not for that specific situation.

Nobunaga began his ascent from a relatively minor domainal base in Owari, near the Kinai region. Oda's rise in Owari by deposing his overlord is a classic example of *gekokujō*,⁴¹⁰ but even more exemplary are his way of handling the warfare⁴¹¹ and the relationship he kept with the traditional structures of authority, the *tennō* and the *bakufu*. Nobunaga, in fact, grew powerful enough to become the champion of the future *Shōgun* Ashikaga Yoshiaki. In 1568, he entered in Miyako at the head of some fifty thousand troops upon a claim of the *tennō* to restore the imperial estates, but especially for the purpose of legitimating Yoshiaki's aspirations to the shogunal throne.⁴¹² Eventually, Yoshiaki was appointed *shōgun* and, immediately after, he sought to have Nobunaga accept the brand new post of *kanrei*,⁴¹³ an office equivalent to vice-*shōgun*, but Nobunaga refused, preferring to maintain his independent position. Moreover, in 1569 he issued a set of regulations concerning the *shōgun* and his subjects, henceforth asserting his control over the *bakufu*'s administration. It ought to be recalled that Oda held no post within the *bakufu*. He was a mere *bushi* who happened to have enough power to govern the actions of those who he was supposed to serve. Accordingly, in 1573, after three years of struggle against a coalition of warlords assembled by the *shōgun*, he forced Yoshiaki to flee both the capital city and the central arena of politics.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹⁰ Cf. Lamers, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁴¹¹ Oda Nobunaga was one of the first warlords to make wide use of Western musketeers. The firearms, in fact, came during a time when Japanese warfare was progressively bestowing more importance on the *ashigaru* 足輕 – the infantries – and it was amongst them that were chosen those known as *teppōtai* 鉄砲隊, the companies of musketeers. Nobunaga placed particular importance on the *teppōtai* and used them effectively. For instance, at the critical battle of Nagashino in the Mikawa province in 1575, Nobunaga's musketeers defeated the enemy's cavalry, considered the warrior élite. Cf. *CHJ IV*, pp. 53-54 and Brown, "The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98", p. 239. We can ascribe Nobunaga's warfare to the *gekokujō* because the implement of Western technology was a defiant act against Japan philosophy of war, which devolved in particular upon the use of the *katana* 刀, and would develop in the code of the *samurai*, the *bushidō* 武士道.

⁴¹² With this regard see Hisashi and Elison, "The Political Posture of Oda Nobunaga", pp. 149-193.

⁴¹³ 管領

⁴¹⁴ Although Ashikaga Yoshiaki left the capital city, he did not resign his title. He continued behaving as a *shōgun* and became a political refugee who was planning to restore his power and honours with the encouragement and protection of powerful lords as Mōri Terumoto. Cf. Elison, "Hideyoshi, the Bountiful Minister", p. 230.

Having expelled the *shōgun* and taken over his powers, Nobunaga was raised to the status of an imperial noble and continued to climb the imperial hierarchy until 1578, when he eventually abdicated all his titles. With him, or because of him, the Ashikaga shogunate ended and what remained of the imperial sovereignty was definitely smothered by one of Nobunaga's preferred mottos: *tenka fubu*,⁴¹⁵ the realm subjected by the military.

In order to describe the respective roles played by the three unifiers in the unification of the country, it has been said that 'Nobunaga quarried the stones for New Japan, Hideyoshi rough-hewed them and Ieyasu set them finally in their proper place'.⁴¹⁶ Oda Nobunaga, in fact, could not carry out his plans of hegemony. In 1582 was treacherously murdered by a vassal of him, Akechi Mitsuhide. The death of Nobunaga brought down the country into anarchy once again. As a fact, whilst keeping outside politics and usurping prerogatives belonging to the *tennō* or the *shōgun*, Nobunaga did not build an alternative system of government based on what he represented. Consequently, when he suddenly disappeared Japan was again in need of a ruler and Toyotomi Hideyoshi was the perfect man for that job.

Hideyoshi was born during 1536, son of a neither prosperous nor influential farmer who did not even bear a surname to pass onto his heir. His status of a parvenu was known both among the Japanese and the foreigners. For instance, the Spanish Jesuit Pero Gomez described Hideyoshi in a derogatory manner as 'un hombre en estado de sangre muy bajo que llevaba hazes de llena a cuestras'.⁴¹⁷ About the age of fifteen, however, the young Hideyoshi left home and traveled through Owari and Mikawa provinces looking for a master to serve as *ashigaru* and only a few years later he offered his allegiance to Nobunaga. He rose rapidly in Oda's ranks and by the 1580s he became one of his chief and most valuable deputies, to the point of killing Oda's assassin only few days after he was killed.

At the time of his death, Nobunaga had extended his influence into a third of the country. More precisely the realm under his regime comprised twenty-nine of Japan's sixty-six provinces. Yet, as testified by the coalition assembled by Yoshiaki in 1570,

⁴¹⁵ 天下不武

⁴¹⁶ See Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁴¹⁷ Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/2663, f. 448.

there were still powerful enemies to subjugate and also other pretenders to be ruler of the *Tenka*,⁴¹⁸ such as Nobunaga's son, Nobukatsu, and Tokugawa Ieyasu.⁴¹⁹

In the years after 1582, Hideyoshi managed to narrow the number of adversaries to his hegemony. Differently from Nobunaga, however, Hideyoshi chose to resort to diplomacy instead of warfare and came to peaceful accords with some of Nobunaga's staunchest enemies. At the same time, as another means of acquiring legitimacy, he approached the court on his own initiative and received promotions in court rank. Differently from Oda, in fact, Hideyoshi craved for such official recognitions and never handed them back.⁴²⁰ In 1585, he was appointed *kanpaku*,⁴²¹ imperial regent, one of the highest posts in the imperial court traditionally reserved for members of the Fujiwara family. The following year, after the abdication of Ōgimachi *Tennō* and the enthronement of Hideyoshi's favourite candidate, the sixteen-year old Go-Yōzei,⁴²² he became *daijō daijin*,⁴²³ the grand minister of state. In only a bunch of years, then, Hideyoshi brought closer than ever the end of the turmoils of the *Sengoku Jidai* and he filled the void left by Ashikaga Yoshiaki and Nobunaga by obtaining from the *tennō* the legitimacy and the titles to rule the archipelago.

Apart from the battles of unification and the political maneuvering themselves, the most massive activity begun under Nobunaga and completed by Hideyoshi was the series of land survey to consolidate the practices of land registration, tax assessment and peasant tenure into a single system, which formed the factual basis for the new social institutions that would characterize Japan until the half of the 19th century.

In effect, during the century of internal wars, one of the main objectives of the *Sengoku daimyō* as regional overlords was to gain systematic control over the productive capacities of their domains. Hence, also before Nobunaga, powerful *daimyō* had already begun to undertake a similar task in their territories, in order to resolve

⁴¹⁸ 天下 *Tenka* literally means 'all beneath the Heaven'.

⁴¹⁹ Hideyoshi reached an accommodation with Nobukatsu and Ieyasu in January 1585.

⁴²⁰ It should be stressed, however, that also Nobunaga, shortly before his death, was offered the title of *kanpaku* and *daijō-daijin*. Although at first he refused to accept those titles, it seems that he postponed a definitive decision for a later moment. Therefore, the doubt still remains: would he maintain his independent posture or would he accept the court offerings?

⁴²¹ See Glossary.

⁴²² The prefix "go" 後 indicates that there had been already a *tennō* called Yōzei, namely the 57th *tennō* whose reign spanned the years from 876 to 884. It is the equivalent of the Western custom of adding an ordinal number after the name of a pope or a king.

⁴²³ See Glossary.

proprietary claims among their subjects. In the same year of Oda's capitulation, Hideyoshi issued orders for a systematic cadastral survey of the territory under his control, starting with the three districts of northern Ōmi that constituted his fief. This operation came to be called the *Taikō kenchi*⁴²⁴ and proceeded in three steps: measurement of land, assessment of its quality⁴²⁵ and hence of its capacity to be taxed, and determination of ownership. By way of the *kenchi*, Hideyoshi secured for himself the rights of taxation and governance and the license to delegate such rights to his vassals or to religious institutions. Any remaining local authority that would assert such rights over its domains had those claims nullified and its lands reassigned. Furthermore, the land survey provided Hideyoshi with the knowledge and the power to limit the wealth of the *daimyō* by displace them towards less productive areas.⁴²⁶

The *Taikō kenchi* was obviously a lengthy process slowed also by the fact that political fragmentation caused landholding, tax collecting and military service recruitment systems to vary greatly from location to location. According to Hideyoshi's plan each village and province had to deal with the survey and they had to send the cadastral registers to Hideyoshi's headquarters, where superior authorities had to analyse precise figures on the total tax base and therefore provide Hideyoshi with the basis for a uniform tax system. Yet, although Hideyoshi started the *kenchi* as early as 1584, by that time he had not yet subjugated all of the sixty-six provinces. He had to turn his gaze to the isolated southern region of Kyūshū.⁴²⁷

In 1586, while at the newly built Ōsaka castle, Hideyoshi received an embassy by D. Francisco of Bungo, who begged his help in the prolonged struggle against Shimazu Yoshihisa of Satsuma.⁴²⁸ When the Satsuma *daimyō* rejected Hideyoshi's overtures concerning a truce, preparations for a military campaign were initiated. The *kanpaku*'s victorious operation in Kyūshū lasted about half a year, between 1586 and

⁴²⁴ 太閤検地

⁴²⁵ The quality of a land was determined on the basis of the *kokudaka* 石高 system, a method of assessing the agricultural yield of each parcel of land in terms of quantity of rice expressed in *koku*. With regard to this system see Wakita, "The Kokudaka System: A Device for Unification", pp. 297-320.

⁴²⁶ Cf. Berry, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54 and Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18. See also *CHJ IV*, pp. 99-109.

⁴²⁷ For the events related to the year 1587, with the exception of manuscripts and printed sources, we followed Boxer, *Christian Century*, pp. 142-155, *idem*, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 43-45 and Okamoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 480-483.

⁴²⁸ See *CE*, II, ff. 190-190^v.

1587 and led Hideyoshi both to the dominance over southern Japan and to his encounter with the Christian missionaries.⁴²⁹

After the pacification of Kyūshū, Hideyoshi had before him a vast new territory at his disposal. As customary of him, he showed magnanimity to the defeated Shimazu and decided only to reduce their holdings, but leave them their status as *de facto* rulers of southern Kyūshū and the wealthiest house on the region, with a holding valued at about 560'000 *koku*. The Ōtomo, for their part, had to content themselves with the confirmation of Bungo alone, as happened to all the houses (Arima, Ōmura, Matsuura and Gotō) that had supported Hideyoshi after his arrival. Those houses were part of the so called *tozama*⁴³⁰ lords, i.e. *daimyō* with independent land bases, submitted to Toyotomi Hideyoshi as a result of alliance or defeat, whose allegiance, then, was by no means assured. Both in the first campaigns after Nobunaga's death and there in southern Japan, Hideyoshi opted to reward the *tozama* lords to avert hostilities. Also in South-Western Japan, then, in order to establish a firm and lasting control over local warlords who had been enjoying a larger dose of autonomy than their Honshū's peers, Hideyoshi deemed it necessary to reorganize the region according to his needs. Hence, he donated fiefs to some of his most loyal *fudai daimyō*⁴³¹, like Terazawa Shima no Kami Hirotaka,⁴³² and he enfeoffed the local *tozama* to neutralize their opposition and to secure their military cooperation. Moreover, the *tozama* enfeoffment turned out to be a practical solution also to prepare Hideyoshi's grand military project: the invasion of China. Yet, before handling with the Asian continent, Hideyoshi had to deal with the Western preachers. First, however, it will be helpful to see how Hideyoshi used to cope with Japanese religious establishments.

In 16th century Japan, the prosperous Buddhist monasteries were assimilated to the *Sengoku daimyō*, in terms of rights over the land, wealth and military force. Oda Nobunaga, for instance, waged a ten-year war against the monks of the Ishiyama

⁴²⁹ For a description of both the Ōtomo-Shimazu struggle and Hideyoshi's campaign see *CHJ IV*, pp. 352-359. See also Berry, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-93.

⁴³⁰ 外様

⁴³¹ The *fudai* 普代 were those retainers who entered Toyotomi service voluntarily during the early stage of Hideyoshi's career.

⁴³² Terazawa Hiromasa (1525-1596) was an old retainer of Oda and then passed to serve Hideyoshi. Following the Kyūshū campaign, he was given a 37'000-*koku* fief in Hizen. In 1592, the revenue was augmented until 80'000 *koku* and he received also the post of governorship of Nagasaki.

Honganji,⁴³³ followers of the Jōdo Shinshū.⁴³⁴ Also Hideyoshi had to use the hard way against religious institutions before going to Kyūshū. In 1585, in fact, he won the resistance of the Shingon⁴³⁵ monastery in Negoro, a leading arm producer which, among others, had supplied the monks of the Honganji during the war against Nobunaga. Although the conflict lasted no more than few days, it shows Hideyoshi's intolerance of religious independence and his way of dealing with religious institutions as if they were secular potentates.

As we saw, Hideyoshi's form of enfeoffment rested on the principles of land possession as defined by the *kenchi*. All *kuge*, *daimyō*, *kunishu* and monastic complexes could hold territories only as a concession (*azukarimono*⁴³⁶) sealed with the *kanpaku*'s *shuin-jō*,⁴³⁷ the vermillion seal. Yet, Ōmura's domain partly eluded this kind of logic. We established that D. Bartolomeu was a weak Kyūshū *daimyō*,⁴³⁸ who managed to keep his fief autonomous in particular through the liaison with the Portuguese and the donation of Nagasaki to the Society of Jesus. He secured for himself the dominion over the land and continued to collect the tariff duties on the goods, yet he handed over the jurisdiction of the city to the missionaries. With the importance of the *kenchi* within Hideyoshi's management of the *Tenka* in mind, it is plausible to suppose that when Hideyoshi was informed about the donation he might not have reacted positively, otherwise he would not take control over the city in 1587.⁴³⁹ The reasons that led him to the expropriation will appear clear if we just follow the events and the sources.

⁴³³ 石山本願寺

⁴³⁴ 浄土真宗

⁴³⁵ 真言

⁴³⁶ 預り物

⁴³⁷ 朱印状

⁴³⁸ The fact that D. Bartolomeu was not as big an asset as it would appear to the European readers who read him called "king" by the Jesuits is stressed in the Franciscan literature after the martyrdom of 1597. The aftermath of the execution of the 26 Christians at Nagasaki was marked by heated exchanges of accusations between members of the Iberian crown. For instance, in a anti-Jesuits treatise we read: '[A]ntes que este Rey de Japão conquistasse a todo o Japão, que estava repartido entre alguns Senhores que chamão Tonos; hum delles depois de feito Christão, que, como os Padres dizem, o foi por interesse, ainda que depois cahio em a conta, e anda bem celebrado nas cartas e lhe chamão El Rej dom Bertholaameu, não sendo Rej, senão como Duque, ou Conde, porem tendo (mais lambido) o nome de Rej, e assi como em Hespanha são muito o que he Senhor de quatro legoas de terra, he chamado em as cartas Rej, que entendão em Hespanha que he algum Rej de França que se fez Christão'. See *Tratado que os religiosos de S. Francisco espalharam em Goa em Baçaim no ano de 1598 contra os Padres da Companhia de Jesus que andam na conversão de Japão*, BL/Add. 9858, f. 70^v.

⁴³⁹ Cf. *Apologia*, f. 75^v: '[Hideyoshi] tomo [Nagasaki] para si, quitando a nosotros la anclage, y al hijo de D. Bartholame, que le sucedio en sus tierras, el dominio, y los derechos, que tenia en aquel puerto, y despues con estar debaxo de su poder, y con los muchos Christianos, que fueron desterrados de diversas partes, fue creciendo en todo este tiempo mucho, tanto que agora avra en el cerca de mil casas'.

During the first years of rule, differently from Oda Nobunaga, the *kanpaku* had not many meetings with the fathers of the Society of Jesus. He officially received for the first time the Vice-provincial Gaspar Coelho, along with Father Luís Frois as interpreter, on 4 May 1586.⁴⁴⁰ During the meeting, Hideyoshi revealed his purpose of invading Korea and China and that he was about to build a fleet of 2'000 ships. It seems that Coelho saw this plan as an opportunity to get into Hideyoshi's good graces and volunteered to use his influence with the Portuguese Captain Major to get military help and advanced also the hypothesis of creating a coalition of *kirishitan daimyō* to put at the *kanpaku*'s disposal.⁴⁴¹ According to Jesuits' sources, notwithstanding Hideyoshi's great disdain for religious who meddled in military matters, the *kanpaku* issued a decree granting the fathers the possibility to preach freely throughout Japan.⁴⁴² Until that moment, the Japan Jesuits did not put a lot of trust in the new hegemon. Hideyoshi, in fact, never showed much interest for the Western missionaries and they never went so far as to call him the man chosen by God, as they did with Nobunaga.⁴⁴³ In effect, although that meeting generated a slight optimism, which increased during the *kanpaku*'s Kyūshū campaign, eventually Coelho's proposals turned out being double-edged for the missionaries.

Hideyoshi established the headquarters for the campaign at Hakata, in northern Kyūshū. In the middle of the operations, he received Father Coelho there and he invited the Portuguese to visit him once again before he moved back to the capital.⁴⁴⁴ Before this last meeting took place, however, Coelho was unexpectedly visited by the *kanpaku*. As a matter of fact, Hideyoshi's interest for Western shipcraft was compelling enough

⁴⁴⁰ In addition to Coelho and Frois, the Jesuits delegation included two more fathers, four Brothers, fifteen *dōjuku* and some of the youngsters from the seminaries, for a total of about thirty persons. See *CE*, II, f. 178^v.

⁴⁴¹ Gaspar Coelho's *military* posture was criticized by his own brethren for being unfitted for a man of the cloth. In 1598, for instance, the Italian Organtino Gnechi Soldo described Coelho's behaviour as more similar to that of a 'Capitano d'armi che di pastore d'anime'. Cf. *ARSI, Jap. Sin.* 13 [II], f. 66^v.

⁴⁴² The decree was issued on 20 June 1586. The fathers asked, and apparently obtained, also that their estates should not be exploited for military uses and that they should not be charged of any obligation in the cities they lived in. Cf. *CE*, II, ff. 178^v-179 and *CHJ IV*, pp. 348-349.

⁴⁴³ Cf. *Carta Annuā do Jappão de 1582*, ANTT/AJ, *Livro* 28, f. 191^v: 'Senhoria estas partes [Miyako] ha ia muitos annos hum Senhor chamado Nobunanga, que com seu esforço e ardis de hum pequeno reino que tinha, em pouco tempo se fez Senhor de toda a Monarchia de Jappão [...]. Este homem parece que escolheu Deus para aparelhar o caminho a nossa Santa lei sem elle entender o que nisso faz, porque não somente estima em pouco e despreza os Camis e fotoques, a quem os jappões tem tanta devoção, mas ainda he cruel imigo e perseguidor dos Bonzos'.

⁴⁴⁴ For a brief account of the two meetings see Okamoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 469-475.

to make a visit to the fathers directly on board their *fusta*.⁴⁴⁵ He was the most welcomed of visits, of course. Hideyoshi took his time in studying the ship. He was really curious about it and ended his short tour giving praises to the Portuguese naval engineering.⁴⁴⁶ When the scheduled meeting took place, after the war was won and over, Hideyoshi showed again his interest on Western ships and expressed his desire to see the Portuguese *Nao do trato*, which that year berthed at Hirado.⁴⁴⁷ The vice-provincial tried to dissuade Hideyoshi by telling him that moving the ship there presented several problems, but Hideyoshi insisted. Eventually, the Captain Major Domingos Monteiro had to go personally to Hakata to offer his services to the hegemon and to declare his inability to comply with Hideyoshi's desire. Even though it seemed that the *kanpaku* understood and accepted the apologies, only a few hours later during the night, Hideyoshi changed radically his attitude towards the Christian faith, its preachers and its believers. That very night, in fact, Hideyoshi sent an accusatory letter to Coelho,⁴⁴⁸ deprived the last strong *kirishitan daimyō*,⁴⁴⁹ Takayama Ukon Justo, of all his estates and exiled him to a peripheral region.⁴⁵⁰ As a final point, on 24 July 1587 Hideyoshi issued the official edict of proscription of the Christian faith, which would never be revoked.

This is not the place to discuss the motives that led Hideyoshi to that abrupt change of attitude. Yet, it would be useful to look into the reasons behind Hideyoshi's 1587 decree, which obviously had been already analysed at length by several historians. Some consider the five-point decree as founded upon political and allegiance reasons, with no religious fundaments.⁴⁵¹ Others, on the other hand, state that the religion was the issue, since the Christian belief was considered strong enough to jeopardize the very

⁴⁴⁵ A *fusta* was a boat of some two or three hundred tons. According to Moran it was built directly upon Coelho's order. Cf. Moran, *The Japanese and the Jesuits*, p. 73. It has been also stated that it was frequently used in naval battles against pirates. Cf. *CHJ IV*, pp. 361-362.

⁴⁴⁶ See *CE*, II, f. 199^v: 'Depois de a ver toda com muita curiosidade (por ser mui diferente das embarcações dos Iapões) & gabando seu artificio'.

⁴⁴⁷ Cf. Okamoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 467-468.

⁴⁴⁸ See *CE*, II, f. 207^v.

⁴⁴⁹ Between 24 May and 11 June 1587, in fact, both Dom Bartolomeu and Dom Francisco died.

⁴⁵⁰ Takayama Ukon Justo (1553-1615) was one of the most faithful Japanese converted lords. He was a retainer of Nobunaga and then passed to serve Hideyoshi. He was definitely expelled from Japan in 1614 and took refuge in Manila where he was welcomed as a champion of the Christian faith. Unfortunately, he died at Manila shortly after his arrival. Cf. Laures, "Takayama Ukon. A Critical Essay", pp. 86-112.

⁴⁵¹ Cf. Boxer, *Christian Century*, p. 151, Cooper, *Rodrigues, O Intérprete Um Jesuíta no Japão e na China*, pp. 93-94 and Moran, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114.

social order Hideyoshi was trying to establish throughout the country.⁴⁵² It is our opinion that this kind of discussion is substantially based on an anachronistic view of the relation between *politic* and *religion*. In early modern Europe, kings and their vassals punished the crime of heresy as the most serious political offense, that of lese-majesty. Disagree with the religion of the ruler was a form of political sedition. Hence, the heretic was basically a traitor. Betraying the *fides* involved the failing of *fidelitas* as a political link, since the heretic broke the very foundation of that link and he therefore deserved the worst punishment.⁴⁵³ In Japan the same happened. Take, for instance, the example of Takayama Ukon. His refusal to apostatize was considered as a political deed and was punished accordingly. Furthermore, it would seem that through Takayama's weakening, Hideyoshi was trying to break up the group of *kirishitan daimyō* close to him.⁴⁵⁴

Before the decree was issued, however, an epistolary exchange between Hideyoshi and Coelho took place. Also at this early stage of the *kanpaku*'s indignation, an accusation among all is worth to be quoted. Hideyoshi blamed Coelho to have come to Japan to spread a faith 'prejudicial a todas as leis de Japão, enganosa, & destruidora de seus costumes & do governo da Tenca'.⁴⁵⁵ It is clear that Hideyoshi wanted to defend not only the Shintoism and the Buddhism, considered as cults belonging to Japan's own nature. In the third point of the edict we find once again this accusation: 'os Padres procedão com sua seita, assim [...] se ficão quebrando as leis de Japão'.⁴⁵⁶ In this case, it would seem that the Jesuit who translated the text of the decree was biased by the very mentality we are addressing. In the original text in Japanese, in fact, we do not find the correspondent for 'se ficão quebrando as leis de Japão', instead we read '日域の仏法を相破る事', which can be translated as 'destroying the law of the Buddha in the place of the rising Sun'. We can see, then, that political and religious criticisms were actually interchangeable and it is, therefore, useless to exclude one in favour of the other.

⁴⁵² Cf. Berry, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93 and Massarella, *A World Elsewhere. Europe's Encounter with Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, p. 162

⁴⁵³ Cf. Prosperi, *Tribunali della Coscienza*, pp. 48-49.

⁴⁵⁴ Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, pp. 170-171.

⁴⁵⁵ See *CE*, II, f. 209.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ivi*, f. 209^v.

Yet, what is significant to us now is how Hideyoshi stressed the importance of the juridical laws he had recently established, which was the main point of the second item.⁴⁵⁷

‘O segundo. Vindo [the fathers] a estes reinos & estados de Iapão, fazem-nos de sua seita, pera o qual destruem os templos dos Camis⁴⁵⁸ & Fotoques,⁴⁵⁹ & isto he cousa agora & dantes nunca vista, nem ouuida de gente, quando o senhor da Tenca dá aos homens Reinos, Vilas, Cidades, & rendas, não he mais que polo tempo presente, & elles são obrigados a guardar inteiramente as leis, & determinações da Tenca, mas fazer a gente plebea outras perturbações semelhantes a estas he cousa dinha de castigo.’⁴⁶⁰

In this entry, Hideyoshi attributed great importance to the fact that the local lords were not the juridical possessor of their domains. According to Hideyoshi, who spoke as the lord of the *Tenka*, the *daimyō* were in charge of a land they did not own, but they only managed it ‘polo tempo presente’, temporarily (当座の事). Therefore, how could D. Bartolomeu donate something that was not his own? Nagasaki, in other words, represented a unicum within the Japanese country and as such embodied also some of the uncertainties that Hideyoshi was trying to level. The *Taikō kenchi* and the *kokudaka* system jointly symbolize firstly the effort to gain firmer control over the domains’ resources and productive output, but also a means to unify different systems into a single and official one. The cadastral registers assured Hideyoshi a complete knowledge of the productive capacities of the fiefs. Yet, the silk trade in Nagasaki granted to Dom Bartolomeu and the Society of Jesus an income that did not fit within the *kenchi* registers.

We do not have the sources to confirm or refute this hypothesis. Yet, there has to be a part of truth in it. In 1590, three years later, Manila’s Archbishop, the Dominican Domingo de Salazar,⁴⁶¹ wrote an intriguing letter, which deserves to be quoted at length:

⁴⁵⁷ We opted to quote the Portuguese translation of the edict for the following reason. This translation enables us not only to read the content of the edict, but also to peer into the mentality of the translator, as we have already showed. At any rate, an English translation from the Japanese could be found in Boxer, *Christian Century*, p. 148 and Elison, “The Evangelic Furnace”, p. 145

⁴⁵⁸ *Kami* 神, the principal spiritual entities of the Shintoism.

⁴⁵⁹ *Hotoke* 仏, the Buddha.

⁴⁶⁰ See *CE*, II, f. 209^v.

⁴⁶¹ Domingo de Salazar (c. 1512-1594) studied law at the University of Salamanca before dedicating his life to the Dominican Order. He set off for the Spanish Indies in 1553, proselytizing especially in Florida and in Mexico, where between 1571 and 1576 carried out duties with the Inquisition. He went back to

‘Dezimos que la culpa desto [the edict] mas esta en los Padres que alli an predicado, que en el Rey que los a mandado salir, porque como aqui nos emos informado de Spañoles que an estado en aquellas Islas⁴⁶² y delos Japones naturales dellas, el motivo que aquel Rey tuvo para hechar de alli alos Padres no fue porque predicaban el Evangelio [...], sino porque aquellos Padres aunque con buen zelo para no ser costosos alos Japones, que es gente muy pobre, an uzado la mercancia en aquellas Islas traziendolas sus cargazones de Macan como alos demas y siguiendo su correspondencia los Padres de Macan con los de Japon y que para hazer esto tienen un breve del Papa Gregorio XIII, que aunque sea assi y ellos lo ayan hecho con buen intento para sustentar como dizen los seminarios o Collegios que alli tienen, pero cosa cierta es que este modo de predicar el Evangelio ni lo enseñaron los apostoles ni le han enseñado los Barones apostolicos entrando a predicar con mercadorias, sino con el menos provecho de todas las cosas [...]. Tambien emos sabido que toman aquellos Padres algunos puertos del Japon, donde cobran el anclaje y derechos de mercadorias, como V. Magestad los cobra [...], y tenian un procurador deputado de su orden que cobrava estos derechos. Tanbien nos an dicho que la tierra adentro começaban a tener algunos pueblos aunque desto no tenemos tanta certidunbre como delo primero’.⁴⁶³

We should pause a while on Salazar’s words and try to understand whether there is something behind them or they show plainly their true nature. That the Spanish had a strong – colonial, commercial and religious – interest over Japan, China and the silk trade was no mistery. Attempts to snatch the Portuguese monopoly over those fields arrived both from laymen and from men of the cloth. Salazar himself only four days before he wrote this letter had confessed that he accepted Manila’s diocese because it was close to China.⁴⁶⁴ It would be normal, then, that Salazar was trying to achieve the same result here: belittle the name and the successes of the *Padroado* in front of the king in the attempt of obtaining the unconditioned support of the monarch to the detriment of the Iberian neighbours. Yet, the only consequence that the Archbishop’s words may have caused in the Spanish court was to limit or to impede the Ignatians’

Europe, but in 1578 he was appointed as first bishop at Manila, where he arrived in 1581. Cf. Porras Camúñez, *Sinodo de Manila de 1582*, Madrid, 1988, pp. 36-115.

⁴⁶² There is the possibility that Salazar was referring to Father Alonso Sánchez. The Spanish Jesuit, in fact, had shown his uneasiness towards the participation of his confreres in the silk trade. Once he finally got to Manila he wrote a letter to Acquaviva, stating that ‘alo menos avia V. P. de remediar que los padres no fuessen a Canton al tiempo de el empleo por que los manderinos chinas (que son los juezes) y todos los mercaderes tienen alos Padres por tratantes y demas caudal que ningun portugues, y llevandome a mi por aquellas ciudades dela China a dentro sin que supresen quien era en una de ellas dixo un mandarin ‘ya la conosco, que de unos padres es que estan en Macan y vienen cada año a Canton a comprar mercaderia y hazer vinanga (que es contratar o emplear)’. See ARSI, *Philipp.* 9, ff. 19^v-20.

⁴⁶³ See Archbishop Domingo de Salazar OP to King Filipe I, Manila, 29 June 1590. ARSI, *Philipp.* 9, ff. 215-215^v.

⁴⁶⁴ Cf. Gil, *Hidalgos y Samurai*, p. 32, n. 23.

involvement in the trade, which did not happen, but it does not seem likely that King Filipe would take the silk trade away from the Portuguese and give it to the Spaniards. Then, in our opinion the prelate's letter can be interpreted in two ways. The first is that he had some grudge (political or religious in this case did not seem to matter much) against the Society of Jesus and desired to spread slanders against it, maybe in order to facilitate the entrance of the Preachers in China. The second, on the other hand, presupposes that Domingo de Salazar was actually stating the truth and thus the Jesuits' involvement in the silk trade between Macao and Nagasaki played actually a role within Hideyoshi's behaviour. It is true that Hideyoshi wanted Brother João Rodrigues to handle his bargains, yet that does not exclude that the *kanpaku* wanted to limit the Jesuits' participation in such a delicate and profitable matter. In favour of the latter interpretation, there is the general tone of the letter, which is neither angry nor excessively accusatory and, until a certain point, it stretches to justify the Ignatians and the trade.

Furthermore, considering the dimensions of the undertaking of mapping the sixty-six provinces of Japan, it seems reasonable to think that for Hideyoshi would have been illogical to leave such a particular city in the hands of a foreign institution, on top of it a religious one that had already demonstrated to have a certain military resourcefulness. Beside Coelho's *fusta*, in fact, the fathers had also other instruments for their defense. Right after they gained possession of Nagasaki, precisely in 1582, thanks to the income of the Japan voyage, they could afford to erect a defensive wall made of hard-pressed clay (*taipa*) all around the city. Furthermore, Nagasaki itself had already been provided with a fortress and six bulwarks.⁴⁶⁵ It is not clear to what extent Nagasaki had been militarized by 1587, yet it should not surprise that a tyrant as Hideyoshi preferred to take the city for himself. Nevertheless, in the second general conference of the mission in August 1590, it was debated whether it would advisable to have a fortress in Nagasaki in case Hideyoshi would restore the Jesuits' control over the port. The fathers were all of the opinion that 'não se tivesse [in Nagasaki] Fortaleza em nosso nome, nem fosse por nosoutros sustentada, nem provida de gente darmas e

⁴⁶⁵ Cf. ANTT/AJ, *Livro 28*, f. 179^v: 'O apposento que nesta terra temos, ficou mui fermoso e seguro com a cerqua que este anno se fez ao redor de huma taimpa mui forte de que toda a fortaleza de Nangaçaque esta cerquada com seus baluartes. Fez-se esta obra toda com o dinheiro que os navios dos portugezes costumão a pagar ao Senhor da terra'.

moniçoens’.⁴⁶⁶ Valignano, in his personal *Resoluções* on the conference, agreed on what had been decided, but incidentally added also some details that help us understand better the level of military defence at Nagasaki. Namely, he wrote that ‘já a artilharia toda se tem mandado pera a China no junco que ja partio e se venderão as munições e espingardas que em casa estavam guardadas’.⁴⁶⁷ It would seem, then, that the Ignatians not only participated on the expenses of the former fortress, but they also kept in their premises firearms and ammunitions presumably used by the Portuguese or Japanese garrison.

At any rate, however, the *kanpaku* did not deal with Nagasaki when he rewarded *fudai* and *tozama daimyō* with land concessions. It is likely that Nagasaki was a topic that deserved to be handled separately, since coping with the port meant dealing with the Society of Jesus.

The 1587-decree against the Christian faith is famous in particular because it was not enforced. As a matter of fact, Hideyoshi’s order to expel the missionaries did not consider that the only way the Jesuits could actually go away was aboard the Great Ship. Fortunately for the fathers, in 1587, owing to the turmoils in Kyūshū, Macao’s citizens resolved to cancel the Japan voyage. Consequently, the missionaries had to wait at least nine months before being able to leave. In any case, while they were waiting for Hideyoshi to decide, they all gathered at Hirado. It is true, as it is commonly stated, that eventually Hideyoshi did not impose the expulsion, but the blow he inferred on the mission was heavy nonetheless. In addition to the confiscation of Nagasaki, in fact, he expropriated also the Jesuits’ estates in Ōsaka, Sakai and Miyako, and, furthermore, he forbid the Portuguese merchants to display Christian symbols aboard the *kurofune*⁴⁶⁸ and to bring any more missionaries to Japan.⁴⁶⁹

In 1587, then, the Japan Jesuits lost two Japanese Christian lords and a third one was weakened and exiled. They lost the port-city and, to make things worse, they lost also the income from the missing voyage. In 1589, however, Hideyoshi received an embassy by the Captain Major Jerónimo Pereira and confessed that he was not adversed

⁴⁶⁶ See *Segunda Consulta Geral feita pello Padre Alexandre Valignano Visitador da Companhia de Jesus em Jappão em Agosto do anno de 1590*, ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 51, ff. 149^v-150.

⁴⁶⁷ See *Resoluções do Padre Visitador sobre a dita consulta*, ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 51, f. 170^v.

⁴⁶⁸ Hideyoshi expressly stated that the merchants were in no means included in the decree of expulsion. Cf. *CE*, II, f. 209^v: ‘O quarto, porque a nao vem fazer sua fazenda, & he cousa mui diferente, fação embora suas fazendas’.

⁴⁶⁹ Cf. *CE*, II, f. 209.

to the Christian faith, but added that the evangelization would shake Japan to its very foundations; hence he could not allow it. It would seem that the plan of the *kanpaku* was not to eradicate Christianity from Japan, rather to show to the Westerners the limitless boundaries of his power without scaring them to the point of interrupting any contact. Whilst the possession of Nagasaki was given back to the Ōmura, the silk trade continued to prosper. In that very year of 1589, precisely on 29 April, Alessandro Valignano was again in Macao waiting to set for Japan. Before returning there, however, the Italian Jesuit had to stipulate again the *armação* with the city merchants. Two things had changed since 1579: first, the participation of the fathers of the Society of Jesus in the contract was confirmed by a royal decree on 18 April 1584 and, second, in 1586 Viceroy Dom Duarte de Menezes had granted to Macao the same privileges as a city of the kingdom, which obliged the Macanese community to renew the contracts. Valignano never regret having stipulated the *armação* although he kept receiving criticisms and reprimands almost every year from Rome or Goa. In 1599, he wrote in exasperation to the father provincial in India that those who had no experience in Japan, simply could not understand what it took for the mission to survive:

‘Eu pola graça de N. Senhor não naçi filho de mercader, nem nunca o fui, mas folgo de ter feito o que fiz por amor de Japão, e creio que N. Senhor tambem o tem por bem feito e que me faz e fará muitas merçes [...], por onde Padre meu quem esta farto, e lhe não falta nada não pode ser bom Juiz dos apertos que padecem os que estão morrendo de fome em grande necessidade, e se qualquer de Vuestras Reverencias se visse colos gastos destas Provincia as costas e com tam pouca renda, e cabedal, e esse pouco tam perigozo e incerto eu lhe aseguro que não dormiria o seu sono muito descansado’.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁷⁰ See Visitor Valignano to the Provincial of India, Shiki, 12 October 1599. BL/Add. 9860, f. 67. Cf. Boxer, *Missionaries and Merchants*, p. 224.

Conclusion

The first part of the present work was dedicated to a contextualization conceived to be not a mere presentation of the historical fact, rather a framework able to introduce us to the whole status quo of the 16th century. Of course, the *raison d'être* of this thesis is still ahead, but it would not have been possible to deal with such a topic – the procurator of the Society of Jesus in Japan – without a straightforward understanding of the facts and the men involved. It is understandable that for the sake of brevity a lot of choices had to be taken, hence limiting space – or not assigning it at all – to important facts that happened in the period and places we have examined. It was necessary to make such choices in order to maintain the focus on the principal subjects of this dissertation. However, there are some elements that have been slightly left aside more for a narrative purpose.

First of all, the narration abruptly stops at 1587, whereas the very title of this work imposes to move our analysis at least 25 years further on. The last ten years of Hideyoshi's rule will not be just censored off, but in the first part was necessary to give a certain amount of notions to explain better what happened in the first twenty years of the 17th century. And it is undeniable that what happened in the 1580s, both in Europe and in Asia, clearly defined the first half of the following century: the Iberian *Provincia cerrada* came into being with a series of political and economic consequences both in the Atlantic Ocean and in Asia, the pontiffs recognized the Jesuits' efforts in Japan and granted them annual donation to continue the proselytization, as already done by the last kings of the Portuguese House Avis, Dom Sebastião and Dom Henrique. In Asia, on the other hand, two fundamental cities for the Asian trade within the Portuguese patronage were founded in less than thirty years. The two of them both strictly linked to Portuguese private entrepreneurs, the silk trade and the Society of Jesus. The latter got to the point of being in charge of Nagasaki, but that did not go well. In the second part, we will see how Hideyoshi's rule waned and we will directly see Tokugawa Ieyasu and how the Jesuits coped with him.

Secondly, we are leaving aside the mentality of the human beings, whose existences we are approaching and trying to understand. Practically all the theme faced in this first part, namely the union of the Iberian crowns, the involvement of men of the cloth in secular matters and the very office of procurator, will be dealt with in the

second part in a different manner, less devoted to the historical facts perhaps, but it is history nonetheless.

PART 2

THE MEN AND THE OFFICE OF PROCURATOR: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

CHAPTER I

CARLO SPINOLA'S LIFE FROM HIS BIRTH UNTIL THE APPOINTMENT TO PROCURATOR OF THE JAPAN PROVINCE 1564-1611

I. 1. A low-born noble: Carlo Spinola's birthplace

The Jesuit Father Carlo Spinola died burned at the stake on 10 September 1622, on what Japanese historiography calls the *Genna Daijunkyō*,¹ the great martyrdom of the *Genna* era.² In that martyrdom, twenty-two missionaries (Jesuits, Dominicans and Franciscans) were burned alive, whereas other thirty found their death by the Japanese swords.³

In the *Chiesa del Gesù* in Rome is preserved an oil painting made by an anonymous Japanese artist, which is almost an actual photograph of the martyrdom (Picture 1). The painting is so detailed that we are able to identify Carlo Spinola among the sentenced to death (the fifth one standing starting from the left), and has therefore a big historical value, which goes beyond the artistic one. In addition to this visual source, we obviously have several descriptions of this martyrdom,⁴ and we are going to quote an excerpt from the first published biography of Carlo Spinola:

¹ 元和大殉教

² The *Genna* era spanned the years from 1615 to 1625.

³ Cf. *Em tempo do Imperador Daifuzama forão mortos por odio de nossa Santa Fé cento e trinta e nove pessoas*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-55, p. 324.

⁴ See for instance *De Novis Christianæ Religiois Progressibvs, et Certaminibvs in Iaponia, anno MDCXXII. In Regno Sinarvm MDCXXI et MDCXII and Relación breve delos grandes y rigurosos martirios que el año passado de 1622 dieron en el Iapon a ciento y diez y ocho ilustrissimos Martyres, sacada principalmente de las cartas de los Padres de la Compañía de Iesus que allí residen, y de lo que han referido muchas personas de aquel Reyno, que en dos Nauios llegaron a la Ciudad de Manila a 12 de Agosto de 1633.*



Picture 1 Anonymous, *Genna Daijunkyō*, Rome, Chiesa del Gesù, 17th century

‘Il nostro Padre Carlo fù il primo di tutti, che ne riportò la desiderata palma [of the martyrdom]; il quale non potè lungamente contrastare con quegli ardori [of the flames], non solo per essere già vecchio [...], ma molto più perche alcune fauille di fuoco di quelle, che dalle legna saltando volauano per aria, se gli fermarono nel petto, e gli accesero la veste [...]. Si che mancandogli a poco a poco le forze, cadde a terra, e quasi che la ringratiasse per la corona, che riportaua da lei, abbracciolla in quell’vltimo atto, e spirò, con questa morte nascendo eternamente al cielo li 10 di Settembre 1622’.⁵

Numerous Western philosophers and writers from the ancient times⁶ up to the 16th century⁷ had been asserting that whilst there may be disguise and dissimulation in a man’s life, in the last scene of death there is no more counterfeiting. ‘Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo eiciuntur, et eripitur persona, manet res’,⁸ the truth, in other words, at last issues from the heart. According to this branch of our philosophy, then, the way a man faces his death has the power to give a good or an ill reputation to his whole life. If we were to judge Spinola’s life through his death, we would state that as a martyr he could not have left a better testimony of his belief.

We know all the details with regard to his death. The day, the place, the reasons, the people involved, who he was with, the moments before and after the execution. We also know that when he was already tied to the stake, a Japanese Christian managed to snatch the *carapuça* – a beret – the Father was wearing as a relic.⁹ Unfortunately, for the moment he was born, we are not as lucky. The information about Carlo Spinola’s early years is quite scanty and inconclusive. Yet, the research that had been carried out during the last years might shed some light upon them.

The precise date of Spinola’s birth has never been ascertained. It is our opinion that he was probably born between 24 and 31 of December 1564, although recently it has been stated that he was born in the first months of 1565.¹⁰ In this regard, Jesuit sources are often discordant,¹¹ but it seems that the year 1564 is confirmed by the Jesuit

⁵ Cf. Spinola F. A., *Vita del P. Carlo Spinola della Compagnia di GIESV morto per a Santa Fede nel Giappone*, p. 214.

⁶ Cf. Seneca, *Epistulæ Morales ad Lucilium*, 17, 102.

⁷ Cf. Michel de Montaigne, *Essays*, XVIII – That men are not to judge of our happiness till after death.

⁸ Cf. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, III, 57-58.

⁹ The original letter in Japanese that attested this fact still survives. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, ff. 133^v-134.

¹⁰ Cf. Ruiz-de-Medina, “Un Jesuita de Madrid Arquitecto de la Iglesia de São Paulo, Macao”, pp. 37-38.

¹¹ By way of example see how various catalogues of the Ignatians disagree about this point. In the *Lista dos Padres e Irmãos que forão pera a India e Japão ano de 1596* we read ‘P. Carlos Espinola, genovês, de 30 anos e da Companhia 12’, that is to say that he was born in 1566. See *DI XVIII 1595-1597*, p. 530. Nevertheless, the *Catalogo dos Padres e Irmãos da Companhia de Jesus da India, feito em dezembro de 1599* reads that ‘P. Carolo Espinola natural de Genova de idade de 34; da Companhia 15’, which means

historian Daniello Bartoli, according to whom when Spinola entered the Society of Jesus (23 December 1584¹²) he was about to turned twenty.¹³ As a matter of fact, it would seem that not even the individual concerned was conscious of his date of birth. In the first and indisputable source that mentions him, the *Collegii Neapolitani Catalogus* of the 1590s, we find the following table:

<i>Nomen et Cognomen</i>	<i>Patria</i>	<i>Ætas</i>	<i>Vires</i>	<i>Tempus Societatis</i>	<i>Tempus Studiorum</i>
Carolus Spinola	Genuensis	Natus anno 1562 ut putat	Mediocres	Ingressus ani 1584, mense 9mbri	Studuit humanioribus literis annum et logicæ annum in Societate

Source: *Collegii Neapolitani Catalogus*, ARSI, *Neap.* 80, f. 8^v.

As registered in this catalogues, Spinola supposed (*putat*) that he was born in 1562. It was not strange back then for someone to ignore his date of birth. Actually, it commonly happened until the very 20th century that people knew only approximately when they were born. Yet, not even the first biographers of Carlo, his fellow Father Bento Fernandes¹⁴ and the already quoted Fabio Ambrosio Spinola,¹⁵ could ascertain Spinola's date of birth.¹⁶

What is even more intriguing, anyway, is Carlo Spinola's birthplace. Since the publication of the first biography in 1628 until the latest works about the Italian Jesuit, the place of his birth was always given as secure information and there has always been

he was born in 1565. Cf. ARSI, *Goa* 24, f. 282. The same can be desumed from the data in *Catalogo I.º das Informaçoes comunas dos Padres e Irmãos de Jappão feito em Junho de 1617*, we read that 'O P. Carlos Spinola Italiano de Genova anno de idade 52 da Companhia 32', which means he was born in 1565. Cf. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-66, f. 166^v.

¹² Cf. Spinola, *op. cit.*, p. 10 and ARSI, *Med.* 47, p. 24.

¹³ See Bartoli, *Dell'Historia della Compagnia di Giesu. Il Giappone, seconda parte Dell'Asia*, IV p. 133: '[...] giovane in età di venti anni, non ancora compiuti'.

¹⁴ Bento Fernandes was born probably in 1578 in Portugal and set off for the Indies in 1602, reaching Japan three years later. He got acquainted with Spinola in Miyako and remained in Japan even after the decree of expulsion of 1614 and continued to proselytize until his capture in 1633, the same year of his martyrdom. Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, pp. 773-774.

¹⁵ We do not have precise information about Fabio Ambrosio Spinola, but he did not belong to the same branch of the Spinola family as Carlo, the Counts of Tassarolo. Fabio was born on 5 October 1593 and entered the Society of Jesus on 28 August 1610, in the Milanese province, which included also Genoa, where most likely he was born and would die on 18 August 1671.

¹⁶ Namely, Fernandes wrote that Spinola 'entro na Companhia de dezanove pera 20 annos de idade'. See Fernandes, "Da vida e virtudes do Padre Carlo Spinola" in *Relaçam das vidas, e mortes gloriosas, que por pregar o Santo Evangelho nos reinos de Iapão alguns Padres, e Irmãos da Companhia de Iesu padeceram no anno de mille seis centos, e vinte e dous, feita pello Padre Bento Fernandes da mesma Companhia residente em Japam*, in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 60, ff. 224-233. Fabio Ambrogio Spinola wrote something similar: 'essendo di età di 19 in 20 anni'. See Spinola, *op. cit.*, p. 10. Considering that Carlo Spinola entered the novitiate on 23 December 1584, we deduce that he was born between the last days of December 1584 and January 1585. Cf. ARSI, *Med.* 47, p. 24.

an understandable need to correct the mistake in favour of historical precision. At any rates, three probable birthplaces have been suggested: Genoa, Prague and Madrid.

The first one, Genoa, is, we might say, an honest mistake. The Spinola, in fact, were one of the most important aristocratic houses in Genoa. After almost two centuries of alternation between self-rule under doges chosen for life and foreign rule in particular by Milan and France, starting from 1531, Genoa instated the dogeship on a two year basis. Until the 18th century, the doges were chosen in particular among two houses: Doria and Spinola. Carlo Spinola, however, belonged to a secondary branch of the family, namely the Counts of Tassarolo, an aristocratic title created by Emperor Ferdinand I in 1560 for Marcantonio Spinola, Carlo's oldest uncle. It was highly probable, then, that Carlo was born between Genoa and Tassarolo. Furthermore, the Jesuit catalogues that survive from the time he was in Italy, i.e. 1584-1595, under the column called *Patria* unmistakably report *Genuensis*. In the early modern period, the substantives *patria* and *natio* were interchangeable and shared a certain polysemy, although the latter usually referred to wider spaces than the former. They could indicate the place where one was born, but may also refer to a community with a collective culture. From the political point of view, in particular, the parameters that lead to the identification of one's *natio* were the dynasties, the titles, the relationship with the country and the rights enjoyed therein.¹⁷ As a consequence, then, although the catalogues of the Society were compiled upon questioning the individual registered, from them we can only deduce that Spinola belonged to a Genoese family.¹⁸ Moreover, if we take a look to later catalogues drawn up in Japan, we always read Father Carlo Spinola, Italian, natural of Genoa.¹⁹

In any case, if we sum the catalogues to the first biographies of Carlo Spinola, it would not be strange to conclude that he was actually born in Genoa. Yet, in 1675 the rector of the Prague University Matthias Tanner wrote that 'Carolus Spinola [...], Pragæ in Bohemia natus'.²⁰ Tanner's volume is the visual record of the martyrdoms of his confrères throughout the whole missions of the Society in the 16th and 17th centuries.

¹⁷ Cf. Spagnoletti, "El Concepto de Naturaleza, Nación y Patria en Italia y el Reino de Nápoles con Respecto a la Monarquía de los Austrias", p. 483.

¹⁸ Cf. Ruiz-de-Medina, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹⁹ Cf. ARSI, Goa 24, f. 282, *TCJ*, pp. 581, 595, 658 and 853.

²⁰ Cf. Tanner, *Societas Jesu usque ad Sanguinis et Vitæ Profusionem Militans. In Europa, Africa, Asia, et America, contra Gentiles, Mahometanos, Judæos, Hæreticos, Impios, Pro Deo Fide Ecclesia Pietate. Sive Vita et Mors Eorum, Qui Ex Societate Jesu in causa Fidei, & Virtutis Propugantæ, Violentam Morte Toto Orbe Sublati Sunt*, p. 289

According to the medieval and early modern mentality, a martyr was intended not as a man who failed, but as someone to be celebrated and, in particular, emulated. As he wrote in the initial paragraph of Spinola's biography, '[s]anguinis Martyrum, non tantum semen est Christianorum, sed etiam exhortatio Martyriorum, dum imitari non piget, quod celebrare delectate'.²¹ A contemporary biographer of Carlo, the Spanish Jesuit Ruiz-de-Medina, ascribed Tanner's assertion to the fact that he wanted to claim for his own country the birth of a glorious martyr of the Society of Jesus.²² According to Ruiz-de-Medina, in fact, Tanner did not found his theory on solid historical clues but on a disputable inference. Namely, the Bohemian wrote that since Carlo's father, Ottavio, served under Emperor Rudolf II, whose court was in Prague, then Carlo must have been born there.²³ Ruiz-de-Medina followed this reasoning but refuted the conclusion. Accordingly, he corrected his fellow on the fact that around the year Carlo was born the young Rudolf was sent to Madrid in order to receive a Christian education, which 16th-century Prague was not able to offer. Hence, he concluded, Carlo must have born in Madrid, since his father moved there along with Rudolf's retinue. Actually, this was not an original idea by Ruiz-de-Medina. In 1711, in fact, appeared in prints the second volume of the history of the Neapolitan province of the Society written by the Neapolitan Francesco Schinosi. As we know, Carlo Spinola entered the novitiate in Nola, therefore Schinosi dedicated two pages to the martyr. With regard to his birth, he wrote that Carlo 'nacque del 1564 in Madrid; come ci è palese [...] per l'antico Notamento del Noviziato Nolano [Schinosi's note: *In arch. Prov. Neap.*]'.²⁴ Schinosi at least provided a reference, a rather vague one, though. Since we were not able to find this reference, we cannot question its intrinsic truthfulness. Still, another source can be added to the dispute, a source that was either ignored or unknown by previous historians.

In the private archive of House Spinola in Tassarolo still survive several family trees compiled since the 17th century for family use. If on the one hand these family trees lack all the bibliographical data historians usually rely upon, such as who was the compiler, when he drew them up and what kind of sources did he have access to, on the

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Cf. Ruiz-de-Medina, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

²³ Tanner, *op. cit.*, p. 289: 'Carolus Spinola è Comitum [*sic*, Contium] Tassaroliorum [*sic*, Tassalorium] Illustrissima progenie, Patre Octavio, Rodulphi Cæsaris, magno stabuli Magistro, Pragæ in Bohemia natus [...]'.
²⁴ Schinosi, *Istoria della Compagnia di Giesu, Appartenente al Regno di Napoli, descritta da Franscesco Schinosi della medesima Compagnia*, vol. II, p. 77.

other hand the fact that they were conceived as a product for Spinolas' eyes only led us to believe that their contents had not been submitted to a board of censors. This idea is reinforced by the information about Carlo Spinola we found in a family tree of the Tassarolo line probably drawn up in the second half of the 19th century: 'Beato Carlo *Gesuita*, Martirizzato al Giappone, nato da Donna libera di Praga'.²⁵ 'Donna libera' is most likely a euphemism for prostitute. Is this the reason why we do not find any mention whatsoever about Carlo's mother in his letters? Ottavio, in fact, never got married and as stated in a petition made by his brother Filippo he had only a child. At any rate, this is not the kind of information a noble lineage want to spread about an eminent ancestor who was recently proclaimed blessed.²⁶ It is also probable that during Carlo's life such a detail must have been concealed in order not to jeopardize the religious path chose by Carlo. During Pope Sixtus V pontificate (1585-1590), in fact, decree establishing who could take the religious votes and who could not was issued. With regards to bastard children, the pontiff ordered:

'[Q]ue não sejam admittidos à Religião, salvo sendo primeiro examinada sua vida e costumes e mais circunstancias acerca de sua sufficientia etc. E achando-se que tem mercimentos taes que supirão o defeito que tem do seu nascimento e que serão muy proveitosos com sua doutrina à Religião e sendo sobre isto feita deliberação matura no capitulo Geral ou Provincial, sejam polo Geral ou Provincial com unanime consentimento dos definidores aprovados e admitidos ao habito'.²⁷

It is true that Sixtus V seated on the chair of St. Peter few months before Carlo Spinola's admission in the Society of Jesus, yet we suppose that this decree was the product of a pre-existent mentality, not a revolutionary act by the pope. It is true, however, that if we read all the information about Spinola's birth in the light of the family tree and the consideration of bastard children in 16th century Europe everything starts to make more sense. Carlo's obliviousness of his birthday, for instance, may be ascribed to the fact that he was never registered in a parish, whereas the uncertainty regards his birthplace has to be attributed to Spinola's own desire of keeping his mother's profession a secret.

²⁵ An inventory of Spinola's private archive has not been made yet. We are therefore unable to provide an identification of the manuscript we quoted.

²⁶ Spinola was beatified by Pope Pius IX in 1869. Cf. ARSI, *Archivio della Postul. Gen. (Santi e Beati) - Beati Carlo Spinola e Soci.* 47 – Breve di beatificazione di Carlo Spinola insieme con 205 Martiri Giapponesi.

²⁷ Cf. *Acerca de nova Constituição do Papa Sisto sobre os Ilegítimos e outras Pessoas que não podem ser admitidas às Religiões*, in ANTT/AJ, *Livro 3*, f. 317^v.

To reinforce the Prague-theory, we may add also another proof. Both Tanner and Schinosi's lines of argument start from the assumption that Ottavio Spinola followed the Rudolf at Madrid in 1563 as Highest Equerry (*Cavallerizzo Maggiore*) to the emperor. By that time, however, Rudolf was only eleven-year old boy who had not yet inherited the crown, whereas Ottavio did not receive that title until the 1570s. However, Carlo Spinola's grandfather, Agostino, had five sons.²⁸ Three of them belonged to the high ranks of the Habsburg crown, under the rule of Carlos V, Fernando I, Maximilian II and Rudolf II. Agostino's firstborn, Marcantonio, was Highest Equerry of Emperor Maximilian II, but in the 1560s was appointed educator (*aio*) of the emperor's offspring when they were sent to Spain.²⁹ It was Marcantonio, then, not Ottavio who was chosen to accompany Rudolf and his brother Ernest to Madrid. The theory sponsored by both Schinosi and Ruiz-de-Medina, then, seems to have more than a flaw. We cannot exclude outright that the 21-year old Ottavio went to Spain as well, yet it seems more probable that at least initially he stayed at the imperial court, which in the 1560s was exactly in Prague, and then he went to Madrid to join Marcantonio. What about Carlo? Did he go with his father or only joined him years later? The only thing we know, if Schinosi is a reliable source, is that he was registered in the Toledan diocese, which back then was the main diocese in Spain and included also Madrid. In effect, also Fabio Ambrosio Spinola wrote that 'Carlo [...] passata la fanciullezza, e pueritia, nela quale diede principio allo studio della Grammatica, andò con non sò che occasione in Ispagna',³⁰ where Carlo continued his studies, perhaps in one of the Society's *collegia nobilium*.

In conclusion, the evidences we have been gathering seem to enable us to determine two things: First, the impossibility to define the exact date of birth of Carlo Spinola for lack of parish or civil documentation and Spinola's unawareness as well. Second, the almost absolute certainty that he was born in the capital city of the Holy Roman Empire, after a while he moved to Spain.

The current state of knowledge does not allow us to give further information on Spinola's early years. Something else might be said about what kind of teaching were given in the colleges for nobles, but nothing else that regards Carlo. We know that he

²⁸ See Annex B – Counts of Tassarolo Family Tree.

²⁹ Spinola, *op. cit.*, p. 2: '[...] fu Marc'Antonio [...] con titolo [...] di Cauallerizzo Maggiore, doppo con carico d'Aio de' figliuoli di Massimiliano, quando passarono in Ispagna, oue fù honorato con la Croce di Sant'Iago, & vna buona Commenda'.

³⁰ *Ivi*, p. 3.

remained only a few years in Spain,³¹ and perhaps as early as 1575 he went to Southern Italy, precisely to the bishopric of Nola, where he eventually met with his uncle, the Cardinal Filippo.

I. 2. The trajectories of a Jesuit (1584-1600)

In this part, we are going to list and define Carlo Spinola's first movement as a novice until his departure from Italy. This period spans the years from 1584 to 1595 is relevant to our research because it was in those years that Carlo gathered the necessary knowledge that allowed him to be appointed procurator of the Japan Vice-province. Hence, we are going to survey briefly his movements throughout the Italian provinces of the Society of Jesus and his studies as a novice as he kept climbing the hierarchy of the Ignatian order. Differently from the previous chapter, in this section we can rely both on printed and manuscript sources, which enable us to be more precise about date and places and, therefore, less imaginative in our deductions. We are going to focus mostly on those details that form a solid base for the rest of the work.

I. 2. 1. The Neapolitan Province, the *Collegio Romano* and Milan

As we saw, it is highly probable that Spinola spent his youth in Madrid and then moved back to Italy. We ignore whether he actually passed by his family's earldom in Tassarolo, but we know that by the mid-1570s he was in Nola, near Naples, guest of the Archbishop Filippo Spinola. Not even ten years after his arrival, between 1583 and 1584, Carlo had already made up his mind about taking the black robe of the Society of Jesus. On 7 December 1584, he sent a letter to his uncle Filippo to inform the new cardinal of the Roman church about his resolute desire of being admitted in the order 'per il giorno di S. Tomaso' and to receive his *placet*.³² The feast of St. Thomas the Apostle was (and is) celebrated on 21 December. Spinola, however, received Filippo's

³¹ The only confirmation of the fact that Spinola was not born in Italy is to be found in a letter the Jesuit wrote in 1606 from Miyako. Namely, he wrote that '[e]u todo o tempo que estivi em Italia tive grandes desejos de vir à Japão e fiz muito pera alcançalo'. Although the quote does not say a lot about Spinola's whereabouts during his youth, at least it tells us that Spinola arrived in Italy from another country. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 151^v.

³² The original of the letter did not survive until today. We only have an excerpt copied by Fabio Ambrosio Spinola and published in his work. Cf. Spinola, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

consent a little later than he expected, therefore he was accepted only two days later and eventually entered the novitiate at Nola ‘di età di 19 in 20 anni’.³³ He stayed at Nola only for a year. When 1586 broke, in fact, he was forced to move to Lecce, Puglia, because the scarcity of subjects did not allow the novices to dwell for two entire years in the probationary houses.³⁴ However, in autumn, he went to Naples to continue his studies in philosophy and metaphysics. Also his staying in the viceregal city lasted only a few months, since in that same year we find traces of him in Rome.

If one looks to the catalogues where Jesuits recently arrived in Rome were registered, we do not find Spinola’s name – and that is a pity, since this catalogue is like a registration form, which each Jesuit was supposed to fill with his private information, as well as the things in his possession. Carlo Spinola, in fact, did not officially enter the *Collegio Romano*, yet between 1586 and 1587 he was enlisted in the advanced mathematics course held in the scientific academy of the German Jesuit Christoph Clavius.³⁵ Most likely, he spent no more than few months in the Eternal City, as confirmed by Fabio Ambrosio Spinola and the French Charlevoix.³⁶ Unfortunately, however, we do not have detailed data regarding in staying in Rome. Clavius’s academy, in fact, was a foreign body within the institutional structure of the Society of Jesus. Although during the 1580s Clavius had been trying to have the academy officially recognized, it remained an informal course until 1594. This is why we do not have precise information about the Jesuits who attended it in the 1580s. Anyway, one thing that can be ascertained is that the average duration of attendance was usually of only one year,³⁷ the same as Spinola.

It is probably during this time that Carlo started to file letters with the Curia asking the pass for the Japan mission, though he had to wait almost a decade before

³³ Spinola, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

³⁴ See Spinola, *op. cit.*, p. 10: ‘[...] la penuria de’ soggetti non permetteva in quei tempi che dimorassero i Novitij l’intero spatio di due anni nelle Case di Probatione.’ The probationary houses – *Domus probationis* – or novitiate, were those places where the novices used to spend the two years before they made the Religious vows.

³⁵ Cf. Baldini, *Saggi sulla cultura della Compagnia di Gesù (secoli XVI – XVIII)*, p. 91 and Frison, “Il contributo scientifico del gesuita Carlo Spinola nel Giappone del primo Tokugawa”, pp. 21-22. Father Christoph Clavius (1538-1612)

³⁶ Cf. Spinola, *op. cit.*, p. 12: ‘...per qualche poco di tempo si trattenne studiando matematica sotto il P. Clavio’ and Charlevoix, *Histoire de l’établissement, des progres, et de la decadence du Christianisme dans l’empire du Japon*, vol. III, p. 222: ‘Il fut envoye a Naples pour y faire sa Philosophie: il alla ensuite a Rome pour etudier les Mathematiques sous le fameux Clavius, & il fit des si grands progres dans ces sciences, qu’il fut charge de les enseigner, tandis qu’il etudoit en Theologie.’

³⁷ Baldini, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

seeing his desire satisfied.³⁸ In any case, by the end of summer of 1587 he left Rome³⁹ headed for Milan, precisely the College of Brera. Although his acquaintance with Clavius lasted less than a year, the two of them remained in contact while Spinola was in Northern Italy, and this is an evidence of the intensity of the time the Italian spent with the German. In Milan, Carlo Spinola first completed the studies of philosophy, natural sciences and theology. Then, he taught Grammar in 1590⁴⁰ and in 1591 became *Magister* of mathematics, replacing replaced Bernardino Salino who had been in charge of the classes since 1589.⁴¹ Spinola held the chair until the end of 1594,⁴² when he defended the thesis in Theology⁴³ and was ordained priest, which was almost a necessary step in order to apply for the Asian mission, because of the strict order sent by Valignano back in 1587.⁴⁴ Eventually, on 16 September 1595, while he was in Cremona participating in the growth of the mission,⁴⁵ Acquaviva personally informed him that he had been selected to go to Japan: '[...] le dico che havendo fatta consideratione sopra i soggetti che voglono mandare col P. Procuratore del Giapone,⁴⁶ tra gl'altri haviamo eletto V. R. [...]! Vada dunque allegramente con la benedizione del Signore che perché si vuol servir di la in così importante missione'.⁴⁷

After having received such pleasant news, Spinola only had to pack his things up and go to Genoa. On 5 January 1596, he set out from the port of Genoa in a galley of

³⁸ We know that, at least until July 1585, Spinola did not ask the general for the pass. Spinola, in fact, does not appear in the list of the *indipetæ* from the Neapolitan province received by Acquaviva in that year. Curiously, among those who wanted to serve the Society outside Europe there is also the Italian Alessandro Ferrari, who set off from Lisbon along with Spinola some years later. Cf. ARSI, *Neap.* 3, ff. 91 and 94.

³⁹ Spinola was not registered in the *Catalogus Collegii Romani anni 1587 in octobr.* Cf. ARSI, *Rom.* 53, ff. 76-84^v.

⁴⁰ *Ivi*, f. 24.

⁴¹ Cf. Baldini e Napolitani, *Christoph Clavius: Corrispondenza*, vol. I, part II, pp. 91-92 and vol. III, part II, p. 8.

⁴² Cf. Fischer, "Jesuiten-Mathematiker in der französischen und italienische Assistenz bis 1762 bzw. 1773", p. 82.

⁴³ See ARSI, *Med.* 47 f. 69^v: 'P. Carolus Spinola auditor Theologia, confessiones congregationis'.

⁴⁴ See *Regimento para el Procurador de la India que reside en Portugal, DI XIV 1585-1588*, p. 753: '[...] procure quanto fuere possible que los que vienen para esta Provincia y fueren para esso, se ordenen sacerdotes en Portugal antes que se partan'.

⁴⁵ According to Fabio Ambrosio Spinola, in Cremona Carlo founded a college 'concorrendo à quest'opera egli stesso con gran somma di danari'. Cf. Spinola, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

⁴⁶ Gil da Mata (1547-1599) was sent from Japan to Europe as mission procurator in 1592. He was received by Filipe I in 1594 and the next year he was in Rome.

⁴⁷ See ARSI, *Med.* 22 [I], f. 8^v. The official patent was issued two days later. Cf. ARSI, *Hist. Soc.* 61 *LIBER PATENTIUM 1573-1601*, f. 50.

the Viceroy of Naples,⁴⁸ for what was destined to be – using Daniello Bartoli’s words – ‘la piu difficile, e la piu disastrosa via, che mai fino allora niun altro’.⁴⁹

I. 2. 2. From Lisbon to Lisbon passing through Brazil and England

Although we have already dealt with Spinola’s first attempt to reach the *Estado da Índia* elsewhere,⁵⁰ it is still interesting to illustrate it here schematically.

Spinola’s first voyage was a rather unfortunate one. In the best situations, a sea voyage from Lisbon to Goa would take no more than six months. The ships of the *Carreira da Índia*, in fact, used to come out of the Tagus when winter gave way to spring, that is between the end of March and the first two weeks of April, and they would reach Goa in September, provided that everything went according to plans. Spinola’s voyage turned out to be more complicated. It lasted twenty-one months and paradoxically ended right where it started, in Lisbon. The account of that journey is justifiably included in the *História Trágico-Marítima*, the chronicle of the various shipwrecks that paid the toll of Portuguese overseas expansion.⁵¹

In any case, the three ships⁵² that composed the *armada* of 1596 raised anchor on April 10 – the Holy Wednesday⁵³ – with Carlo Spinola and other seven Jesuits

⁴⁸ See Sforza, *Lettera inedita del Beato Carlo Spinola ad Alberico I Cybo-Malaspina Principe di Massa*, p. 710: ‘[...] alli 5 di Gennaro di 596 nelle galere del Vicerè di Napoli il conte di Miranda’. See also ARSI, *Med.* 21 [I], f. 13. Under Felipe II there were nine viceroyalties in the Spanish monarchy: four in the Iberian Peninsula (Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia and Navarra), three in Italy (Naples, Sicily and Sardinia), and two in the Indies (Nueva España and Peru). The Netherlands were ruled by a Governor, whose job was comparable to the one assigned to the viceroy. The viceroy in Naples at that time was Juan de Zúñiga y Avellaneda (r. 1586-1595).

⁴⁹ Cf. Bartoli, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁵⁰ See Frison, “‘La piu difficile, e la piu disastrosa via, che mai fino allora niun altro’ - Carlo Spinola and his attempts to get to the *Índias*”, pp. 69-86.

⁵¹ Spinola left a detailed description of their pilgrimage in his longest letter, written in Lisbon on 23 or 24 March 1598, ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, ff. 137-140. See also Miyazaki, パードレ・カルロ・スピノラ、一五九八年一月十八日、リスボン発、イエズス会総長クラウディオ・アクワビーヴァ宛書簡 (その一), pp. 18-37, *idem*, パードレ・カルロ・スピノラ、一五九八年一月十八日、リスボン発、イエズス会総長クラウディオ・アクワビーヴァ宛書簡 (その二), pp. 11-20. This disastrous and adventurous voyage was described also by Father Gaspar Afonso, another Jesuit aboard, and it was his account to be included in the *História Trágico-Marítima*. Cf. Peres, *História Trágico-Marítima compilada por Bernardo Gomes de Brito*, vol. V, pp. 81-171. The original manuscript used by the compiler is a letter that Gaspar Afonso wrote in Évora on 21 June 1599. See ARSI, *Lus.* 106, ff. 251-270^v.

⁵² The *São Francisco*, the *Conceição* and the *São Felipe*.

⁵³ Peres, *op. cit.*, p. 85: ‘[...] uma Quarta Feira de Trêvas’.

aboard the main ship, the *São Francisco*.⁵⁴ The route was the same as that sailed by Vasco da Gama: they set course for Cape Verde islands turning thence southwest, so as to encircle the anticyclone in the South Atlantic in a bow-like trajectory which took the ships close to the Brazilian coast, south of the Cape of Saint Augustine. Then they dropped slowly eastward, heading for the Cape of Good Hope.⁵⁵ The Jesuits aboard the *São Francisco* occupied their time aboard dealing both with their studies and, in particular, with the religious offices, which was always quite an undertaking considering the number of people aboard, about 500.

Two months after departure, precisely on June 16, the *São Francisco* had already reached the tropic of Capricorn and was sailing smoothly towards the Cape of Good Hope. But then, owing to stern wind the rudder broke. Since the ship was in no condition either to face the currents of the Cape or to go back to Portugal – the solution suggested by the pilot –, it was decided to build two big oars ‘ao modo com que se guovernão os barcos de Riba do Douro’,⁵⁶ with which it was somehow possible to steer the ship. Eventually, after a week of debate, the crew convinced the Captain and the pilot to point the bow towards Salvador da Bahia in Brazil,⁵⁷ although an *alvará* issued by the Portuguese Crown in 1565 expressly forbid *Carreira*’s ships to winter in Brazil (mostly for economic reasons), rather they were requested to go back to Lisbon, which is probably the reason why the pilot tried to go back to Portugal, in the first place.⁵⁸

In the early morning of 16 July, the *São Francisco* arrived at Salvador da Bahia de Todos os Santos. One of the buildings that stood upon the bay was the Jesuit *Collegio da Baya*, a college so skilfully built, that it could likely appear in Rome.⁵⁹

After five months during which a new rudder was repaid and the hold was filled with new goods, like sugar, on December 12 the *São Francisco* left Bahia, looking for

⁵⁴ Cf. *DI XVIII 1595-1597*, pp. 528-530: ‘Na nao S. Francisco: P. Gaspar Afonso, natural de Serpa, arcebispado d’Evora, idade 44 e da Companhia 24, pregador. P. Jacome de Vicari, natural de Napoles, de 28 anos e da Companhia 13, acabados seus estudos. P. Alexandre Ferraro, napolitano, de 31 anos e da Companhia 12, tres anos de theologia. P. Carlo Espinola, genovês, de 30 anos e da Companhia 12, acabados seus estudos. Ir. Jeronimo Marucheli, napolitano, de 27 annos e da Companhia dez, estudou até phelosophia. Ir. Jeronimo de Angelis, siciliano, de 27 anos e da Companhia dez, coadjutor. Ir. Jorge Pereira, de Vila Real, arcebispado de Braga, de 18 anos e da Companhia 4, estudava latim. Ir. Bertolamé Sanches, do arcebispado de Toledo, de 30 anos e da Companhia 7, coadjutor’.

⁵⁵ See Albuquerque, *Escalas da Carreira da Índia*, p. 5.

⁵⁶ See ARSI, *Lus.* 106, f. 251^v.

⁵⁷ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 137.

⁵⁸ See *Provisão sobre as náos, que invernaão, arriabbarem a esta cidade* of 6 March 1565 in *Boletim do Conselho Ultramarino – Legislação Antiga*, vol. I (1446-1754), pp. 169-170.

⁵⁹ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 137^v.

those winds which could possibly take the ship behind Pernambuco. They managed to surmount the Cape of Saint Augustine only on 20 January 1597 and subsequently reached the Tropic of the Cancer on February 18. But then a terrible storm almost tore the ship to pieces and then it was clear to everyone that the Canary Islands were definitely out of reach, as was Cape Verde. The only chance to make land was to go aft at the discretion of the wind, provided that the cargo was lightened. Therefore, 80 sugar crates were thrown overboard to let the wind slowly carry them until they caught sight of the *Indias de Castella*, precisely the Virgin Islands next to Puerto Rico. On 25 March, thanks to the help of a Puerto Rican pilot, the ship entered San Juan's port.

After the eight Jesuits found accommodation in the hospital or in the Bishop's or the governor's residence, they started to help in the religious offices, which were particularly demanding since the *São Francisco* reached San Juan only a few days before the Holy Week.⁶⁰ Once the Holy week was over, and with it the whole lot of confessions, the group of Jesuits divided. Following the Jesuit dictate of the *ire bini*, the four Italian Jesuits separated in two groups to better proselytize the villages around the city. They got back to San Juan in June, but they would leave the island only two months later, on 21 August 'in un picciolo naviglio disarmato [...], però nuovo, e stimato buono di vela', heading for Portugal.⁶¹

Also this part of the voyage, however, did not end well. The ship reached the Azores by mid-October, which meant that Portugal was only a week away. Yet, on 17, an English pirate ship came upon the Portuguese vessel and took it over. The years comprised between 1587 and 1597 correspond to the British assaults against Iberian interests in the Atlantic Ocean, which could be traced principally around the Azores and near the Iberian littoral. The British ships used to hunt their prey on the way back from India, so that the holds would be crammed with merchandise and the long journey would have weakened the ships' resistance, as was the case of this ship.⁶²

The ship and all the crew were then brought to southern England. Spinola interpreted the mishap as a way to testify his faith and to put into practice his mission. Thus, he confessed to the English pirate that he was an Italian Jesuit, but, unexpectedly

⁶⁰ *Ivi*, f. 138.

⁶¹ *Ivi*, f. 139.

⁶² Cf. Guinote, Frutuoso and António Lopes, *Naufrações e outras perdas da "Carreira da Índia" Séculos XVI e XVII*, p. 122.

‘la cosa riuscì al contrario, perche ci cominciorno a riverire più, e trattar miglore [...], e mi dissero subito che non havea da temere, perche eglino non perseguono se non i naturali che vanno di propria volontà in Inghilterra per convertire alla fede del papa; tanto più essendo noi italiani, co’ quali loro trattano, e non hanno guerra’.⁶³ Spinola’s surprise was well justified. After the death of the Catholic Mary I in 1558, the assumption of the English throne by Elizabeth I brought renewed persecution of Catholicism, particularly in the second half of her reign, after the papal bull *Regnans in excelsis*, in which Pius V excommunicated Elizabeth and threatened the same for all English Catholics who obeyed her.⁶⁴ Shortly before the publication of the bull, the Society founded an English college at Douai in France to provide a rallying-point for the scattered bands of Catholics who had fled from their native land. From being merely an asylum for refugees, Douai rapidly became the centre of a great missionary effort to wrest England from the grasp of Anglicanism.⁶⁵ The appearance of the Jesuits put the English monarchy on the alert and in order to meet the increasing danger the penal laws were greatly amplified and strengthened. In 1585, with the issue of the *Act Against Jesuits and Seminarists* it was ordered that ‘all and every Jesuits, seminary priests, and other priests whatsoever [...], shall within forty days [...] depart out of this realm of England, and out of all other her highness’s realms and dominions’.⁶⁶

The last part of the excerpt is even more important if read in the light of what would happen in Japan only two years later. According to Spinola, the English pirate underlined the political status of the two Jesuits as a reason not to harm them. As a matter of fact, the Elizabethan acts against Catholicism were not exactly actions of religious persecution, just like Hideyoshi’s were not. Elizabeth was more concerned with political rather than theological issues. The act was published to make the missionaries unable ‘to stir up and move sedition, rebellion, and open hostility within

⁶³ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 139^v.

⁶⁴ Pius V opened a process for heresy against Elizabeth on 5 February 1570 and twenty days later a bull excommunicating and deposing the queen was published. The bull was basically directed to the achievement of a twofold result. In the first place, by declaring the queen excommunicate and deposed, it aimed at destroying the allegiance of her subjects. In the second place, it not only legalized rebellion but, by implication, positively commanded it. See Black, *The Reign of Elizabeth 1558-1603*, pp. 135-137 and *CHC VI*, pp. 261-282.

⁶⁵ Cf. Black, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁶⁶ Gee and Hardy (eds.), *Documents Illustrative of English Church History*, p. 486.

the same her highness's realms and dominions'.⁶⁷ The similarities with Hideyoshi's edict of 1587 are more than evident.

At any rate, afterwards the missionaries were taken to southern England, where the Captain provided accommodation for them, paying a daily fee of 'due reali al giorno'.⁶⁸ After almost a month, on 6 December 1597, the pirate decided to escort personally the Jesuits to the French of Saint-Malo, but the English Channel did not allow them to cross the sea. Having found a safe harbour in Plymouth, they had a fortunate meeting with a German Catholic merchant, who 'fa professione di condurre i preti d'Inghilterra, et Portogallo à sua patria, haveva passa porto d'ambidue i Regni, et all'hora veniva con particular licenza de la Regina, per poter condur seco à Portogallo alcuni de portoghesi, che in quel posto stavano'.⁶⁹ On 10 January 1598, they sailed aboard a small ship and in only 8 days-time they reached Lisbon, exactly where everything began 22 months before. Spinola along with his Sicilian fellow Geronimo De Angelis⁷⁰ went straight to São Roque where, since they were dressed in the English manner and they had not shaved, it was hard for the Portuguese Jesuits to recognize them, also because they were reported lost at sea and given for dead. Notwithstanding all the troubles of the navigation, they soon renewed their desire to reach Japan. 'aspettando di patire maggiori cose che non habbiamo patite sin'hora [...], et adesso come à soldati vecchi pareranno via più le cose facili, et i pericoli minori'.⁷¹

I. 2. 3. The end of the journey, the beginning of the mission: Carlo Spinola between Macao and Japan (1599-1611)

Despite Spinola and de Angelis's strong desire to set off again for Japan, the two missionaries had to wait more than they expected. In effect, as early as March they were already ready to leave Lisbon. In a letter to an Italian brethren written on 8 March, Spinola wrote that 'non ho più tempo, le navi stanno di partenza, sono cinque, ma tre

⁶⁷ *Ivi*, p. 485.

⁶⁸ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 139^v.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Geronimo de Angelis (1568-1623) was born in Enna, Sicily and entered the Society of Jesus in 1586. He travelled alongside Spinola from their embarkation at Genoa to their arrival in Japan. He remained in Japan after the expulsion decree of 1614, proselytizing in particular the northern regions and he was probably the first European to venture out to Hokkaidō, back then called Ezo. Eventually he was captured by the Edo *bakufu* and executed in Edo on 4 December 1623. Cf. Cieslik, "The Great Martyrdom in Edo 1623", pp. 1-12.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

grandissime, la mia avanza tutte, dimani credo, o al più tardi mercordì partiremo, e tornaremo a tentar l'impresa'.⁷² Unfortunately for the zealous Jesuit, however, owing to English corsairs out of the Tagus' mouth, the *armada* was forced to delay the departure until the time it was too late to set sail towards the *Estado da Índia*.⁷³

This delay offered to Spinola the opportunity to make his final profession of the fourth vow in October,⁷⁴ and then by the end of March 1599 he left Portugal for the second time, while Lisbon was scourged by the plague.⁷⁵ Obviously, it was not possible to keep the plague off the ship and although the epidemic lasted only until the equator, two missionaries succumbed to the disease.⁷⁶ Afterwards, also Spinola got sick and had to rest a week in Mozambique. He recovered rapidly, however, and managed to get on board the ship *do trato* which used to sail between Mozambique and Goa. As early as December he was in the capital city of the *Estado da Índia* waiting for a ship to carry him to Macao. He set off in April and eventually reached Macao in August 1600.

As we know, Spinola had been assigned to the Japan mission. According to plans, he should have left Macao the following summer, but the annual carrack bounded for Japan did not sail in 1601.⁷⁷ Apart from the missing voyage, however, there was also another reason that kept Spinola in Macao one year longer than expected. On 27 November 1600, in fact, someone set the Jesuit church on fire.⁷⁸ According to Father Valentim Carvalho, the new rector of the college, nothing but the walls survived the fire. The Society of Jesus, consequently, had to find a temporary solution to celebrate Christian rites and the premises of the primary school were arranged for this purpose.⁷⁹ At the same time, however, the city of Macao rallied its means to aid the Society build a new church. The Captain Major, on a proposal from the citizens of Macao, granted half

⁷² Carlo Spinola to Father Pompilio Lambertenghi, Lisbon, 8 March 1598. BMA, MS 568 D. *Piece 001*, f. 1.

⁷³ *Ibid.* Fabio Ambrosio Spinola wrote that the ships sailed but had to pull back because of the Dutch: '[...] doppo qualche poco di camino da lontano scoperta vna grossa armata d'Olandesi, che su le volte si trattenne, e l'aspettaua per combatterle'. Spinola, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Cf. *HP III*, p. 220.

⁷⁴ He made his profession on 28 October. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 37, f. 13 and *Lus.* 2, ff. 173-174.

⁷⁵ Father Carlo Spinola to General Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 21 December 1599. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 141.

⁷⁶ The Italian Felice Algerio and the Portuguese Afonso Álvares.

⁷⁷ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 83 and *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 149. Regarding the Portuguese-fleet movements in 1601, see Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 62-63 and Costa, "A Route under Pressure. Communication between Nagasaki and Macao (1597-1617)", p. 86.

⁷⁸ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], ff. 45-45^v and ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 121, ff. 2-2^v.

⁷⁹ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 45^v. The primary school (*escola dos meninos*) was probably the one constructed in 1572, where children were taught reading, writing and arithmetic. Cf. Teixeira, "The Church of St. Paul in Macau", p. 55.

percent of the incomes from the trade with Japan to the Society so that, as Carvalho wished, at least half of the new building could be financed.⁸⁰ But of course, the resources the Society was in need of were not only economic. It was necessary to entrust someone with the project of the new church. In a recently work of ours, we have tried to clear any doubts with regard to Spinola's authorship of the project of the church of *São Paulo*. Although a definitive proof, e.g. a signed project or a direct mention, did not come up yet, the sources we summoned point solidly to Spinola. Since this aspect of him will be dealt with in one of the next sections of this work, for now we shall say only that Carlo Spinola was in charge of drawing the plan of the new church, but he had nothing to do both with the factual building of the church body or the façade.⁸¹

Spinola's staying in Macao was filled also with other commitments and duties. As a matter of fact, it would seem that he took advantage of the prolonged permanence and started to learn Japanese.⁸² Moreover, during the spring of 1601 Spinola was chosen to be procurator by Valentim Carvalho. Spinola was chosen to replace the Portuguese Miguel Soares, who had died in September 1600. According to Spinola's own writings, Carvalho's choice was mostly dictated by the ability of the Italian Jesuit to create a climate of confidence and trust around his person.⁸³ He was assured that he would have been in charge only until the departure of the *Nao* in summer, but owing to a diatribe between the Portuguese and the Chinese officers it was not possible to prepare the ship on time and therefore he was forced to postpone his departure.⁸⁴

The wait, however, was almost over, as was Spinola's bad luck in sea travel. In the 1602 annual report, in fact, we read that the *Nao da China* '[c]hegou aos dez, ou onze de Julho às Ilhas de Goto, que estão aqui perto de Nangazaqui onde se viu em grande perigo, assim por hum tempo rijo que houve, como pelas grandes correntes, que

⁸⁰ Valentim Carvalho estimated an income for the Society of about 2'500-3'000 *cruzados*, which was the half percent of the value of the goods that were expected from Japan. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 121, f. 2: '[...] todos universalmente movidos de charidade e compaixão fizeram entre si huma aiunta diante do Capitão Môr em que determinarão, *uno animi concensu*, que elles nos davão meio por cento de todo o que tinham em Jappão trazendo N. S. a nao a salvamento, o que não foi tão pouco que a vinda da nao não montasse dous mil e trezentos taeis que vem a dizer tres mil sento e trinta e sete pardaos de reales." For other alms offered to the Society at Macao, see ff. 4-4^v.

⁸¹ We faced directly this topic in our work "A face hidden behind the façade. New evidences about Carlo Spinola's authorship of the project of *São Paulo's Church*", text presented at the *International Conference on Macau Narratives*, Lisbon, 8-11 May 2013 (printing).

⁸² Cf. Pacheco, 鈴田の囚人 カルロ・スピノラノの書簡, p. 6.

⁸³ See Procurator Carlo Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal João Alvarez, Macao, 27 January 1602. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 149. Miguel Soares (1551-1600) held the task of Procurator in Macao from 1588 until his death.

⁸⁴ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 89.

hà entre aquellas Ilhas [...]'.⁸⁵ At any rate, the crew, Carlo Spinola, Geronimo de Angelis and other nine comrades made safely to Nagasaki.⁸⁶ Soon afterwards, the missionaries started to attend the Japanese classes at the Arima college, in order to be employed in the conversation and preservation of the Christendom of Kyūshū.⁸⁷

Spinola remained in Arima almost two years between 1602 and 1604. Each day during the first year he had to attend two lectures of Japanese,⁸⁸ and turned out to be well-versed in the Japanese language. As early as 1603, in fact, he was already preaching in the native language and was assigned to the mission in Arie, south of Shimabara.⁸⁹ Spinola first-class education along with his aptitude for the Japanese language earned him the chance to test his qualities as a missionary in the most delicate region in Japan, the capital city of Miyako. In 1612, once he was called back to Nagasaki, he wrote to an Italian friend of him and he gave a brief description of the seven years spent there:

‘dopo di havere imparata la lingua Giapponica per uno anno, et per un altro coltivato più di ~~sei~~ 8 mila anime nel territorio di Arima, mi mandorno i superiori al Miaco, che he metropoli di tutta l’isola, per compagno, et admonitore del nuovo Rettore di quella casa,⁹⁰ ove stetti sette anni intieri, correndo come paroco ordinario di molte miglaia di christiani, che vi sono, i quali con essortationi publiche, et private, et con varij modi, et inventioni fui promovendo nello spirito con non puoco frutto; et perche in quella città è il nido dell’Idolatria, mi sforzai di indurre molti gentili alla nostra Santa fede, et ne baptizai più de duemila di mia mano, tra i quali vi furno non puochi dei nobili; et si con questi, come con gl’altri, che venivano molte volte mossi da curiosità a vedere, et udire le nostre cose, intrava con l’Astrologia, mostrandogli alcuni instrumenti a proposito, delle quali cose non si può facilmente dire quanto sino curiosi, et quanto profitto ricevano per intendere che tutto ciò, che dicemo della nostra Santa Legge è vero, poiche del corso dei cieli, et cose metheorologiche, diciamo cose

⁸⁵ See BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-59*, f. 79^v.

⁸⁶ In that year, a large part of the Chinese silks imported by the *Nao do Trato* remained unsold, since the Japanese merchants complained that the prices asked by the Portuguese, who evidently were trying to recover from the loss of the previous year, were too high. Cf. Boxer, *The Christian Century*, p. 273.

⁸⁷ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 34, f. 16.

⁸⁸ See BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-59*, ff. 130-130^v: ‘Rezideram este anno no Collegio de Arima, e no Seminario que a elle està anexo vinte da Companhia, alguns dos quaes se occupam no ensino, e criaçam dos alumnos, hum Padre em ler cada dia duas liçoens da lingoa Japoa a cinco dos nossos que na monçam passada vieram’.

⁸⁹ See TCJ, p. 447: ‘Em Arie – Padre Carlos Spínola, confessa na língoa e tem princípios pera a saber bem, por não aver hum ano e meyo que está em Japão. Italiano, Professo de 4 votos’.

⁹⁰ Father Pedro Morejón (c. 1562-1639). In Spinola’s letters we find several positive references to the Spanish father. For instance, in 1612, he wrote that Morejón ‘con su mucha humildad, caridad, y llaneza la mayor, que he visto en Japon, no parece superior, mas antes compañero, o inferior de todos’. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 154.

tutte conformi alla ragione, molto contrarie a i sogni, che loro insegnano i Bonzi suoi sacerdoti; si che già dicono a bocca piena che non possono essere si non buggie quelle cose, che insegnano intorno all'altra vita, le quali non si veggono, essendo tanto essorbitanti dalla ragione quelle che dicono de i cieli, et elementi; et adesso che veggono essere stati ingannati, si vergognano di havere tenuto per certe cose si false, et aliene dalla ragione'.⁹¹

As we can guess from Spinola's own words, his staying in central Japan was characterized by a particular method of proselytization. Both in China and in Japan, in fact, the Society of Jesus resorted to scientific demonstration to allure the curious mandarins and the *kuge*, the noble of the capital.

Only three years after his arrival, on 9 April 1552, Javier wrote to Loyola that it was necessary to send to Japan literate fathers with a good knowledge of astronomy (*esphera*), due to the great curiosity the Japanese felt towards scientific matters and meteorological phenomena, such as the reactions that caused rain and snow. According to Javier, in fact, being able to answer the numerous questions asked by the Japanese was the road to win their benevolence.⁹²

The same topic is to be found also in Frois' *História do Japam*, where he wrote how Buddhist monks – not common people, then – kept asking questions about eclipses of the moon and the sun, high and low tides, and also about Western knowledge of the atmosphere.

Almost fifteen years after Javier's letter, in the 1570s, the new superior of the Japan mission, the Portuguese Francisco Cabral, wrote to Rome asking for textbooks about cosmology and philosophy for the same reason as Javier and Frois: he needed missionaries acquainted with scientific knowledge.⁹³

Since the early stage of the Japan Mission, then, almost all the Jesuits involved in the proselytization realized that in order to win over the Japanese people it was

⁹¹ Procurator Carlo Spinola to Father Bernardino Rossignoli, Nagasaki, 25 May 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, ff. 156-156^v.

⁹² See Schurhammer and Wicki, *Epistolae S. Francisci Xavierii*, vol. II, p. 373: 'Tambien es necesario que tiengan letras para responder a las muchas preguntas que hazen lo gipones. Seria bueno que fuesen buenos artistas; y no perdirian nadie que fuesen ssofistas para en las disputas tomar los gipones in contradicion; que supiesen alguna cosa dela esphera, porque huegan en grande manera los gipones in saber los movimientos del cielo, los eclipsis del sol, mengoar y crescer la luna; como se engendra el agua de la lluvia, la nieve y piedra, trovanes, relanpagos, cometas y otras cosas ansi naturales. Mucho aprovecha lla declaracion destas cosas para ganar la voluntad al pueblo. Esta information de la gente de Gipon me parecio ser cosa conveniente escribir a vuestra santa Charidad, para que este al cabo de las virtudes que han de tener los Padres que alla am de yr'.

⁹³ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [II], f. 159.

necessary to develop a missionary method that was at once mild and smart. The Japan Jesuits saw clearly the difference in premises and in results between the two interpretations of the *compelle intrare*,⁹⁴ which generated a dispute regarding the missionary method in Spanish America. Basically, the dispute opposed the notion of *ecclesia militans*, which justified military campaigns of conquest followed by forced conversion, to the employment of persuasion of the intellect by rational means and by the gentle attraction and exhortation of the will.⁹⁵ It is well known how this shift in mentality in Japan gave birth to the *accomodatio* principle, which materialized in Valignano's handbook for the missionaries – *Il Cerimoniale*, yet the mere adaptation to Japan customs was not enough to grant an extensive evangelization. The Fathers, in fact, needed to create for themselves enough room for manoeuvre within the complicated structure of the Japanese society. One of the most functional ways devised by the Ignatians was to capitalize on Japanese extreme curiosity for Western inventions and scientific tools along with empirical demonstrations of scientific theories.⁹⁶ The measure of this insight is given by the different fates experienced in Tokugawa Japan by the Western faith and the Western science. The former was repelled and persecuted starting from 1612 until the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The latter, on the other hand, held an illegal status until the 1710s, when the eighth Tokugawa *shōgun*, Yoshimune, after taking possession of some Western scientific texts, started to encourage the learning of the foreign scientific thought and gave birth to the group of literati interested in the study of Dutch and Western culture, the *rangakusha*.⁹⁷ In any case, it must not be forgotten that the scientific activity was only a way to dissimulate the Society's real purpose. In other words, the scientific activity was a contingent element to their identity, mainly due to an interpretation of the Ignatian principle of acting close to the secular world.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Luke 14:23: 'And the Lord said to the servant: Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in [*compelle intrare*], that my house may be filled.'

⁹⁵ The main advocate of the second interpretation was the Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566), the principal defender of the rights of the Indians as well as of the values of their religions and cultures. For a close examination of the change in the missionary methods see Prosperi, "Il missionario", pp. 179-187.

⁹⁶ The same results were obtained through demonstration of Western superiority in military engineering. Cf. *Lettera Annua del Giappone dell'Anno MDXCVI scritta dal P. Luigi Frois al R. P. Clavdio Acquaviva Generale della Compagnia di Gesù*, pp. 203-204

⁹⁷ 蘭学者. Regarding this topic see Hirose, "The European Influence on Japanese Astronomy", in *MN*, 19, pp. 295-314.

⁹⁸ Cf. Romano, "Les Jésuites entre apostolat missionnaire et activité scientifique (XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles)", pp. 214-215.

Hence, following the foundation of the college at Funai, the Japan Jesuits began to compose a scientific literature for Japanese audience. In 1583, the Spanish Pedro Gomez was chosen to write a textbook for the colleges' students of philosophy. It took ten years to compose such a book, but in 1593 *De Sphaera* was finally available. *De Sphaera* constitutes the first part of a *compendium* and is the first Western scientific publication regarding Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology in Japan and represented the starting point for several Japanese scientific books of the mid-seventeenth century.⁹⁹

Beside printing textbooks, however, the Society of Jesus was also conceiving a bigger plan in order to convert the greater number of Japanese. In November 1583, in fact, General Acquaviva envisaged the idea of creating a *Collegio de Ciencias*, as a separate and unique establishment within the mission, instead of teachings such topics in several colleges, which apparently was what the Jesuits in Japan have decided.¹⁰⁰ Unfortunately, beside Acquaviva's letter, we do not have other primary sources about this college. Nevertheless, the most recent biographies of Carlo Spinola¹⁰¹ state that in May 1605 Father Carlo Spinola founded a scientific academy in Miyako. This information was first given by Charlevoix in 1715,¹⁰² but a manuscript that confirms or proves wrong such information had not come up yet.

In any case, Spinola's scientific knowledge allowed him to come into contact with Japan's leading figures. In 1606 he wrote one of his most important and analysed letters, in which he confirmed the great importance the knowledge of of mathematic, which at that time had a wider meaning than today, since it included not only arithmetic and geometry, but also astronomy, optics, statics, and so on – had for the proselytization of Japan:

⁹⁹ Cf. Hiraoka, "Jesuit Cosmological Textbook in 'the Christian century' Japan: *De sphaera* of Pedro Gomez (Part I)", pp.99-101.

¹⁰⁰ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, ff. 6-6^v.

¹⁰¹ See for instance the entry "Carlo Spinola" by Yuuki Ryōgo (alias Diego Pacheco) in the *Diccionario Historico de la Compañía de Jesus: biografico – temático*, vol. IV, pp. 3623-3624 and Vogel and Rankin, "European Expansion and Self-Definition", pp. 829-830.

¹⁰² See Charlevoix, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42: 'On travailloit avec plus de succes a Meaco. Le gout que la Cour d'Ozaca avoit pris aux Mathematiques, sit juger aux Jesuites du College de Meaco, & sur tout au Pere Spinola, qui avoit professe ces Sciences en Italie avec honneur, que l'on pourroit s'attacher les Grands Seigneurs, & les rendre ou dociles pour le Royaume de Dieu, ou du moins favorables aux Predicateurs de l'Evangile, en leur inspirant la pensee de s'instruire des connoissances naturelles. On etablit donc une espece d'Academie, qui sut composee de tout ce qu'il y avoit a Meaco de gens distinguez par leur naissance, par leur merite, & par leur employ'.

‘A mathematica me sirve muyto para entrar na familiaridade destes *Tonos*¹⁰³ principaes, os quaes sao muy curiosos d’estas cousas, e ate o *Dairi*,¹⁰⁴ e *Xongunsama*¹⁰⁵ tem noticia de mim, e me tem mandado a chamar; antes para ser estimado dos Japones he a parte mais necessaria, de modo que porque sabia mathematica foy melhor que eu viesse a Japao, e os que viessem para ca, e soubessem della, serao estimados’.¹⁰⁶

Although Spinola’s presence in Miyako was almost fundamental, since he was the only one who was at once fluently in Japanese, proficient in scientific topics and was also used to deal with the nobility, his time in Honshū did not last more than seven years. As we will see briefly, in fact, his services were needed again in Macao.

Before entering the last stage of Spinola’s life, which is going to be dealt with in details since it corresponds to his procuratorship, we must outline the new political junction in Japan, since it was the new political situation that influenced the evolution of the Christian church in Japan and, consequently, Spinola’s own faith.

¹⁰³ 殿 It was an honorific suffix added after the name of an important lord.

¹⁰⁴ 内裏 It can be translated with *Inner Sanctum*. For metonymy it indicates the *tennō*. In this case Spinola was referring to Go-Yōzei *tennō*.

¹⁰⁵ 将軍様 Tokugawa Hidetada.

¹⁰⁶ See Carlo Spinola to Father João Álvares, Miyako, 3 December 1606. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, ff. 151-151^v. In the *Annua da Viceprovincia de Japam do anno de 1604*, moreover, we read that Spinola met also with Toyotomi Hideyori. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 55, f. 148. Spinola’s letter is the fulcrum of our study regards Spinola’s scientific activity in Japan, upon which is based the information provided here. See Frison, “Il contributo scientifico del gesuita Carlo Spinola nel Giappone del primo Tokugawa”, pp. 21-56.

CHAPTER II

JAPAN NEW JUNCTURE: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TOKUGAWA *BAKUFU*

II. 1. Toyotomi Hideyoshi and international affairs: the Korean Campaign

As we saw earlier, when Hideyoshi issued his 1587-edict against the Christian faith, he wanted the Jesuits out of the *tenka* within twenty days. As Coelho explained, however, they were technically unable to leave Japan without the *nao do trato*. Hence, the missionaries convened in Hirado where they held a general conference. Apparently, they all agreed that the moment to testify with their own blood and death the truth of the Christian faith had finally come and therefore no one was to leave the country. Fathers and Brothers, a contingent of 115 men, spread again throughout the island of Kyūshū, although the destructions perpetrated towards the mission's estates caused the Ignatians to go back to a life of scarcity and privation.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, the deaths of D. Francisco and D. Bartolomeu delivered serious blows to the mission. The lord of Bungo, Ōtomo Yoshimune Constantino, on his part, at first decided to apostatize but then in 1590 came back to the flock. On the other hand, however, the Society could still rely on the converted lords in Buzen, Chikuzen and Chikugo. Besides, Takayama Ukon, after being disposed of his fief and exiled, was then granted another fief with the same amount of *koku*.¹⁰⁸

In the meanwhile, Hideyoshi had already started to think about the next steps for completing the unification. By 1591, in fact, he wiped out the last resistance in northern Japan and sent a member of House Shimazu to the Ryūkyū court with gifts to respond

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *Lettera Annibale* [sic, Annuale] *del Giappone delli 24 di Febraio 1589*, pp. 4-6.

¹⁰⁸ See Father Gil da Mata to General Acquaviva, Japan, 15 July 1590. RAH/Cor. 9/2663, f. 488^v. It would seem that in the aftermath of the edict the number of *kirishitan daimyō* augmented sensibly. Between 1591 to 1596, in fact, the lords of Tsushima – Sō Yoshitomo, Iga – Tsutui Sadatsugu, Mino – Oda Hidenobu, Hita – Mōri Takamasa, Tokushima – Hachikusa Iemasa, Shinano – Kyōgoku Takamoto and Tsugaru – Tsugaru Nagahira were baptized. Cf. Costa, "Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Christian *Daimyō* during the Crisis of 1600", pp. 48-49 and 56-58 and *idem*, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, p. 176.

to the tribute sent to the *kanpaku*. In 1592, he handed over the title of *kanpaku* to his adopted son Hidetsugu and assumed the title of *taikō*.¹⁰⁹ In the same year, *Taicosama* – as was commonly called by the Jesuits, put the first step outside the borders of Japan. As we saw, the 1587-edict was addressed exclusively to the preachers, not to the Western traders, whose relative importance Hideyoshi began to appreciate right at that time and not only five years later, he made the first move to both implement and control foreign trade by centralizing its management.

We have a document which claims that in 1592 Hideyoshi bestowed exclusive formal permits – the *shuin-jō*¹¹⁰ – to travel for purposes of trade to foreign countries, including the Philippines (Roson) and Amakō (Macao).¹¹¹ Under the *shuin-jō* system all Japanese shipping, or that belonging to foreigners resident in Japan, which were engaged in maritime commerce with foreign countries had to be provided with the *shuin-jō*. Skippers or merchants whose voyages were not authorized by this official permit were regarded as pirates or smugglers and punished accordingly. There is a debate about the authenticity of this document, but it is a fact that Hideyoshi encouraged international relations, although he was probably only trying to obtain abroad what he had already achieved in Japan, i.e. the political recognition of his status. In 1591, in fact, not only did he manage to get rid of the *wakō* that used to pillage in the Chinese Sea, he also addressed a letter to the Viceroy of the Indies at Goa, Matias de Albuquerque, in which he basically established again the principles expressed in the 1587-edict. The *taikō* wanted Albuquerque to know that ‘the unit of the nation was set on a firm foundation, and now foreign nations, far and near, without exception, bring tribute to us’. After this subtle advice of sending tributes, Hideyoshi warned Albuquerque that Christian Fathers were not to be received courteously in Japan, instead ‘no matter what sect or denomination they represent – they shall be destroyed’. Yet, he concluded the

¹⁰⁹ 太閤, regent in retirement.

¹¹⁰ 朱印状, literally “red seal”.

¹¹¹ See Berry, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135: ‘From the first year of Bunroku, individuals from Nagasaki, Kyōto, and Sakai received red-seal documents and were authorized to sail to these countries for purpose of trade: Kōnan [south Vietnam], Tonkin [north Vietnam], Champa [Vietnam south of Kōnan], Kamboja [Cambodia], Rokukan [southern Thailand], Patani [Thailand], Shiyamu [Siam], Taiwan, Roson [the Philippines], and Amakō [Macao]. Five ships from Nagasaki [were authorized]: two ships to Suetsugo Heizō; one ship to Funamoto Yaheiji; one ship to Araki Sōtarō; and one ship to Itoya Zuiemon. Three ships from Kyoto: one ship to Chaya Shirōjirō; one ship to the Suminokura; one ship to the Fushimiya. One ship from Sakai to the Itoya.’

letter by stating that if the viceroy was eager to establish ‘amity with this land, the seas have been rid of the pirate menace, and merchants are permitted to come and go’.¹¹²

The year before Hideyoshi had this letter written and sent, precisely on 3 March 1591, he had received an embassy from the viceroy at his palace in Miyako, the Jurakutei.¹¹³ The embassy was headed by Alessandro Valignano – in a diplomat capacity – and the four Japanese youngsters that had been sent to Europe in 1582. Valignano presented to Hideyoshi a letter and a present from Albuquerque. As we read in the annual report of 1591-92, the embassy turned out to be rather successful, as Hideyoshi first distributed gifts to the whole Portuguese party:

‘[H]izo llamar los quatro cavalleros Japones con todos los demas portugueses y pajez y a cada uno mando dar un tablero pequeño con sinco barras de plata y un cosonde¹¹⁴ de seda y alos Irmãos João Rodrigues y Anbrosio Fernandes que servian de lenguas, mandou dar a cada uno un tablero mediano con 30 barras de plata y dos cosondes de seda (y porque cada barra tiene quatro cruzados y tres reales de España, hera la cantidad que dio al Padre Visitador 860 cruzados y otros tantos alos dos Padres y alos dos Irmãos 258, y a todos los demas 21 cruzados y medio que sumado todo viene a ser 2’494 ducados fuera de 36 cosondes de seda que valdrian mas de otros 100 cruzados, la qual dadiva fuera dela honrra que con esto a todos hizo fue segun la costumbre de Japon una liberalidad muy grande que por ventura Quvacundono nunca hizo)’.¹¹⁵

The *kanpaku*, then, officially allowed ten Fathers to dwell in Nagasaki and declared that he was going to be more tolerant provided the Jesuits continued to act with modesty and discretion, and indulged in no overt anti-Buddhist or iconoclastic acts, as used to happen in Takayama Justo’s domain. Moreover, the *kanpaku* sent to the viceroy a letter ‘en un papel hecho aposta de ocho palmos de largo y quarto en alto’ along with various gifts, such as a *naginata* – a Japanese halberd,¹¹⁶ a *tachi* – a long-sword,¹¹⁷ a *katana* and a *wakizashi*,¹¹⁸ the short-sword the samurai used to carry along with the *katana*, ‘muchas

¹¹² The quotations are from *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, vol. 1, pp. 316-318. There is also a Spanish version of this letter, probably a coeval translation, which offers the same information as the English one although it is dated ‘alos 20 anos dela hera tenxo [Tenshō] alos 25 dias dela septima luna’, which means 1 September 1592. Cf. RAH/Jes., *Tomo 116* 9/3689, ff. 71^v-72^v. See also Gil, *Hidalgos y Samurai*, pp. 39-42.

¹¹³ 聚楽第

¹¹⁴ It is probably the Japanese word *kosode* 小袖, which indicates a type of kimono.

¹¹⁵ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 51, f. 319.

¹¹⁶ 長刀

¹¹⁷ 太刀

¹¹⁸ 脇指

delas quales se estiman en Japon en 500 yen, 1U yen, 2U yen, 4U yen hasta 6U cruzados solamente por respeto del temple del hazero antiguo', and finally some precious silks.¹¹⁹

Aside from his positive response to the viceroy's embassy, Hideyoshi commissioned Buddhist monks from the Kyōto Gozan,¹²⁰ the leading Rinzai Zen temples in the capital, to draft a letter also for the Spanish Governor in Manila, Gómez Pérez das Mariñas.¹²¹ Hideyoshi informed the Spaniard about his long-awaited project of conquering China, a plan that would lead him to transfer the headquarters in Nagoya before long. Once there, the *taikō* expected das Mariñas to send him an embassy bearing the banner of submission, otherwise an attack would punctually be prepared.¹²² Father Antonio Sedeño reported the fact to Acquaviva with words that rightly describe how Hideyoshi's letter was received in Manila: '[e]ste año embio el Emperador de alli al Governador destas Yslas una embaxada llena de amenazas, diziendo que se luego no le embia un embaxador a que le de la obediencia que embiara sus exercitos a destruyrlas'.¹²³

As written to Manila, Hideyoshi deployed a great army of more than 160'000 troops at Nagoya and crossed the sea to Korea. The Korean expedition was only the initial, yet unavoidable, step in Hideyoshi's grand scheme to bring China under his control. It must be remembered, however, that Hideyoshi probably conceived the campaign also within the scope of his plan of keeping under Japanese control the intra-Asian trade in the China Sea. Yet, it is undeniable that he was also reaching for an empire: the Korean expedition was designed to inspire awe throughout Asia and to fix

¹¹⁹ For a detailed description of Hideyoshi's gift see RAH/Jes., *Tomo 116*, 9/3689, ff. 71-71^v.

¹²⁰ 五山

¹²¹ Cf. *CHJ IV*, pp. 69-70.

¹²² Cf. Berry, *op. cit.*, p. 212. As commonly happens, the time of politic was much slower than the time of trade. Manila, in fact, had already had various contacts with Japanese vessels before Hideyoshi's letter. It was commonly pirates, but, for instance, in 1589 it is reported the arrival at Manila of a Japanese ship loaded with supplies and lots of weapons which amounted to 'mas de quinientos arcabuzes y otras tantas espadas a su usso y algunas armas enastadas'. At first, out of caution, Spanish officers captured the crew and confiscated the goods, but once they realized they were dealing with merchants and not with pirates, they let them return to their business, whereby 'se a proveido esta tierra de armas'. See *Fiscal* Gaspar de Ayala to King Philip II, Manila, 15 July 1589. AGI, *Filipinas 18A*, R.7, N.49, f. 6. In addition to the commercial ties, there were also private Japanese lords who offered logistic and military support for a Spanish expedition against the South-Eastern China coast, just like did Konishi Yukinaga Agostinho, who in 1587 sent a letter to Manila offering 6'000 men or more and ammunitions to conquer Brunei, Siam, Maluku or even China. See AGI, *Filipinas 18A*, R.5, N. 32, f. 4 and Boxer, *The Christian Century*, p. 259.

¹²³ See Father Antonio Sedeño to General Acquaviva, Manila, 7 June 1592. ARSI, *Philipp.* 9, f. 276.

Hideyoshi's greatness for posterity.¹²⁴ During the meeting Hideyoshi had with the Macao's Captain Major Jerónimo Pereira in 1588, whilst confessing that personally he had nothing against the Christian faith, the Japanese seemed to have stated that the *kami* and Buddha were nothing but ancient Japanese lords who because of their legendary deeds started to be worshipped as divinities.¹²⁵ In the Western philosophy of religion, Hideyoshi's statement would be part of the Evemerism, a concept named after the Greek philosopher Evemeris, according to which polytheistic gods were in fact ancient historical characters whose exploits were then deified. Was Hideyoshi's real intent to become part of the *Shintō*'s pantheon and being worshipped by the posterities? Alessandro Valignano¹²⁶ and Father Francesco Pasio¹²⁷ would answer positively to this question. We can also add that he was actually posthumously deified by Go-Yōzei *tennō* with the title *Toyokuni Daimyōjin*,¹²⁸ a tutelary deity of Japan. This cult, however, was wiped out in 1615 by that other Japanese who had himself deified and whose sanctuary is still there at a hundred odd kilometers from Tōkyō,¹²⁹ Tokugawa Ieyasu.

In any case, during the first stage of the Korean War, Hideyoshi showed supreme confidence in his victory.¹³⁰ In effect, the Japanese forces landed in Korea in May 1592, took the fortress of Pusan and occupied Seoul within a month. Yet, by the end of summer counteroffensive began to form and soon appeared unstoppable. Heavy defeats at sea stalled the transfer of fresh troops and supplies for the Japanese brigades and the Korean operated a scorched earth policy. In the same time, Chinese soldiers

¹²⁴ See Berry, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

¹²⁵ Cf. *Lettera Annibale [sic, Annuale] del Giappone delli 24 di Febraio 1589*, pp. 136-137.

¹²⁶ Cf. Valignano, *Lettera del P. Alessandro Valignano, Visitatore della Compagnia di GIESV nel Giappone e nella Cina, de' 10 d'Ottobre del 1599 a Reuerendo P. Clavdio Acquaviva Generale della medesima Compagnia*, p. 36: 'Non lascierò quì di dire, che tra l'altre cose [...] ordinate da Taicosama, fu anche questa, che dopo d'esser pubblicata la sua morte, lo facessero Camo, chiamandolo Scinfaciman [Shin-Hachiman 新八幡神], che vuol dire nuouo Faciman, appresso i Giapponesi [*sic*], Dio della guerra, e gli edificassero vn sontuoso tempio [...] doue sepelissero il suo cadauero, e vi collocassero la sua statua, acciò tutti l'adorassero'.

¹²⁷ Cf. Father Francesco Pasio to General Acquaviva. Nagasaki, 3 October 1598. In Hayus, *De Rebus Iaponicis, Indicis, et Pervanis Epistolae Recentiores*, p. 500: 'Denique cupidus nominis sui apud omnen posteritatem perpetuandi, vt nempe coleretur tanquam DEVS, noluis corpus suum (licet mos in tota Iaponia contrarius obtinuisset) post mortem concremari, sed in arcam artificiose ad id elaboratam inclusum in propugnaculo suo, idque loco recreationibus & udis destinato, deponi. Itaque se voluit deinceps esse inter Chamos (hoc enim nomen est magnorum Dominorum), virtuteque bellica olim prestantium, qui post mortem in Deos relati putantur). Appellati autem voluit Scinfaciman, hoc est, nouum Faciman; nam vt olim apud Romanos Mars, sic Faciman apud Iaponios habetur Deus belli'.

¹²⁸ 豊國大明神

¹²⁹ The *Shintō* shrine *Tōshōgū* 東照宮 at Nikkō in the Tochigi Prefecture.

¹³⁰ See for instance his letter to Hidetsugu sent on 27 June 1592, where he promised to his son the post of Civil Dictator of China and stated that 'Korea and China are within easy reach and no inconvenience is anticipated for any concerned, high or low'. See *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, vol. 1, pp. 319-320.

crossed the borders and started to push the Japanese southward. By mid-1593 negotiation appeared the only alternative to defeat and by the end of summer Hideyoshi's first Korean expedition came to an end along with his dream of subjugating the Ming.

The negotiations that followed were long and inconclusive. After the first meeting at Nagoya in 1593, the Chinese embassy left and did not return to Japan with a response to Hideyoshi's terms until the end of 1596.¹³¹ By that time, however, not only Hideyoshi's life and energy was drawing to an end, but he had to handle again a matter regarding the Western faith and its preachers. This time, however, his resolution went much further than the simple issue of a decree.

II. 2. Toyotomi Hideyoshi and foreign affairs: the *San Felipe* incident

We saw that because of the dispositions made by Hideyoshi in 1587, Christianity ceased to be a matter confined to the domain of a single lord and became a national problem. We saw also that Hideyoshi did not enforce the expulsion but limited himself to destroying and confiscating Jesuits' estates throughout the country. His tolerance, if we may call it so, is apparent also by the number and religious fervour of the *daimyō* in his own entourage, such as Konishi Yukinaga¹³² and Gamō Ujisato,¹³³ and by the way he dealt with such a powerful lord as Dom Justo. Yet, the tide for the Japan Christianity was changing and the troubles this time came not from the Japanese, but from the Spaniards settled in the Philippines.

¹³¹ For a description of the campaign see Berry, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-217.

¹³² Konishi Yukinaga Agostinho (c. 1555-1600) first met Hideyoshi in 1577 and turned Christian in 1583. Following the Kyūshū campaign he was given half of Higo province, with the other half going to Kato Kiyomasa, with whom he came at odds frequently over the issue of Christianity. The two of them were named as chief commanders of the Korean expedition in 1592. Although in 1587 he offered his military help to Manila for military expeditions in South-East Asia, after the initial defeats in Korea he sought to reach a peaceful conclusion to the campaign. He was one of the most powerful *kirishitan daimyō*, but when Ieyasu rose to power, he chose to follow Toyotomi Hideyori and was defeated. Instead of committing *seppuku*, which his faith forbade, he faced death by decapitation. Cf. Laures, *Kirishitan bunko. A manual of books and documents on the early christian mission in Japan*, pp. 113-114.

¹³³ Gamō Ujisato Leão (1556-1595) got married with one of Oda Nobunaga's daughters and was given a sizeable fief in Ise. After Oda's death, he joined Hideyoshi and served him in Kyūshū and in the Odawara campaign (1590), after which he was given a huge fief in Mutsu – Aizu. He received the baptism in 1585. During the Korean expedition, he served on Hideyoshi's staff in Nagoya. He suddenly and mysteriously died in 1595. Cf. Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 171, n. 452.

Reaching Japan had always been part of the Spanish colonial plans and the very Christopher Columbus supported by the *Reyes Catolicos* passed the Pillars of Hercules headed for *Cipangu*. In Europe the arrival of the Portuguese in Japan was first made known by a Spanish officer, Garcia de Escalante Alvarado, who wrote his account of Portuguese first visits to the Ryūkyū and Japan while in Portuguese captivity in the Moluccas, and a Portuguese captain, Jorge Álvares.¹³⁴ It is known as well that the instructions received by Miguel López de Legazpi – *el conquistador de Filipinas* – in 1564 mentioned the possibility of reaching the Japanese islands, which, the Spaniards still considered as part of their side of the world.¹³⁵ In the 1570s, Felipe II received a letter from Manila by Governor Juan Pacheco Maldonado, who wrote his king about ‘the rich country of Japan, whence is brought great quantities of silver’. Each year, according to Maldonado, an unspecified number of Japanese ships reached Philippine’s harbours to exchange gold for silver: ‘two to two and a half *marcos*¹³⁶ of silver for one of gold’.¹³⁷ Another account written in 1573 reads that there was an active commerce between Japan and the Philippines even before the Spaniards got there. Japan is described as China’s trading partner, with the exchange of silks for silver.¹³⁸ Moreover, not only Japanese vessels visited the Spanish settlement, they also established a small colony in Manila, where 40 Chinese and 20 Japanese, some of them baptized, used to live.¹³⁹ The relationship, however, was not always pacific.

We saw that Hideyoshi claimed to rid the seas of the pirate menace, yet earlier in 1582, Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa was forced to send an *armada* against two ships, ‘el uno de Japones y otro de sangleyes’, at Cagayan with subsequent death of two hundred Japanese, including the Captain of the ship and his son.¹⁴⁰ Although the Spaniards easily erased the menace, pirates’ incursions did not end. Three years later, in fact, Governor Santiago de Vera wrote to his king that Japanese pirates were often sighted off the coast of Cagayan plundering Chinese trading ships. Hence, he ordered to build six *galeotas* and suggested that, in order to keep the trade with China alive, it was necessary to provide strong defences for their ships with economic aid for the artillery

¹³⁴ Cf. Lidin, *Tanegashima: The Arrival of Europe in Japan*, p. 21.

¹³⁵ Cf. Ollé, “A Inserção das Filipinas na Ásia Oriental (1565-1593)”, p. 14.

¹³⁶ The *marco* was the unit of weight used in weighing gold and silver in the different Latin countries. In Spain it was equivalent to 226 grams.

¹³⁷ See *Letter From Juan Pacheco Maldonado to Felipe II* in *TPI*, vol. 1, n.º 3, pp. 295-303.

¹³⁸ See *Relation of the Western Islands Called Filipinas* in *TPI*, vol. 1, n.º 3, pp. 190-208.

¹³⁹ Cf. Ollé, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. AGI, *Filipinas* 6, R.4, N.52.

from *Nueva España*. Without this help, he concluded, ‘no se podra hazer cossa fructuosa y cada dia se atreverian mas estos cosarios’.¹⁴¹ We have documents that relate *wakō*’s plundering also in the first years of the 17th century, consequently we can imply that Hideyoshi’s policy did not turn out to be a successful one. On the contrary, Tokugawa Ieyasu’s measures proved to be more decisive.¹⁴²

At any rate, the needs to strengthen Manila’s defences and to provide the settlement with military supplies were direct consequences of the Japanese looming threat, which from 1592 onwards was not limited to pirates but included the tyrant Toyotomi. Hideyoshi’s aggressive international policy concerned the governor, and later his son Luis,¹⁴³ to the point that he suggested a military alliance with the Chinese Empire,¹⁴⁴ submitted a list of precautions to the war-officials of the city,¹⁴⁵ and asked for Spanish soldiers and munitions to be sent to Manila.¹⁴⁶ Following Hideyoshi’s letter, however, relations between Japan and Manila were established, although the first diplomatic exchanges did not go as good as both parties expected.¹⁴⁷

Yet, whilst politic was trudging, trading activities began to take place with more regularity. Just as it happened in the Portuguese vessels from Macao, also the Spaniards used to carry aboard missionaries of the Roman Church, in particular Friars Minors and Dominicans. Although a few Franciscans reached Japan before 1590, it was a passage with no sensible consequences. Until 1593, in fact, the Jesuits had been holding the monopoly of the evangelization of Japan. Yet, as we just saw, the Spanish were interested in Japan before the discovery of the Philippines and also Francis Xavier expressed his concern about a Spanish approach to Japan when he suggested D. João III to talk and dissuade Emperor Carlos V to reach the archipelago through the Western way.¹⁴⁸ The diplomatic missions sent to China by Manila in the 1570s along with the several attempts made by the mendicant orders to gain a foothold in the Ming Empire

¹⁴¹ See AGI, *Filipinas 18A*, R.3, N.15, f. 6.

¹⁴² In 1602, eager to trade with Manila, the shōgun issued the death penalty for more than 600 people accused of piracy, a deed which actually put an end to Japanese piracy in the Philippines. Cf. Gil, *Los Chinos en Manila – Siglos XVI y XVII*, p. 90

¹⁴³ See AGI, *Filipinas 18B*, R.4, N.29.

¹⁴⁴ See AGI, *Filipinas 18B*, R.2, N. 13.

¹⁴⁵ See *TPI*, vol. 1, n. 8, pp. 284-297.

¹⁴⁶ See AGI, *Filipinas 18B*, R.2, N.5 and N.7.

¹⁴⁷ For this part we followed our text presented at the conference *As Filipinas e o Pacífico (c.1580-c.1660) / The Philippines and the Pacific (c.1580-c.1660)*, “Commercial liaisons between Japan and the Philippines during the first years of the Tokugawa Jidai”.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, pp. 181-182.

exacerbated the situation, although they all ended in failure due to Chinese intransigence.

Both the diplomatic and the religious undertakings were against the legal rights of the Portuguese patronage established at Tordesillas and Zaragoza, according to which the Chinese mainland felt within the spiritual jurisdiction of the Portuguese bishop of China and Japan resident at Macao. It was presumable, that once failed in China, the Spaniards would switch their attention to Japan, especially after they understood how profitable the silk trade was. In order to protect the Japan mission from Spanish intrusion, the Jesuits sent several requests for a bull to Gregory XIII forbidding any change in the existing status of the mission field. Yet in 1586 Sixtus V allowed religious in the Philippines to found missions in China and the Franciscans made no secret of their intention to do the same also in Japan and the chance of breaking the Jesuit monopoly occurred in 1592, the year of Hideyoshi's letter to das Marinãs.¹⁴⁹

In that letter, the *kanpaku* mentioned that initially he meant to invade the Philippines without waiting on them to swear subjection, but he was persuaded to do otherwise by Harada Magoshichirō Gaspar,¹⁵⁰ a Christian merchant involved in the trade with Philippines. Harada, through the intercession of a counsellor of the *taikō*,¹⁵¹ was able to convince Hideyoshi that it would be advisable to give the Spaniards a chance of submitting to Japan, instead of sending an army right away. Harada informed Hideyoshi about how well merchants like him were treated in Manila, and he also assured that a Spanish embassy would surely follow once he could talk with the governor and thus he was allowed to lead the delegation.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-187 and Boxer, *The Christian Century*, pp. 154-160.

¹⁵⁰ According to Iaccarino, it was Harada Kiemon who convinced Hideyoshi, but eventually, due to bad health, he had to renounce to go and entrusted everything to his nephew, Magoshichirō. Nevertheless, in the sources we consulted, and quoted, only the latter Harada appears, although in one letter he appears as 'Faranda Maguoxichiro', whereas in the other one the translator, most likely a Chinese, transcribed the name using the Chinese reading of the characters: 'Guantien Chun Chit Lonc', nowadays Yuántián Sunqiláng. Unfortunately, Iaccarino did not provide any archival evidences and thus we are not able to give further clarification to the matter. Cf. Iaccarino, "Alessandro Valignano e la missione Cobo (1592)", pp. 130-131.

¹⁵¹ Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/6255, f. 201: '...porque Faranda Maguoxichiro que por via de mercancia va y viene cada año a esse reyno, dixo a mi privado Faxeguaba Sonin que importava embyar yo luego alguna embarcacion de Japon y que el yria a essas Islas a dezir como mi armada yva alla y assi sin duda me darian luego obediencia y me pagarian tributo'.

¹⁵² Cf. AGI, *Filipinas*, 18B, R.2, N.12, f. 6: 'Guantien Chun Chit Lonc [...] me a dicho el buen tratamiento que ay hacen alos mercades Japones vasallos meos, que de aqui van a esas yslas, el qual preguntandole yo si el que gobierna ay m'es amigo, me respondio y asegurado que como yo envie carta para el, que el me enviara envaxada. Y quando el no lo fuese, estando yo en mi Reyno asentado soy tan poderoso que tengo

Hideyoshi's envoys reached Manila on 29 May 1592, yet das Mariñas had already been warned of their arrival by the Jesuit Superior in Manila, Antonio Sedeño, who had received two letters from Nagasaki written by Valignano stating that 'un Jappon de Meaco mercader [Harada Magoshichirō], movido de su interes, dio a entender a Cambacudono que seria facil cosa hazer que el Governador delos Luzones le embiase embaxada, y le diese obediencia, y se sujetase a su mandado'.¹⁵³ The Italian in order not to compromise the already precarious situation of the Japan mission gave Manila some advices in dealing with the Japanese emissaries. Das Mariñas, however, did not follow Valignano's instructions. Instead he chose to send back an embassy headed by the Dominican Father Juan Cobo, who arrived at Satsuma by the end of July 1592 and met with Hideyoshi almost a month later.¹⁵⁴ It would appear that Cobo's answers displayed to Hideyoshi for the first time the position and extent of the Habsburgs's colonial empire and the fact that Portugal became part of that crown a few years earlier. Cobo was dismissed with a reply to das Mariñas but died en route for Manila.¹⁵⁵ Another mission from Manila, this one led by four Franciscans, was cordially received by Hideyoshi in 1593. The Friars put forward proposals of peaceful relations with Manila and asked permission to remain in Japan until the answers from Manila to the matters faced with Hideyoshi came. *Taicosama* allowed them to reside in his country, provided always that they did not proselytize. He answered positively also to the Friars' request of visiting Miyako and he offered to pay for their daily expenses while in the capital city.¹⁵⁶ It has been stated that the Japanese tyrant permitted the

gentes que vayan a conquistar qualquier reyno y aunque este es hombre bajo, yo le e dado credito por la buena raçon que da y asi pues no envio la jente que pensava enviar'.

¹⁵³ See "Copia de una carta que el Padre Alexandro Valignano dela Compañía de Jesus Visitador de Jappon y China escrivio al Reitor de Manila dela misma Compañía sobre avisos que embiava al Governador delas dichas Islas", in *Apologia Societatis Contra Calumnias ipsi irrogatas a F. Joanne de Santa Maria Provinciali Franciscanorum in Indiis Occidentalibus*, BNCR/FGes. 1246, ff. 316^v-317. Cf. also Iaccarino, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-132.

¹⁵⁴ *Ivi*, pp. 133-137. Cobo came from Mexico to Manila in 1588 and was the most accomplished Sinologue among the Europeans in the Philippines, yet he did not speak Japanese.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Iaccarino, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140 and Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161. The meeting turned out to be quite detrimental for the Society of Jesus. In effect, it was made clear to Hideyoshi that the viceroy's embassy headed by Valignano had no official value and King Filipe would have never sent such a rich tributary gift. Hideyoshi did not take the news well and ordered to take down a church in Nagasaki along with its premises. Valignano knew something bad would happen if the news came to the *taikō*'s attention. In fact, when he wrote to das Mariñas mentioned that it was risky for the mission to reveal that Spaniards and Portuguese were now unite under the same crown. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 31, f. 37 and Iaccarino, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.

¹⁵⁶ The record of the 1593-meeting was sent to Pero Gomez by the Miyako *shoshidai* 所司代, the shogunal governor of Miyako, Maeda Gen'i Hōin, on 9 September 1593. In RAH/Cor. 9/2665, ff. 203-203^v. The *shoshidai*'s letter was of paramount importance for the Japan Jesuits, since it cleared them from any involvement in the issue of the anti-Christian edict in 1587. As a consequence, on 28 September the

Friars to remain at Miyako in the hope that they would play a similar role to the Jesuits at Nagasaki, therefore creating an alternative to the Portuguese monopoly of trade in China.¹⁵⁷ In our opinion, however, this deduction fails to include some elements. As we saw, Hideyoshi's deepest motivation was seeing his leading status acknowledged by the countries surrounding Japan. His desire of receiving tributary missions from outside has to be read within the structure of the Chinese cultural sphere. Hence, the diplomatic visits the Portuguese *Capitão-Mór* or the Spaniards paid annually to the ruler of Japan are supposed to be interpreted as a formal recognition of submission to the Japanese empire. Hideyoshi's threatening missives to the viceroy at Goa, the governor of Manila and the lord of Formosa if on the one hand promised amity and peaceful exchanges, on the other hand established a vertical relation in order to grant the very existence of those exchanges. At any rate, the fact that Hideyoshi handled the international relations in a subtle if inscrutable matter is proved by the words the Governor of Manila Francisco Tello wrote to Spain after Hideyoshi's death:

‘las cossas del Japon estubieron entretenidas los años passados aunque siempre con temores y amenazas de que abra de bajar a estas Yslas [...], pero aseguravase en mucha parte este miedo con la ocupaçion que el Xapon tenia dela Guerra de Coria y palabras de Taycosama, Señor de Xapon, que significava queria la paz y amistad.’¹⁵⁸

Hideyoshi, in other words, asked for peace with the sceptre and the sword in his hand, although for the moment the latter was pointed towards Korea and China. Only three years before this letter was sent, however, the situation in Japan had changed drastically compared to the 1593 state of affair.

On 19 October 1596, in fact, the *San Felipe*, a Spanish galleon bound for Acapulco and laden with rich cargo, ran aground off the coast of Tosa. After Hideyoshi was informed of the shipwreck, he sent to Tosa an envoy to inform the Spanish that all the goods in the vessel were now his for the taking. The upset Spanish captain, Matías de Landecho, managed to set a meeting with Hideyoshi and chose as his representatives the Franciscans in Miyako. The Friars' behaviour in the capital city during the previous

Capitão Mór, Gaspar Pinto da Rocha ordered an examination of the document at Nagasaki. The witnesses called to testify were: António de Abreu, Nagasaki householder; Mor João, 38 years old, Nagasaki householder; Bartolomeu Ryoshichika, 60 years old, Nagasaki householder; Murayama António, 31 years old, Nagasaki householder and João Rodrigues, about 32 years old, Portuguese and Brother of the Society of Jesus. See RAH/Cor. 9/2665, ff. 341-344^v.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-162.

¹⁵⁸ See *Carta de la Audiencia de Manila sobre su fundación y funcionamiento*, AGI, *Filipinas 18B, R.9, N. 122*, f. 15.

three years had left the Jesuits and the Japanese converts aghast at their intemperate zeal. Hideyoshi's apparent friendliness, in fact, had been mistaken for full patronage and made them forget about the 1587 prohibition of Christianity.¹⁵⁹ According to the Bishop of Japan, Pedro Martins,¹⁶⁰ and to the Captain Major Rui Mendes de Figueiredo,¹⁶¹ this excess of confidence and defiance of the *taikō*'s laws were the main causes for Hideyoshi's swift and decisive decision to crucify twenty-six Christians at Nagasaki. But let's proceed with order.

It would seem that though inconclusive as it was, the first Korean campaign drained Hideyoshi's coffers. The *taikō*, on his hand, had just refused to accept the Ming emperor's offer to invest him formally as king of Japan, thus establishing Japan's subordination to China and was now renewed in his intention of invading the continent. The new campaign, however, needed capitals. Moreover, in the 1590s a series of disastrous earthquakes devastated large areas of Japan, including his costly new palace at Fushimi. In these circumstances, the wreckage of the *San Felipe* represented an unexpected gift. Apparently, during the negotiations with the Japan officers to recover the cargo, the Spanish pilot in an effort to impress – maybe scare? – the Japanese with the power of the Spanish Empire, admitted that Spain overseas conquests had been facilitated by the mendicant orders, which normally preceded the arrival of the *conquistadores*. This incautious admission is believed to be the hint that led Hideyoshi to consider the Christian faith not only a disturber of political situation in Japan, but a factual threat to its independence and security. As a consequence, he forthwith sentenced the Franciscans to death, along with seventeen of their Japanese neophytes and three Japanese Jesuit lay brothers, for a total of twenty-six persons:

'Tendo eu prohibido os annos passados rigurosamente a ley que pregão os Padres, vierão estes dos Luções, dizendo que erão embaixadores e se deixarão estar no Meaco, promulgando esta lei, pello que a elles, e aquelles que receberão a mesma lei mando iusticar, são por todos 24 [*sic*], os quais se ponhão na cruz em Nangasaqui, e se deixem estar nella asi daqui por diante muito mais e mais prohibo esta lei, pello que faço a saber isto para que o prohibão muy

¹⁵⁹ As stated by Boxer, they had some excuse for believing that the edict was now a dead letter. There where Christians among the *kanpaku*'s entourage, the embassy from Goa was received in solemn official audience, as he received the Franciscans in 1593, moreover the Jesuits were quietly but steadily continuing their work in Southern Japan. See Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.

¹⁶⁰ See *Certidão do Senhor Dom Pedro Bispo de Japão acerca do estado daquella nova Igreja*, BL/Add. 9858, f. 1.

¹⁶¹ See *Outra certidão do Capitão Mor da Viagem de Japão, trata da mesma materia que a passada*, Ivi, ff. 4-6^v.

rigurosamente, e se por ventura ouver alguma que quebre este meu mandado, o mandarei iusticar com toda a familia. Feita o 1.º ano da era Queichoõ aos 20 dias da mesma lua. Sello real'.¹⁶²

Since the foregoing is based substantially on Jesuits sources, hence partisans of the *Padroado*, it is interesting to take a look to the Spanish account of the matter, since it unveils again how troubles in Asia reawakened political divergences between two hearts that were held in only one hand.¹⁶³ Two sources in particular deserve our attention.

The first is represented by Franciscans' documents that attribute Hideyoshi's sudden change to the Jesuits' mischievous whispers. As we said, in fact, in the early 1590s the Friars were carrying out freely their mission in Miyako. Their lack of experience on Japanese *modus vivendi* led them to misinterpret Jesuits' caution for want of patronage by Japanese lords. More importantly, whilst the Society of Jesus saw the Friars' blatant behaviour as one of the primary causes of Hideyoshi's rage, the Franciscans interpreted the facts differently, or at least wanted their readers to do so:

'E assi os frades estavam com liberdade e os Padres sem ella, os frades com licença e favor del Rei e os Padres em sua desgraça [...]. Os Padres dizem missa escondidamente em sua casa, os frades trazão seu habito e andavão publicamente com elle. Os Padres andavão como seculares Japois não sahião de noite ou de modo que não fossem conhecidos. Os frades não guardavão nenhum comprimento do mundo, e secular, os Padres como puros seculares em trajo e trato, e comprimento tratavão com os Japões, os frades não tratavão se não com pobres, os Padres com ricos dizendo que se tratassem com os pobres, não quererião ver a sua casa os ricos. Os frades em seu trajo, casa e comida, mostravão que erão pobres, os Padres mostravão em tudo que erão ricos e assj erão vesitados de gente mais principal, os frades não tinham tratos nem mercadorias, os Padres como puro mercaderes trazem seus empregos e tratos, os frades andavão descalços e a pé; os Padres calçados e em ombros de homens e palanquins, ou a cavalo com grande acompanhamento de criados. Os frades servião-se de alguns pobres humildes, os Padres tinham variedades de criados e todos os de sua casa tem seu grau de honrra. Finalmente em modo de viver erão differentes, porem qual pregava mais propriamente

¹⁶² The text of the edict was translated and sent to the pontiff by Bishop Pedro Martins on 23 February 1597. See BL/Add. 9860, ff. 25-26^v. See also AGI, *Filipinas* 79, N. 28 and Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

¹⁶³ With regard to this specific topic, it is interesting to see how Jesuits' and Franciscans' accounts of the same event, like, for instance, the 1597 martyrdom of Nagasaki. As showed by Oliveira e Costa, the mutual accusation between the Ignatians and the Minors rebounded also on the editorial production in Europe. Thus, the contents of the publications reflect the orders particular views of the matter. Yet, only by reading the titles it is evident the origin of the text. Cf. Costa, *O Japão e o Cristianismo no Século XVI – Ensaio de História Luso-Nipônica*, pp. 216-219.

o Santo Evangelho e imitava a Christo Jesu crucificado e pobre, iulgueo quem os Padres quizerem, e assi parece que aos frades por pobres, e não terem se não pobres amigos, que pregarem a fee que está prohibida, fazem muitos e muitos Christãos e se sabe não lhes disserão nada. Que se pode dizer a isto?’¹⁶⁴

What can you say about that? Asked Friar Marcelo de Ribadeneira. First of all, it should be noted that the Friar worked within the Portuguese *padroado*, which means that his loyalty lay on his order, not the political institution that sent him in Asia. Moreover, the *Ordo Fratrum Minorum* was as related to the Spanish *patroazgo* as the Society of Jesus was to the *padroado*. Second, we can say that this treatise shows clearly how the Franciscans, maybe out of naïveté, failed to comprehend the complexity of Japanese society as thoroughly as the Jesuits did, since they kept dictating their *Weltanschauung* to a society that basically rejected it. At any rate, this work was formally condemned at the request of the Society of Jesus by the Inquisition at Goa on 14 August 1598.¹⁶⁵ Yet, the Franciscans spread also another accusation against the Ignatians. According to an anonymous account of the *San Felipe*’s incident, on 14 November 1596, Hideyoshi from Miyako charged the Spaniards of being ‘ladrones cosarios que beniamos a comarcar la tierra para tomarla [...] ymbiando primero a los Padres de S. Francisco para que predicaran la ley de Nanbal’.¹⁶⁶ The anonymous Spaniard wrote that Hideyoshi heard such things from ‘algunas personas y tres portugeses’, but did not specified whether they were laymen or men of the cloth. The vagueness was resolved by Fray Pedro Bautista, the commissioner of the Friars in Japan and one of the six Franciscans condemned to death.¹⁶⁷ Bautista, in fact, while imprisoned in Ōsaka, wrote to his confrères that he could not conceive as possible that such a wickedness as to call the Spaniards thieves could reside in the heart of a Christian.¹⁶⁸ On the other hand, however,

¹⁶⁴ See *Tratado que os religiosos de S. Francisco espalharam em Goa em Baçaim no ano de 1598 contra os Padres da Companhia de Jesus que andam na conversão de Japão*, BL/Add. 9858, ff. 78-78^v.

¹⁶⁵ See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, ff. 119-119^v. Cf. Boxer, *The Christian Century*, p. 77 and Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218.

¹⁶⁶ See *Relaçion del biaje del galleon S. Phelippe de Su Magestad aribada que hiço al Japon y su perdida y lo que mas a sucedido. Año de 1596*, AGI, *Filipinas* 79, N. 28, f. 4. Cf. Gil, *Hidalgos y Samurai*, pp. 69-71. ‘Nanbal’ is the wrong transliteration of the Japanese word Nanban 南蠻, literally the Southern barbarians, the expression by which the Japanese used to denote the Westerners and their culture, Nanban Bunka 南蠻文化.

¹⁶⁷ The other five condemned were Francisco Blanco, Gonçalo Garcia, Francisco de San Miguel and Filipe de Jesus.

¹⁶⁸ See Commissioner Pedro Bautista OFM to Fray Martin and Fray Juan Pobre, Ōsaka, 23 December 1596. AGI, *Filipinas* 84, N. 80, f. 1^v: ‘Por una parte no me puedo persuader que en pecho de Christianos tan gran maldad cupiese que digesen que eran ladrones los castillas’.

Pedro Bautista could not help but admire the Jesuits' shrewdness and he was forced to admit that at the end of the day 'los padres estan libres [...] y nosotros en prision'.¹⁶⁹

The second source that deserves our attention is a letter signed by Governor Francisco Tello and addressed to Filipe I written in the aftermath of the executions. Tello tried extensively to put the Portuguese and the Ignatians in an unfavourable light, in order to lay on them the blame for the painful end met by the Spaniards in Japan and it is rather interesting the way he put it:

'Dizen estos Frayles que los Portuguezes vasallos de V. Magestad tienen dicho al Japon que tres rreyes ay en el mundo poderossos. El mayor dellos es el Japon y el segundo don Antonio y el tercero V. Magestad, que es el que el dizen ser menos poderosso y cossa me a parecido nueva para los Portuguezes tener la memoria y nombre de don Antonio aun en estas partes tan remotas'.¹⁷⁰

Such accusation was officially addressed by Bishop Martins in 1598. He denied that the cargo of the Spanish vessel was confiscated upon a conversation between Portuguese Jesuits and Hideyoshi. He denied also that in Hideyoshi's presence a Portuguese claimed that the king of Spain was not the sovereign of Portugal. He felt rather sure about the last point, since the man who allegedly said that, António Garcês – 'un portugues honrado y conoçido en Manilla',¹⁷¹ had been commissioned to deliver to the Japanese court the gift from the *Nao do trato* of 1596, yet by the time the Spanish vessel had wrecked at Tosa's Urado he was already back in Nagasaki.¹⁷²

By reporting such information, were the Franciscans and Tello just rubbing salt into the king's wound due to António's escape? Was this just a way to relieve Manila of responsibilities for the lost cargo? Be that as it may, only a month after his letter to the

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ See Governor Francisco Tello to King Filipe I, Manila, 18 May 1597. AGI, *Filipinas 18B*, R. 7, N. 62.

¹⁷¹ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 13 [III]*, f. 352. Garcês, probably the son of a Portuguese and an Asian, was one of the Portuguese merchants who were able to maintain a robust trade between Japan and the Philippines. In 1600, for instance, only his ships and the ones belonging to another Portuguese, Vasco Dias, were allowed to make the voyage between the two archipelagos, since the new tyrant, Tokugawa Ieyasu, 'tiene ordenado que ningun navio de Jappones vaya este año alla, y esto [...] porque no quieren que os tien alla en sospecha, mandando Jappones ya que quedaron este año con tanta sospecha de ellos'. *Ivi*, f. 316^v.

¹⁷² See *Certidão do Senhor Dom Pedro Bispo de Japão acerca do estado daquela nova Igreja*; BL/Add. 9868, ff. 2^v-3: 'Certifico mais que he grandissima falsidade dizer que os Portuguezes forão causa da tomada da nao e que dizerão no Meaco que El Rey de Espanha não era Rei dos Portuguezeses e que os Espanhões vinhão a conquistar a terra e outras mentiras que Gemonoxo disse aos Espanhões em Urado [...], porque quando a Nao veo a Urado, ia António Garges e seus companheiros estavam em Nangasaqui, e não estavam emtão no Meaco [...]. Certifico mais que a causa e decasião [*sic*, decisão] da morte dos frades, alem do que está ditto, elles mesmos o derão pello modo com que procederão na conversão, e esta he a verdade'.

king, Tello sent another missive informing Spain that he had incarcerated Don Luis Perez das Mariñas and Don Matias de Landecho and started investigations (*averiguaciones*) about ‘el aver aprestado y aderezado mal este navio’.¹⁷³ Both the former governor and the captain, then, were held responsible only for technical mistakes, not the way the matter had been handled in Japan.

It is beyond the author’s intentions to justify the position of any of the two opposite parties, yet it would seem that there is less acrimony in Jesuits’ documents than what we found in the Franciscan ones. On 8 September 1597,¹⁷⁴ in fact, Hideyoshi wrote again to Francisco Tello. It is an odd letter, completely different from the ones sent years before. In this one, which survives only in the Spanish translation, Hideyoshi first wrote a paragraph about the Shintoism and how the *kami* govern and affect nature and gave birth to the *go-rin*,¹⁷⁵ the five fundamental relationships upon which is based the Confucianism.¹⁷⁶ He used this part as an introduction to the core of the letter, namely how the Franciscans came to Japan and spoiled such a perfect equilibrium. The *taikō* explained that he had been pushed to condemn the Friars to death by the way they kept defying his prohibition to promulgate the Christian faith.¹⁷⁷ There is no doubt about the authenticity of this document, since we have a summary of Hideyoshi’s letter in a general account on the state of the Spanish colony of Manila, written in July 1599 by the *Audiencia de Manila*.¹⁷⁸ In other words, then, Bishop Martins’s certification is to be credited.

On the other hand, however, among the accusations made by the Minors there is also the reason why the Ignatians were spared by Hideyoshi. Following the execution of February 1597, in fact, Bishop Martins was forced to leave Japan for Macao by the Nagasaki *Bugyō* Terazawa Shima no Kami Hirotaka. At first Hideyoshi threatened to

¹⁷³ See AGI, *Filipinas 18B*, R.7, N.64, f. 2.

¹⁷⁴ In the text we find the date according to the Japanese calendar: 2nd Keichō 慶長, 7th month, 27th day.

¹⁷⁵ 五倫

¹⁷⁶ Relationship between lord and subject, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother, father and son and between friends. The latter is the only one that involves equals, but it is mentioned the least.

¹⁷⁷ The Spanish translation of Hideyoshi’s letter is in APTCJ, *Caja 102*, n.º 45 and ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [II], ff. 207^v-211^v. Cf. Gil, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-78 and Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

¹⁷⁸ See AGI, *Filipinas 18B*, R. 9, N. 122, f. 16: ‘Poco antes que Taycosama murese respondio por una carta suya al Governador destas yslas las caussas que abia tenido para crucificar los religiosos de S. Francisco que eran por aver predicado y hecho Christianos en su rreyno contra su leys y voluntad y pidio no le embiasen mas religiosos si querian durasse la paz entre estos reynos y el suyo’. In the same manuscript, we also find the answers noted down in the Spanish court. The answer to this point is quite interesting, since it shows that the Spanish monarchy was actually pushing Rome for the abrogation of the Jesuits’ monopoly established in 1585 by Pope Gregory XIII.

include all the missionaries in his condemnation, but he opted to expel ‘a todos os Padres da Companhia que estavam em Japão, exeptuando huns poucos que podia deixar em o mesmo porto de Nagasaqi, para terem conta com os Portugueses, e se continuar o comercio que elles tem em Japão’.¹⁷⁹ Eventually, eleven Jesuits out of 112 left Japan in the *soma* of a Portuguese who traded with Cambodia.¹⁸⁰ Yet, as cunningly confessed by Father Francisco Pires, the Ignatians managed to send to Macao those brethren who would be missed the less, namely two sick Fathers and nine Brothers.¹⁸¹

Once again, then, the silk trade proved to be an indestructible shield for the missionaries of the Society of Jesus. Once again, however, Hideyoshi saw fit to destroy the Jesuits’ constructions in Kyūshū. In mid-1598, the same year of the *taikō*’s demise, Terazawa put into practice Hideyoshi’s orders and burned down the seminary at Arima, 137 churches and numerous other buildings.¹⁸² Hideyoshi, however, was mainly preoccupied by the progress of the second Korean expedition, which had begun early in 1597, and so the Jesuits were left substantially in peace, whereas the Korean invasion ended not even one year later owing to the *taikō*’s death. Consequently the Japanese invasion armies were recalled home and a new phase both for Japan history and for the history of the Japan mission broke through with the ascent of Tokugawa Ieyasu.

II. 3. The Japanese Christianity and the foundation of the Tokugawa Bakufu

In September 1598 there was a rumour spreading through the streets of Nagasaki that Hideyoshi died in the first days of August, but out of caution his death was concealed. João Rodrigues, the main asset the fathers had in Hideyoshi’s headquarters, contradicted this news and wrote to his brethren that the *taikō* was only ill and he had asked him to transact the selling of 200 bales (*fardos*) of rice in order to buy a great deal

¹⁷⁹ See *Certidão do Bispo de Japão acerca do estado da christandade que nelle ha*, RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 37. See also BNCR/FGes. 1246, ff. 309-309^v.

¹⁸⁰ In 1598 there were 46 fathers and 66 brothers in Japan, more other 20 who had been sent to Macao in order to complete their studies. See *Annua de Jappão do Anno de 1598*, BL/Add. 9859, ff. 21^v-22.

¹⁸¹ See Father Francisco Pires to General Acquaviva, Macao, 2 July 1598. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 13 [I], f. 139.

¹⁸² See Cerqueira’s certificate signed on 21 February 1599 in BL/Add. 9860, f. 57. See also RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 37.

of silk. A few days later, however, the rumour was confirmed, ‘Tayco era muerto y [...] murio a 16 de Setembro de 1598’.¹⁸³

In his last days, Hideyoshi was busy in preparing the ground for his succession. In 1593, in fact, a legitimate heir, Hideyori, was born. Only two years later, Hideyoshi maybe in order to avoid fratricidal disputes upon his inheritance accused his adopted son Hidetsugu of treason, had him imprisoned and eventually killed. Although now there was only one legitimate heir, however, when Hideyoshi passed away, Hideyori was only a five-year old infant. Hideyoshi wished that after his death Japan did not fall again in the anarchy of the past years and wanted also to secure the *tenka* for his son. Hence entrusted the chief power to a board of five elders (*tairō*¹⁸⁴) chosen among the leading *daimyō* of the *taikō*’s circle: Tokugawa Ieyasu, Maeda Toshiie, Mōri Terumoto, Ukita Hideie and Uesugi Takekatsu. Moreover, Hideyoshi arranged a marriage between Hideyori and a niece of Ieyasu, who was also chosen to be protector of the infant Hideyori. To check on the five *tairō*, Hideyoshi chose amongst his own trusted officials five *bugyō* and had them cementing their connection with solemn oaths as well as a judicious distribution of offices and money.¹⁸⁵

Hideyoshi’s last decisions show clearly that one of the *tairō* stood up above the others. As wrote Valignano, he was a ‘Senhor Gentil llamado Iyeyasu, Rey de ocho Reynos, y el mas poderoso que aora ay en Japon’.¹⁸⁶ As we touched on earlier, Ieyasu built his fortune from scratch. He was born in 1543 as Matsudaira Takechiyo, son of Matsudaira Hirotada (1526-1549), lord of the Mikawa Province. He became head of the Matsudaira family in 1555. In 1566 he petitioned the court to allow him to change his family name from Matsudaira to Tokugawa, that being the name of the area whence his family originated, and changed also his name to Ieyasu. The following year, he sought and sealed an alliance with Oda Nobunaga, with whom by May 1582 he jointly annihilated the Takeda army after a decade of war. Ieyasu had the Suruga domain added

¹⁸³ See Vice-provincial Pero Gomez to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, September 1598. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 13 [I], ff. 143-144^v. As would happen often in Jesuits’ letters, this letter was closed and picked up again several times. Since it could be sent only when the monsoon allowed to do so, the Fathers could update the information they had written down. In this case, the letter was written in three different occasions.

¹⁸⁴ 大老

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Valignano, *Lettera del P. Alessandro Valignano, Visitatore della Compagnia di GIESV nel Giappone e nella Cina, de’ 10 d’Ottobre del 1599 a Reuerendo P. Clavdio Aquaviva Generale della medesima Compagnia*, p. 4 and Valignano to the Father Provincial of Portugal, Nagasaki, 20 February 1599. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, ff. 19-19^v. See also Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-180.

¹⁸⁶ See RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 19.

to his territory, which already comprised the Mikawa and the Tōtōmi provinces, and thus he became one of the prominent lords in Western Honshū.

As we already saw, afterwards Ieyasu joined with Hideyoshi instead of fighting him. In 1590, they combined forces and moved northwards to take the province of Odawara from the Hōjō family. After the victorious campaign, Hideyoshi repaid Ieyasu by suggesting the exchange the eight Hōjō provinces in the Kantō area with Ieyasu's territory. As a result, in 1590 Ieyasu became the lord of the fertile Kantō plains with an income of about 1'000'000 *koku*. He set up his new headquarters in a small fishing village that it was later called Edo and it is now known as Tōkyō. Hideyoshi's death was the last step before Ieyasu could ascend to his maximum power.

It was not long before Ieyasu gave the other *tairō* cause for complaint in making several political marriages for his sons and daughters, which had been strictly prohibited by Hideyoshi in the oath he had required from them. Moreover, only one year after *Taicosama's* death, also Maeda Toshiie, Hideyori's guardian, died and therefore Ieyasu took his place and went and stayed in the castle of Ōsaka.¹⁸⁷

As is well known, Ieyasu eventually seized the power after the battle of Sekigahara in October 1600 – ‘a Guerra dos Governadores’¹⁸⁸ – which saw the opposition of the Western front in favour of Toyotomi Hideyori against the Eastern, pro-Tokugawa faction.¹⁸⁹ For our purposes here, it is irrelevant to review the phases of the battle. Suffice it to say, that his victory was owed mainly to the treachery of generals who betrayed their cause and that Ieyasu's punishments virtually limited to three executions, among which stands up that of Konishi Yukinaga Agostinho, who considered himself bound in honour to Toyotomi Hideyori and his late father.¹⁹⁰ In addition to Agostinho, other Christian lords – Kobayakawa Hidekane at Chikugo, Oda Hidenobu at Mino and Kuroda Nagamasa at Buzen – were deprived of their lands and incomes.¹⁹¹ Fortunately for the Society of Jesus, however, not all *kirishitan daimyō* had sided with the losing faction. Both Ōmura Yoshiaki and Arima Harunobu, for instance, maintained a neutral posture during the conflict and their territories remained basically

¹⁸⁷ With regard to Ieyasu's early years, we followed the aforementioned bibliography.

¹⁸⁸ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 107^v.

¹⁸⁹ For the battle of Sekigahara see Sadler, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-146.

¹⁹⁰ According to Moran if Konishi Yukinaga had been powerful and able enough to rise above other contenders and make himself lord of the *Tenka*, it would have been possible to see the totality of Japan turned to Christianity. See Moran, *The Japanese and the Jesuits*, pp. 190-191.

¹⁹¹ See RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 37^v, Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-181 and Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-307.

untouched,¹⁹² whereas four *kirishitan daimyō* were rewarded for their support to the Eastern faction. This appears to be a clear demonstration of the fact that for the *kirishitan daimyō* the Christian faith was never an element upon which creating a closed enclave among the Japanese lords. Despite the Japanese tyrants' fear, the *kirishitan daimyō* shared only their belief, not the political aims.

Although the news of Ieyasu's victory was received not negatively by the Japanese Christendom,¹⁹³ the fathers were conscious that the most favourable scenario for them was a country without a sole and undisputed ruler.¹⁹⁴ In any case, however, the first years of Tokugawa's rule allowed them to be slightly optimistic and to send good news to their confrères at Macao.¹⁹⁵ Ieyasu, in fact, was by no means similar to Hideyoshi and he soon demonstrated so in the way he dealt with affairs regarding adjacent countries and the foreigners in Japan. Nevertheless, he did follow Hideyoshi's example in one occasion, when he sought the cooperation of the Ignatians of Nagasaki, through the service of João Rodrigues, in the management of the port. This display of benevolence towards the Society of Jesus encouraged Rodrigues to ask for the revocation of Hideyoshi's anti-Christian edicts, but Ieyasu replied that it was too early to do something against the memory of a recent dead.¹⁹⁶ At any rate, as early as December 1599, Ieyasu wrote to Terazawa at Nagasaki that he granted freedom to the Christian believers to attend to Christian rites and to live in conformity with the Western faith. Moreover, the relief received by Ieyasu's disposition gave new energy to the missionaries and the Japanese believers as well, since the flood of people to attend the mass in the Sundays was so abundant that the fathers petitioned the *bugyō* for the license to build a new and bigger church, whose construction was completed by the end

¹⁹² Notwithstanding Yoshiaki's neutrality, Ieyasu expropriated his fief, handed it over to Terazawa Hirotaka and moved Ōmura to Amakusa. Following the intervention of other *kirishitan daimyō*, however, the change was undone and Amakusa went to Hirotaka. Nevertheless, Ōmura Yoshiaki was forced to abdicate in favour of his son, Sumiyori. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], ff. 73-73^v and Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

¹⁹³ See *Copia da carta escrita em Nangazaqui porto de Japam ao N. R. em Christo Padre em 25 de 8bro de 1600*, BA/JÁ Cód. 49-IV-59, ff. 5-5^v.

¹⁹⁴ See BPE, Cód. CXV/2-7, ff. 121-121^v: 'Queira Nosso Senhor que tudo redunde em bem desta sua Igreja, como esperamos que redundara polla experiencia que ha que quando ha guerras sempre os padres achão a colheyta el alguns senhores e assi nunca a christandade deixa de ir por diante, o que não he quando ha hum senhor absoluto, o qual se he auerso a ley de Deus, a toda a christandade da trabalho como se uio em Taycô'.

¹⁹⁵ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 149.

¹⁹⁶ See Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 180. Notwithstanding the measures took by Ieyasu in the early 1600s in favour of the Christian faith, in 1604 Father Francesco Pasio was sure that the edict would never be revoked, although he was more open-minded than Hideyoshi. See BL/Add. 9860 f. 89. 'Por nenhum caso quer [Ieyasu] revocar o edito de Tayco em que prohibio que os Japoens se não convertam a nossa Sancta fé posto que por vezes tem dito de palavra, que como se não fizerem Christãos Senhores grandes, dos mais se lhe mando nada'.

of 1601.¹⁹⁷ In 1602, moreover, it was established a new seminar in Arima, after the one founded by Valignano was destroyed upon Hideyoshi's order. In Nagasaki, on the other hand, opened a smaller seminar dedicated to the teaching of the Western arts.¹⁹⁸ To better understand the proportions of the Japan Vice-province, however, it would be useful to provide some numbers.

In the year of the foundation of the Tokugawa *bakufu*, the Society of Jesus had in Japan 53 fathers and 66 brothers, for a total of 119 Jesuits. They maintained about 900 persons,¹⁹⁹ as well as two colleges, one in Nagasaki and the other in Arima, a probationary house in *Todos os Santos* near Nagasaki, the two seminars in Nagasaki and Arima, twenty-one residences²⁰⁰ and 190 churches scattered throughout Japan.²⁰¹ By 1609 the numbers were not that different. If, on the one hand, the Jesuits total number augmented up to 132 and the residences were now thirty, on the other hand the number of colleges and probationary house remained unaltered, whereas the small seminar in Nagasaki was closed.²⁰²

In the first quarter of the 17th century, namely from 1600 to 1618, the number of the Japan Jesuit fluctuated from a minimum of 107 units in 1601 to a maximum of 138 missionaries in 1607.²⁰³ With the exceptions of the two extremes, the number of the missionaries remained rather constant, although starting from 1609 it is evident a descending pattern that would culminate in 1614 with the departure for Macao and

¹⁹⁷ See *Annua do Jappão de 1600*, BA/Add. 9859, ff. 97-100^v. The church was financed also by the alms of local Christians. It was projected to be 45 meters long and 25 meters wide. The Jesuits churches in Japan from the 17th century onwards were designed to divide up the women and the men in two separate zones, which was a solution 'muy bien recebida delos Jappones'. The *Carta de Japão de fevereiro de 1601 até Outubro do mesmo anno* reads that the church ended to be bigger than expected, notwithstanding impediments due to Nagasaki's geography: 'alem de se acreçentar a traça que se escreveo trinta e quatro palmos de compridão por quatro, faltava lugar pela parte do mar pera se estender o edificio por causa de hum precipicio que desse athe a praya foi necessario fazer huma grande fabrica de madeira groça com que se alevantasse o lugar athe ficar igual com o outro; he esta fabrica de tres sobrados sobre as quaes se edificou a capella mayor, e a sachristia de huma parte e da outra hum sala igual aella com duas tribunas ensima dellas com que ficou todo este edificio pela parte de mar muy alto, e fermosos [...]. Em toda a obra deste templo derão sempre as sua custa os officiais e obreiros necessarios. E alem dos dous mil crusados que primero se aiuntarão derão alguns christãos deste povo mais de outros seis centos'. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 50, ff. 180^v-181.

¹⁹⁸ See *Annua do Jappão de 1602*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, ff. 77^v-79^v.

¹⁹⁹ See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Macao, 8 October 1603. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 131.

²⁰⁰ The 1603-annual report reads nineteen residences. Cf. Pasio, *Tre lettere Annve del Giappone de gli anni 1603, 1604, 1605 e parte del 1606 mandate dal P. Francesco Pasio V. Prouinciale di quelle parti al M. R. P. Claudio Acquaiua Generale della Compagnia di Giesv*, p. 24.

²⁰¹ See RAH/Cor. 9/2665, ff. 38^v-39.

²⁰² See Rodrigues Giram, *Lettera Annva del Giappone del 1609 e 1610 scritta al M. R. P. Clavdio Acqvaviva Generale della Compagnia di Giesv dal P. Giovan Rodriguez Girano*, p. 11.

²⁰³ Be it noted that the highest recorder number of Jesuits presence in Japan is 142 in 1591.

Manila of seventy-three missionaries. (See Table 3 and Chart 2) It is remarkable that after the peak in 1607, the number kept dropping until the big rupture in 1614. This trend is most likely ascribable to the particular juncture of Japan and Asian history, like, for instance, the incident regarding André Pessoa in 1610, which will be coping with later. Such events not only carried with them important political consequences, but rebounded heavily also on the finances of the missions, thus causing its slowdown both in terms of growth and with respect to actual means of support.

At any rate, the 1600s represented a positive decade for the mission. From the point of view of the Christendom, in fact, the missionaries felt the relief of Hideyoshi's death. Although *Taicosama* did not enforce his decree in 1587, he sent to death twenty-six believers only ten years later. He represented a constant menace and there was no chance whatsoever of achieving the dream of Japan as a Christian country with Hideyoshi holding the sceptre of power. It is almost certain that the Fathers had long abandoned such dream and Ieyasu's rising did not summon it back, in particular after the establishment of the new *bakufu* in 1603.²⁰⁴ The Spanish Jesuit Pedro Morejón, in fact, in January 1603 blatantly wrote to the general that Ieyasu 'aunque por sus intereses y por el provecho que a sus reinos viene de la comunicacion de estrangeros disimula con nuestras cosas y alas vezes muestra buen rostro y amistad mas en su interior es averso totalente por ser aficionado a sus sectas y por esta causa estima sus bonços y renueva los templos caidos con las guerras pasadas',²⁰⁵. At any rate, however, if the state of uncertainty they used to live in under Hideyoshi was not gone before 1604, the events of that year made them ideally come back to the confident state of things of the early 1580s.

²⁰⁴ See *Copia da Carta pera Nosso Padre Geral em que se conta o succedido em Japão desde Janeiro de 1603, athe Setembro do mesmo anno, e da conversão de mais de quatro mil Christãos de novo*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, ff. 115-115^v.


²⁰⁵ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 114.

Table 3
JESUITS IN JAPAN 1600-1618

	<i>FATHERS</i>	<i>BROTHERS</i>	TOTAL
<i>1600</i>	48	72	123
<i>1601</i>	?	?	107
<i>1602</i>	53	76	129
<i>1603</i>	53	66	119
<i>1604</i>	63	60	123
<i>1605</i>	61	60	121
<i>1606</i>	63	61	124
<i>1607</i>	63	75	138
<i>1608</i>	63	76	139
<i>1609</i>	63	71	134
<i>1610</i>	69	69	138
<i>1611</i>	64	63	127
<i>1612</i>	62	60	122
<i>1613</i>	64	54	118
<i>1614</i>	64	52	116
<i>1615</i>	18	9	27
<i>1616</i>	24	9	33
<i>1617</i>	24	7	31
<i>1618</i>	25	8	33

Sources: 1601 – *IHSJJ*, pp. 324-327 and pp. 348-350; BL/Add. 9859, ff. 97-97^v; BA/JA, *Cód. 49-IV-59*, f. 77^v, f. 288^v and f. 390^v; *Tre lettere Annve del Giappone de gli anni 1603, 1604, 1605 e parte del 1606*, p. 24; *Lettera Annva del Giappone del 1609 e 1610*, p. 11; RAH/Cor. 9/2679, ff. 10-10^v; ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 104 and f. 177; ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 115 and ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 84.

**Chart 2: Trend of Jesuits presence in Japan
1600-1614**



Source: *IHSJJ*, pp. 324-327.

Ieyasu had a keen interest for the foreign affairs. As wrote by Morejón, he showed a tolerant face towards Christianity due to his interest in the incomes from the silk trade with Macao. In order to keep the *trato* running smoothly, *Daifusama*²⁰⁶ opted to entrust his investment to Father João Rodrigues. The strict connection between the Ignatians and the silk trade may have not included the Christian faith within the religions sponsored by Japan, but it did lead Ieyasu to grant the fathers licenses to reside freely in Miyako, Ōsaka, Nagasaki, Takaku and Ōmura.²⁰⁷ In that year, Ieyasu received the dignity of *sei-i tai-shōgun*,²⁰⁸ by Go-Yōzei *tennō* and in the Jesuits' chronicles he started to be called *Cubo* – *kubō* – or *Cubo-sama*.²⁰⁹

Between 1603 and 1604, Father João Rodrigues often went to visit the *Cubo* at his residence at Fushimi in order to discuss matters inherent the trade. As we will see later, the involvement in the commerce with Macao, in fact, needed a lot of attention and carefulness. It had to be handled by a capable man who enjoyed the trust of the Japanese, both the officers and traders. Between 1597 and 1608 that man was the Portuguese Rodrigues, commonly known by his nickname *Tçuzu*.²¹⁰ In addition to all the literature against the involvement of the clergy in commercial activity, the participation in the *trato da seda* represented both a benediction and a danger for the Japan Jesuits. In the 1600s, however, it was mostly the former.

In 1602, the year Spinola got to Japan, the *pancada* may not have been a very profitable one both for the Macanese merchants and for Japanese. The *feitor*, in fact, experienced great difficulty in disposing of the cargo of raw silk. On the one hand, the Japanese merchants at Nagasaki complained that the prices asked by the Portuguese were too high, whereas, as a consequence, the *feitor* complained that the market price was far too low. The merchants of Miyako brought the dispute to the notice of Tokugawa Ieyasu, accusing some of the Portuguese inhabitants of Nagasaki and did not

²⁰⁶ From the Japanese court title *daifu* 内府 which Ieyasu owned before becoming *shōgun*. The word *daifu*, also read *naifu*, is the abbreviation of *naidaijin* 内大臣, Minister of the Centre.

²⁰⁷ *Ivi*, f. 114^v.

²⁰⁸ 征夷大將軍, literally the general who subdued the barbarians.

²⁰⁹ 公方様. For the interpretation of the title by the Ignatians see BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-59*, f. 113^v and BL/Add. 9860, f. 87.

²¹⁰ The word *Tçuzu* is most likely the transliteration of the Japanese word *tsūji* 通辞, interpreter. During the *Edo Jidai*, this title was assigned in particular to those who carried out interpreting services between Japanese and foreign merchants at Hirado and Nagasaki. Rodrigues, in fact, was not the only *tsūji*. There was also the *tō-tsūji* 唐通辞, who handled bargains between Japanese and the Chinese community, and, further on in the 17th century, the *oranda-tsūji* オランダ通辞.

forget to include the Ignatians in their complaints. Ieyasu ordered an investigation to be made. Jesuits sources do not go much into the details of the matter, yet it would seem that thanks to João Rodrigues' diplomatic skill and rhetoric everything was put to rest and the Jesuits came away from the meeting reinforced.²¹¹ Rodrigues, in fact, did not conduct the negotiations alone. He went to Fushimi with Murayama Tōan António, a leading Christian convert.²¹² Through the combined activities of the Rodrigues and Murayama, Ieyasu decided to remove Terazawa Hirotaka from the office of Nagasaki *bugyō* and entrusted the municipal government of the port to a council of four headmen – ‘melhores Christãos que aqui ha’²¹³ – under the chairmanship of Tōan as *daikan*.²¹⁴ It would seem that Ieyasu invited the five of them that they sought the advice of the Fathers when facing matters of great importance.²¹⁵ As part of the settlement, Ieyasu decreed that the leading merchants of Sakai, who were the principal purchasers of Chinese raw silk at this period, should buy up the raw silk and certain categories of woven silk in bulk at fixed prices, for subsequent re-sale and distribution to other Japanese silk merchants. This system (called by the Japanese *ito-wappu seido*²¹⁶) was soon extended to include the Miyako and Nagasaki merchants and then successively to those of Edo and Ōsaka. Certain varieties of the best woven and patterned silks were to be reserved for purchase by the *shōgun* at his local representative's valuation, at that time Father João Rodrigues. Although it was a great honour to represent *Cubosama*, in the 1610s dealing with the *shōgun*'s share of silver or silk turned out to be a liability too difficult to handle and was sanctioned by Acquaviva himself. Anyway, with the exception of better fabrics reserved for Ieyasu, the silk import trade now became the monopoly of the mercantile group operated by the leading silk merchants from the five shogunal cities of Edo, Kyōto, Ōsaka, Sakai and Nagasaki. These purchased the cargo in bulk from the Portuguese at Nagasaki and then divided the raw and manufactured silks among themselves and their associates.²¹⁷

²¹¹ Cf. Cooper, *Rodrigues, O Intérprete*, pp. 206-207.

²¹² Murayama Tōan was born at Nagoya of humble parents. He was baptized at Nagasaki, where he displayed commercial acumen and aptitude for European dishes.

²¹³ See BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-59*, f. 118^v.

²¹⁴ 代官, commissioner or magistrate.

²¹⁵ See Vice-provincial Pasio to Viceroy Aires Saldanha, Nagasaki, 24 February 1604. BL/Add. 9860, f. 87.

²¹⁶ 糸割符制度

²¹⁷ See Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 57-59.

In any case, between 1603 and 1604 the Society of Jesus became once again officially influent in the government of Nagasaki. Yet, to the reinvigorated political influence did not correspond a factual improvement of the general conditions of the mission. This happened especially for two reasons, which shared a common ground: the scarcity of incomes and the foreign competition, both in commercial and religious terms.

II. 4. The end of the *Padroado*'s monopoly: religious and commercial competition in Japan

As we saw, Ieyasu's behaviour during the first years of his rule could not but inspire optimism in the Ignatians. As a matter of fact, they saw how their involvement in the silk trade with Macao held in check the Japanese rulers, who did not seem to notice that even without the fathers, Portuguese ships would have come to Japanese ports nonetheless. In the aftermath of the Nagasaki's martyrdom, the fathers were of the opinion that using the annual voyage as leverage over Hideyoshi would be a way to regain his favour. The *taikō* was in need of funds in order to finance the second Korean War and to repair the damages delivered by the earthquakes. At the same time, he abruptly interrupted the negotiations with the Chinese envoys and leveled cutting remarks at the Spaniards in the Philippines. Consequently, the Ignatians thought that he could not afford to lose also the liaison with Macao, if not for economic reasons at least for his dominion over the country, because 'se alevantara Japão contra elle se faltar a nao'.²¹⁸

It has been correctly stated, in fact, that if the Japanese would have realized sooner that they held in their hands the fate of the Portuguese settlement of Macao, the history of the Japan mission of the Society of Jesus would have been much shorter than a century. In the 1600s, however, things started to get worse owing to European competitors in Asia.

²¹⁸ See Bishop Pedro Martins to the King's Chaplain Major, Nagasaki, 23 February 1597. BL/Add. 9860, ff. 23-23^v.

II. 4. 1. Japan and the Philippines: commercial and religious exchanges

Soon after Hideyoshi's death, Ieyasu took up negotiations with Manila. In 1597, in fact, he sent a *shuinsen* to Manila in order to negotiate a commercial route between his fief and *Nueva España*. The envoy he sent, a Japanese called Gorōiemon, did not come back to Japan as he was supposed to, thus Ieyasu was forced to send another messenger in 1599 to seek out what happened to him.²¹⁹ Yet, Ieyasu also wanted to intermediate with Manila about an annual voyage from the Philippines to the Japanese Eastern region of Kantō and about Ieyasu's wishes to improve both Japanese shipbuilding and mining enginery. In exchange to a stable commercial route, Tokugawa Ieyasu stated he would tolerate the presence of the Franciscans.²²⁰ The envoy Ieyasu sent in search of Gorōiemon was, in fact, not Japanese. His name was Jerónimo de Jesus and he was a Lisbon-born Friar Minor.

Fray Jerónimo de Jesus disembarked in Kuchinotsu in July 1598. After he managed to elude the Japanese authorities, he secretly moved to the island of Honshū, where Ieyasu got wind of his presence and sent for him. In addition to sending envoys to Manila, as a result of the meeting Ieyasu allowed the Friar to stay in Japan. On 30 May 1599, a church was inaugurated at Edo and sometime later Jerónimo de Jesus embarked for Manila.²²¹ The Friar's mission in the Philippines resulted to be quite successful. On 5 July, in fact, the *Real Hacienda* granted him 'quatro cientos pesos [...] para comprar ciertas cosas porque se acordó llevase al rreyno del Xapon para presentar al gobernador del y alos criados de cerca de su persona conforme ala orden pues se le dio'.²²² Furthermore, on 15 May 1601, another 400 *pesos* were issued so that Fray Jerónimo may 'tratar de asentar las pazes entre aquel Reyno y estas Islas',²²³ something considered of extreme importance by the Spaniards. Both Manila and Edo, then, wanted peaceful and regular connections. To the improvement of the diplomatic contacts

²¹⁹ See *Treslado de hum cap. de huma carta que do Miaco escreveo a António Garçes huma pessoa daquelle Corte, na qual vinha em substancia a carta que Daifu Sama manda aos Luções por frej Jerónjmo o teor da qual em letra de Japão he o seguinte*, in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], f. 213.

²²⁰ Cf. Takase, 十七世紀初頭におけるわが国のスペイン貿易について, p. 10 and Arcos, "The Philippine Colonial Elite and the Evangelization of Japan", p. 81.

²²¹ See Fujita, *Japan's Encounter with Christianity*, p. 152 and RAH/Cor. 9/2679, ff. 1-1^v.

²²² See AGI, *Contaduria* 1205, f. 265^v. Cf. Gil, *Hidalgos y Samurai*, pp. 80-81.

²²³ See AGI, *Filipinas* 19, R. 2, N. 21, f. 2.

corresponded the increase in Japanese trading vessels at Manila²²⁴ and the foundation of new Franciscan residences in Ieyasu's territories.

Of course, the news of Ieyasu's interest in having the Spaniards in his land was not confined to his inner circle. In October 1598, in fact, Valignano wrote to the rector of the college of Manila, Juan de Ribera, that the whole idea of a trans-Pacific trade between the Kantō and New Spain was inspired by Fray Jerónimo de Jesus.²²⁵ Be that as it may, Ieyasu's desire to open official commercial liaisons between the two countries was rather strong. He was worried that owing to the *wakō*'s incursions, he would not receive a positive answer from Manila. Hence, he followed Hideyoshi's example and commissioned the Nagasaki *Bugyō* Terazawa and the *daimyō* of Higo and Amakusa, Dom Agostinho, to seize all the pirates they could find in their territories. Subsequently:

'[P]or orden de Terazauandono fueron embiados todos a Miaco presos y en llegando ay los mandaron crucificar a todos parte en la ciudad de Ozaca, parte en la ciudad de Fuximi. Mandando Dayfusama dizir a Fr. Jeronimo que fuesse ver la justicia que el mandava hazer delos cossarios y que lo escribiesse al governador delos Luçones. [...] Y no contento, mando tambien Terazauandono un su criado pera que mandasse crucificar [...] todas las [...] mugeres y hijos delos que fueron crucificados en Fuximi y en Ozaca, que fueron quarenta y tantos y las mugeres y niños que se avian de justiciar en Nangassaqui eran sincoenta y tres'.²²⁶

Although in the end innocent wives and sons were not executed along with their fathers, Valignano could not help but to reprimand Jerónimo de Jesus for his recklessness in promising such things to Ieyasu without considering all the consequences. It was predictable, in fact, that Ieyasu would embark on a campaign of cleansing the seas in order to lure Spanish vessels to his ports. As the entrepreneur that he was, Valignano was not only worried about the fate of innocent Japanese. He had to take care not only of the Christendom, but also of the missionaries who were able to keep on with the evangelization of Japan only through the incomes of the silk trade. The Italian Jesuit was sure that the Spanish competition against the Portuguese went to nobody's advantage, because the Japanese mercantile community could and would not receive more than an established quantity of silk textiles. As the facts will demonstrate, in fact,

²²⁴ For the *Real Hacienda*'s accounts of 1599 see AGI, *Contaduría 1205*, ff. 91-92^v. There are recorded four ships that paid the custom house duties (*derechos de almojarifazgo*) for a total of 74 *pesos*, 1 *tomín* and 11 *granos* of common gold. The fund had been thoroughly studied by Juan Gil. See Gil, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-107.

²²⁵ See Visitor Valignano to Rector Juan de Ribera, Shiki, 22 October 1598. ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 13 [III]*, f. 351.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

the arrival of silk also from Manila had the only predictable result of inflating the selling prices.

At any rate, Valignano stated that Japanese scarce demand for silk was the reason why in the last twelve years the Macanese had opted to deliver the ship only once every two years.²²⁷ As a matter of fact, between 1586 and 1598 the Great Ship finalized the voyage only in five occasions (1588, 1590, 1593, 1596 and 1598). The remaining eight voyages basically ended in two ways, either the Great Ship wintered in Japan twice, as happened in 1586 and 1591 due to Hideyoshi's wars in Kyūshū and in Korea, or the annual voyage did not actually take place for several reasons (1587, 1589, 1592, 1594, 1595 and 1597).²²⁸

As can be noted, then, what stated by Valignano is not exactly true. He was right however in writing that the market was not as absorbent as to receive many carracks laden with textiles. The Macanese and the Jesuits had the confirmation of that when Hideyoshi confiscated the cargo of the *San Felipe* back in 1596. It would seem, in fact, that the Spanish vessel's 'hazienda era mucha, y la mesma que los Portugueses llevan a Jappon',²²⁹ which led us ask whether it was really an accident or the vessel wrecked in Japan by design. Be that as it may, the confiscation had bad consequences for the Portuguese trade also for the immediate future: in 1596 there was a strong drop in sales, in 1597 there was no official voyage to Japan and for 1598 the predictions were not optimistic.²³⁰

²²⁷ *Ibid*: 'Jappon no es capaz de dos naves, ni aun de una cada anno. Y assi vimos por experiencia que de doze annos a esta parte se dexaron de hazer seis viagens, o porque las naves quedaron invernando aqui por no poder despachar sus mercaderias, o porque aunque las despacharon, las vendieron tan mal y quedo Jappon tan falto dellas, que volviendo las naos a Macao, entendieron los de aquella Ciudad que se perderian se hiziessen luego otras viagens, y por esto dexaron de hazer seis, no viniendo mas que de dos en dos annos nave'.

²²⁸ In 1587 and 1597 the missing voyages were due to Hideyoshi's military endeavor in Kyūshū and the execution of the 26 martyrs. In 1589, it was because of the death of the Captain Major Jerónimo Pereira and the decision about who was to substitute him was not made on time. In 1592, the cause was probably Hideyoshi's Korean campaign. In 1594, the Captain Major Dom Francisco de Sá wrecked in Achem. Finally, the 1595 voyage failed for unknown reasons. Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 43-53. In order to obviate to the loss due to missing voyages, on 10 November 1610 an *alvará* was issued declaring that if a Captain Major wintered in Macao despite there were the conditions to make the voyage, he would be deprived of the patent for the voyage itself. See *APO VI*, pp. 848-849.

²²⁹ See BNCR/FGes. 1246, f. 303.

²³⁰ See Visitor Valignano to the Provincial of the Philippines Raimondo Prado, Macao, 19 November 1597. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 62': 'Aqui [Macao] tambien se hallaron en harta necesidad porque los Portugueses como tuvieron tan grande baxa en sus haciendas el año passado [1596] con las haciendas que Taycosama tomo alos Castellanos y este año no pudieron hazer su viaje y para el año que viene [1598] conforme alas nuevas que vinieron tambien no salira muy provechosa por las mesmas haciendas que la mesma nao llevaba de que Japon quedo lleno'.

For the Spaniards, however, the situation was rather different. They were finally able to send their ships and their missionaries to Japan. Although European and papal laws prohibited this “invasion” into Portuguese territory, the Japanese were more willing to let them pass and exchange goods with them and between 1600 and 1602 an epistolary exchange took place between Japan and Manila.

In October 1601, Terazawa Shima no Kami Hirotaka, who acted in Ieyasu’s stand, wrote to the Spanish governor in order to determine the number of mercantile vessels that could go back and forth between the two countries. The *bugyō* wanted also to know why Ieyasu’s request of opening the trans-Pacific trade was not dignified with an answer.²³¹ Acuña, who came on duty in 1602, answered back in June. He wrote two letters, one to Terazawa and the other to Ieyasu himself.²³² Firstly he stated that, although he had just being appointed, he was eager to comply with everything Ieyasu might wish for. Nevertheless, he informed Ieyasu that although the viceroy in Mexico had already been informed of Ieyasu’s request, they were still waiting for an answer. On the other hand, however, he stated Manila’s decision of limiting the number of *shuinsen* to six, ‘tres en cada monçion’. He entrusted his letter along with ‘un regalillo de menudencias de Castilla’ (a mirror) to a group of fifteen fathers and begged Ieyasu to favor and treat them well.²³³ Eventually, then, the religious monopoly of the Society of Jesus in Japan was definitely infringed. Moreover, in 1604 arrived in Manila and in Japan the brief issued by Pope Clemens VIII, which allowed the mendicant orders to go to Japan, provided that they passed through the Portuguese India. The brief was immediately contested by the fathers belonging to the *patroazgo*, namely by the fathers superiors of the Friars Minors, the Predicators and the Augustinian, who claimed that the pontiff was misinformed and thus sent to Rome two procurators in order to provide Clemens VIII of all the information he lacked.²³⁴ Eventually, on 8 November 1608, Pope Paul V, also in consequence of how the Inquisition in Goa interfered with – and mistreated – non-Portuguese missionaries, granted permission to members of the

²³¹ See AGI, *Filipinas* 19, R. 3, N. 36.

²³² Cf. Gil, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-88.

²³³ See AGI, *Filipinas* 19, R. 3, N. 35.

²³⁴ Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 41^v.

mendicant orders to follow any route they chose to the Indies.²³⁵ Two years later, Acquaviva wrote to Francesco Pasio in order to definitely close the matter:

‘Como Sua Santidade tinha concedido, a instancia del Rei, que possão estes religiosos passar das Philipinas a Japão e estar nelle e Sua Magestade tenha metido a mão neste negocio, e procurado com tanta efficacia que o Papa revogasse o breve, alem disto que estes religiosos tenham auido licença do Ogosho²³⁶ para residirem e fazerem casas em Japão, parece que N. Senhor se quer tambem servir delles nessas partes, e assi julgamos que nem cá nem lá se deva daqui em diante fazer officio nenhum em contrario’.²³⁷

In any case, even before 1608 it was actually impossible for the Jesuits or the bishop to prevent the mendicants from coming to Japan, since now they enjoyed a sort of political protection, or at least, some of Japanese southern *daimyō* felt that they could exploit the mendicant orders in order to obtain shares of the brand new trade with Manila. Furthermore, Ieyasu’s attitude towards the Christian faith did not change because of the new missionaries. The Jesuits and the mendicant orders were essentially realist regarding this point.²³⁸ In 1603, Father Pasio wrote again that the *shōgun* ‘aunque no es nada affeçionado, antes averso a nuestra Santa ley, con todo esso no nos persigue, y con aver dicho que no quiere que la gente noble se haga christianas nunca hizo sobre esso examen, ni inquisiçion alguna’.²³⁹ Still, the general tone of the Italian Jesuit’s letter is rather optimistic one, with only an exception: the financial problems of the mission, which are strictly correlated with the topic of the next chapter.

As a matter of fact, it was not only the religious monopoly of the Ignatians that fell in the first years of the 17th century. The turn of the century forms a turning point in the history of the Macao-Nagasaki trade in more than one aspect. Firstly, this is the year that saw Ieyasu emerging victorious from the struggle for supremacy at Sekigahara. Secondly, the Protestant made their first appearance in Japan with the arrival, on 1 April, of the Dutch ship *Liefde* in Bungo.²⁴⁰

²³⁵ Cf. Dunne, *Generation of Giants – The Story of the Jesuits in China in the Last Decades of the Ming Dynasty*, p. 235.

²³⁶ *Ōgosho* 大御所, retired *shōgun*, it is the titled assumed by Tokugawa Ieyasu after he abdicated to his son Hidetada in 1605.

²³⁷ See General Acquaviva to Vice-provincial Pasio, Rome, 1 January 1610. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, f. 36.

²³⁸ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 114^v.

²³⁹ See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 3 October 1604. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 129.

²⁴⁰ With regard to the Dutch’s fleet journey see Corr, *Adams, The pilot. The Life and Times of Captain William Adams 1564-1620*, pp. 23-37.

II. 4. 2. Dutch and English in Japan

The end of the 16th century witnessed two important developments in the history of Japan: the unification of the country by Hideyoshi and a significant expansion of Japanese activities, legitimate and otherwise, in Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Thanks to Hideyoshi's unification, Japanese maritime commerce was now carried only in ships that received an official license by the ruler, therefore called *go-shuin-sen*. The *shuin-sen* system was inaugurated by Hideyoshi in 1592 and lasted for more than forty years, although until the first quarter of the 17th century it was not rare to see Japanese ships without the *shuin-jō* in foreign ports.²⁴¹

The *shuin-jō* system was established as a further way for Hideyoshi to keep track of the overseas commerce. As a matter of fact, it would seem that those who received the official license to trade abroad, were not pioneers of such voyages, but experience men who were part of an already established commerce.²⁴² In October 1602, however, at the request of Don Lupo de Ulloa, the captain of the second Spanish vessel wrecked at Tosa heading for New Spain, Ieyasu issued a *shuin-jō* for the community of foreigners in Japan:

‘Se algum navio de estrangeiros por causa de algum temporal vier a qualquer Reino ou porto de Japão, mandamos que de nenhuma qualidade lhe seja tomado nada das suas fazendas que trouxerem no Navio.

Item, rigurosamente proibimos que na compra e venda das fazendas, que em seu navio trouxerem não seja feita força alguma. E se lhes não vier bem estarem no porte, onde o navio entrou se poderão passar a qualquer otro onde quizerem os mercadores do dito navio, e ahi comprar e vender livremente.

Item en universal mandamos que os estrangeiros possam habitar em Japão em qualquer parte que elles quizerem, mas rigurosamente lhes proibimos a promulgação de sua ley. Dado na nona luna no septimo anno era Queichó, helo vermelho real a Dom Pedro de Acunha’.²⁴³

It is important to stress again Ieyasu's posture toward Christianity, which in this case was no different from the one assumed by Hideyoshi back in 1587. It is probable, however, that Ieyasu included this item in the license in order to keep the number of

²⁴¹ For a study with regard to the *shuin-sen* see Peri, “Essai sur les Relations du Japon et de l’Indochine aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles”, pp. 1-104.

²⁴² See Peri, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

²⁴³ See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 165. Another version in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], f. 238. A Spanish translation in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [I], f. 3.

missionaries to a minimum and to be sure nobody would misinterpret his small amount of tolerance for an actual opening to the foreign religion.

Another point of interest in the license is the fact that although issued upon request of the Spaniards, it was addressed to the foreigners in a broad sense. In April 1600, in fact, the Dutch ship *Liefde* arrived at Bungo. The ship had left Rotterdam as part of a fleet of five ships in June 1598. The fleet attempted to reach Asia passing through the Strait of Magellan, which it managed to surpass only in September 1599 and with several casualties. Only a ship, the *Liefde*, managed to enter the Pacific Ocean. When the vessel reached Japan months later, of the original 110 men of the crew only 24 were still alive, though in really bad physical condition.²⁴⁴ Thus, the first Dutch ship in Japan was not the result of a well-conceived plan, rather a fortuitous event. In any case, however, it was good news neither for the Portuguese traders nor for the missionaries of the *Padroado*.

Alessandro Valignano punctually expressed his preoccupation with regard to the Dutch and English progress in Orient. In particular, he was worried that the North Europeans could teach the Japanese use of artillery.²⁴⁵ Valignano could not possibly know, but in that very day, Ieyasu made use of the artillery seized from the *Liefde* at the battle of Sekigahara.²⁴⁶ Although there are some doubts about the truthfulness of this last information,²⁴⁷ Ieyasu actually seized both the weapons and other useful things he found aboard. Additionally, the reality of facts surpassed Valignano's fear. It appears, in fact, that the Dutch not only taught the Japanese how to use artillery, but went even further. It is known that Tokugawa Ieyasu since his first contacts with the Spaniards had sought in Manila not only first-hand knowledge of direct navigation between Japan and New Spain, but also co-operation in the mining sector. In 1609, he asked the former Spanish Governor Don Rodrigo de Vivero, who was en route for Acapulco but suspiciously ended up in Japan, for fifty mining experts veterans of the Mexican deposits, 'because they were unable to exploit many rich mines as they did not know

²⁴⁴ See Corr, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-34, Totman, *Tokugawa Ieyasu Shogun*, pp. 14-16 and *Informação sobre a entrada dos Olandezes em Iapam e sobre algumas cousas que depois socederão. Feita em Janeiro de 1615*, ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], f. 220.

²⁴⁵ See Visitor Valignano to the Assistant of Portugal João Álvares, Nagasaki, 20 October 1600. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 27.

²⁴⁶ Cf. Diogo do Couto, *Décadas da Ásia*, XII-V-2, *apud* Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, p. 302.

²⁴⁷ See Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 302, n. 101.

how to advantageously extract the metals from them'.²⁴⁸ Years later, the Spaniards provided the *bakufu* of engineers in order to improve the Japanese 'fabrica de navios d'alto bordo' and offered also Spanish officers who could teach the Japanese how to fuse artillery.²⁴⁹ It appears that the *bakufu* forwarded similar request also to the Dutch, and presumably to the Portuguese, although according to Jesuits sources, the Lusitans always held back such knowledge in order to preserve their indispensability within the country. Be that as it may, by 1612 in Japan there were already foundries managed by Japanese but supervised by the Dutch.²⁵⁰ It is clear that both the Dutch and the Spaniards decided to take advantage of this gap left by the Portuguese. They saw this as an opportunity to gain respect in the eyes of the Japanese to the detriment of the Portuguese, who were, therefore, giving up their economic and cultural monopoly.²⁵¹

Anyway, when the *Liefde* arrived the situation was rather different. As we said, the vessel was not bound for Japan. After the news of its arrival reached Nagasaki, also Bishop Cerqueira wrote a letter to inform the Curia. He wrote Claudio Acquaviva that 'huma nao Olandesa de Vaçallos da Raynha de Inglaterra veo com quasi toda a gente morta aportar a Bungo. Mas Dayfu lhe tomou o fato e a mesma nao [...]. Trazia muitas munições e pretendia ir a Sunda ajuntar-se com outros que ali forão carregar de speciaria'.²⁵² This paragraph by Cerqueira is only apparently confused. Among the survivors of the crew, in fact, there was also William Adams, 'piloto [...], grande official e matematico e herege',²⁵³ as Valentim Carvalho described him – most likely the best known English in early modern Japan. Since it was with him that Ieyasu had long interviews, that seems to be the reason why Cerqueira wrote the ship belonged to England. At any rate, the castaways were allowed to settle in Japan and Adams would progressively rise in Ieyasu's *privaça*.

Despite the problems and the loss of influence within the shogunal court that the Ignatians would suffer owing to Adams and the Dutch in general, by the begin of the

²⁴⁸ Cf. Arcos, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85. Cf. Gil. *Hidalgos y Samurai*, p. 178 and pp. 186-188.

²⁴⁹ Cf. Bishop Cerqueira to King Filipe II, Nagasaki, October 1613. RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 259^v.

²⁵⁰ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], f. 221. For Hollanders and English it was common to include pieces of artillery in the gifts they presented to the Tokugawa. Cf. Boxer, *Jan Compagnie in Japan, 1600-1850. An essay on the cultural, artistic and scientific influence exercised by the Hollanders in Japan from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries*, pp. 26-27.

²⁵¹ Cf. Costa, *O Japão e o Cristianismo no Século XVI*, pp. 81-82.

²⁵² See Bishop Cerqueira to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 22 October 1600. BPE, *Cód. CXV/2-7*, n.º 17, f. 121.

²⁵³ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], f. 220.

17th century the arrival of the Dutch in Asia created in particular economic problems, but to understand that we have to go back briefly to the European state of affairs.

For the Portuguese kingdom, being under the Habsburg Crown meant also being forced to abandon its policy of neutrality in European conflicts. Moreover, Portugal traditional allies, England and the Netherlands, suddenly became enemies. Starting from the 1580s, the ships of the *Carreira da Índia* began to be the target of English corsairs. In 1585, in fact, the last Tudor monarch, Elizabeth I and her ministers agreed on open war with Spain. They considered the Azores archipelago to be the point to pillage both Spanish and Portuguese vessels in their return route and the trend continued also in the 1590s, as Carlo Spinola's voyage proves. It is commonly accepted, in fact, that the end of the century is when began the crisis of the *Carreira* and that the direct and indirect consequences of English and Dutch privateering and competition were the main causes of that crisis.²⁵⁴

The Netherlands, on their part, maintained an ambiguous attitude with respect to the Iberian crowns. In 1585, after the seizure of Antwerp, King Filipe I decided to place a (not so rigorous) embargo on Dutch ships and goods in Spain and Portugal in order to crush the rebels' resistance, but he was forced to lift it in the 1590s due to provision difficulties.²⁵⁵ For the United Provinces that decade represented a time of economic growth and military expansion. In order to respond to the Iberian embargos, in fact, they were forced to seek direct routes for accessing colonial wealth. Whilst the first voyage to the Western African coast is recorded in 1593, the first steps in Asia were moved two years later with the expedition of Kornellis de Houtman.²⁵⁶

Although until the turn of the century the North-Western European were content to launch raids and piratical attacks against the Iberian vessels, the outcome of Houtman's pioneering voyage arouse enthusiasm and led to the rig of five fleets bounded for Asia in 1598. Starting from this moment, the United Provinces sent fleets through the Cape route each year, hence broking the Portuguese monopoly of that route.

²⁵⁴ See for instance Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial*, vol. III, p. 43-79.

²⁵⁵ A second embargo was placed by Filipe II in 1598 and had devastating effect on Dutch trade with a fall on voyages from the Iberian peninsula to the Baltic from 107 in that year to only two in the following year.

²⁵⁶ With regard to the struggle for supremacy between the Iberian crowns and the North European powers we followed Butel, *The Atlantic*, pp. 62-129. As it can be expected, the bibliography about the *Carreira da Índia* is overwhelmingly abundant. We decided to follow Guinote, Frutuoso and António Lopes, *Naufrágios e outras perdas da "Carreira da Índia" Séculos XVI e XVII*, and Murteira, *A Carreira da Índia e o Corso Neerlandês 1595-1625*.

Breaking the monopoly did not mean only to navigate along the same sea-path, but corresponded also to direct attacks to Portuguese and Spanish fundamental spots along the *Carreira* including Lisbon and also in this case Carlo Spinola was a witness of the North European privateering, since his departure from Lisbon in 1598 was delayed owing to English corsairs lying in ambush right outside the Tagus' mouth. This proactive attitude was not officially shared by the Netherlands. Before the establishing of the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC) in 1602, in fact, Dutch ships were forbidden to attack Iberian vessels but were instructed only to use force in self-defence. Nevertheless, there are records of attacks on Portuguese ships in the Atlantic Ocean as early as 1597.²⁵⁷ With respect to Asia, the *Liefde* was not the only ship to reach that region in 1600. In that very year, also the Spaniards of Manila had an encounter with the Hollanders, who were repelled. As a consequence, in December Pedro de Acuña while still in New Mexico informed Filipe II about the Dutch privateering in South East Asia and suggested to assemble warships at Manila, where everything could be carried out cheaply.²⁵⁸ Filipe sent his consent in April 1601 and thus the naval conflict between the Iberian Crowns and the 'estados reveldes' was moved also in Asia.

In 1602, in order to eliminate violent struggles among Dutch merchants that led to prices' increase, the large commercial firms that traded in Asia merged together in the VOC. The United Provinces granted the company the monopoly of maritime trade in Asia. Moreover, it soon appeared clearly that the VOC could also represent a valid weapon to use against the Habsburgs and their fleets in Asia.²⁵⁹ As wrote by the Habsburg king, the Dutch were aiming to the Portuguese settlements along the South Eastern coast of China, in particular Macao. As early as 1601, among the Hollanders circulated the idea of an attack against the Portuguese port on the Pearl River. In October, three ships were sent to reconnoitre the harbour. Since the settlement was lacking in defensive structures and garrisons, they were promptly attacked by five Portuguese galleys commanded by the Captain Major Dom Paulo de Portugal and their crews were seized.²⁶⁰ Two years later, however, the battle ended differently. On 29 July 1603, in fact, two VOC ships and a *pataxo* reached Macao and this time they took the

²⁵⁷ Cf. Murteira, *op. cit.*, p. 24 and bibliography cited therein.

²⁵⁸ See King Filipe II to Governor Pedro de Acuña, Valladolid, 6 April 1601. AGI, *Filipinas 19, R.2, N. 12*: '[P]ara lo demas que se pudiese ofrecer armar algunas galeras en Manila pue se podria hazer a poca costa y respecto de ser la tierra tan barata de todo con se podria asegurar aquello y estorbar alos enemigos que no pasen adelante con sus yntentos'.

²⁵⁹ Cf. Murteira, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

²⁶⁰ Cf. Boxer, *Estudos para a História de Macau*, pp. 21 and 208.

Macanese completely by surprise. Yet, the Dutch were not there to invade the port; their target was the *Nao do trato* and its rich cargo of silk and gold.²⁶¹ The news and the description of the VOC's looting arrived in Japan right the following month:

‘Estavamos com os olhos longos esperando por ella [the carrack], e passandose já o tempo em que ordinariamente costumava chegar a muitos parecia que sem duvida envernaria este ano em Macao, por não poder negociar a quantidade das fazendas necessarias para fazer viagem, mas *quis cognovit sensum domini, aut consiliarius ejus fuit?*²⁶² Hum pataxo, que aqui chegou aos trinta de Agosto, nos acabou de dar o dezengano de o que passava, por elle sabemos, que estando a nao surta no lugar onde foe tomar a carga, deram de repente nella duas naos Olandezas, e achandoa sem gente nem defeza, a vista de toda a Cidade a levaram com todo o recheio, com grande mâgoa, e sentimento dos moradores vindo roubado o remedio seu, e de seus filhos’.²⁶³

Valignano himself gave a description of the mishap. Apparently, both the ship's officers and the soldiers went momentarily back to the city to bid their families goodbye and left the ship off guard, unmanned and disarmed. It was as easy for the Dutch to snatch both the ship and the cargo, ‘sem nenhum trabalho nem custo’,²⁶⁴ as it was distressing for the Macanese to see all their fortune and investment go away without even putting up a fight.²⁶⁵ Furthermore, in 1603 the Dutch struck a triple blow against the Portuguese of Macao. Around March, in fact, the Portuguese vessel *Santa Catarina* fell in the hands of the Netherlanders while crossing the Strait of Singapore. The *Santa Catarina* left Macao in February loaded with the proceeds of the previous year's China and Japan voyages, a cargo of Chinese silks and porcelains worth more than 500'000 ducats.²⁶⁶ In December of the same year, the viceroy writing to the king, described the *Santa Catarina* as the richest and most powerful ship that ever left China, which was bringing the means of subsistence for the whole of India.²⁶⁷ However, if on the one hand for the city of Macao

²⁶¹ Boxer calculated the loss in 1'400'000 florins, being a florin roughly the equivalent of a ducat. Cf. Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 22. Takase, however, basing his analysis on Jesuits' sources – ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 137 – and on a letter by Bishop Cequeira – RAH/Cor. 9/2566, f. 309 – argued that it is difficult to ascertain the exact amount of that loss, since his data vary from more than 400'000 *cruzados* to one million (*conto*) in gold. Cf. Takase, マカオ=長崎間貿易の総取引高・生糸取引量・生糸価格, pp. 54-55. Moran, on his part, evaluated that the Portuguese lost more than 900'000 ducats. See Moran, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

²⁶² Romans 11:34: ‘For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been his counsellor?’

²⁶³ See BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-59, ff. 122-122^v.

²⁶⁴ See BL/Add. 9860, f. 88.

²⁶⁵ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 137.

²⁶⁶ See Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 59-60.

²⁶⁷ Cf. Boxer, *The Affair of the “Madre de Deus”*. A Chapter in the history of the Portuguese in Japan, p. 15.

this was a disastrous year, we should focus mainly on what those losses meant for the Japan Jesuits.

Valignano had left Japan also for economic reasons. He had to understand why the annual allowance the Japan Jesuits were supposed to receive in Madrid from the papal nuncio had not been paid during the last years. The missionaries complained that by 1602 the missing payments by the Holy See amounted to about 50'000 *cruzados*.²⁶⁸ Due to Dutch raids, in 1603 the Japan Jesuits lost more than 15'000 ducats.²⁶⁹ This loss almost corresponded to the quantity of money the mission needed for its annual subsistence in the 1600s,²⁷⁰ not considering subsidiary expenses such as travel allowances for the missionaries bounded for Japan or for the mission procurators, who were sent by the overseas provinces to Rome every six years in order to acquaint the general with the state of the mission.²⁷¹ Summing up the major and supplementary expenses, the Japan mission's expenses amounted to 18'000 ducats per year. As we already saw, in addition to the proceeds of the silk trade and the papal pension – provided that it was paid, the Fathers could rely only on the incomes from the *aldeias* in the Province of the North, on the 1'000 *cruzados* granted by D. Sebastião in 1574 and on another five-year pension of 1'000 *cruzados* donated by Cardinal Henrique in 1579 and confirmed by Filipe I in 1585.²⁷² On 2 August 1607, Filipe II established that it was not necessary to confirm the pension each five years, and added another 2'000 *cruzados*

²⁶⁸ See Vice-provincial Pasio to the Assistant of Portugal Álvares, Nagasaki, 5 December 1602. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 107^v. Although in the first year of his pontificate, Pope Sixtus V raised to 6'000 *cruzados* the alms granted by Gregory XIII, in 1586 he canceled the increase and reestablished the payment as it used to be, but it seems that between 1587 and 1590 the pension was paid not even in one occasion. We ignore the reasons why during his last three years, Sixtus V decided not to issue the payment. In 1590, on the other hand, after Sixtus's death, two popes were elected – Urban VII and Gregory XIV – but died soon after being appointed and their deaths caused the block of the Holy See. Cf. *Ivi*, f. 131.

²⁶⁹ *Ivi*, f. 137: '[T]res mil y mas, que le yvan de provimento para el gasto de sus casas, y otros doze mil que se mandavão en seda, y en otras pieças que era todo su caudal'. It has to be considered that only four years before, in 1599, another vessel sank with the consequent loss for the Japan mission of more than 8'000 *cruzados*. The losses, then, were generally higher than the incomes. *Ivi*, f. 131^v.

²⁷⁰ See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Macao, 8 October 1603. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 131: 'El gasto que se haze pera sustentar esta cazas [...] llega cada año ala soma de doze mil taeis, que es un pezo que corre en estas partes, y vale [...] mas, o menos de quinze mil ducados, los quales aunque hazen contia grande, todavia considerado el numero de las cazas, y dela gente que Japon sustenta, y los grandes extraordinarios que tiene a su cargo, es cosa tam poca que parece increíble poderse sustentar com tam poco gasto, y sin duda que muchas vezes me persuado que nos crece el dinero con el gasto'.

²⁷¹ Cf. Faria, "The Functions of Procurator in the Society of Jesus. Luís de Almeida, Procurator?", p. 35.

²⁷² See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 131. Cf. *DI XI 1577-1580*, p. 540, *TCJ*, p. 188 and Rodrigues, "Local Sources of Funding for the Japanese Mission", p. 117.

per year ‘em quanto não tivessem no Japão outra renda equivalente’.²⁷³ Regardless of the difficulty of collecting those payments in Madrid and in Malacca, whose officers were known in the kingdom also for accounting fraud,²⁷⁴ the Jesuits had to calculate also the percentage they were going to lose, due to the 30% exchange rate in the Indian and the Malacca custom houses. Thus, to gather and invest the 15’000 ducats in the 1603 Japan voyage, the Ignatians not only had to rally all their economical means left in Macao, but were forced also to borrow money, ‘por não termos de nosso tanto que nós bastasse’.²⁷⁵

Obviously, the missionaries could not rely on any financial help from the Macanese, since they had just lost a great deal of their fortune. In Japan, however, the situation was a little more positive. Having heard the news of the fathers’ neediness, in fact, Dom João²⁷⁶ gave 300 *taéis* to the fathers in Nagasaki in order to keep the seminar open and 100 to the Jesuits in Arima and as many to those in Miyako. Other *daimyō* followed his example and handed over to the fathers alms in rice.²⁷⁷ There was also another source of income, which the fathers mentioned only in passing, namely the help given by Japanese believers. It is difficult to ascertain the exact value of this kind of contributions, since in the majority of cases the letters do not enter into details, but they were not small and inconclusive offerings.²⁷⁸ In 1596, for instance, Lourenço Mexia wrote that ‘faltando a Nao que vem cada anno da China em Jappão, derão os Christãos aos Padres da Companhia d’esmola myl e duzentos cruzados, que pera gente tão pobre he grande charidade, e outro tinha en nossa casa myl e quinhentos cruzados, os quaes emprestou ate a vinda da nao, e não vindo os dava’.²⁷⁹ The Southern lords and devotees were not the only ones to express their kindness towards the Ignatians. As we said

²⁷³ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [II], f. 31. Another version of the text in BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-3, ff. 32-33. The *alvará* was received in Goa only in December 1614.

²⁷⁴ See Vice-roy Francico da Gama to King Filipe II, Goa, 18 December 1599. BL/Add. 28432, f. 16^v: ‘Na Alfandega de Malaca farei quanto me for possível en conformidade do que me V. Magestade manda, suposto o que en outra carta digo sobre o remedio que determinava dar nos roubos que nela fazem e desorden dos officiaes, o aremdamento passado foy de oytenta e seis mil pardaos, mas a taes peçoas e con taes fiadores e tão aventejadas condições que sempre perderâ a fazenda de V. Magestade mais de vinte mil pardaos. Em Abril passado se aremdou em setenta e simquo mil em minha prezença e comparecer de todos os officiaes que tenho aprestados pera o Conselho da Fazenda a Afonço da Barreyra que jaa a teve e paguou muy bem e aguora deu seguras fianças e estaa obriguado a entregar todo o remanecemte das ordinarias pera ser trazido a este tisouro’.

²⁷⁵ See BL/Add. 9860, f. 88.

²⁷⁶ Arima Harunobu changed his Christian name from Protásio to João when he made the confirmation.

²⁷⁷ See BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-59, ff. 123-124.

²⁷⁸ Cf. Rodrigues, “Local Sources of Funding for the Japanese Mission”, pp. 125-127.

²⁷⁹ See Father Lourenço Mexia to General Acquaviva, Macao, 15 November 1596. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 13 [I], f. 29.

earlier, it was around that time that Ieyasu chose João Rodrigues as his representative regarding the trade with Macao. Consequently, Ieyasu was probably well informed about the terrible state of the mission finances. Pasio wrote to Acquaviva that the *shōgun* sympathized with them due to their loss and gave to Rodrigues 350 *cruzados*, ‘cousa de que toda a Corte pasmou por não ser costume do Xōgun dar cousa alguma a ninguém’.²⁸⁰

Despite the Spaniards from Manila and the arrival of the Dutch, in the first decade of the 17th century, the Society of Jesus had still various supporters, with the *kubō* in the front line. Whilst on the political side the situation was not bad at all, in particular if we consider that not even ten years earlier they were on the verge of the expulsion, economically speaking, as we saw, the situation was not half as good, one of the consequences of losing that huge amount of money consisting in the necessity of freeing the mission of all the disposable personnel and edifices.

II. 5. The Society of Jesus and the involvement in *negotia secularia*

The 1580s was the decade when the debate around the Jesuits participation in the silk trade was born. Around that specific matter revolves all the discussion on the holy poverty and the Society of Jesus self-restraint. Both these topics were continuously addressed by the critics of the Ignatian order. In 1587, for instance, Acquaviva sent several letters to the *Estado da Índia*, in particular to Alessandro Valignano since he filled the leading role therein. In that year, both good and bad news had been dispatched to the general’s secretariat. On the one hand, Valignano told him that he had remedied to the excesses in their participation in the silk trade, which was a relief for the general, since he intended to postpone its definitive ban on their involvement in the trade due to Sixtus V’s reduction of the papal pension.²⁸¹ On the other hand, however, he received also complaints about the missionaries’ extravagance with respect to the gift-offerings to the Japanese and to the way the fathers dressed or moved. Regarding these

²⁸⁰ See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 6 November 1604. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 41. Also in BL/Add. 9860, f. 89. Cf. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 208

²⁸¹ See General Acquaviva to Provincial of India Valignano, Rome, 28 December 1587. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, ff. 13-13^v.

grievances, he entrusted his Italian fellow to get rid of superfluous wastes and to exercise the sobriety expected by members of the Society of Jesus.²⁸²

Fifteen years later, Acquaviva's recommendations had to be put into practice not out of respect for the Society's *Constitutions*, rather out of pure necessity. In 1602, in fact, Valignano had already invited the vice-provincial in Japan, Father Francesco Pasio, to reduce the expenses of a half by doing the following:

- close the two seminars and the press;
- leave almost all of the residences;
- dismiss 200 *dōjuku* out of the total of 300 and two-thirds of the servants (*moços de serviço*);
- cutback in new buildings and presents 'aunque fuessen necesarios'.²⁸³

Pasio, however, had to face the impossibility of implementing Valignano's orders. Whilst the seminar in Arima did not close thanks to the donation by D. João, with regard to the dismissal of *dōjuku* and servants, Pasio laid off no more than 70 of them, since he received the news of a pension of 10'000 ducats issued by Filipe II.²⁸⁴ Pasio was soon forced to recognize his mistake and convened a council to set it right. The fathers decided to limit the expenses for dresses – probably they saw fit to withdraw from using silk instead of the customary black robes – and food.²⁸⁵ However, those were just temporary measures that could not solve the general problem. As Pasio wrote to the viceroy, 'senão formos socorridos, impossível he, não digo eu ir avante com a conversão, mas nem ainda conservar o que está feito'.²⁸⁶ Fortunately for the Ignatians, in 1604 the Great Ship sailed for Nagasaki in July with 'bom remedio aos Padres de Japão e [...] N. S. ordenou que a Nao ahi tivesse muy grande, e bom despacho de suas fazendas, vendendo todas muyto bem, e tornandose para este Macao tres mezes antes do tempo acostumado, entrando neste porto aos 8 de dezembro'.²⁸⁷ After years of

²⁸² See General Acquaviva to Provincial of India Valignano, Rome, 27 January 1587. ARSI, *Jap. Sin* 3, f. 13.

²⁸³ See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Macao, 16 October 1603. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 137.

²⁸⁴ Filipe II actually granted the 10'000 *cruzados*, yet the payment was supposed to be spread in three or four times. Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, p. 635, n. 221.

²⁸⁵ See BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-59, f. 122^v: 'E primeiramente começando pelos da Companhia, se poz taxa no vestir, e comer, e outras couzas semelhantes deminuindo alguma couza do ordinario'.

²⁸⁶ See Vice-provincial Pasio to Viceroy Aires de Saldanha, Nagasaki, 24 February 1604. BL/Add. 9860, f. 88.

²⁸⁷ See Visitor Valignano to the Assistant of Portugal Álvares, Macao, 25 January 1605. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], ff. 186-186^v. Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 60-61.

misfortune, then, between 1604 and 1605 the Great Ship managed to elude both the Dutch blockade off the Kyūshū's coast and a huge typhoon which claimed the life of 800 ships berthed at Nagasaki and Shimonoseki, included 'huma fragata de Castelhanos que viera das Felippinas com mais de 50 mil cruzados'.²⁸⁸ The number of ships sank and the details reported in the Portuguese sources are probably inaccurate. In March 1606, in fact, Bishop Cerqueira complained about Manila's ships arrived in Japan with António Colaço, the procurator at court. Namely, he wrote that in 1605 the Spaniards brought a lot of silk and other goods (*fazendas*) that the Portuguese profits dropped and the ship was almost forced to winter at Nagasaki because the cargo was sold only with difficulty.²⁸⁹ Furthermore, although the *Nao do Trato* weathered the typhoon, the same could not be said for Jesuits buildings in Japan.²⁹⁰ The year 1606, on the other hand, was a fortunate year for Macao and the Japan Jesuits: the citizens of Macao arranged the voyage for the third year in a row, a thing that had not happened for twenty years. In that year, not only the earnings from the selling of silk were exceptionally high, but the Fathers received financial help both in China and in Japan.²⁹¹ The storm the Society had to face in 1606, however, was not made of rain and strong winds.

II. 5. 1. The consequences of power: João Rodrigues Tçuzu

As we saw earlier, in 1602 Tokugawa Ieyasu entrusted the government of Nagasaki to a council of four headmen with the Christian Murayama Tōan António as *daikan*. In the same time, the *ito-wappu* system was implemented and the procurator at Nagasaki, Father João Rodrigues Tçuzu, was chosen to manage Ieyasu's affairs with Macao. The Ignatians, then, at once gained strong influence both within Japan busiest commercial port and inside the future shogunal court. Yet, as we saw earlier, the Bible, the patristic and the *Constitutions* forbade involvement in *negotia secularia*.

²⁸⁸ See Guerreiro, *Relaçam Annal das Covsas qve fezeram os Padres da Companhia de IESVS nas partes da India Oriental, & em algumas outras da conquista deste reyno no anno de 606 & 607 & do processo da conuersão, & Christandade daquellas partes*, book IV, f. 3^v. See also *Copia da carta escrita no discurso do dito anno, athe 20 de março de 1606, ao N. M. R. em Christo Padre*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, ff. 282-282^v. Cf. Boxer, *Ibid.* and Costa, "A Route under Pressure", p. 88.

²⁸⁹ See Bishop Cerqueira to Procurator António Colaço, Nagasaki, 10 March 1606. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 52. Be it noted that Cerqueira was one of the biggest opposers to the commerce between Japan and the Philippines. Generally speaking, his idea can be gathered by this early letter, but as the years passed he grew more specific and sent several letters to both Madrid and Rome. Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/2666, ff. 255-270.

²⁹⁰ See Vice-provincial Pasio to Procurator Colaço, Nagasaki, 3 February 1606. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 57.

²⁹¹ See Rector of the College of Macao Valentim Carvalho to General Acquaviva, Macao, 1 November 1606. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], f. 249.

Although the *Constitutions* presumably had in mind anything ordinarily or more properly done by laymen, such as the conduct of lawsuits and the management of finances, during his generalate Claudio Acquaviva persistently wrote as if the *Constitutions* forbade entanglements in *negotia politica*. In the Fifth General Congregation (1592-1593) it was declared that no one should meddle in matters regarding *raison d'état* or with political matters of any sort. The founder of the Society himself insisted that the Ignatians were to accept no place of honour, were not to enter the palaces of popes, princes, cardinals, or lords, and were to avoid 'todas las cosas seglares'.²⁹²

In 1607, General Acquaviva was particularly worried about the meddling in political and commercial matters of the Japan Jesuits and wanted Francesco Pasio to solve the situation, in particular the one regarding João Rodrigues, whose *privaça* with Ieyasu was the topic of a previous letter Pasio sent to Rome. Acquaviva answered that:

'Escrevenos V. R. os favores que o Padre João Rodriguez recebeo do Cubo e de como deu o governo desta cidade a Christãos subordenando-os aos nossos, no que esperamos na prudencia de V.s R.s terão procedido ate agora com tal cautela e resguardo que não tenham acontecido os desastres a que a tal subordenação he sojeita, e porque alongo andar não pode deixar de os aver, queremos que os nossos se desobriguem della, em modo que o que succeder não se possa atribuir a Companhia, fazendo-o saber ao Cubo na forma que melhor parecer, porque não podera deixar de se edificar vendo-nos tam alheos do que outros tanto estimão e buscão. E encomendamos muito a V. R. o effeito disto, porque cá onde estamos tememos que a esta hora nos tenhamos arrependido de o não ter feito mais cedo'.²⁹³

Ironically, the worry showed in the last words – 'tememos que a esta hora nos tenhamos arrependido de o não ter feito mais cedo' – turned out to be true. The year before, in fact, Pasio received a letter from Dom Sancho Ōmura Yoshiaki, son of the late Dom Bartolomeu, who, in no uncertain terms, informed the Jesuit that the time when he would not favour the Fathers anymore had finally come. Although the *daimyō* wrote that he did not owe an explanation to Pasio, he gave him one notwithstanding. Yoshiaki ascribed his apostasy to an order issued by the *bakufu*, that obliged him to expel every Christian from his domain. He concluded his short missive with a sort of justification for his behaviour: 'como V. R. muito bem sabe eu em particular ej de residir em pessoa na cidade de Yedo corte de Sua Alteza o que não fazem os demais Senhores; pello que

²⁹² Cf. Höpfl, *Jesuit Political Thought*, pp. 56-59.

²⁹³ See General Acquaviva to Vice-provincial Pasio, Rome, 1 May 1607. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, f. 33.

como isto assi seja não posso deixar de obedecer, em tudo aquillo que Sua Alteza me mandar'.²⁹⁴ This statement needs an explication.

During the campaign of Odawara, Hideyoshi offered Ieyasu the lordship of the eight provinces of the Kantō. Ieyasu soon saw the strategic position of the small settlement called Edo and elected it as his capital by mid-1590. No great change took place in Edo for some years, since Ieyasu was well occupied with other matters. After the foundation of the Tokugawa *Bakufu*, however, the situation had changed and Edo became the chief city of Japan. As a consequence, in July 1604 Ieyasu issued orders to all the *daimyō* to supply labour and materials to build the castle and reconstruct the city. For each 1'000 *koku* of their income they had to provide one man. In 1606, also the construction of the fortress started.²⁹⁵ Thus, the justification adduced by Yoshiaki had a kernel of truth.

According to Jesuits' sources, however, the reasons why Ōmura abandoned the Christian faith and expelled the Ignatians from his territory were quite different and it all began due to the growth of Nagasaki out its original bounds.

The city of Nagasaki, as we know, was part of the *bakufu*'s domains and was administered by the local *daikan*, but periodically a visiting *bugyō* came to supervise the government. The town bordered with the Ōmura domain, where the *bugyō* and the *daikan* had obviously no jurisdiction. The city, however, grew so much that it ended overlapping with the neighbouring territory, a fact that led to constant disputes and quarrels. When the supervising *Bugyō* Ogasawara Ichian arrived in Nagasaki in 1605, the city's officers complained to him of the anomalous situation. He reported such distressing news in Edo, proposing to the *kubō* that Ōmura's land in and around Nagasaki should be incorporated within the city, whereas Yoshiaki should receive the district of Urakami in compensation. The arrangement left Yoshiaki with a bitter taste in his mouth, since 'por o que lhe derão não ser equivalente no rendimento ao que lhe tomarão, como pello muito que elle por rezam da Nao estimava estas terras visinhas a

²⁹⁴ See Dom Sancho Ōmura Yoshiaki to Vice-provincial Pasio, Ōmura, 24 February 1606. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 420. The date is uncertain. The letter is a translation from the original Japanese and ended with 'Oye 18 do primero mes do año'. We think the date follows the Japanese calendar, thus the 18th day of the first month would be 24 February. Yet, if the translator adapted the date to the Gregorian calendar it would be 18 January. Also Cooper dated the letter following the Japanese calendar. See Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

²⁹⁵ See Sadler, *Shogun. The Life of Tokugawa Ieyasu*, pp. 170-173. Cf. also RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 47.

este porto'.²⁹⁶ Apparently, knowing João Rodrigues's great influence at court as well as the Father's presence while the arrangement took place, Ōmura suspected him of having conceived the whole business. Consequently, he grew suspicious of all the Fathers of the Society and eventually expelled them from his domain.

This is the information we found in the official certificate signed by Bishop Cerqueira in the aftermath of the expulsion from Ōmura. There are, however, other sources that mention details Cerqueira left out. The Spanish Jesuit Antonio Francisco Critana, for instance, wrote that after Ogasawara went to Nagasaki, Dom Sancho visited Ieyasu along with Rodrigues and the Nagasaki's headmen. The party presented to Honda Kozuke no Suke Masazumi – 'que aqui es como en España el Duque de Lerma'²⁹⁷ – a map of Nagasaki drawn by a retainer of Dom Sancho. It seems that Honda wanted to compare that map with another he had previously received by João Rodrigues, a thing that led Sancho to believe that the dice were loaded from the start and that Rodrigues was in cahoots with the municipal council of Nagasaki.²⁹⁸ Other sources, however, tell yet another story.

We are referring to a collection of documents entitled *Excellentes provas da inocentia do Padre João Rodriguez sobre o caso de Omuradono*.²⁹⁹ It is a compilation of four documents, the Spanish translation from the original Japanese, written at the request of João Rodrigues by some of the people involved in this case. The first one, is a letter written by Ogasawara himself, who stated that 'la Compañía no tiene culpa ninguna, ni intervino en este por ninguna via' and that Ieyasu ordered the exchange of lands as a consequence of Ichian's own report.³⁰⁰ That Rodrigues was unrelated to

²⁹⁶ See *Certidam do Bispo de Japam acerca do caso de Omuradono Dom Sancho Senhor de Omura*, ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [III], ff. 236-237. Cf. Boxer, *Christian Century*, pp. 185-186.

²⁹⁷ See RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 91^v.

²⁹⁸ See Father Antonio Francisco Critana to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 10 March 1606. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 147: 'Pidio el Conzuquedono a su criado que le truxese la descripcion de Nangasaqui del P. procurador que antes tenia recebida, por lo qual entendio [...] Omuradono que ya se avian anticipado el P. y los regidores a pedir que juntasen aquellas ruas que le pertenecian a los demas dela ciudad, que ellos governavan por el rey. Y assi disse que dixo el Cozuquedono que un año atras se lo avian pedido los regidores y como el P. Procurador tenia entonces una superintendencia en el gobierno con ellos, le culpa el Omuradono diziendo que fue consertidor con ellos, o que le avia de avisar dello que pretendian para hazer que no viniessen a effecto'.

²⁹⁹ In ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], ff. 152-153. It contains four items: 1. Traslado de una carta de Ogasawara Ychian que vino de parte de Daifusama por Gobernador de Nagasaqui y para el despacho dela nave delos Portuguezes y delos mas navios que vienen de otros reinos al dicho puerto de Nagasaqui; 2. Carta de Fonda Cozuquedono Regidor general delos estados de Daifusama; 3. Carta de Ocamoto Daifachidono Christiano secretario, y oidor de Cozuquedono; 4. Carta de Omuradono para el Padre Viceprov. traslada del original escrito y firmado por su propia mano.

³⁰⁰ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 152.

Ieyasu's decision is confirmed also by Honda *Cozuqedono* and Okamoto Daihachi, Honda's Christian secretary who we will get to know better later. The last document of the collection is a letter sent by Ōmura Yoshiaki to the Portuguese viceroy, which basically deals with the same topics as the letter sent to Pasio.

The sequence of events presented in these documents is more or less the same told by Cerqueira in his *Certidam*. Both sources exclude that the fathers' played a part against Yoshiaki. Then, how the Jesuits explained to Rome the apostasy of the Japanese lord?

According to Pasio, who, be it noted, was the highest representative of the Society of Jesus in Japan, Yoshiaki was indebted by the lord of Higo, the anti-Christian Katō Kiyomasa, who helped Ōmura in covering the exorbitant expenses and the manpower for the edification of Edo's fortress.³⁰¹ Kiyomasa, a former Toyotomi's retainer who joined the Tokugawa, was a stern *bushi* and a follower of Nichiren, the branch of Buddhism to which Yoshiaki eventually turned to.

Then, although it would seem that Rodrigues had really nothing to do with the exchange of lands in Kyūshū, Yoshiaki's behaviour should have rung an alarm bell. The Southern *daimyō*, in fact, not only eradicated the Christianity from his domain,³⁰² but it seems that he was planning also to get rid of João Rodrigues, owing to the role he played in the silk trade and his influence within the shogunal court. As early as 1603, Bishop Cerqueira warned Rome about the difficulties arising from Rodrigues's secular duties, in particular with regard to his intervention in determining the *pancada* price when Japanese demand and Portuguese offer failed to meet.³⁰³ Cerqueira found himself in an awkward position, since he acknowledged the dangers and unsuitableness of those activities, yet he recognized also that it was not easy to refute appointments from the *shōgun* himself.³⁰⁴ It would seem that Valignano felt almost the same thing when in 1591 he wrote that to avoid 'muitas murmurações que na China ha parecendolhes que os Padres são contra elles por amor dos Japoens, se não meterà o Procurador em dar a

³⁰¹ See Vice-provincial Pasio to Father Gregorio López, Nagasaki, 2 February 1607. RAH/Cor. 9/2655, f. 91. In this letter, Pasio made reference to the letters included in the *Excellentes provas da inocentia do Padre João Rodriguez sobre o caso de Omuradono*. Regarding Kiyomasa's role in Yoshiaki's apostasy see also ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [III], ff. 270-270^v.

³⁰² After the Jesuits' expulsion, both the Friars and the Preachers made an attempt to establish a mission in Ōmura, but they were not allowed to. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [III], f. 240.

³⁰³ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 20 [I], ff. 167-167^v. Cf. Cooper, *Rodrigues, O Intérprete*, p. 259.

³⁰⁴ See Bishop Cerqueira to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 1 March 1607. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 21, ff. 135-137^v. Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, p. 59 and Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-262.

pancada da seda, ou outra couza semelhante, sem ordem geral ou particular do Superior'.³⁰⁵ The Japan Jesuits, at least part of them, were aware of the danger and opposed against it. In 1605, for instance, Diogo de Mesquita wrote that both Japanese and Portuguese were scandalized by the involvement of the fathers in the negotiation of the *pancada* and 'en repartir la mesma seda por los mercadores y mas personas que nos parece'.³⁰⁶ Although later Francesco Pasio wrote in detraction of Mesquita that 'muito pouco tem estudado' and whose opinions were therefore unreliable,³⁰⁷ there were also other Jesuits who did not consider meddling in secular matters a positive thing. The Italian Organtino, among others, wrote to the general a letter that most likely had the effect of cementing Acquaviva's ideas with respect to the *negotia politica*. Organtino recognized the perks that came from participating in the temporal jurisdiction of Nagasaki, yet he wrote that:

'[C]omo il governo, e giuriditione temporale difficilmente si compatiscono con l'instituto della Compagnia e costumi religiosi; e specialmente perche in Giapone queste cose danno occasione a molti, che ci tengano invidia e parlino male di noi, e ci diano molti travagli come sino adesso ci hanno datto; paremi nel Signore che V. P. dovrebbe ordinare, e comandare rigorosamente che da qui avanti non solo li Nostri non se intermettessero in ninguna cosa pertenente alli negocij temporali di questa cità, ma ne di niuno altro luogo e terra di questo Giapone'.³⁰⁸

According to Organtino, Yoshiaki wrote a treatise against the fathers of the Society to present to Ieyasu in the attempt of having Rodrigues exiled. It is easy to imagine what kind of effect these words may have had on Acquaviva, whose aforementioned letter was written in total unawareness of what was happening in Japan.

II. 5. 2. André Pessoa and the sinking of the *Nossa Senhora da Graça*³⁰⁹

Although that was not the first letter in which Acquaviva showed his concern towards his confrères meddling in temporal matters, the renewed invitation to abandon

³⁰⁵ See *RPJ*, f. 39.

³⁰⁶ See Diogo de Mesquita to General Acquaviva [SOLI], Nagasaki, 21 March 1605. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 8.

³⁰⁷ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], f. 338.

³⁰⁸ See Father Organtino Gneccchi Soldo to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 28 March 1607. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], f. 278^v.

³⁰⁹ Although historically the ship is better known as *Madre de Deus*, we preferred to use the name by which is called in contemporaneous accounts.

such activities probably did not reach Japan before 1610. The lateness in the dispatch was not due only to the slowness of communication between Europe and Asia, but also to the Dutch, who were exerting a progressively higher pressure on Portuguese settlements in South-East China. In effect, both the annual voyages of 1607 and 1608 did not take place due to Dutch blockades of Macao.³¹⁰

In 1607, however, since Macao could not reach Japan, the Japanese took a visit to the Portuguese entrepôt. Two Japanese ships, one of them belonging to Arima Harunobu, on the return voyage from Champa (today's central Vietnam) harboured at Macao for the winter, although, as we know, the Japanese were forbidden to set foot in Chinese territory. Notwithstanding the long-standing prohibition, however, the Japanese walked freely through the town armed to the teeth creating distress and upsetting the Chinese officers, who went to complain with the *Vereadores*. The situation was extremely delicate for the Portuguese, since they could not afford to antagonize either party. Consequently, they requested the Japanese to moderate their insolence, but to no avail. On 30 November, then, a fight between Portuguese and Japanese broke out and led to the intervention of the Captain Major André Pessoa along with all the available armed men. The casualties were almost all Japanese: 40 dead and the rest imprisoned. When the prisoners were released, Pessoa compelled them to sign an affidavit admitting their responsibilities and thus absolving the Portuguese from all blame in order not to endanger Macao's trade with Nagasaki.

Owing to two missing voyages, the *Nao* that sailed for Nagasaki in 1609, the *Nossa Senhora da Graça*, was richly freighted, since it carried the overdue supply of two years for the Japanese market. The Hollanders tried to stop also this ship, but the vessel managed to escape and made it safely to Nagasaki by the end of July. The Captain Major was again André Pessoa, who took with him the affidavit signed by the Japanese.³¹¹

Since the last time the *Nao do trato* had reached the South-Western coast of Kyūshū, more than a thing had changed in Japan. In 1605, Ieyasu resigned the title of *sei-i tai-shōgun* by passing it onto his son Hidetada and thereby asserting the hereditary principle in shogunal succession. Ieyasu took the title of retired *shogun* – *ōgosho* – and

³¹⁰ Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 62-63.

³¹¹ Cf. Boxer, *The Affair of the "Madre de Deus"*, pp. 37-38 and *idem*, *The Christian Century*, pp. 270-271.

named the family castle at Sunpu as his official residence.³¹² Once Tokugawa's control over Japan had been secured, Ieyasu coped with foreign affairs. In that very year, in fact, he allowed one of the survivors of the *Liefde*, Jacob Quackernaek, to go to Patani to invite VOC's vessels to trade in Japan.³¹³ In addition to Manila, then, Ieyasu was looking for yet another commercial partner in order not to depend too much on Portuguese voyages from China. Furthermore, in 1606, he dismissed Ogasawara Ichian from his post of visiting *bugyō*, which was quite the blow on the Christian mission, since Ichian proved to be an accommodating, if not favourable, officer. On the contrary, his substitute, Hasegawa Sahyōei, well personified the new phase of trouble the Japan Christianity was inexorably getting close to.

At any rate, still in 1607, Ieyasu did almost nothing against the papist missionaries in Japan. Although, in fact, he confirmed his prohibition against the conversion to Christianity of *daimyō* and nobles,³¹⁴ in 1607 he invited Francesco Pasio as chief of the mission to his new residence at Sunpu. Pasio, along with João Rodrigues, Pedro Morejón and two Japanese brothers, were courteously received by the *Vongoxo*. They seized the opportunity to remind Ieyasu what Rodrigues asked in the aftermath of Hideyoshi's death, to abrogate the *kanpaku*'s edict and give them back the freedom to proselytize to everyone.³¹⁵ Despite Pasio did not write down Ieyasu's answer to his proposal, we know that the freedom the Jesuits had enjoyed during the 1580s would never be equaled again.

In any case, as soon as André Pessoa arrived at the sight of Nagasaki's harbour, a number of Japanese boats sent by Hasegawa came alongside the Great Ship to prevent any person or goods from going ashore without permission.³¹⁶ Pessoa, however, refused to have the Japanese aboard his carrack and sent them back to the port. Hasegawa, then, proposed to have two inspectors to examine and appraise the 'caixões e fardos hum per

³¹² Cf. Totman, *Tokugawa Ieyasu Shogun*, pp. 96-97, Asao and Jansen, "Shogun and *Tennō*", pp. 259-260, *CHJ IV*, pp. 145-146, RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 43 and BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-59*, f. 280^v.

³¹³ Cf. Totman, *Tokugawa Ieyasu: Shogun*, p. 104.

³¹⁴ Cf. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

³¹⁵ See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 14 October 1607. BL/Add. 9860, ff. 127^v-128.

³¹⁶ With regard to André Pessoa and the *Nossa Senhora da Graça*'s incident we followed the *Relação da queima da nao Nossa Senhora da Graça, em que veyo por Capitam mór da viagem Andre Pessoa no anno de 1609*, in RAH/Cor. 9/2666, ff. 109-115 alongside with Alvarez, "Don Rodrigo de Vivero et la Destruction de la Nao "Madre de Deos" (1609 á 1610), pp. 479-511, and, with some limitations, Boxer, The Affair of the "Madre de Deus", *The Christian Century*, pp. 271-274 and *idem*, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 63-68.

hum para tomar o que melhor lhe parecesse para Daifu'.³¹⁷ This demand was likewise rejected by Pessoa, who retorted that Hasegawa 'em terra fizesse o que quizesse, mas não já dentro da sua nao, da qual elle hera Senhor e Capitão'.³¹⁸ Eventually, Hasegawa agreed to limit his inspection of the cargo to a superficial examination and inventory of the goods as the Portuguese were safely landed.

André Pessoa was struck by the way the officers treated them. The Portuguese were normally received with courtesy, but the new *bugyō* clearly wanted to take care of things differently. According to the author of the *Relação da queima da nao Nossa Senhora da Graça*, the reason for this behaviour was that the Japanese had finally realized that there was more at stake in the Nagasaki-Macao trade than the contrary. In other words, they became conscious that the profits in Japanese silver from the selling of Chinese silks and gold were the reason Macao could keep on existing, whereas the Tokugawa *bakufu* had already found other partners capable of providing the textiles the Japanese craved for.³¹⁹ Furthermore, Hasegawa was not alone in his resolution. Murayama Tōan, in fact, supported him as he was progressively moving away from his support to the missionaries of the Society of Jesus.³²⁰

After the Portuguese found accommodation in Nagasaki, Hasegawa and Murayama ordered a round of all the houses where the Portuguese were lodged and inspected all their wares, which were bought to a fixed price lower than what established by the Portuguese. Afterwards, Pessoa decided to relate to Hasegawa the way the Japanese behaved in Macao two years before and suggested to mention the facts to Ieyasu. Hasegawa, however, strongly advised him to keep Ieyasu out of it. The *bugyō* pointed out that the retired *shōgun* was well aware of his fellows' behaviour in abroad and he was worried that it would be the cause for breaking the relationship with foreign countries. Moreover, he added that since the Japanese were guilty as charged, nobody would have risked informing Ieyasu about it. Both Captain Pessoa and the

³¹⁷ See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 109^v.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*

³¹⁹ Notwithstanding the promises made by both Hollanders, Spaniards and later also by the English, only the Portuguese had legal access to the best quality Chinese silk, whereas the others had to rely on second-hand textiles that never provided the same incomes as the silk sold by the Portuguese of Macao.

³²⁰ Depending on what kind of sources one uses – Dominican or Jesuit – Murayama comes out either a good Christian or a really bad one. Be that as it may, it seems indisputable that when he received the office of *daikan* he started to behave differently, in particular towards João Rodrigues, the one who interceded for him with Ieyasu. After the decree of expulsion in 1614, however, Murayama changed again his attitude and went back to a strict Christian way of life, until he was killed by the *bakufu* in 1619 along with his son.

Fathers of the Society of Jesus acknowledged that Hasegawa had a point and followed his advice. Nevertheless, out of prudence they handed over copies of the affidavit to a *bakufu* officer well-disposed toward the Portuguese, the master of the mint Gotō Shōzaburō, and to a retainer of Honda Masazumi.

In the meanwhile, to the satisfaction of Ieyasu the two Dutch ships that failed to stop the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* arrived at Hirado with a letter by Maurice of Nassau to establish a commercial link with Japan, and soon received permission to set up a factory.³²¹ Their appearance forced Pessoa to dissimulate with his outrage at the way Hasegawa was handling the Portuguese. Thus, through the good offices of the Jesuits and ‘huma grossa peita de dinheiro à conta da armação’,³²² he persuaded the *bugyō* to send Macao’s envoy, Mateo Leitão, to meet Ieyasu together with a trustworthy subordinate of him, in the attempt of speaking with the *ōgosho* before the Dutch did. Notwithstanding their effort, however, the Hollanders were received first and Ieyasu allowed them to stay in Hirado. During the meeting, the Dutch, aware of the value of the Nagasaki-Macao trade, told Ieyasu that soon the Portuguese would not be able to bring Chinese silks to Japan owing to their military presence in the China Sea.³²³

It would seem that in the same year, also Spaniards from Manila tried to persuade the Japanese to abandon the trade with the Portuguese, for they would take care of importing Chinese silks to Japan, ‘porque [...] Sua Magestade Catolica hera de sua nação, e isto pretendia e os tinha a elles [the Spaniards] por filhos e aos portugueses por servos’.³²⁴ Ieyasu and the *Shōgun* Hidetada, however, were not trying to cut off the thread with the Portuguese; rather they yearned to establish contacts also with New Spain. In December 1609 and May 1610, in fact, they wrote a letter to Filipe II’s *valido*, the Duke of Lerma, opening Japanese ports to Spanish vessels coming from Mexico.³²⁵

³²¹ Cf. Boxer, *The Christian Century*, p. 289, Corr, Adams. *The Pilot*, p. 111, *Informação sobre a entrada dos Olandezes em Iapam e sobre algumas cousas que depois socederão*, f. 220 and BL/Add. 9860, f. 204.

³²² See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 110^v.

³²³ This information was confirmed by Francesco Pasio in 1610. See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 15 March 1610. BL/Add. 9860, f. 204: ‘Aos Olandeses concedeo o Cubo feitoria no porto de Firando e que viessem ao dito porto por elles prometerem que virião todos os annos, e trarião muitas fazendas de sua terra, e tudo o que tras a Nao dos Portugueses, e se elles continuarem com este comercio, alem do perigo que corer aa nao dos Portugueses, arreceamos muito semeem em Japão herejia’.

³²⁴ See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 111.

³²⁵ Cf. Gil, *Hidalgos y Samurai*, pp. 256-258. In the same time, Japan trade with the Philippines continued properly. Between 1609 and 1610 eight *shuin-sen* arrived in Manila with a cargo of mixed goods, such as copper, hemp textiles, gunpowder and Japanese iron. Cf. AGI, *Contaduria 1208*, f. 109^v and ff. 207-213. However, Bishop Cerqueira wrote that in 1610 the Japanese sent to Manila ‘seis navios muy arrezoados

Judging from Ieyasu's attitude towards the foreigners, it is clear that he did not want to exclude the agents of the Portuguese *padroado* from Japan and substitute them with the Hollanders or the Spaniards. After his meeting with the Portuguese ambassador, in fact, Ieyasu issued a *shuin-jō* for the senate of Macao.³²⁶ The *ōgosho* was looking for several commercial partners that could link Japan with the outside world, as it is confirmed also by the author of the *Relação da queima da nao Nossa Senhora da Graça*, probably João Rodrigues Giram, who affirmed that Ieyasu said to the Portuguese that 'elle já lhes [to the Dutch] tinha dado sua palavra, a qual não havia de quebrar, mas que assi huns como outros viessem a Japão, o qual hera franco pera todos, que em seus portos não haveria brigas, e que laa no mar cada hum se vigiasse'.³²⁷ In those years, moreover, the attention and curiosity for European knowledge – artistic, scientific and engineering – was at its uppermost. The Society of Jesus in Miyako, as we saw, was currently implementing such knowledge in order to pull in the Japanese aristocracy. But, as is customary, when something reaches its climax, that is when it starts to be on the wane.

In spite of the agreement reached at Nagasaki between the Portuguese and the Japanese and in spite of Jesuits' assurances, Pessoa was deeply suspicious of Hasegawa's intentions and he consolidated his suspects when he saw how badly the *bugyō* received the news of the *shuin-jō* for the Portuguese. Thus, the Portuguese captain secretly prepared a formal complaint – 'huma lista e apontamentos'³²⁸ – against the *bugyō* to be presented to Ieyasu. When the Jesuits heard of it, they did their best to dissuade Pessoa, but Hasegawa had already been informed about it and henceforth considered the Portuguese captain as his mortal enemy. The grudge between the two was eventually led in front of Ieyasu. To complicate matters even more the Japanese survivors of the Macao's incident came back in Japan around that time. They soon disavowed their affidavits, since it has been extorted under menace, and along with Hasegawa accused Pessoa for his behaviour. Moreover, they emphasized to Ieyasu that the Japanese killed and imprisoned were part of a *shuin-sen*'s crew, hence official and legitimate ship. Although Ieyasu was much impressed by these arguments, he did not

carregados de grande quantidade de prata, a mayor que nunca os Jappões depois que este commercio de Manilha com Jappão se tem aberto, têm mandado'. See Bishop Cerqueira to King Filipe II, Nagasaki, 12 March 1611. RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 255.

³²⁶ The *shuin-jō* was written by the Buddhist monk Enkoji Genkitsu on 19 August 1609 and was issued on 24 August. See Alvarez, *op. cit.*, pp. 482-483. A transcription in Boxer, *The Christian Century*, p. 272.

³²⁷ See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 111^v.

³²⁸ *Ivi*, f. 112.

want to take drastic action, lest this should result in the loss of the trade with Macao, according to Boxer.³²⁹ Be that as it may, after some hesitation, Ieyasu finally decided to have Pessoa and the Portuguese all killed and to confiscate the vessel along with the cargo. Arima Harunobu, on his part, claimed that he had to avenge the death of his subordinates and added his forces to Ieyasu's.³³⁰

As soon as the news reached Nagasaki, Hasegawa started to claim that he would have Pessoa's head cut off, whereas the Portuguese took to the ship, which he had armed and set to fight.³³¹ Before the attack began, Hasegawa, Murayama and Arima tried again the diplomatic way and sent a joint message to the Jesuits, telling them that if the Portuguese handed over Pessoa, everything would be settled without fighting, but the missionaries answered that the Portuguese would never hand over their captain.³³² The time for talk was over and in the morning of 3 January 1610, the Japanese launched the attack. Owing to lack of wind, the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* was not able to set sail, yet during three days the Portuguese managed to repel the attacks. On 6 January, however, the Arima samurai succeeded in setting fire to the ship. It was soon obvious that it was impossible for the crew to extinguish it while fighting. Seeing that all was lost, Pessoa 'tomou hum crucifix ou imagem e foi andando pelo meyo da nao e juntamente mandou dar fogo ao payol da polvora, pera que da parte contraria morressem mais ao arrebentar da nao e se não lograssem do recheo'.³³³ The ship blew up and the explosion could be heard from places far from Nagasaki.

According to the *Relação*, along with the vessel, also the cargo worth 'hum conto douro' was lost. In addition to several crates of silver, in fact, also 3'000 *picols* of silk were aboard during the fight. Francesco Pasio wrote that the vice-province invested

³²⁹ See Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-277.

³³⁰ Charles Boxer attributed Ieyasu's choice of punishing the Portuguese to a meeting between the tyrant and Don Rodrigo de Vivero y Velasco, a former governor of the Philippines. According to Boxer, when Ieyasu asked whether the Spaniards could supply the bulk of silk imports to Japan, in absence of the Portuguese carrack, Vivero allegedly replied that they would send not merely one, but two or three ships yearly. However, even in Vivero's own accounts of the meeting with Ieyasu, there is no mention of this. For the transcriptions of Vivero's accounts see Gil, *Hidalgos y Samurai*, pp. 140-206. At any rate, in the aftermath of the incident, Pasio wrote to Rome that 'nunca o Cubo ouvera de se resolver a mandar tomar a Nao, e matar os Portugueses se não tivera este comercio de Manilha, por via do qual faz conta que lhe pode vir tudo o que lhe vinha de Macao, e os da Manilha ssi lho prometerão'. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [III], f. 335. It is not clear, then, whether Pasio was actually stating the truth or was he only trying to blame the Spaniards for what happened to the Portuguese.

³³¹ See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 113.

³³² In 1611, Honda Masazumi wrote a letter to the Portuguese authorities stating again that the Japanese intention was only to seize the captain, not to kill all the crew or to burn down the ship. Cf. Boxer, *The Christian Century*, Appendix V, pp. 428-429,

³³³ *Ivi*, f. 114^v.

between 12'000 and 13'000 ducats in the 1609-*armação* and lost between 20'000 and 30'000 ducats 'do que ouvera de render aquella seda que vendemos pollo preço de Japão por este anno acontecer valer extraordinariamente cara'.³³⁴ The Procurator of Japan in Macao, João Coelho, reported that they had lost a cargo of 'cento e trinta quintaes de seda fina'.³³⁵ The Japan Jesuits, then, were actually facing the financial collapse: not only they had lost all the incomes from that year, but they lacked also the capital to extinguish the debts both in Japan and Macao.³³⁶

But the worst part was that the Portuguese did not want to come back to Japan as long as Ieyasu was still breathing, 'salvo se elle vendo a falta que a Nao lhe faz os convidassem com partidos honrosos, e liberdades de modo que pudessem tornar com honra e proveito'. Soon after the battle, on the contrary, Hasegawa sent for the Macao merchants who had survived and told them that if they wanted to continue trading, it would have to be on the Japanese terms, which were evidently too humiliating and disadvantageous, since the majority of the Portuguese at first refused to sign it.³³⁷ Yet, before they embarked for Macao, Hasegawa insisted with the Portuguese not to interrupt the trade with Japan.³³⁸

II. 5. 3. First of all and instead of them all: the expulsion of João Rodrigues Tçuzu

With regard to the missionaries of the Society of Jesus, both Tokugawa Ieyasu and the *Bugyō* Hasegawa Sahyōei took an atypical decision. Whilst in the past, whatever incident regarding the Westerners led almost directly to threats of expulsion or actual persecutions, this time the Japanese aimed not at the Society of Jesus as a religious-political-commercial institution, rather to two particular men. In other words, the measures took by the *bakufu* in this occasion had nothing to do with religious antagonism, but are to be ascribed to the *negotia politica* or *secularia* Acquaviva wrote about. Unfortunately, only the Jesuit version of the facts survives, hence it is a biased

³³⁴ Pasio first wrote that 'nesta Nao perdemos passante de vinte mil ducados', yet further on in the letter he corrected the numbers and stated that they lost more than 30'000 ducats. Cf. Vice-provincial Pasio to Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 14 March 1610, ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], f. 333^v and f. 335.

³³⁵ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [II], f. 4.

³³⁶ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], f. 333^v.

³³⁷ Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 68-69.

³³⁸ See Boxer, *The Christian Century*, pp. 282-283.

vision which might (or might not) leave out important details.³³⁹ Anyway, it goes as follow.

Francesco Pasio wrote to Rome in 1610 describing a plot against him and João Rodrigues devised by Hasegawa in collaboration with the *Daikan* Murayama. After some years of friendship with the Jesuits and with João Rodrigues, in fact, lately the *daikan* was showing signs of disaffection towards the papist missionaries. In particular, it seemed that he felt to be in contention with Rodrigues with respect to the duties assigned by Ieyasu in Nagasaki. Tōan started to change manifestly his attitude when Ogasawara Ichian was substitute by Hasegawa Sahyōei, who as we saw did not hide his hostility towards the Westerners, either merchants or missionaries. The *bugyō* and the *daikan* soon realized that, despite divided by faith, they could join forces and profit by the suppression of their common enemies, i.e. Rodrigues and the Society of Jesus. Thus, as soon as he was appointed governor of Nagasaki, Hasegawa wanted the Ignatians to act not only as translators for the Portuguese and Japanese merchants, but also as officials to be consulted whenever a dispute between merchants arouse. This duty put the fathers in an uncomfortable position, since it forced them to take side even if the matter did not regard them. Obviously, whenever the Fathers did not stand for the Japanese side, Hasegawa accused them of subversion and disrespect toward Japanese laws.³⁴⁰ All things considered, however, Hasegawa and Murayama wanted especially to expel Rodrigues and Pasio from Nagasaki, since the two Jesuits had always a saying in deciding the *pancada* price. According to Pasio, in order to have them expelled, Hasegawa and Murayama accused him and Rodrigues to have incited André Pessoa to file the formal complaint with the *bakufu* against the *bugyō*. As we saw, in the *Relação* it was stated the contrary and also Luís Cerqueira sworn that the ‘Padres da Companhia tem neste negocio da nao contribuido inteiramente com sua obrigação’.³⁴¹ Be that as it may, neither Hasegawa nor Murayama seemed to have accepted the explications of the missionaries and would accept to settle the matter only at one condition:

³³⁹ The document is a letter Pasio wrote to Acquaviva on 19 March 1610. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], ff. 338-339^v.

³⁴⁰ A case in particular angered Hasegawa against Cerqueira and the Jesuits, namely the dispute between Bernardo Funamoto, a Japanese Christian from Nagasaki, and Vicente Rodrigues, a Portuguese living in Nagasaki, on the property of the cargo of a ship from Macao. See Carvalho, *Apologia do Japão*, pp. 80-82. Cf. Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-270.

³⁴¹ See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 105.

‘Procuramos de fazer as amidades, as quais elle [Hasegawa Sahyōei] não quis aceitar sem lhe prometer de mandar o Padre João Rodriguez para Macao, e que fosse de maneira que se não entendesse que elles o procuravão, se não que a Companhia de seu proprio motu o fazia assi como consta fazer muitas mudanças dos seus sogeitos, o qual resguardo procurava por se arreçar que sabendo o Cubó a verdade do que passava lho tomasse a mal, pois tinha amor, e bom conceito do Padre e o mesmo tenia dos outros privados da Corte’.³⁴²

The fathers convened that it was advisable to content Hasegawa, provided that the *bugyō* changed his attitude towards the Christian faith and protected the missionaries in presence of Ieyasu. After the explosion of the *Nao do trato*, Sahyōei went to Suruga to brief Ieyasu on the incident. Ieyasu’s reaction was furious. He ordered the death of all the Portuguese survivors and the expulsion of all the missionaries. Yet, when a couple of months later Hasegawa came back to Nagasaki, he informed Pasio that eventually Ieyasu issued only an expulsion decree for João Rodrigues and that it was only thanks to his intercession that Pasio was allowed to stay. The vice-provincial, however, had already been informed about the meeting by Pedro Morejón who was at Suruga while Hasegawa was there and the two stories did not match. According to Morejón’s account, when Ieyasu ordered the executions of the Portuguese and the expulsion of the missionaries, Arima Harunobu objected that if they did that, it would be impossible to see another Portuguese vessel in Japan. Ieyasu, then, calmed down and declared a general pardon for the Ignatians acquitting them of any accuse. Then, our problem is basically to understand why, notwithstanding the general pardon, Rodrigues was forced to leave Japan and Pasio risked the same.

Be it noted that the facts we are reporting are taken from discordant sources, namely the *Relação* of the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* and Pasio’s letter, hence we are forced to make some hypotheses.

First, we must underline that the missing information in the *Relação* can be attributed to the purpose of that text. In other words, it is likely that the Jesuits did not have to or want to divulge evidences that could have damaged the name of the Japan mission and clearly the expulsion of a member of the order owing to his excessive involvement in Ieyasu’s financial transactions was one of them.³⁴³ Pasio unintentionally confirm this point when he wrote that although Rodrigues was sent to Macao ‘nenhuma

³⁴² See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [III], f. 338^v.

³⁴³ A shortened version was published as an appendix of the 1610 annual report. Cf. Rodrigues Giram, *Lettera Annua del Giappone del 1609 e 1610*, pp. 136-141.

cousa perde de sua honra, pois todos sabem que foy porada de Safioye e Toan'.³⁴⁴ At any rate, the answer to our problem can probably be found in a letter Rodrigues himself wrote twelve years later from his Macanese exile. Writing to the sixth General of the Society of Jesus, Muzio Vitelleschi, *Tçuzu* wrote:

‘Vim de Japam aqui desterrado pello Senhor da Tenca, primeiro que todos e em lugar de todos, com patente particular pera que ouvindo-se a morte do Senhor da Tenca que me mandou a instancia de huns meus adversarios seculares que tiveram grandes intentos de destruir a lej de deos e christandade contra os quaes eu tinha mão com o favor divino’.³⁴⁵

João Rodrigues’s letter is as interesting as it is reliable. We can easily put a name to the ‘adversarios’ he was referring to: Hasegawa Sahyōei and Murayama Tōan. If we follow *Tçuzu*’s statement along with the other two sources we quoted, we can draw our conclusions. Instead of expelling all the missionaries from Japan, which most likely would have put an end to the trade or at least seriously hindered the link between Macao and Nagasaki, Hasegawa proposed to Ieyasu to *strike one to educate one hundred*. After all, although Ieyasu used to rely on Rodrigues for the matters regarding the trade with Macao, by that time he could rely also on William Adams, the Dutch at Hirado, the Spaniards of Manila and the promise of a trade with New Spain. *Tçuzu* was a disposable man for Ieyasu, but still represented a great loss for the Society of Jesus.

It really seems that the *bugyō* thought everything through in order to obtain what he wanted without endangering his position. First, he had the Fathers agree on expelling Rodrigues as if it was their decision and then convinced Ieyasu that punishing *Tçuzu* was enough to hit the Society of Jesus, but not that hard of a blow to destabilize even more the relationship with Macao. Moreover, if it was not for Morejón who unveiled precious details of the meeting, the Ignatians might have thought that Hasegawa actually interceded in their favour with Ieyasu.

To corroborate our conclusion, we have a description of João Rodrigues made by Visitor Francisco Vieira in 1619. He wrote that Rodrigues ‘[t]eve grande entrada com Taicosama e com este imperador [...]. Errou em entremeter-se em coisas seculares

³⁴⁴ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], f. 338^v.

³⁴⁵ See João Rodrigues *Tçuzu* to General Muzio Vitelleschi, Macao, 31 October 1622. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 18 [I-II], f. 9.

e no governo de Nangasaqui. Tomou com isto alguma liberdade e criou muitos inimigos como Toan e Fasegaua. Estes perseguiram-no [...] e forçaram-no a sair do Japão’.³⁴⁶

* * *

In March 1610, then, João Rodrigues bid farewell to Japan, whereas Pasio was allowed to remain. As we saw, he had to face an actual crisis due to the sinking ship and piling debts. He had no other solution than to dismiss several *dōjuku*, close the seminar and some residences. As happened in the previous years, some Japanese gave to the missionaries an help commensurate to their own means, but ‘entre elles não há Senhores grandes, nem Christãos muito ricos, por a mayor parte destes terem acabado nas guerras passadas e outros mortos, e não se terem feitos outros de novo polla prohibição do Cubo’.³⁴⁷ In Macao the situation was not better. The loss of the cargo caused a general dearth of funds, which led the creditors of the Jesuits to knock at the college’s doors to solicit payments,³⁴⁸ yet a former coadjutor of the Society in Japan, Vicente Rodrigues, lent them 5’000 *taéis*.³⁴⁹

Contrary to the secular realism showed by Pasio, Diogo de Mesquita, an orthodox religious who never concealed his opposition to the participation in the silk trade, wrote to Acquaviva words that, if on the one hand had a positive effect on the general, on the other hand hide beneath the satisfaction of a strict religiosity the disastrous financial situation of the vice-province and disregard for the debts ran up by the mission:

‘[A] penuria tenho por abundancia e merce de Deos com que nos sustenta e livra de mil molestias e indecencias no proceder conforme al nosso Instituto, porque con a penuria cessão os faustos, cessão as fabricas impertinentes en terra tão instable, cessão os peditorios que nos fazem como a ricos e os presentes grandes que de nos esperão e costumamos a fazer a gentios e cristãos no que se gasta muito. [...]. [P]elo que não tenha V. P. pena, porque esta Crisandade e corpo da Companhia que nela esta, não há de perecer por falta do necessario, antes da abundancia há muito que temer, e se devemos alguma cousa ha por onde pagar, nem

³⁴⁶ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 25, f. 107^c. *Apud* Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

³⁴⁷ See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 15 March 1610. BL/Add. 9860, f. 204.

³⁴⁸ See Father Diogo Pinto to General Acquaviva, Macao, 24 January 1611. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [I], f. 4.

³⁴⁹ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [II], f. 268.

são dividas que nos desenquiem, nem desacreditem, porque são de pessoas que emprestão em certa maneira rogando e pera pagar quando podermos'.³⁵⁰

Despite his strong opposition to one of the leading features of the Society of Jesus in Japan, Mesquita was asked to go to Macao and negotiate the restoration of the commercial thread between Macao and Nagasaki, but eventually Father Rui Barreto was selected to go. The ship set off in April 1611, a calm year despite extemporary persecutions.³⁵¹ Although it was not an official voyage,³⁵² Mesquita stated that the Japanese invested a great sum of money in it,³⁵³ probably because neither Spanish ships nor Dutch ones arrived in Japan between 1610 and 1611.³⁵⁴ On the return voyage from Macao, however, the vessel wrecked in a storm off the Fujian coast and the survivors, Barreto included, were killed by the Chinese.³⁵⁵ Fortunately, the other envoy sent from Macao, Dom Nuno de Soutomaior, was aboard another vessel and arrived safely in Japan. He was received by Honda Masazumi and both parties agreed on the resumption of the trade on the basis it used to be carried on before André Pessoa, as testify the Japanese papers sent to the Captain Major Dom Diogo de Vasconcelos³⁵⁶ and to the authorities of Macao by Honda and Gotō Shōzaburō in August 1611.³⁵⁷ Judging from the surviving Portuguese documents, moreover, it would seem that from that moment it began to appear a separation between the interests of the *negotia animarum* and of the *negotia secularum*. Macao's *Vereadores*, in fact, delivered to Ieyasu an official letter stating that 'ainda que não queira ter Padre algum em seus reinos, ao menos naquella praya de Nangasaqi conceda à Nao que todos os annos ordinariamente vem, e aos Portugueses moradores de Nangasaqi huma terra, aqual seja dos Portugueses que vem comerciar como dos que residem e morão em Japão'.³⁵⁸

Consequently, if on the one hand starting from 1612 the official annual voyage that linked Macao and Nagasaki was officially resumed with the Great Ship of Captain Pedro Martins Gaio, on the other hand for the Society of Jesus the years 1611 and 1612

³⁵⁰ See Diogo de Mesquita to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 24 March 1611. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 12^v

³⁵¹ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 57, f. 132^v. Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, p. 369.

³⁵² Cf. RAH/Jes. *Legajo 21*, 9/7236 [I] f. 313.

³⁵³ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 12^v.

³⁵⁴ Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 69-70.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁶ Dom Diogo de Vasconcelos served as Captain Major of the surveillance fleet sent from Goa to protect Macao from the Dutch and to cooperate with Manila to expel the Hollanders from the Maluku Islands. Cf. Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

³⁵⁷ The Japanese documents regarding the resumption of the trade with Macao were translated and published by Boxer in *The Christian Century*, Appendix V, pp. 428-435.

³⁵⁸ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [I], f. 1.

were a time of great changes both regarding internal management and their behaviour in Japan. In the next chapter, firstly we are going to deal with issues inherent the relationship between members of the mission and then we shall see how the office of procurator evolved after João Rodrigues's expulsion and how Carlo Spinola carried on his duties in Nagasaki.

CHAPTER III

***OMNE REGNUM IN SE DIVISUM DESOLABITUR:* DISUNITY WITHIN THE JAPAN MISSION**

Introduction

As we briefly touched on earlier, during the 1610s several changes took place in the Japan mission of the Society of Jesus. As a matter of fact, juridically, the Vice-province of Japan became a province on 9 December 1608. As a consequence, the office of vice-provincial lapsed and new appointments turned out to be necessary.

Selecting a father for important roles such as visitor, provincial, vice-provincial or even rector depended not only on the qualities of the single members of the Society. Due to the incorporation of the Kingdom of Portugal into the Habsburg Crown, in South-East Asia, namely China, Japan and the Philippines, came into being situations difficult to handle from Europe. Matters of commerce overlapped continuously with missionary issues, leading to the constant opposition between agents of the *Padroado* and the *Padroazgo*. These rivalries sprout from the spectacular profits of the silk trade between China and Japan, but also from the appeal that the Chinese and Japanese missions had to the European people, both laymen and men of the cloth. To make oneself protagonist in territories so fascinating with abundant conversions or with a impressive death whose account would certainly ended up printed throughout Europe, represented a way to achieve immortal fame and to honour at once one's family, one's religious order and even one's country.

Accordingly, when the fifth Jesuit General Claudio Acquaviva made the selections for the brand new Province of Japan he knew he was dealing with a delicate matter. Acquaviva's choices fell on an Italian and a Portuguese, namely Francesco Pasio passed to be vice-provincial to visitor, whereas Valentim Carvalho was appointed first provincial of Japan.³⁵⁹ The patents did not reach Japan until 31 July 1611, when the

³⁵⁹ Cf. BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-55*, p. 50.

change to province effectively took place. Yet, afterwards both elections were strongly contested and turned out to be unfortunate for different reasons. As for now, suffice it to say that, although it is noticeable that Acquaviva tended to favour his Italian countrymen, he was trying to maintain balance in the appointment of positions of power, since he was aware of what kind of criticisms and disunity such appointments arouse.

To conclude this brief introduction to the chapter we selected a quote by Francis Bacon. The English philosopher and statesman described religion as the strongest bond of human society, which brings happiness to the community provided that religion itself is contained within the true bond of unity. Bacon thought that that unity could generate one fruit for the believers, namely: ‘peace; which containeth infinite blessings. It establisheth faith; it kindleth charity; the outward peace of the church, distilleth into peace of conscience; and it turneth the labors of writing, and reading of controversies, into treaties [*sic*, treatises] of mortification and devotion’.³⁶⁰ As we will see, disunity among the Japan Jesuits did not cause a war between the Ignatians, but it surely did not lead to peace of conscience or to treatises of devotion. On the contrary, a lot of paper was spent both to defend one’s country, with declarations born out of an emergent early nationalism, and to put the matter to rest for the good of the mission. Eventually, however, it was the Tokugawa *Bakufu* to eradicate definitely the issue from Japan.

III. 1. A political matter: Portuguese Fathers VS Spanish Fathers

“Estas dos fuertes naciones,
que, por nueva union hermanas,
la emulacion de sus glorias
hacia parecer contrarias”.

(Lope de Vega, *El Brasil Restituido*, 1625)

According to a collection of documents – evidently assembled by a member of the Society of Jesus – entitled *Testimonianze de’ Sommi Pontefici in favore della Compagnia di Gesù*, Pope Gregory XIII used to say that ‘tre cose specialmente ammirava nella Compagnia [...]. Tanta umiltà e modestia con una così variata ed eccellente dottrina. Tanta unione, e cospirazione di voleri in tanta diversità di nazioni e

³⁶⁰ See Bacon, *Essays, Civil and Moral*, ‘Of Unity in Religion’.

d'ingegni. Tanta continenza in una sí verde, e sí vivace gioventù dà quei piaceri che molto anche attraggono l'uman corpo, ancorché debole e fiacco [...].³⁶¹ Although it is not specified when Gregory XIII pronounced such words, his pontificate (1572-1585) fits perfectly in the timeframe that saw first the appearance of disunity among the Ignatians in Europe or in the *Estado da Índia*. As a matter of fact, either the pontiff's declaration is forged or he ignored completely what was going on between Portuguese and Spanish Jesuits.

As it is well known, the rivalry between Portuguese and Spaniards was not a product of Portugal's annexation to Spain in 1580. It has deeper historical reasons, but it is part of the human nature to gather in groups in order to seek protection and recognition and the belonging to the same region or country had always had a strong unifying effect. There are consequences, however, that come out of this categorizing attitude. One of these is to discriminate those belonging to another group.³⁶² The hope that the Society of Jesus could prevail over national identity had been fostered since its early days. To this end the first general had given a Frenchman charge of the *Collegio Romano*, assigned the Paris college to a Spaniard, and the Perugian college to a Fleming.³⁶³ What Loyola had tried to do was smoothing down the acrimony amongst the Ignatians by forcing them to have continual contacts, instead of making Jesuits from different countries avoid each other by remaining in their own birthplaces. So instead of fueling a cycle of hostility bred by long-standing stereotypes, Loyola tried to reduce the disparity between stereotypes and reality through contact with – so he hoped – a corresponding reduction in hostility.

Alessandro Valignano had to deal with the same issue even before he reached Goa. While in the college of São Roque in Lisbon, in fact, he explored the talents and character of each of the missionaries he was leading to Goa, to see how brethren composed of three nationalities (Portuguese, Spanish and Italian) fraternized with one another.³⁶⁴ He did his best to create union between them and, upon suggestion of the

³⁶¹ See BNCR/FGes. 1139, f. 11^v.

³⁶² Cf. Bodenhausen and Macrae, "Stereotype Activation and Inhibition", p. 7.

³⁶³ Cf. Clossey, *Salvation and Globalization in the Early Jesuit Missions*, p. 60.

³⁶⁴ See Visitor Valignano to the Secretary of the Society of Jesus Antonio Possevino, Lisbon, January 1574. ARSI, *Lus.* 66, ff. 42-43^v. Cf. *VMP I*, pp. 77-78.

Portuguese, invited Italians and Spaniards to learn a little of Portuguese, also by visiting hospitals and prisons.³⁶⁵

The visitor was the head of one of the larger number of missionaries – forty-one – which left Europe all at once. Before they set off, however, Valignano had to face the resistance of the Portuguese fathers of São Roque. As soon as he got to Lisbon, in fact, he wrote to Mercurian that those fathers ‘parlavano tanto risolutamente che non posseano ir tanti alla India, et che il Rè havrebbe pigliato a male che vi fussero andati tanti Spagnoli, et che bisognava prima provarli un anno qui in Portogallo, [and that] il Rè non havrebbe dato denari per tanti, né luogo nelle navi, et che era scandalo che andassero tanti’.³⁶⁶ It should also be noted that owing to the *Padroado*’s rights, starting with Mercurian, the Society had been trying to make relations between Rome and India more direct and independent exactly to avoid such political problems. The first step in this direction was the appointment of Valignano as visitor. The main purpose of this choice seems, in fact, to have been the freeing of the Indian province from an unwarranted tutelage on the part of the fathers in Portugal.³⁶⁷ In any case, eventually Valignano was able to handle the fathers in Lisbon and embarked for Goa.

Almost two years later, in December 1575, after having thought about it for a long time, he resolved to brief Mercurian about the same problem but more in details, as he had the chance to observe the behaviour of his Portuguese, Spanish and Italian confrères in Cochim.³⁶⁸ With regard to the Portuguese Jesuits, he noticed that as soon as they set foot in the Indies, they assumed a haughty attitude, and no longer carried out the duties that were expected from them, because ‘si veggono tra questa gente negra tutti diventano gentil’huomini et signori et non vogliono fare nessuno di quelli officii che facevano in Portogallo’.³⁶⁹

On the other hand, the Spanish fathers, the Castilians in particular, were disconsolate and repentant of having come to India. Valignano probed into the roots that generated such feelings and declared that maybe the problem lay on the posture the

³⁶⁵ Cf. *Sumario*, p. 14*.

³⁶⁶ See Visitor Valignano to General Mercurian, Lisbon, 28 January 1574. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [III], f. 189. Cf. *VMP I*, p. 67, n. 86.

³⁶⁷ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 7 [II], f. 194^v and f. 195^v. See also *VMP I*, p. 82.

³⁶⁸ See Visitor Valignano to General Mercurian, Cochim-Goa, 4 December 1575. ARSI, *Goa.* 47, ff. 42-58^v. See also *DIX 1575-1577*, pp. 143-219.

³⁶⁹ ARSI, *Goa* 47, f. 42^v. On the racial attitude within the Portuguese Overseas Empire see Boxer, *Relações raciais no Império Colonial Português 1415-182*, Rio de Janeiro, 1967.

Portuguese assumed toward Spanish fellows. The Portuguese, in fact, ‘naturalmente poco si ammassano colli castigliani, o sia per le guerre passate, o perché si temono quelle che possono venire per essere in molti luoghi confini,³⁷⁰ o perché ciasched’uno di queste nationi pretende et di valere et di sapere più degli altri, sempre si pungono et si motteggiano’.³⁷¹ In order to put a bridle on the effects of birthplaces on interpersonal behaviour, Valignano proposed three solutions. First, to send Italian fathers apt for leading roles, since Valignano noticed that the Italians not only were more welcomed by the Portuguese than the Spaniards but they were not influenced by political prejudices and thus ‘terranno più facilità et libertà di unire queste due nationi et insieme si pianterà in questa Provincia il modo soave di governare’.³⁷² Valignano could not know back then, but this advice would eventually cause the Portuguese to shift their complaints exactly from the Spaniards to the Italians. Second, Valignano suggested to the general to select Spanish missionaries among those coming from Valencia or Aragon, instead of Castile. Finally, he proposed that both Italians and Spaniards passed at least one year in the college of Coimbra in order to learn Portuguese and get acquainted with the Portuguese way.

Loyola and Valignano were implementing effective sociological practices, which now are studied and known topics, but back then were just product of experience and wits. In the case of intergroup hostility, in fact, the individual members of the category – Spain Jesuits – were recognized as being less negative than the category as a whole – the Spaniards, and it is assumed that the latter is adjusted in the direction of the former. Indeed, if cultural distance is not too large, as happens between Portugal and Spain, the more one group knows about the other group and particularly if members of each group know each other’s language, the more they perceive each other as similar, which can make contact rewarding, as hoped by Valignano.³⁷³ Perceived similarity, moreover, increases if there are common goals – the evangelization – or if one group cannot reach its goals without the help of the other group, which was the case of the Portuguese Assistancy.

³⁷⁰ Valignano was referring to both the situation in Asia, with the Philippines near China and Japan, and in South America, with Brazil and the confining Rio de la Plata’s region.

³⁷¹ ARSI, *Goa* 47, f. 42^v.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, f. 43.

³⁷³ Cf. Triandis and Trafimow, “Culture and its Implications for Intergroup Behavior”, pp. 376-378.

The process of exclusion of Spanish Fathers from the Portuguese Assistancy, which, as we saw, was already underway with D. Sebastião and would not be stopped by D. Henrique,³⁷⁴ had led Valignano to limit the problem without causing any scandal or endangering anybody. Exactly one year later, also the Provincial of India Rui Vicente,³⁷⁵ urged Mercurian not to stop sending to Goa Jesuits from the most different countries. He confessed his discontent about the order of excluding Spaniards from the Asian mission and invited the general to do something about it. Both Vicente and Valignano, in fact, were conscious of the factual impossibility for a small country as Portugal to provide enough manpower for the gigantic Portuguese Assistancy or for the Province of India alone.³⁷⁶ Valignano resumed the problem with just a few words: ‘perché l’India non produce soggetti et consuma molti, et la Provincia di Portogallo non può pur in parte sopplire’.³⁷⁷

If the problem was considered serious in the mid-1570s, the political union of the Iberian crowns took the debate to a whole new level. In Japan, for instance, when religious and commercial representatives from the Philippines made their appearance, Spanish fathers were caught between a rock and a hard place. Should they protect the mission or show loyalty to their country?³⁷⁸ Conscious of the problem, as early as 1574 Valignano proposed to Mercurian to assign the Spanish missionaries bounded for Japan only to ‘lugares muito remotos e distantes dos portos do mar de onde não possam ter nenhum tipo de comunicação com os castelhanos’.³⁷⁹ The problem did not affect only the Ignatians. In effect, Spaniards belonging to other religious orders, such as

³⁷⁴ This prohibition obviously included also the Oriental regions. On 24 December 1578, in fact, Mercurian addressed a letter to Valignano informing the Italian that he was trying to convince D. Henrique to revoke the prohibition for Spanish Fathers to Japan. See *DI XI 1577-1580*, pp. 467-469. Cf. Costa, *A Rivalidade luso-espanhola no Extremo Oriente*, pp. 483-485.

³⁷⁵ The Portuguese Rui Vicente (1523-1587) turned Jesuit in 1553 in Coimbra. He set off for India in 1574 where he held the position of provincial from that year until 1583.

³⁷⁶ See *DI XI 1577-1580*, pp. 34-35.

³⁷⁷ See ARSI, *Goa* 47, f. 42^v.

³⁷⁸ Cf. Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 485. Father Afonso de Lucena was particularly critic about this point with his Spanish colleagues. In 1598, for instance, wrote that the Spanish Jesuits ‘naturalmente falando fazem as partes de Castella e puxão quanto pode pollos seus reynos e isto sem falta e pecado nenhum a todos lhe parece bem que estejam qua frades por esta via dos Luções e lhe fazem os maiores agasalhados que pode ser [...]. E posto que o Padre V. Provincial [Pedro Gomez] he castelhano, não so tem aquela inclinação que tem os outros as cousas de Castella e se alguma cousa faz he por persuasão dos outros e por ser homem muito brando’. See Father Lucena to Assistant of Portugal João Álvares, Ômura, 20 October 1596. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 13 [I], f. 12. Two years later, Pedro Gomez wrote a letter in his defence, where it appears clearly that the help he offered to his countrymen was only normal courtesy and that he was as critic towards Spaniards arrival in Japan as the Portuguese were. See Vice-provincial Pedro Gomez to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 9 February 1598. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 13 [I], f. 123.

³⁷⁹ See *DI X 1575-1577*, p. 674.

Augustinians and Friars Minors, complained about how they were treated in Portuguese dominions. For example, in 1587, a group of fathers belonging to the Spanish patronage wrote the king a complaining letter about the difficulty of carrying on their mission in a city – Macao – where every decision was taken according to the ‘mandato de su Visorrey [...] y a la obediencia delos Padres Teatinos [i.e. the Jesuits]’.³⁸⁰ In the meanwhile, in Europe Spanish Fathers complained that their Portuguese colleagues were deliberately seeking to remove them from the Province of Portugal because of their national origins.³⁸¹ Five years later, Acquaviva directed a provincial inspector for the good of religion and the peace of the kingdom to punish any Jesuits in Portugal who affected nationalistic sentiments, an order he found it necessary to repeat the following year.³⁸²

The conflict between Spaniards and Portuguese climaxed with the Fifth General Congregation (1593–94), when Spanish dissidents used the Congregation to decentralize the Society by shifting certain powers from the general to the provincial congregations, but eventually Acquaviva succeeded in overriding their will.³⁸³ Evidently, then, the matter was not confined in the lucrative Asiatic regions, but differently from Europe, in India, China, Japan and the Philippines, the clout of the curia or of the secular powers was much weaker and solving this problematic while Portugal was part of the Habsburg domains turned out to be impossible. In fact, still in 1618, there were Jesuits stating that the Indies belonged to Portugal and consequently not only the Portuguese fathers should represent the governing body, but also the number of Portuguese missionaries should be higher than the other.³⁸⁴

³⁸⁰ See AGI, *Filipinas*, 79, N. 16, f. 1: ‘[...] mas aqui no le ay naydie que quiera, y si alguno quiere ni osa por miedos falsos, pues posponen todas las cosas al mandato de su Visorrey, ora sea el que fuere, y a la obediencia delos Padres Teatinos que en esto son todo para persuadir por aca, que solo lo que ellos hacen es lo que conviene, y no otra cosa.’

³⁸¹ According to the Portuguese Father Afonso de Lucena (1551-1623), during the generalate of the fourth General, Everard Mercurian, due to lack of union the Spanish Jesuits in Italy and Portugal were all sent back to Spain and the Portuguese were, therefore, reassigned to Portugal. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [I], f. 58^v.

³⁸² See Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise. The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond, 1540-1750*, p. 92.

³⁸³ See Clossey, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

³⁸⁴ See Visitor Francisco Vieira to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas [SOLI], Nagasaki, 3 September 1618. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 168^v: ‘Sejão V.s R.s certos que em quanto estas Provincias da India não tiverem a maior parte de subjeitos Portugueses, nunca poderá aver perfeita união, assi como no corpo humano não pode aver concordia nos humores, da qual nace a saude, se não ouver hum humor predominante, da mesma maneira, como os estrangeiros forem muitos e tantos como os Portugueses, logo ha bandosinhos, e desinquietações. E por conseguinte nas Missões que se fizerem de Europa para a India sempre hão de ser mais os Portugueses que os estrangeiros, se V.s R.s querem cá paz e união’.

In November 1595, however, Alessandro Valignano wrote three letters in eight days to Acquaviva about the division that was affecting the Society of Jesus due to nationalistic rivalries.³⁸⁵ The visitor wanted Acquaviva to know that some Portuguese fathers gathered around the common idea that the Province of India was in no need of foreigners' help and 'que con solos los portugueses se podrá remediar'.³⁸⁶ According to Valignano, the Portuguese Jesuits tried to prevent foreign fathers from coming to the Indies by founding their plea upon economic matters (the fact that the Portuguese Crown was obliged to pay a viaticum of 110 ducats per person), although they were directing their complaints in particular towards their Spaniards fellows.

Among the three letters, the third one is the most interesting, because it demonstrates that the Italian was actually justifying the position held by the Portuguese party, although he disagreed with the way the Lusitanian fathers advanced their requests:

'El principio desta desunión es quasi natural [...], entre los castellanos y portugueses porque, como son naciones confines, tuvieron muchas vezes entre sí guerra; y como repartieron entre sí por concessión del Papa Alexandro 6^o³⁸⁷ la conquista de todas las tierras incógnitas,³⁸⁸ en que tienen también sus controversias como apetitores de gloria y de tierras,³⁸⁹ tuvieron siempre entre sí una cierta manera de emulación. Mas después que vinieron los estados de Portugal al Rei Don Felipe, creció mucho esta emulación y poca unión entre ellos. Y como las passiones y afecciones naturales que hay entre naciones fácilmente entran también en la Religión, se con la gracia del espíritu y con la diligencia de los superiores no se moderan, por esso también de algunos años a esta parte fue esta emulación y poca unión creciendo entre los nuestros'.³⁹⁰

Acquaviva replied to Valignano on 28 March 1597. His letter shows particular concern towards the lack of unity between Portuguese and Spanish fathers. Namely, he wrote that 'questa veramente è cosa che mi tocca il core [...]; et se bene la radice principale

³⁸⁵ The three letters had been written on 10, 17, and 18 November. The manuscripts are in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 12 [III], ff. 295-297^v, ff. 307-308^v, and ff. 309-310^v, whereas the transcriptions in *DI XVII 1595-1597*, pp. 120-135, pp. 179-191, and pp. 191-200.

³⁸⁶ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 12 [III], f. 296.

³⁸⁷ Rodrigo Borja (1431-1503).

³⁸⁸ The Treaty of Tordesillas (June 1494) established a line of demarcation running north and south three hundred and seventy leagues west of Cape Verdes. This arrangement reserved for Portugal the discovery of Brazil, while it allowed Castilian ships to run across the Atlantic secure from the stronger Portuguese fleet.

³⁸⁹ The pertinent territories were especially Japan, Moluccas, Brazil and the Rio de la Plata regions. Cf. *DI XVII 1595-1597*, p. 193.

³⁹⁰ See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Goa, 18 November 1595. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 12 [III], f. 309.

nasce da principio quasi naturale, come V. R. dice, e cresce poi per gli interessi che hanno i secolari tra loro; non di meno lo Spirito, et vocatione della Compagnia deve prevalere'.³⁹¹ The general insisted on Valignano disciplining those Jesuits who allowed such behaviour. He informed the visitor that he had already reprimanded the Portuguese with respect to their demand to exclude the Spaniards from the Indies to the Italians advantage, but ended the letter with a cautious 'ma certo bisogna andar con molta scelta nel mandare'.³⁹²

Valignano, however, did not blame solely the ingrained antipathy among neighbours for the disunity among his fellows. Instead, he believed that the union of the crowns caused the growth of a kind of *emulación*. Valignano's use of the word has a clear Aristotelian reference. According to the Aristotelians, in fact, there are two types of emulation: the virtuous one, which seeks to imitate the good deeds of one's acquaintances, and the vicious one, which cannot suffer the prosperity, fortune, honour and glory of others. The latter is born out of envy and it is usually found in those who share the same profession. Aristotle, indeed, made a distinction between envy and emulation, speaking of the latter as an honest mood, whereas the former is a despicable feeling for despicable people. Both of them are born out of a comparison between two subjects, but emulation allows people to gain something, to improve them; on the other hand, the emulation born out of envy is well resumed by the German utterance *Schadenfreude*, to experience joy at another's misfortune or to lessen the amount of goodness in someone else.³⁹³

Although in 1605, Valignano made indeed clear the Aristotelian difference by writing about 'huma emulação não Santa, pera que lhe não chamem enveja',³⁹⁴ in this letter he made another distinction outside Aristotle's thought. The visitor first discerned between the natural passions ('passiones que podemos llamar naturales') and the vicious ones, the ones that are far apart from reason. He wrote that the Portuguese fathers are justified in their complaints, because blood once spilled for the conquering

³⁹¹ General Claudio Acquaviva to Visitor Alessandro Valignano, Roma, 28 March 1597. ARSI, *Lus.* 32, ff. 76-76^v.

³⁹² *Ibid.*

³⁹³ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, book II, chapters 10 and 11 and Salovey, *The Psychology of Jealousy and Envy*, pp. 9-12.

³⁹⁴ See Visitor Valignano to the Archbishop of Goa, Macao, 7 October 1605. BL/Add. 9860, f. 99.

of *Índia* was Portuguese-red and the men who fought to death for it were *Lusos*,³⁹⁵ consequently it was obvious for him that the honour and burden of governing the *Estado da Índia* should fall on their shoulders and that was as true for secular offices as it was for the religious ones. Moreover, it was not only a matter of fairness: ‘allende de lo que se debe a los trabajos que los portugueses passaram en la conquista y conservación de la India, la razón está mostrando que en los lugares que son de sus propios naturales y adó el cuerpo de los nuestros es también de portugueses, mejor gobernarán ellos y harán mucho más fructo que otros de naciones extranjeras’.³⁹⁶ We concede that Valignano remained faithful to this principle until – at least – the year before his passing. In 1605, in fact, he wrote similar words to Acquaviva, declaring his gratitude to Portugal:

‘Tenho grandes obrigações à nação Portuguesa que sempre me mostrou tanto amor e respeito assi os de casa como os de fora sofrendome de mais de trinta annos a esta parte neste governo, e no da India mais de 21 annos com que me tem posto hum ferrete para até morte os amar e servir [...]; mas porque tambem me parece que [...] seria enorme infidelidade e iniustica que se usaria com ella e com a Coroa real de Portugal, e Nação Portuguesa por instrumento seu para fazer tam abalizados cousas em seu serviço em todas estas partes Orientais defendendo e estendendo sua Santa Ley e fazendo tam grande converçam e christandade em todas as partes. E isto com grande espalhamento de seu sangue e nam menos trabalhos e gastos de suas fazendas e pessoas parece cousa impia, nam soo iniusta quererem vir outros agora pretender tomar a honra e o proveito ganhado com tanto custo.’³⁹⁷

It is worth underlining that Valignano’s thought apparently was not received either in Rome or in Japan. In 1612, in fact, one of the Portuguese fathers who got involved the most in this issue, Afonso de Lucena, urged the Assistant of the Portuguese Province to send to Japan capable Portuguese fathers to be Superiors rather than skilled foreign fathers. And he added that ‘pera a união desta provincia convem que ordinariamente os Superiores sejam de Portugal. E saiba que inda que nosso Padre e V. R. tenham outro conceito nunca a vera união se assi não for’.³⁹⁸ Also Father Francisco Pires expressed similar ideas to those of Valignano. Differently from what stated by Lucena, who had in

³⁹⁵ Something really similar appears in the 11th chapter of the *Capitulos do Estado da Nobreza* of the Cortes of Tomar. The Portuguese aristocracy wanted that the captaincies of ‘Mina, Santhome, Cabo Verde, Brasil, & as mais ilhas se provejão pelo modo antigo a fidalgos, pois ellas as ganharão & defenderão’. See *PMGP*, f. 100.

³⁹⁶ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 12 [III], f. 309.

³⁹⁷ See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Macao, 18 January 1605. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [III], ff. 1-1^v.

³⁹⁸ See Father Afonso de Lucena to Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Ōmura, 17 February 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [I], f. 103^v.

mind the union amongst the Jesuits, Pires thought that the Superiors of the province should be Portuguese because of the trade between Macao and Nagasaki and the profits that came along.³⁹⁹

The disunity between Portuguese and Spanish Jesuits, then, had mostly historical roots, which were evidently almost impossible to eradicate, as Alessandro Valignano was forced to admit in November 1593.⁴⁰⁰ Loyola and Valignano thought also that sharing a common goal might prompt sympathy and solidarity to the detriment of dividing feelings and they tried to smooth that dissent away by making foreign missionaries familiarize with the Portuguese language and way of life. As we saw, this strategy did not bear the wished fruits. In effect, it has been argued that contact does not always lead to favourable attitude change. Among the necessary conditions for favourable, contact-induced change, for instance, we find equal status and intergroup cooperation. Stereotypes, however, are unlikely to be changed by contact if the contact is perceived as consistent with the stereotype.⁴⁰¹ Contact, in other words, may support rather than negate the stereotype, and that is indeed what happened in the Indies, where the Portuguese used to complain about the attitude adopted by the Spaniards. Moreover, with regard to equality in status, Valignano knew that the Portuguese in India would never accept to be commanded by a Spaniard and thus wrote to Acquaviva that ‘no conviene en ninguna manera hazerse en la Provincia de la India Provincial castellano’.⁴⁰²

At any rate, with the turn of the century there was the gradual disappearance of Spanish fathers from the Chinese and Japanese missions, due in particular to missing replacement for the oldest and deceased fathers.⁴⁰³ Along with the decrease of the

³⁹⁹ See Father Francisco Pires to Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 10 March 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [II], f. 214: ‘Como o remedio desta Provincia depende tanto deste contrato dos Portugueses, [...] nos podem dar de ganho dez, doze, e quinze mil cruzados, pera noso sustento, e pagarmos nosa dividas, convem que o Superior Universal seja Portugues, que lhes tome a benevolentia, como fazia o Padre Francisco Cabral, eo Padre Gaspar Coelho, porque ja dos Padres Estrangeiros, entendem que não olhas a honra del Rei, e proveito dos Purtugueses’.

⁴⁰⁰ Cf. *DI XVI 1592-1594*, pp. 259-260: ‘[H]a V.P. de entender (como ya en parte sabrá) que entre portugueses y castellanos uvo siempre mucha emulación y discención por ser naciones confines y que tuvieron muchas guerras entre sí; y aunque agora están todos debaxo de hun mismo rey, todavía no sólo no cessó esta desunión, mas antes se acrescentó mucho, porque los portugueses con estar debaxo de la corona de Castilla y quedar sin rey proprio y natural, naturalmente quedaron mui sentidos, y hasta nuestro Señor lo remediar no podrá ser otra cosa’.

⁴⁰¹ Cf. Rothbart, “Category Dynamics and the Modification of Outgroup Stereotypes”, pp. 45-64.

⁴⁰² See *DI XVI 1592-1594*, p. 260.

⁴⁰³ The last Spaniard to having reached the *Estado da Índia* was Diogo Pantoja, who was destined for the Chinese mission, where he worked from 1599 until his death in 1616. He was the first and only Spanish

Spaniards, the number of the Italians grew. This augmentation rebounded on the relationship between Portuguese and Italian Jesuits, which eventually affected also Spinola when he received the appointment to procurator.

III. 2. ‘Padre daimio e Padre tanda’: Portuguese Fathers VS Italian Fathers

Differently from what happened with the Spanish Jesuits, when it came to deal with the Italians the heart of the matter was the role filled within the hierarchy of the Society of Jesus. As we saw, in 1595 Valignano wrote to Acquaviva that the Portuguese got along with their Italian confrères and thus it was advisable to send more Italians than Spaniards, as it actually happened. According to the proceedings of the Fourth Indian Provincial Congregation held in Goa at the end of October 1594,⁴⁰⁴ the Italians were so zealous in the promotion of the Christian faith that the Portuguese could not deny them a place in the Indies. In Valignano’s opinion, however, the Italians were exempted from the critics only because he and Acquaviva were both Italian.⁴⁰⁵ Yet, from an historical and sociological point of view, it seems fair to think that, at least at that time, the Portuguese would rather have Italians instead of Spaniards among them. We have a witness that can corroborate our view. It is a document written in the 1600s probably by the Assistant of Portugal, Father João Álvares, which faced directly the problems caused by nationalistic divisions.⁴⁰⁶

The author began with the presentation of some facts which he considered certain and verified. He stated that the *Estado da Índia* was so big that it could not be looked after only by Portuguese Jesuits and added that the members of the Italian Province were the most apt to help the Portuguese in attending to the evangelization of the *Estado*, because ‘como a experiencia o tem mostrado por que de todas as nações a gente italiana, he a que mais se sabe acomodar aos nossos portugueses’.⁴⁰⁷ Valignano

father who worked in the Chinese vice-province. For a thorough list of all the missionaries sent to the Indies see BPE, *Cód. CXVI/2-11*, n.º 44, ff. 3-22^v. Cf. also Costa, *A Rivalidade luso-espanhola no Extremo Oriente*, pp. 494-495.

⁴⁰⁴ See *DI XVI 1592-1594*, pp. 633-663. Acquaviva answered only in 1596, that is after Valignano sent his letter but before the General actually received it.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 12 [II]*, f. 296.

⁴⁰⁶ See BNCR/FGes. 1255, File 46 - Exponuntur causae dissensionum, quae in Indiis oriri possunt inter Socios lusitanos et externos. Suggestuntur remedia opportuna, ff. 238-243.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ivi*, f. 238.

probably could not agree more. In 1605, in fact, he wrote to Álvares that the disunity he saw between Italians and Portuguese was innocuous, because it lacked the historical basis of the rivalry between Spaniards and Portuguese.⁴⁰⁸

At any rate, it is likely that the opinions expressed by João Álvares were a product of political shrewdness and caution. Álvares's occupation, in fact, was to aid the general about all the matters regarding the Portuguese Assistancy. But, differently to what was happening in the Indies, in Álvares's case *he* was the foreigner. He was advising the Italian Acquaviva, while in Italy. Then, it is somehow expected that he found a little room to praise the Italians. Furthermore, in the attempt of justifying why he was suggesting to send less foreign missionaries to the Indies, he showed how those few Portuguese residing in the Roman college were loved and accepted, whereas 'se agora no Collegio Romano ouvesse trinta ou quarenta portugueses, que fizessem corpo (poes naturalmente os da mesma nação, mais facilmente se ajuntão entre si, maxime quando se achão entre estrangeiros) claro esta, que avião de ser mais notados e não tam recebidos e amados'.⁴⁰⁹ To better describe how the Indies were such a complicated place he used a curious metaphor:

'Isto tudo presuposto como verdadeiro digo, que as nossas provincias da India são como huma arca de Noes em que se recolherão animais de varias castas assi os sogeitos de que se constão aquellas provincias são varios, huns nascidos na India; outros Europeos. E dos Europeos huns entrados na India, outros mandados de Europa.'⁴¹⁰

From these three groups, derived three types of disunion, the same outlined by Valignano in the 1595-triptych of letters to Acquaviva,⁴¹¹ but it is the third one that deserves more attention: the disunion that lures between Portuguese and Jesuits of other nationalities.

He analysed the issue to provide a solution by stressing the flaws of each of the two groups starting from his fellows Portuguese. Among the various faults he enumerated, it is important to us to report a specific feeling – a bitterness – that affected those Lusitanian fathers who suffer in watching foreign Jesuits receive the higher ranks.

⁴⁰⁸ See Visitor Valignano to the Assitant of Portugal Álvares, Macao, 24 January 1605. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], ff. 154-155.

⁴⁰⁹ BNCR/FGes. 1255, f. 242^v.

⁴¹⁰ *Ivi*, f. 240.

⁴¹¹ The three types of disunion were: 1. between Portuguese fathers and those Jesuits born in the Indies (*filhos da India*); 2. between the Portuguese-born Jesuits who entered the Society in Europe and those who entered directly in India; 3. between Portuguese Fathers and foreign Fathers.

We will see shortly that also Valignano underlined this attitude and how he defined it, but for now suffice it to say that Portuguese's complaints had a factual basis. Their critics, in fact, pointed also to the duration of the appointments, which often turned out to be long-life occupations, contrarily to the habit of the Society which contemplated substitutions each three or four years in every level of the hierarchy.⁴¹² Valignano, for example, was appointed visitor in 1573 and, except for the four-year hiatus of his provincialate, he remained in charge until his death. Also Francesco Pasio passed from the post of vice-provincial to that of visitor and died while filling it. At any rate, the solution provided by Álvares was to send to the Indies only virtuous and foreigners-friendly Portuguese, in other words a kind of missionary who 'não chejra a humor national'.⁴¹³

Regarding the foreigners, on the other hand, he deemed that the problem was quantitative in the first place. Sending together a lot of foreign missionaries gave them the opportunity and need to unite beneath the common feeling of being outsiders. Moreover, Álvares reported that foreign Ignatians used to complain about their destination, since the most of them wished to go to China and Japan, but were stuck in India instead.⁴¹⁴ The assistant recommended that the foreigners bound for the *Estado* were provided of the necessary qualities; respectful of the provincial's order and possibly that they had already finished all the academic courses.⁴¹⁵ But there was a directive that the Portuguese considered too unfair, an order issued from Rome that forbade the provincial to expel foreign fathers without previous consultation with Rome.⁴¹⁶ This meant that if the provincial found a missionary unworthy of the Society, he had to wait at least four or five years before he could actually dismiss him.⁴¹⁷ No

⁴¹² Cf. Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, pp. 243-244, Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, pp. 74-76 and Father Francisco Pires to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 26 January 1614. ARSI, *Jap. Sin 16 [I]*, ff. 3-3^v: 'A 3.^a [topic] ou primeira por sua importancia he que Nosso Padre devia determinar que en Japão se muden os Superiores particularmente Universal cada 3 ou 4 anos, como nas demais partes de Europa por muitos inconvenientes que se seguem do contrario a Companhia, porque como Roma está tão longe primeiro que Nosso Padre seja avisado pera por remedio algumas cousas pasão primeiro quatro ou cinque anos, e as vezes mais antes de haver resposta'. Alden showed that between 1546 and 1616, the Japanese mission was the one where the average length of provincial's terms was the longest, 9.7 years, against the 9.0 of China, 6.6 of Brazil, 5.5 of Goa and 3.8 of Portugal, the only province which fully respected the *Constitutions*.

⁴¹³ See BNCR/FGes. 1255, f. 241.

⁴¹⁴ *Ivi*, ff. 240^v-241.

⁴¹⁵ *Ivi*, f. 241^v.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁷ The case of Valentim Carvalho well illustrates how long it took for a father to be dismissed. He was appointed provincial in 1611; in 1612 the first criticisms against his rule were sent to Rome, but he was dismissed only in October 1617, when Vitelleschi's dismissal letter reached Macao.

wonder that the Portuguese party felt compelled to protest about this point. Álvares suggested to revoke the order because ‘os Portugeses semtem muito esta exceção, e em quanto ella durar, sempre geremão. Por onde convem *pro bono pacis*, e igualdade com todos, que o Provincial da India tenha enteja faculdade que dantes tinha *dimittendi omnes non professos*’.⁴¹⁸

Non professos were those Jesuits who still had not done the *professione ad quatuor votorum*, i.e. the vow *circa missiones* that distinguishes the Society of Jesus from the other missionary orders. It was the Jesuit higher ambition to be granted the ultimate profession, since only a few of them had the prerequisites to reach that grade. It was an achievement that glorified not only the Ignatian who received it, but also the country to which that Ignatian belonged. As we saw, Álvares reported the Spanish and Italian fathers used to complain about remaining in India while destined for China and Japan. This is a probing point, since this topic has always been approached from a different point of view. In 1601, Valignano explained to Acquaviva what he considered to be a long-standing issue, i.e. the habit of the Goa Jesuits to hold there literate Portuguese fathers and to send to China or Japan the foreigners.⁴¹⁹ This tendency affected the missions with a consequent lack of Portuguese professed fathers.⁴²⁰ Earlier in 1594, also Francesco Pasio wrote to Acquaviva about the same matter. The general wrote back that:

‘[I]l rimedio che V. R. propone di mandar alcun numero di soggetti di bone parti et lettere de Portuguesi, et Italiani che in numero eccedessero, o avanzassero gli altri, è difficile, et molto piú il mandar da Portogallo soggetti eminenti perché veramente la Provincia è essausta; pure lo scrivo al P. Visitatore Valignano et a quello dell’India,⁴²¹ oltre i soggetti che si son mandati col P. Gil de la Matta⁴²² (de’ quali il P. è stato servito di levar il P. Giacomo Vicarii Italiano

⁴¹⁸ BNCR, *Ibid.*, f. 243.

⁴¹⁹ See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 3 March 1601. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 65.

⁴²⁰ Valignano proposed the same issue two years later, when he complained again about this tendency of keeping missionaries bound for the Oriental missions in India. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], ff. 142-144. Bishop Luís Cerqueira expressed the same bewilderment to Acquaviva some years before, in 1598. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 13 [III], f. 204^v. Nevertheless, the complaints were not limited to the interruption of the missionaries’ flow. In 1615, for example, Afonso de Lucena accused the Fathers in Goa to keep there books sent from Europe bound for Japan. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [I], f. 143^v, quoted in Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, p. 611, note 133.

⁴²¹ Nicolau Pimenta.

⁴²² Father Gil da Mata (1547-1599) was sent to Rome as Procurator of the Japanese in mission in 1592.

soggetto d'ottimo spirito, et di rare parti)⁴²³ quel che si potrà fare per un paio di Portughesi di parti segnalate,⁴²⁴ che spero saranno per ogni cosa'.⁴²⁵

Thus, the problem of having such a small number of notable Portuguese fathers beyond Goa was not only a consequence of keeping the better ones in India, but lay in an insufficiency belonging to Portugal itself. According to the catalogue of the Japanese Vice-province written up in October 1603,⁴²⁶ there was in Japan a total of 119 Jesuits, between fathers (53) and brothers (66); of these only 18 were professed fathers: six Portuguese,⁴²⁷ seven Spaniards,⁴²⁸ and five Italians.⁴²⁹ Only two years before, however, there was only a Portuguese professed father, Valentim Carvalho and he was about to leave for Macao.⁴³⁰ Accordingly, Valignano wrote that 'aquí hai agora solamente ocho Padres Professos los quatro Italianos que son el Padre Francesco Pasio V. Provincial, el Padre Organtino Soldo, el Padre Celso Confaloniero y yo. Y otros tres son Castellanos, que son el Padre Francisco Calderon, el Padre Melchior de Mora, y el Padre Pero Ramon, y el octavo es el Padre Valentim Carvalho Portugues'.⁴³¹ The quantitative augmentation of Portuguese fathers in only two years is ascribable to Valignano's resolutions. The Italian, in fact, decided to grant the final profession to two Portuguese out of six fathers,⁴³² although none of them did complete the four-year course of Theology, normally a prerequisite to take the ultimate vow.⁴³³ This is the umpteenth

⁴²³ Acquaviva did not know, but the Italian Father Giacomo de Vicariis who had sailed from Lisbon on 10 April 1596 together with Carlo Spinola died en route for India on 27 July.

⁴²⁴ Here we did not understand exactly what Acquaviva meant. The doubt is whether he was referring to the two Portuguese who travelled along with de Vicariis – Gaspar Afonso and Jorge Pereira – or he was talking about sending other Portuguese in future voyages.

⁴²⁵ General Acquaviva to Father Francesco Pasio, Rome, 28 March 1597. ARSI, *Lus.* 32, ff. 77-77^v.

⁴²⁶ *Catálogo das pessoas da Viceprovincia da China e Jappão, com os graos e officios que têm, de Outubro de 603. TCJ*, pp. 441-455.

⁴²⁷ Bishop Luís Cerqueira, João Rodrigues *Tçuzu*, Matheus de Couros, Bartolomeu Gómes, Francisco de Paiva and Jerónimo Rodríguez. Bishop Cerqueira was included in this catalogue despite he was in charge of the bishopric of Japan and was not an actual member of the Jesuit mission.

⁴²⁸ Belchior de Mora, Pedro da Cruz, Francisco Calderon, Garcia Garcés, Baltasar de Torres, Pedro Morejon and Pedro Ramón.

⁴²⁹ Francesco Pasio, Celso Confalonieri, Carlo Spinola, Organtino Ghecchi Soldo and Pietro Paolo. To make a comparison, in China – i.e. Macao, Peking, Nanking, Nan Chang and Shao Zhou – there were 14 professed fathers (nine Portuguese, two Spaniards and three Italians) out of a total of 75 Jesuits.

⁴³⁰ Valentim Carvalho (1559-1630) left Japan in March 1601 and remained Rector of the College until 1609.

⁴³¹ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 65. The scarcity of Portuguese Professed of the four vows was stressed also by Bishop Cerqueira in 1599. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 20 [III], f. 53^v.

⁴³² Afonso de Lucena and Diogo de Mesquita.

⁴³³ In 1616, Visitor Francisco Vieira wrote to the new General Muzio Vitelleschi about the instructions the Acquaviva sent him along with the appointment as visitor. Vieira asked for clarification about the necessary requirements a father in China and Japan was supposed to have in order to be admitted *ad professionem 4or votorum*. Namely, he wrote that 'ainda que não tenho visto as cartas do Geral pera os Visitadores passados, maxime pera o Padre Alexandre por estarem todos estes papeis em Japão, acho

time for Valignano to dispose of the rules of the Society in order to ameliorate the standards of the Japanese mission. The visitor, in fact, preferred to make use of Jesuits who could cope with Japanese language and customs rather than fathers graduated in Theology.⁴³⁴ Most likely, Valignano took this decision because he knew how valued the hierarchy was in the Japanese culture. This aspect is well underlined by the substantives *sensei*⁴³⁵ (teacher) or *senpai*⁴³⁶ (older colleague) which denote someone who was born, or was there, before (*saki*⁴³⁷), therefore someone who deserves respect and reverence because of his experience and better knowledge. In any case, even though Valignano did not actually break any of the rules set forth in the Constitutions,⁴³⁸ in December 1602 Acquaviva impeded those promotions.⁴³⁹

Acquaviva's opposition notwithstanding, what really counts here is Valignano's commitment to the Portuguese fathers. He logically summarized his conception of the matter by stating that 'por ser esta Provincia de Portugueses, son los Professos

comtudo informação do Padre Provincial Valentim Carvalho e de outros Padres Consultores, que concorrerão com o Padre Alexandre Valignano em consultas *de promovendis ad gradus*, que elle por particular declaração, ou dispensação, praticava e promovia *ad professionem 4.or votorum* alguns Padres com alguma cousa menos de saber, e d'estudo, do que a formula 3.^a *de promovendis ad gradus*, e o rigor das Constituições geralmente requerem: V. G. com tre anos de Theologia, tres anos e alguns meses mais, ou tres anos e meyo e com exame que mostava saberem ultra mediocritatem absolute, ou hum pouco mais de mediocridade. E isto iulgando que bastaria este saber pera profissão de 4.or votos em Provincia que por rezão de suas missões importantissimas e urgentes occupaões na Christandade, he forçada a lhes acudir mais depressa com operarios, e tambem emfaticada parece racionavel e bem fundada; mas comtudo como não vi *in scriptis* esta moderação, e desejo não sair hum ponto da vontade de V.P. humilmente peço me avise'. Visitor Francisco Vieira to General Muzio Vitelleschi, Macao, 7 December 1616. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 26.

⁴³⁴ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], f. 65^v: '[A]mbos tienen entre los nuestros, y los forasteros mui buena openion, y tienen partes para gobierno [...]. Y con la lengoa y grande experiencia que tienen y ser tan conocidos y amados delos Iappones ayudan en esta V. Provincia mucho, parecia cosa estraña, y no tan justa alos ojos del pueblo ver que otros mas mançebos, y que no tienen ninguna experiencia de Jappon se hagan Professos y tengan su lugar en la Congregacion, y que estos que governaron siempre, se queden fuera se no se hallaren ser Reitores'.

⁴³⁵ 先生

⁴³⁶ 先輩

⁴³⁷ 先

⁴³⁸ Cf. *Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinæ Et Hispanicæ Cum Earum Declarationibus*, Fifth Part - *De lo que Toca al Admitir, ó Incorporar en la Compañía* – Cap. II – *De las Cualidades de los que Han de Ser Admitidos*, p. 175: 'Quien tuviese en el Derecho canónico doctrina suficiente, ó otras partes señaladas, de las cuales pudiese suplirse lo que falta al studio de Teología, podría sin ello admitirse á Profesion de tres Votos, y algunas personas señaladas tambien de cuatro, aunque esto no se debe estender'. The italic is ours. The otras partes señaladas in this case were the linguistic skill of the two fathers and their long field experience in Japan.

⁴³⁹ Acquaviva's prohibition was reported by Francesco Pasio in 1606. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], ff. 247-248.

Portugueses mui pocos, y de razon parece que avia de ser más en numero de ellos que todos los mas'.⁴⁴⁰

As a matter of fact, although Acquaviva would not approve the two promotions, in October 1601, Valignano wrote that seven new professed fathers were then in Japan, yet the Spaniards were still in the majority.⁴⁴¹ Although the Portuguese professed were not as many as they wished to be, by the end of the following year there was harmony in the Asian missions. Valignano, in fact, wrote hopefully to the general assuring him that in Japan 'se vive con mucha unión'.⁴⁴² This was the first and last time that he let himself be optimistic about this issue.

Alessandro Valignano eventually left Japan in January 1603. He wrote other letters regarding this subject from Macao right until his death (20 January 1606), but he did not live enough to see how worse the situation would.

Before leaving Japan, in fact, Valignano took two decisions which did not win the approval of the whole Jesuit party in the *Estado da Índia*: he confirmed Francesco Pasio as the vice-provincial in Japan and appointed another Italian⁴⁴³ as the founder of the brand new Malabar Province.⁴⁴⁴ Pasio himself warned Rome about the perilous situation that was developing. Differently from the past, he was now as worried about the lack of Spanish Fathers as he was about the growing importance that the Italians were acquiring in the Japan Vice-province.

Pasio was well aware that the reason why in Japan there were few Portuguese Jesuits was the amplitude of the Portuguese Assistancy. He was also aware that fathers

⁴⁴⁰ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 65^v. Afterwards, Valignano explained how the foundation of the College of Macao was conceived precisely for this purpose.

⁴⁴¹ See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 24 October 1601. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 83^v: 'Este ano tambien hizimos siete professos de quatro votos que fueron los Padres Francisco Rodriguez y Juan Rodriguez Portugueses, y los Padres Garcia Garces, Pero dela Cruz, Balthazar de Torres, y Pero Morejon Castellanos, y el P. Pietro Paulo Italiano, que eran todos hombres de mas de 20 anos dela Compañía, virtuosos e letrados y que merecian bien este grado y todos mui buenas lenguas de Japon.'

⁴⁴² See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Arima, 24 December 1602. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 109.

⁴⁴³ Alberto Laerzio (1557-1630).

⁴⁴⁴ It has to be admitted that the complaints of the Portuguese fathers were not inconsistent. When Laerzio was appointed Provincial he brought back from Europe 31 Italians out of a contingent of 60 missionaries, and, to the chagrin of his Portuguese subjects, immediately assigned several Italians to administrative posts in the new Province, e.g. Nicola Spinola as Rector of Quilon. See Alden, *op. cit.*, p. 268. Nonetheless, the Malabar Jesuits 'could not do without him. From the Archbishop to the Novices, all loved him [...]. Yet exaggerated nationalism, and, perhaps, the petty feelings that small men are apt to nurse against giants, seriously threatened the peace of the Province'. See Ferrolí, *The Jesuits in Malabar*, vol. 1, pp. 378-380.

of different nationalities were to be sent to Japan in order to compensate for this scarcity and here lay his anxiety and his plead to Acquaviva. It was necessary – Pasio put forward – that Spanish professed fathers should fill this lack in Japan because ‘si no vinieren Castellanos, an de venir muchos Italianos ansi como vinieron estes años, y si esto ansi fuere, la natural aversion que hasta agora los Portugueses an tenido alos Castellanos, convertienlaan contra los Italianos, principalmente si fueren personas de ser, y que tengan officios de emportança, porque parecerà alos Portugueses que los Italianos lles vienen quitar lo que es suyo’.⁴⁴⁵ That is why – he glossed – the highest positions of the Society in the *Estado da Índia* should be granted to Portuguese fathers. We ignore whether it was a direct consequences of Pasio’s words, but in 1610 King Filipe II forbid the Italian missionaries to embark for the Indies and ordered the repatriation of those already in mission.⁴⁴⁶ The order, however, had no consequences.

As we saw, in the early 17th century the Spaniards gradually disappeared from the China and Japan missions. Parallel to this decrease, the number of the Italians grew and this augmentation rebounded on the relationship with the Portuguese, as Pasio and Valignano feared. In effect, the former visitor had to cope with this problem in 1599, when he received a letter from Acquaviva, who recommended Valignano to substitute the old Spanish Vice-provincial Pedro Gomez with his companion Francesco Pasio. By that time, owing to Gomez’s advanced age, Pasio had already been acting as *de facto* vice-provincial. Nevertheless, Valignano wrote to Acquaviva that it was not a good decision. Firstly, because Gomez was in good terms with Terazawa Hirotaka, and second because ‘moralmente se entende que no se tomara bien ser nombrado por Viceprovincial, y que desconfiaran desso assi los Portugueses, como los Castellanos, porque parecera cosa dura ser governados de dos italianos, siendo el uno viceprovincial y el otro visitador’.⁴⁴⁷ Eventually, despite Valignano’s resolution, in 1600 Gomez died and Pasio replaced him as vice-provincial.

The situation got even worse when the patents for the appointments of the brand new province arrived in Japan. Lusitanian Jesuits, in fact, concentrated their animosity towards the Italians in the figure of the new visitor, Francesco Pasio, who filled the post

⁴⁴⁵ See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 22 October 1606. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [III], ff. 247^v-248.

⁴⁴⁶ Cf. BPE, *Cód. CXV/2-8*, n.º 9, f. 16.

⁴⁴⁷ See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 20 February 1599. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 13 [III], f. 255.

of vice-provincial from 1600 to 1611 and then was appointed visitor. Although Italian Fathers like Organtino saw Pasio's appointment as the perfect choice for the good of the mission,⁴⁴⁸ the Portuguese Francisco Pires left behind words that give us an idea of the Portuguese attitude:

‘Tem fama o Padre Francesco Pasio que he pouco afeiçoado aos Portugueses, particularmente nos de partes, e polo contrario favorecer, e autorizar en tudo aos Padres Italianos aos quais fez pasar logo a Japão acabados os estudos em Amacao. E aos Padres Portugueses deteve la con titulos de Reitor, mestres, ou Procuradores com que desouou esta Provincia dos bons sojeitos Portugueses, asi elle como o Padre Alexandre detendo huns que vinhão, e mandando outros de Japão pera a China quando estavam no melhor da lingua pera sirvirem [...].⁴⁴⁹ Con estarem quatorze Padres Italianos em Japão, os dez estão em residentias, e estas das melhores, bem providas cada hum per si corre ja annos hum modo de falar em Japão de Padre *Daimio* e Padre *Tanda*,⁴⁵⁰ que he Padres fidalgos e comus. Os Italianos geralmente são os que se querem tratar fidalgamento no modo de comer, e vestir etc.a esta conta parece disse o Padre Celso [Confalonieri] Italiano que escrevera a Europa a N. P. que era bom mandar Padres Italianos letrados pera estar nas residentias graves, e Padres Portugueses casoistas pera correr as aldeas por serem robustos [...]. Ha entre os Japois uma pratica que quem quierem agradar ao Padre Francesco Pasio lhe não diga mal de Padre Italiano porque o ouve com muita pena, e toda a maneira de queixume, e polo contrario os ouve con facilidade quando he contra algum Padre Portugues’.⁴⁵¹

During the second decade of the 17th century, however, the nascent rivalry between Portuguese and Italians was inhibited by the misgovernment of Valentim Carvalho. In this specific case, there is no uncertainty about how badly Carvalho carried out his duties, since we can rely upon the testimonies left also by those Portuguese Jesuits who joined in the common criticism of the Father Provincial.⁴⁵² A line by Visitor Francisco

⁴⁴⁸ In 1607, Organtino wrote to Acquaviva that the Japanese mission needed neutral Fathers Superiors in order to smooth disunity between Jesuits of different nations. Therefore, he thought that assigning Pasio to the visitor post was the best solution also because he was ‘persona di buone parti, e molto experimentato nelle cose di Giapone’. Cf. Father Organtino to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 28 March 1607. ARSI, *Ibid.*, f. 279.

⁴⁴⁹ Most likely, this is a reference to Valentim Carvalho.

⁴⁵⁰ The two Japanese words are *daimyō* 大名 – literally “great name” but it is roughly the same as feudal lord – and *tada* 唯 – which can be translated with “commoner” or “usual”.

⁴⁵¹ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [III], f. 213.

⁴⁵² Afonso de Lucena, probably the harshest critic of Carvalho, wrote that ‘a todos os Padres de Japão assi portugueses como estrangeiros tem desgostado e descontentado e até ao seu proprio companheiro [Gabriel de Matos] com quem elle pretende estar bem e contentallo’. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [III], f. 279. The other critics were: Francisco Pires, Mateus de Couros, Gabriel de Matos, Jerónimo Rodrigues, Diogo de Mesquita, Francisco Calderón, Celso Confalonieri, Francisco Pacheco, Baltasar de Torres, João Mateus Adami, Geronimo de Angelis, Juan Baptista Baeza, Manuel Barreto, Camillo Costanzo, Francisco

Vieira well describes the mood in which the Portuguese were when had to write such critics:

‘Algumas cousas escrevo a N. P. [Muzio Vitelleschi] acerca do procedimento do Padre Provincial Valentim Carvalho, as quaes escrevo de muito mâ vontade, porque são faltas, e faltas de homem Portugues, de que eu *secundum hominem* folgàra muito de poder com verdade, e fidelidade dizer bens, e louvores, mas escrevo assi por me parecer necessario, pera bem desta Provincia *et ut sim fidelis*.’⁴⁵³

Indeed, a large number of Portuguese fathers,⁴⁵⁴ as soon as they noticed that the new superior was not doing any better than Francesco Pasio, put up opposition against the provincial, which included pleas for his dismissal.⁴⁵⁵ It is worth underlining how the Portuguese fathers doubled back and assumed an objective point of view, which was by no mean obvious. Initially, they all sympathized with Carvalho. They all shared optimistic confidence in him and the reforms he would make. However, after only a few months of government the real features of the Portuguese came to light and the earlier optimism was smothered by a feeling of regret for the Italian visitor to the point that someone started to desire Pasio’s return in order to discipline the provincial. Afonso de Lucena, amongst others, admitted that at first he did not want Pasio to come back to Japan ‘por amor do Padre Valentim Carvalho e por da nação dos Portugueses’,⁴⁵⁶ but by 1613 he regretted these words.

The Portuguese were so unhappy about Francesco Pasio that it was quite difficult for them to withdraw from the first impression and admit that a countryman was doing worse than an Italian. This is a classic example of idealization of group impressions, a process which is considerably stronger when referred to an outgroup (them), but sociological research has pointed out that stereotypes are not absent in the perceptions of the ingroup (us), although they are less extreme and more complex than the perceptions of the outgroup. Hence, here we see an example of changing ingroup stereotypes, which took place because Carvalho engaged in behaviour recognized as

Boldrino, João Baptista Porro, Manuel Dias, João Baptista Zola, João Rodrigues Girão, Carlo Spinola and Pedro Marques. Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, pp. 388-393.

⁴⁵³ See Visitor Francisco Vieira to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Macao, 14 October 1616. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, ff. 16-16^v,

⁴⁵⁴ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [I], f. 274^v: ‘O Padre Manoel Dias não concorda com o Padre Provincial e com elle se unem o Padre Matteus de Couros, o Padre Lucena, et en parte o Padre Francisco Pacheco.’

⁴⁵⁵ Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, pp. 619-620.

⁴⁵⁶ See Father Afonso de Lucena to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Ōmura, 13 July 1613. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [III], f. 279^v.

counter to the stereotypes as perceived by the Portuguese fathers themselves.⁴⁵⁷ It has been documented that there are many kinds of collectives, amongst which our own country represents a very important one. Patriotism can be considered as a subcategory of this collectivism and yet it can be subdivided into chauvinism (extravagant glorification of own country) and constructive patriotism (working hard for the benefit of the country). Here, with the acrimony of the Portuguese being smoothed away, it seems to witness a shift from the former, which is often associated with tensions in intergroup relations, to the latter, which, on the contrary, may be helpful to intergroup relations.⁴⁵⁸

However, also from the Italian side arrived to Rome criticisms towards the Portuguese. Carlo Spinola, for instance, wrote more than one letter to Rome describing thoroughly how different Italians and Spaniards were from the Portuguese in front of the Japanese believers. Valignano himself was well aware of the problem. Before setting out for the *Estado da Índia*, in fact, the visitor had to deal with the method of government of Jesuits in Portugal, who – according to him – agreed that to rule with severity, not with love, was the true Ignatian spirit.⁴⁵⁹ Valignano did not consider harshness as the better way to evangelize and he strengthened his view after he came to know deeply the Japanese people. He took the general idea on the religious behaviour from the *Regulae Modestiae* written by Loyola in 1555. Those rules aimed to define the composure of the Ignatians and to conciliate spontaneity with the religious dignity.⁴⁶⁰ In the *Cerimoniale*, Valignano dedicates two chapters to the behaviour the fathers were supposed to keep in order to familiarize with the Japanese.⁴⁶¹ He resumed his thought declaring that his confrères had to understand that ‘ham de ter muita paciencia e longanimidade com os Christãos, e hão de gastar muito tempo agasalhando-os e tratando com eles, mostrando-lhes que folgão muyto de os conversar, tratando-os domestica e familiarmente e não com sequeidade e como foresteiros’.⁴⁶² It would seem

⁴⁵⁷ Cf. Rothbart, “Category Dynamics and the Modification of Outgroup Stereotypes”, pp. 48-49. Pires, for instance, described Cabral as a man who treated himself ‘fidalgamente’. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [II], f. 234.

⁴⁵⁸ Cf. Triandis and Trafimow, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

⁴⁵⁹ See VMP, I, pp. 72-73.

⁴⁶⁰ Cf. *Memorial de lo que Nuestro Padre me responde acerca de las cosas de Casa, comenzado à 26 de Henero del año de 1555 in Memoriale P. Ludovici Consalvii de Camara in Monumenta Ignatiana*, Series IV, Scripta de S. Ignatio, Tomo I, pp. 153-336.

⁴⁶¹ Cf. Valignano, *Il Cerimoniale per i Missionari del Giappone*, Cap. 1º - Do modo que se há de ter pera adquirir e conservar autoridade tratando com os Jappoens, pp. 130-148 and Cap. 2º - Do modo que se há de ter pera fazer familiares os Christãos, pp. 158-170.

⁴⁶² Cf. Valignano, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

that Spinola followed the path showed by the visitor, since he criticized the Portuguese because they ruled the Japanese ‘*in virga ferrea conforme a su naturaleza un poco rispida, y altiva*’.⁴⁶³ The *virga ferrea*, the iron rod opposed to Valignano’s *spirito suave*, is the symbol of government and jurisdiction in the Old Testament. It was in the hands of Moses who returned to Egypt with it and used it to bring the plague to the country. The iron rod of Moses is therefore the *inflexibilis justitia*.⁴⁶⁴ In the light of this, how intriguing it is to link the *virga ferrea* to the naivety of the earlier Father Lucena who used to believe that Valentim Carvalho, the first Provincial of Japan, was the one ‘*quod esset redempturus Israel?*’⁴⁶⁵

* * *

Since the first chapter of the present work, we tried to establish a thread that could link at once Europe, Asia, the respective kingdoms and the Society of Jesus. This thread was supposed to unite these domains on a consequential basis: each event played a role in the one that followed. Hence, the union of the Iberian crowns led to several consequences in the other side of the globe, which concerned commercial routes, religious monopolies and human behaviours. Regarding the last one, we have seen how political contrasts – both historical and administrative – slipped in the bonds that linked together the fathers of the Society of Jesus. The sense of belonging to a country did actually create strong divisions between the Ignatians, whereas the sharing of offices fostered this discrimination. Indeed, it was the desire to rule that triggered such passions.⁴⁶⁶ The Portuguese missionaries could not stand watching Spaniards and

⁴⁶³ Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 18 March 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 154.

⁴⁶⁴ The rods were actually two. Moses had one, whereas the other – hold by Aaron – represented the spiritual or priestly government and jurisdiction and was preserved in the tabernacle and in the Ark of the Covenant. The second rod stands for the *potestas sacerdotalis*. Cf. Ullmann, “A Medieval Document on Papal Theories of Government”, pp. 195-196. References to the iron rod are scattered throughout the Bible from the Old Testament (Psalms 2, 9: ‘Thou shalt rule them with a rod of iron, and shalt break them in pieces like a potter’s vessel’.) to the very end of the New (Revelation 2, 27: ‘And he shall rule them with a rod of iron, and as the vessel of a potter they shall be broken’.). Justifications of the coercive way of government are also in Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 10, 1180a, 5-22.

⁴⁶⁵ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [III], f. 279. The Latin is a quotation of Luke 24, 21: ‘But we hoped, that it was he that should have redeemed Israel: and now besides all this, to day is the third day since these things were done’.

⁴⁶⁶ Be it noted that the disunity created by early nationalism was not the only one to divide the group of Ignatians in Japan. There were also other topics, such as the formation of native clergy and the missionary theories, that divide the fathers. Yet, in those cases, the disunity was not as clear as in the nationalistic passions. Hence, fathers that were opposed for their ideas on the native clergy could support each other with regard to evangelization practices.


Italians occupy the ruling positions of the Society in territories that were theirs by rights of conquest. The Spaniards, on the other hand, felt a kind of obligation towards their country and the Spanish patronage, a matter that exacerbated the already biased Portuguese behaviour. Finally, the Italians were not able to soothe the disunity between their Iberian fellows and the assignment of offices to Italians in order to rule peacefully was not as successful as it was wished. As a matter of fact, as we will see in the next chapter it was not only the appointment of Pasio as visitor to provoke scorn and rancour among the Portuguese.

To conclude this part, however, it is unavoidable to notice that this disunity was a self-defeating attitude for the mission. As the Italian Jesuit Eugenio Francesco pointed out, it is ‘una verità infallibile, que *Omne regnum in se divisum desolabitur*’.⁴⁶⁷ Francesco quoted a passage from the gospel of Matthew: ‘[e]very kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate: and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand’.⁴⁶⁸ In fact, these disunities had probably a side effect on the evangelization of Japan. The Ignatians had always been preoccupied not to be compared to a Buddhism sect and in order to do so they tried to prevent the mendicant orders from coming to Japan. The Society of Jesus knew that if the Japanese Christians saw that there were divisions also within the Roman church, they would probably start to have doubts about the truth of the Western creed. As we saw, eventually the Jesuits’ efforts to maintain the monopoly of the evangelization in Japan were thwarted. Yet, owing to the disunities we have just analyzed, we might say that the first and most dangerous enemy of the Jesuits was the Jesuits themselves, since they let secular passions get the better of the mission.

⁴⁶⁷ Eugenio Francesco to General Vitelleschi [SOLI], Nagasaki, 5 October 1617. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 95.


⁴⁶⁸ Cf. Matthew 12, 25.

Table 4 - Fathers Professed of the Fourth Vow in Japan



Sources: 1593 – *TCJ*, pp. 306-325; March 1601 – ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 14 [I]*, ff. 65-65^v; October 1601 – ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 14 [I]*, f. 83^v; 1603 – *TCJ*, pp. 441-445; 1613 – *TCJ*, pp. 552-558; 1614 – *TCJ*, pp. 593-609.

Chart 3 - Number of Jesuit Fathers in Japan and number of Professed of the Fourth Vow



Sources: 1593 – *TCJ*, pp. 306-325; 1603 – *TCJ*, pp. 441-445; 1613 – *TCJ*, pp. 552-558; 1614 – *TCJ*, pp. 593-609.

CHAPTER IV

CARLO SPINOLA PROCURATOR OF JAPAN. PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS AND COMPARISONS WITH OTHER PROCURATORS IN JAPAN

IV. 1. The assignment of the post of procurator of Japan

The Jesuit historian Michael Cooper in his biography of João Rodrigues erroneously stated that owing to the removal of *Tçuzu* from Japan, Carlo Spinola was chosen to be his substitute.⁴⁶⁹ We will soon prove him wrong, but first it is important to stress out the significance of Cooper's mistake. Although Cooper did not find the sources that could have enabled him to determine the succession of the procurators of Japan in the first quarter of the 17th century, it is true that through his biography he had established the importance of that specific office for the mission. Nonetheless, Cooper failed to clarify that when Rodrigues left Japan, he had already been exempted to deal with the specific responsibilities of the procurator. The sources, in fact, tell us that Rodrigues filled that post in Japan from 1598 to 1606, that is to say that it was due to his proximity to Hideyoshi that he had been appointed procurator, not the other way around. He remained in charge during the first year of the Tokugawa *Bakufu*, but evidently the obligations towards Ieyasu were too overwhelming and went beyond the simple negotiation of high-quality textiles from China. In 1606, in fact, Rodrigues was forced to resign as procurator and went to stay permanently in Honshū, probably moving between Miyako and Suruga.

In the catalogue of 1607, in fact, he is registered as: 'Padre João Rodriguez que corre com a Corte'.⁴⁷⁰ Father Antonio Francisco Critana in 1606 called the Portuguese 'el Padre Procurador General',⁴⁷¹ which makes us think that Francesco Pasio felt compelled to create this position *ex novo* around João Rodrigues and his appointments with the Japanese tyrants.

⁴⁶⁹ Cf. Cooper, *Rodrigues, O Intérprete*, p. 275.

⁴⁷⁰ See BL/Add. 9860, f. 118.

⁴⁷¹ See Father Critana to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 10 March 1606. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 147.

Rodrigues filled the post of procurator also after having left Japan. Between 1623 and 1627, in fact, he served the Japanese province as procurator but from the Chinese extremity. As it is known, *Tçuzu* embarked for the *Estado da Índia* in 1575, when he was only fourteen years old. He was a self-made man, who arrived in Japan during his youth and was admitted to the Society there in 1580, which, as we saw, was a circumstance that led to the discrimination of other fathers due to the fact that those who were admitted outside Europe did not have the same intellectual preparation as those who followed the basic *curriculum studiorum* in the European colleges. Rodrigues, however, made great use of the experience he gained in the field and became a key figure in the mission also thanks to his outstanding knowledge of the Japanese language. As early as 1591, in fact, we find his traces in Hideyoshi's court and five years later he was ordained to the priesthood at Macao. When he was first appointed procurator in 1598, Rodrigues had not yet made his final profession. He was granted this honour on 4 June 1601⁴⁷² by Valignano along with six fathers,⁴⁷³ 'todos hombres de mas de 20 anos dela Compañía, virtuosos e letrados y que merecian bien este grado y todos mui buenas lenguas de Japon'.⁴⁷⁴ As correctly pointed out by Michael Cooper, in a normal situation Rodrigues would not have been granted the fourth vow.⁴⁷⁵ In fact, we saw that Afonso de Lucena and Diogo da Mesquita's professions were rejected by General Acquaviva because they did not finish the four-year course of theology. According to Carlo Spinola, however, Rodrigues 'fù fatto professore solo per essere insigne nella lingua Giapponica, et era interprete dei portughesi con l'Imperatore, trattando tutti i negotij della nave'.⁴⁷⁶ Spinola was being clearly polemic against a confrère who received the highest degree in the Society's hierarchy only thanks to matters external to the religious domain. Commonly, in fact, the solemn profession was bestowed only on the most deserving fathers, in particular on those with intellectual gifts and high educational level, which, was not Rodrigues's case. Similarly to Spinola, Cooper pointed out that within the Society of Jesus proficiency in

⁴⁷² Original text in ARSI, *Lus.3*, f. 24.

⁴⁷³ The Portuguese Francisco Rodrigues, the Spanish Garcias Garces, Pedro de la Cruz, Baltazar de Torres and Pedro Morejón and the Italian Pedro Paulo.

⁴⁷⁴ See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 24 October 1601. ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 14 [I]*, f. 83^v.

⁴⁷⁵ Cf. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

⁴⁷⁶ See Procurator Carlo Spinola to Father Bernardino Rossignoli, Nagasaki, 25 May 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 36*, f. 156^v.

foreign languages was considered a qualification for the final profession and in a country with such a complicated language this qualification was even more important.⁴⁷⁷

Furthermore, Cooper noted also that in the 1600s the main offices of the mission were held by Spaniards or Italians. Thus, he inferred that the lack of Portuguese influence in the management of the mission could be another reason for admitting Rodrigues to the final vow, because professed fathers were allowed to take part in the congregations.⁴⁷⁸ In the *Constitutions*, however, it is stated clearly that the procurators were allowed to participate in the congregations beside professed fathers, hence even if they were not professed of the fourth vow.⁴⁷⁹ In our opinion, it was in particular the role Rodrigues played within the Japanese court that led Valignano to propose Rodrigues's profession. It is possible that Valignano felt compelled to rise Rodrigues in status in order to confer more authority to the Portuguese. This decision, in fact, worked in two ways: on the one hand, Rodrigues assumed an official role of preponderance within the mission; on the other this enhanced status of him might have had a positive influence also on the Japanese, who, as Valignano knew well, attached great importance to hierarchical status.

Without detracting the relevance of the reasons that led to Rodrigues's profession, it is important also to stress the reasons why he could *not* have made his profession. The aforementioned brief quote by Spinola is part of a wider consideration of the Italian about the office of procurator. Namely, he referred to Rodrigues's appointment as the first occasion in which a professed father was selected to fill that position. It was common within the Society, in fact, that the procurator was either a Brother or an external assistant. We already saw that in the *Constitutions* Loyola set that as far as possible the Ignatians should avoid mingling in secular matters, 'no admitiendo tales cargos ni se ocupando en ellos por ruegos algunos'. However, he conceded that 'si los hubiere de Colegios, ellos tengan Procurador que los trate y defienda su derecho. Si de las Casas de la Compañía, ó de todo el cuerpo della, para que pueda guardar ella su paz, el mesmo Procurador, ó algun otro Coadjutor, ó alguna persona de fuera de la Compañía, ó alguna familia, que tomase la

⁴⁷⁷ Cf. Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203. Similarly to the Japan mission, the Fathers of the Mexican Province in 1583 received an order from the general stating that 'no se ordenem de Sacerdotes los nuestros sin saber alguna lengua delos naturales, ni se promuevan a mas altos estudios, *scilicet* ni los philosophos à la Theologia, ni los latinos ala philosophia, y aia maestros de lla'. Cf. BNCR/FGes. 1255, f. 32^v.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁹ Cf. *Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinae Et Hispanicae Cum Earum Declarationibus*, Eighth Part – Chapter III, *Quiénes se han de congregar*, p. 239. Cf. Faria, "The Functions of Procurator in the Society of Jesus. Luís de Almeida, Procurator?", p. 32.

proteccion de la Casa, podría defender el derecho de la Compañía, á mayor gloria divina’.⁴⁸⁰ Thus, Loyola not only limited as much as possible Jesuits’ interference with secular matters, but, having recognized the factual impossibility to avoid such occupations, he ruled that at least professed fathers were dispensed from the office of procurator. As is obvious, however, between a written rule and its implementation there were the historical juncture and the actual conditions of each missions. In this respect, in 1594 the Procurator of the Brazil Province, Father Ludovico da Fonseca, sent an interesting questionnaire on different topics to Acquaviva. When answering the question whether professed fathers should be given the office of procurator, the general categorically replied that ‘nec collegiorum, nec domorum probationis possunt ullo modo esse procuratores, et si qui sunt, amoveantur’.⁴⁸¹ Japan and Brazil represent two different situations within the scope of the Society’s overseas missions, yet in both cases the office of procurator was commonly bestowed neither to laymen nor to Brothers. On the other hand, if we take a look to the Province of the Philippines, we see that in that case the post of procurator was commonly entrusted to *hermanos*, as happened between 1599 and 1602 with Brother Lorenzo Rodriguez,⁴⁸² in 1607 with Brother Francisco Nieto⁴⁸³ and in 1620 with Brother Sebastian Bertarelo.⁴⁸⁴ With all evidence, then, the matters with which the procurators had to deal in Japan or in Brazil turned out to be fundamental for the survival or the prosperity of the missions and therefore only reliable and distinguished fathers could be assigned to that post. Even so, Alessandro Valignano needed to keep up the appearances and therefore instructed that the procurator ‘nas compras e vendas que faz não haja nenhuma ocasião de escandalo, as não farà por sy mesmo, mas terá algumas pessoas fieis a suficientes que fazem digo devotas nossas pellas quaes faça as compras e vendas que se houvem de fazer’.⁴⁸⁵

Back to Japan, by 1606 João Rodrigues *Tçuzu* had made another step within the ranks of the Society and was appointed ‘Procurador general’. In the Society of Jesus, the procurator general was appointed directly by the general and resided in Rome. He

⁴⁸⁰ See *Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinae Et Hispanicae Cum Earum Declarationibus*, Sixth Part – Cap. III, *De las cosas, en que deben ocuparse, y en que no, los de la Compañía*, p. 199.

⁴⁸¹ See *Responsiones ad proposita a Patre Ludovico da Fonseca, procuratore Brasilia anno 1594*, ARSI, Bras. 2, ff. 85-86. Basically the same is stated in the *Epitome Instituti Societatis Iesu*, Cap. IV, Sec. V – *De Procuratore*, p. 647: ‘Professi tamen quatuor Votorum ordinarie eo non fungantur’.

⁴⁸² See AGI, *Contaduria* 1205, f. 86.

⁴⁸³ See AGI, *Contaduria* 1208, f. 26.

⁴⁸⁴ See AGI, *Contaduria* 1210, ff. 341-341^v.

⁴⁸⁵ See *RPJ*, f. 37.

was the chief magistrate of the Society and represented its interests in the Papal Curia. He was supposed to be a prudent, faithful and well-mannered person, but not a professed member of the faith.⁴⁸⁶ It is difficult to ascertain whether Critana was just making use of a personal expression or he consciously called Rodrigues general procurator having in mind the taxonomy of the Society of Jesus. At any rate, the way the office of procurator had been carried out by Rodrigues is without parallel in the history of the Japan mission of the Society of Jesus. Nobody before or after him played such a decisive role and represented such an asset for the Jesuits in Japan. Yet, it was exactly for this that he was expelled.

When Rodrigues started to reside at Ieyasu's court, the office of procurator was assigned to João Coelho.⁴⁸⁷ The Portuguese, however, remained in charge not even for three years. In 1608, in fact, took place an exchange of procurators between Macao and Nagasaki and thus Father Sebastião Vieira⁴⁸⁸ went to Nagasaki, whereas Coelho moved to Macao. According to Carlo Spinola, Vieira was transferred to Nagasaki owing to his bad behaviour towards the Macanese, who begged the missionaries to send him away.⁴⁸⁹ This change, however, proved to be advantageous neither for João Coelho nor for Sebastião Vieira. Probably as early as 1610, in fact, Coelho got ill and died because of the disease on 27 January 1611. The seriousness of the illness must have been clear right away, since a request to dismiss Coelho was sent to Pasio with the first ship available for Japan. The Italian soon sent for Spinola, who, as we know, in 1611 was at Miyako. It would seem that Pasio selected Spinola for two reasons: first, Spinola had already filled the post of procurator at Macao before and second because Spinola's respected presence was needed also to help curtail the discontent the Macanese had been feeling towards the Ignatians since the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* incident. The Italian Jesuit, however, was not willing to return to Macao, for he abhorred in particular

⁴⁸⁶ Cf. Faria, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

⁴⁸⁷ The Portuguese João Coelho (c. 1575-1612) turned Jesuit in 1593 and set off for the Indies in 1597. After a period in Goa, he passed to Macao in the early 1600s and thence to Japan. He first went to Arima and subsequently to Nagasaki to fill the post of procurator. Then, he went back to Macao in 1608 where he eventually died in January 1612, after a long-term illness while in charge of the post of procurator there. Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, p. 767.

⁴⁸⁸ Born in Portugal, Sebastião Vieira (1574-634) entered the Society of Jesus in February 1591. He sailed for the Indies in 1602 and in 1604 he was already in Japan. In 1606, however, was called back to Macao where he was appointed procurator of Japan. He came back to Nagasaki three years later and made his solemn profession in 1611, soon after he was dismissed as procurator. He stayed in Japan during the persecution, but in 1619 he was again in Macao. Afterwards, he was sent to Europe, where he remained between 1626 and 1629. He sailed again for the Indies in that year and in 1632 he arrived in Japan having sailed from Manila. He was caught by the *bakufu* and executed in 1634. Cf. Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 812.

⁴⁸⁹ See Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 18 March 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 154.

the idea of being once more appointed procurator. Furthermore, he believed that Macao's damp climate was bad for his health.⁴⁹⁰ Apparently, these motives were enough for Father Francisco Pires. The Portuguese Jesuit, in fact, complained with António Mascarenhas in Rome that as soon as Spinola knew that he was chosen to substitute Coelho he accused the Portuguese fathers to plot against him in order to send him out of Japan, which according to Pires was enough to make Pasio change his mind as the order of sending him to Macao was revoked.⁴⁹¹

These words by Pires are in the same letter we quoted before, the one where he wrote about 'Padre Daimio e Padre Tanda'. As discussed above, it is a letter strewn with criticism towards the Italian fellows, hence there might be a bit of an exaggeration in it. Be that as it may, Spinola could not avoid the duties of procurator much longer. In effect, also the procurator at Nagasaki, Sebastião Vieira, was about to be dismissed for he was 'prejudicial para a união, tinha condição insofrível pera os de dentro e para os de fora, e alem disto o officio o consumia na saude corporal', as declared Francesco Pasio.⁴⁹²

The visitor considered the office of procurator as the second most important within the Province of Japan, owing to the fact that each missionary depended on him, more precisely on the provisions issued by the *procuradoria*. That is why – he stated – it was deemed necessary to choose the candidate amidst fathers blessed with the best qualities.⁴⁹³ Accordingly, in explaining the reasons why he was chosen to be procurator, Spinola wrote that for the province's sake it was advisable to have next to the provincial 'alcuno, che tenesse esperientia de la Corte, et essendo italiano, nelle consulte temperasse gli humori di natione, et come procuratore soccorresse à tutti egualmente'.⁴⁹⁴ As discussed above, however, bestowing on Italian fathers important offices for the mission was the reason why the Portuguese, like the aforementioned

⁴⁹⁰ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 21 [III], ff. 227-227^v.

⁴⁹¹ See Father Pires to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 10 March 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [III], f. 213.

⁴⁹² See Visitor Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 15 March 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [I], f. 139. Also Carlo Spinola spent a few words on Sebastião Vieira. Namely, he described the Portuguese as a Jesuit 'del qual no hay satisfacion en la provincia, mas antes es tenido por hombre muy colerico, y altivo assi con los de casa, come de fuera, tratando a todos con palabras asperas, y no nada religiosas'. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 154.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*: 'he esse officio em Japão de muita importancia de modo que o Procurador he a segunda pessoa da Provincia e todos dependem delle por todas as cosas se proverem desta Procuradoria e por isto he necessario que o Procurador seja pessoa de muitas partes'.

⁴⁹⁴ See Procurator Spinola to Father Bernardino Rossignoli, Nagasaki, 25 May 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 156.

Francisco Pires, started to complain against Pasio and the Italians as a group. In effect, in another letter of him, Spinola coped again with this topic. In this case, he wrote that the Portuguese fathers ‘no quieren que se hagan superiores se no de los suyos, y quieren los mejores puestos, y mas honrosas misiones’.⁴⁹⁵ Despite his criticism, Spinola was conscious of the disproportion in the assignments of offices between fathers from different countries. In 1613, in fact, he wrote that ‘não ha duvida que pera estarmos todo em paz, e mais contentes, melhor he ser o superior portugues’.⁴⁹⁶ He resented, however, the decisional influence the Portuguese Jesuits exerted over the mission in Japan. In a letter to an Italian friend of him, Father Bernardino Rossignoli, Spinola accused the Portuguese to have plotted against him and had him removed from Miyako suspecting that Spinola aimed to become rector after Morejón.⁴⁹⁷

Be that the truth or not, as a consequence of Spinola’s coming to Nagasaki, Sebastião Vieira took his place in the imperial city. However, before reaching Honshū, Pasio admitted Vieira to the final profession, to the great chagrin of Spinola, who wrote that ‘promover a grado quien es perturbador de la union, no sirve de mas, se no de darle fuerças para hazer mas mal que primero’.⁴⁹⁸ As we saw earlier, João Rodrigues was the first professed father to fill the post of procurator in Japan, although he made his profession when he was already procurator. In the same year of Rodrigues’s profession, Alessandro Valignano asked Acquaviva for permission to nominate professed father as procurators. More specifically, the visitor needed the consent to appoint Carlo Spinola to the Macao’s procuratorship. Evidently, Valignano sent different demands both from Nagasaki and from Macao, since in 1606 the general wrote him the following:

‘Acerca dos procuradores de Macao e China, para que V. R. pede licença, que possam fazer este officio Professos de quatro votos polla importancia, e autoridade que mister tenham os que nestas partes hão de executar este cargo. Já V. R. tera entendido nossa mente e conceito da resposta que lhe demos, quando os annos passados nos pedio a mesma licença para poder ser em Macao procurador o Padre Carlos Spinola, porque como então dissemos e V. R. muito bem sabe de nossas Constituições, claramente se collige que o intento de Nosso B. Padre não he que se occupem os professos em semelhantes officios que concernem ao temporal, mas em nossos ministerios e bem das almas. Nem com dizer que ahi não ha demandas se satisfaz a

⁴⁹⁵ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 154.

⁴⁹⁶ See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 5 October 1613. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 161^v.

⁴⁹⁷ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 156^v.

⁴⁹⁸ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 154.

este ponto, porque em fim sua occupação principal he attender ao temporal que he fora de seu estado, e não diz com a intenção de N. B. fundador. Porem, considerado a falta que la ha do sojeitos para este officio, permittimos que os procuradores que agora o fazem possão continuar ate V. R. achar pessoas que lhe possão socceder nessas procuradoras'.⁴⁹⁹

Even though Acquaviva at first tried to compel his friend Valignano to remain true to the fundamental document of the Society, eventually he had to give his consent, despite his reluctance. We may think that notwithstanding Acquaviva's answer to his demand, Valignano would have acted exactly as he did, since he did not wait for the answer to come and Spinola was appointed procurator in Macao between March and April 1601.

Both in Macao and in Nagasaki, however, in the last resort Spinola's appointment was decided by Father Valentim Carvalho. Also in 1611, in fact, it was the provincial who deemed Spinola worthy of the assignment and only afterwards Pasio bestowed the office on him. The visitor explained that Spinola was chosen because he could also be a valid help for Carvalho during the consultations and other offices due to his experience gained up in Miyako.⁵⁰⁰

In addition to those stated by Pasio, moreover, there is also another reason why Spinola had been picked up twice to be procurator. According to the *Epitome Instituti Societatis Iesu*, those appointed procurators 'priusquam officio fungi incipient, ab aliquot Oeconomiae bene perito instruantur; rudimenta Arithmeticae condiscant, & quo pacto libri rationum tenendi'.⁵⁰¹ Dealing with economic matters, then, required the procurators to have at least a basic knowledge of mathematics, otherwise someone had to teach them. As we know, Spinola taught mathematics in Milan and he was the draughtsman of the project of São Paulo's Church in Macao, therefore, if we exclude the fact that he was a professed of the fourth vow, he was the most suitable choice for the office nonetheless.

All those motives, however, meant a little for the Italian Jesuit, since he had to leave Miyako and the Christendom of central Japan much to his regret. We saw that in the capital he had been executing duties that required an uncommon scientific knowledge. Most likely, he was also involved in the artistic and architectural activities

⁴⁹⁹ Cf. General Claudio Acquaviva to Visitor Alessandro Valignano, Rome, 12 December 1606. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, f. 48.

⁵⁰⁰ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [I], f. 139: '[...] será de boa ajuda pera o Padre Provincial nas Consultas e mais negócios por ser pessoa recta e polla experiencia que tem das partes do Cami'.

⁵⁰¹ See *Epitome Instituti Societatis Iesu*, p. 647.

of the Society, but by the end of 1611 he was called to Nagasaki ‘per occuparmi in officio, che qualsivoglia lo può fare’.⁵⁰² Spinola filled the office from 1611 until his capture in December 1618. During these eight years he sent several letters first to Acquaviva and then to Vitelleschi begging to be dismissed. He started to complain about his appointment as soon as he received the charge. In 1612, in fact, he wrote that he opposed against the appointment adding ‘la grande repugnantia che sentiva à tal officio, per haverlo provato in Macão molto distrattivo, ma non fui udito, et resto molto desconsolato, per vedere nel miglor tempo interrotto il corso delle mie occupationi [...]; che se ciò havesse potuto sospettare, che nel Giappone haveva d’essere procuratore, mi pare che non procurava di venirci’.⁵⁰³ Spinola justified his opposition (*repugnantia*) with words we should expect from a man of the cloth, in particular having in mind the words written by Acquaviva about assigning the post of procurator to a professed father:

‘[S]i questo officio fusse come gl’altri d’Europa, saria più soffribile, ma qui il procuratore è universale, et particolare, poiche tutte le case, et persone provvede, et riparte insino alle minutissime cose, che sono necessarie, si in casa, come ne i continui viaggi per mare; et oltre a questo comprare, et vendere, procurando di guadagnare, et acrescere il capitale, come si fosse qualche mercadante’.⁵⁰⁴

The concept was stressed also by João Rodrigues in his memorandum for the procurator of Japan, when he wrote that ‘o officio de Procurador de Japão por ser hum puro negociador, he muito differente do das outras Provincias: tem muita necessidade de differente talento, diferentes ordens, differente meneyo sob pena de padecer sempre muito esta Provincia que tanto depende do temporal’.⁵⁰⁵ With regard to the procurator in Portuguese colleges, we have an interesting document of the early 17th century entitled *Varias Lembranças Pera hum Procurador*,⁵⁰⁶ a notebook which discloses that the Évora procurator had to keep track of prevailing wage rates for all types of both skilled and unskilled workers that the college and its supporting estates required, as well as the

⁵⁰² See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 156^v.

⁵⁰³ *Ivi*, ff. 156-156^v.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.* João Rodrigues *Tçuzu* corroborated Spinola’s words in a letter he wrote to Vitelleschi in 1624, the first year of his procuratorship in Macao. Namely, the Portuguese wrote that the procurator of Japan ‘he officio diferente dos procuradores ordinario das Provincias, e ainda dos Collegios, por muitas particularidades que tem, que ao longe se não entendem bem quanto ao longe, se apontão cazos particulares, que são outra couza do que são’. Cf. Procurator Rodrigues to General Vitelleschi, Macao, 28 January 1624. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-6, f. 153. The letter is published in Penalva and Rodrigues, *Fontes Para a História de Macau no séc. XVII*, p. 355-361. Another *via* of Rodrigues’s letter, although written on 25 January, in RAH/Jes. *Legajo 21 9/7236 (I)*, ff. 591-592^v.

⁵⁰⁵ Cf. *Couzas que podem servir para os Procuradores*. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-8, f. 635.

⁵⁰⁶ In BNP/FG 4254, ff. 1-138^v.

costs of all sorts of commodities (such as provisions, earthenware, pewter, paper, cloth and tanned leather) used by the college. The Évora procurator also needed to know the dates of the fourteen annual fairs in his region, the rising and setting of the sun according to the seasons, how to make conversions from Portuguese currencies to Castilian ones and so on.⁵⁰⁷ Another important thing about this notebook is the importance attached to the yearly payments due by the provinces belonging to the Portuguese Assistancy both in the kingdom and overseas. Regarding our work, it is worth to report the paragraph about the papal pension issued in Madrid, with which the notebook ends:

<i>Dinheiro que a colectaria de Espanha paga ao Japão cadano</i>	
Paga cadano para os seminarios e Igrejas de Japão	<i>Escudos</i>
quatro mil escudos de ouro em ouro como disem as bullas	4U000
Estes quatro mil escudos de ouro se pagan a dose reales e meio por escudos que fazem soma ao todo de 50U000 reales	50U000 reales
Estes 50U000 reales fazem no dinheiro Portugues a 40 réis por real	Dous contos 2000U000
Estes dous contos fazem crusados Portugueses a rezão de 400 réis por cada crusado	Sinco mil cruzados 5U000
Estes mesmos 50U000 reales feitos em moeda castellana fazem maravedis ⁵⁰⁸ 1700U000 maravedis	Hum esta a setecentos maravedis 1700U000
E em ducados castelhanos a rezão de 374 maravedis por ducado 4U545 e 170 maravedis	4U545 E170

Source: BNP/FG 4254, f. 138.

Unfortunately, a similar document for the Japan mission does not survive. When Spinola was captured by the Nagasaki *Bugyō* Hasegawa Gonroku all the documents, books and objects kept in the *procuratoria*, i.e. the premises where the procurator used to carry out his duty, were confiscated and subsequently burned publicly.⁵⁰⁹ Thus, we are not able to make a detailed comparison between the methodologies of the office in Portugal and Japan. Still, the main occupations of a procurator were everywhere the same: ‘1. Vt bona, ac jura Collegii conserventur. 2. Vt redditus non descrescant, sed potius augeantur. 3. Vt quæ Collegio debentur, summa diligentia exigantur; & omnia necessaria opportunem comparentur. 4 Vt res, & pecuniæ rectem dispensentur. 5. Vt

⁵⁰⁷ Cf. Alden, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

⁵⁰⁸ *Maravedis* or *Morabetis* was the most common currency in Castile.

⁵⁰⁹ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 37, f. 237^v.

dati, & accepti ratio semper constare possit'.⁵¹⁰ With regard to the second point, the collector of the *Epitome* added that the college should have good farmers, that the buildings should be built following the advices of an expert and according to the custom of the country. Yet, he concluded declaring that 'quæ speciem habent secularis negotiationis, sciat Nostris esse prohibita'.⁵¹¹

Before entering into the details of Spinola's procuratorship, we have to see upon what philosophical basis Father Carlo Spinola, as well as other Fathers who had experience with that office,⁵¹² founded their *repugnantia* towards the procuratorship. In other words, we are going to deal with the problematic relationship that linked almost indissolubly the Roman Church and economy and finally disclose why, according to Rome, men of the cloth 'cannot serve God and mammon'.⁵¹³

IV. 2. Some considerations on Christian philosophy and *negotia illicita*

The first quarter of the 17th century witnessed a feverish legislative activity in Madrid and Rome with regard to the Japan Jesuits and their share in the *armação*. In 1607, Filipe II doubled in value the royal pension of 2'000 *cruzados* in order for the Ignatians to stop their participation in the silk trade and granted them also half the proceeds of a Japan voyage. Accordingly, in January of the next year, he issued an *alvará* prohibiting all the missionaries in the *Estado da Índia* to take part in any trade whatsoever, an order that he reissued in February 1610. In July 1611, however, the king backtracked on this prohibition. He canceled the 1607 raise and allowed the Ignatians to keep on investing the annual pension of 2'000 *cruzados* and the papal subvention in *picols* of silk. With regard to half of the profits of a voyage, he put off his decision until further notice.⁵¹⁴ As a consequence of this enactment, on 8 November 1611 General

⁵¹⁰ See *Epitome Instituti Societatis Iesu*, p. 648.

⁵¹¹ *Ivi*, p. 649.

⁵¹² In 1618, for instance, Manoel Borges wrote to General Vitelleschi to make some modification with regard to the procurators' obligation 'pera que as almas [of the future procurators] não se embarçem e os nossos não repugnem tal officio, pois não há quem nelle queira estar'. See Procurator Borges to General Vitelleschi, Macao, 20 November 1618. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 34, f. 146.

⁵¹³ Matthew 6:24.

⁵¹⁴ Cf. *Alvarà del Rey Sobre a meia viagem suspendida por então, com dous mil cruzados de renda, que se tinham concedidos, e se concede continuar com o emprego ordinario*, Lisbon, 1 July 1611. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-5, ff. 126^v-127 and *Alvarà de El Rey sobre a mesma viagem suspendida por então com dous mil cruzados de renda que se tinham concedidos, e se concede continuando com o emprego ordinario*, Lisbon, 6 February 1612. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-7, ff. 47-49. Eventually, in 1613, Filipe granted those profits to the Society in order to extinguish their debts. The other half was used to fortify Malaka. Cf. *Alvará*

Acquaviva sent a formal prohibition for all the missionaries ‘in Provinciis Goana, Malabarica et Japonensi [...] ut ab omni mercatura, et negotiation abstineant per se, vel per alium exercenda tam ad proprium Societatis, quam ad externorum emolumentum’.⁵¹⁵ Acquaviva, however, specified that the Japan Jesuits involved in the silk trade were exempted from this order, but they were the only exception.⁵¹⁶

In the late 16th century, however, the situation was definitely different. In 1596, in fact, Fray Martin de la Ascensión, one of the Franciscans crucified in Nagasaki, published a treatise in which he criticized the evangelization process carried out by the Society in Japan.⁵¹⁷ This treatise spawned a sequel in 1615, when another Friar Minor, Fray Sebastião de São Pedro, signed his own anti-Jesuit essay in the wake of Tokugawa’s expulsion of all the missionaries from Japanese soil, blaming the missionaries of the Society of Jesus and their behaviour for the intolerant policy of the *bakufu*.⁵¹⁸ The Ignatians obviously prepared responses for both treatises and quickly sent them to Rome. The first reply is the famous *Apologia* Valignano wrote in 1598,⁵¹⁹ while the second one was signed by Valentim Carvalho in May 1617.⁵²⁰

This dispute is important because include two coexistent yet not contemporary *Weltanschauungs*. The Franciscans, in fact, relied on a system of thought strictly belonging to the medieval mentality, whereas the Jesuits’ responses drew on a newer mentality, more pragmatic and eager to compromises, born out of Renaissance and Humanism. Besides, through this dispute we are allowed to study the predominant conceptions about several fields, such as missionary methodology, international politics and the field we are interested in here: how the clergy was supposed to behave in relation to money and trade.

sobre a Viagem da China que V. Magestade tem concedido aos Rellegiosos [sic] da Companhia de Jappão e fortificação de Malaqua para V. Magestade ver, Lisbon, 28 September 1613. ANTT/CJ Maço 86, ff. 1-2^v.

⁵¹⁵ See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-56, f. 195.

⁵¹⁶ Cf. Ruiz-de-Medina, “«El Trato de la Seda» en Japón y los Jesuitas”, p. 315.

⁵¹⁷ See *Tratado que os religiosos de S. Francisco espalharam em Goa em Baçaim no ano de 1598 contra os Padres da Companhia de Jesus que andam na conversão de Japão*, Macao, 16 November 1597. BL/Add. 9858, ff. 61-80 and ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 40. Cf. Correia, “A Apologia de Valignano e a Defesa do Padroado e dos Direitos da Coroa Portuguesa na Ásia Oriental”, pp. 171-172.

⁵¹⁸ *Recopilação das causas, porque o Imperador de Japão desterrou de seus Reinos todos os Padres*. Cf. Carvalho, *Apologia do Japão*, pp. 23-24.

⁵¹⁹ See *Apologia en la qual se responde a diversas calumnias q se escrivieran contra los PP. da la Compañia de Japon, y de la China. Autor el Padre Alexandre Vilignano [sic] Visitador de la misma Compañia*, in BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-58.

⁵²⁰ See *Apologia e resposta feita pelo Padre Valentim Carvalho da Companhia de Jesus, Provincial nesta Província de Japão e China [...]*, BL/Add. 9856, ff. 1-114.

The Friars Minors, obviously, attacked the Society with regard to their participation in the *armação* contract, since they considered trading as something which went directly against the vows of poverty and, theologically speaking, it was considered unfit for a religious order to get involved in such practices. In addition to this point, which was shared also by the crown, they accused the Society of Jesus not only of breaking the vow, but also to be guilty of the sin of greed (*avaritia*) – one of the deadly sins – for the accumulation of huge amount of wealth and money. We have already discussed the expenditures of the Japan Jesuits in the silk trade and we have also ascertained the profits. Hence, we will not enter into details about this topic, yet we are going to look deeper into the mentality that generated them and in the one which refused them.

IV. 2. 1. *Quod pro charitate introductum est, non debet contra charitatem militare*

The relationship with the economic world is a matter the Roman church had been dealing with since its early days. In the Bible, in the New Testament in particular,⁵²¹ the church found a solid basis to criticize, condemn and correct wrong behaviours related to financial operations and the economy in general.⁵²² The debate about money and enrichment started to become more pregnant when, from the 11th up to the 13th century, the poverty of Jesus Christ assumed a concrete social value.⁵²³ During this period, the European society used to consider the renunciation to a wealthy life as the prototype of Christian, hence civic, perfection.⁵²⁴

⁵²¹ In addition to the already quoted Matthew 6:24, see Luke 12:15: ‘And he said to them: take heed and beware of all covetousness: for a man’s life doth not consist in the abundance of things which he possesseth’, or John 2:15-16: ‘And when he had made, as it were, a scourge of little cords, he drove them all out of the temple, the sheep also and the oxen: and the money of the changers he poured out, and the tables he overthrew. And to them that sold doves he said: Take these things hence, and make not the house of my father a house of traffic’.

⁵²² See Le Goff, *Lo sterco del diavolo. Il denaro nel Medioevo*, pp. XI-XIII.

⁵²³ The definition of the poverty as virtue is ascribed to Bernard of Clairvaux, (1090–1153), a French abbot of the Cistercian Order, who considered exemplary those who experienced inner poverty in the first place and distance themselves to the enrichment of the Church. With the Franciscan Order, this conception of poverty was brought to a different level: if Bernard professed indifference to wealth and wellbeing, Francis understood poverty as detachment from economic goods, in order to control them through the understanding of their relative utility. Cf. Todeschini, *I mercanti e il Tempio*, pp. 107-109.

⁵²⁴ Just like Jesus exchanged his transcendental being for a mortal body in order to donate the salvation of humanity, the spontaneous choice of a life of privation was considered as the way through which wealthy

The presence of money (*pecunia*) in theological literature is due mostly to the foundations of new religious orders – the Preachers and the Minors – that worked separately from the Episcopal control and were forced to match their own rule with the economic and social conditions of 13th-century Europe, where money had already begun to circulate widely. The rule of the Franciscan Order, for instance, required two papal interventions before the final confirmation was submitted owing to the difficulty in applying the matter discussed in the fourth chapter – “That the brothers should not accept money”.⁵²⁵ Only in 1226, in fact, the pontiff promulgated the bull *Ex parte vestra* – addressed to both the Franciscans and the Dominicans – with which he relaxed the prohibition about *pecunia*, provided that the possession of money remained confined to small quantities and was due to honest necessity.⁵²⁶ Thus, also in the very rule of the Franciscan Order, beside the distinction between necessary and superfluous, it is detectable an instinct to adaptation, both for the rules and for the men.⁵²⁷

The other side of the economic debate was represented by the definition and the integration of the merchant and the commercial exchanges within the ecclesiastical canons. Along with the foundations of religious orders, in fact, took place another development that took the debate about money to a deeper level: the increasing intellectual activities of the European universities, where discussions about the problems of a Christian way of life included the role played in it by money and economic exchanges.⁵²⁸

The reason why these two events took place only after the 11th century is fundamentally sociological. During the Early Middle Ages, in fact, the European

people could come into contact with poor and indigent people. Cf. Todeschini, *Ricchezza francescana. Dalla povertà volontaria alla società di mercato*, pp. 25-28.

⁵²⁵ Cf. Esser, *Gli Scritti di S. Francesco D'Assisi: nova edizione critica e versione italiana*, Chapter IV - *That the brothers should not accept money*, pp. 462-469: ‘I firmly command all the friars that in no manner are they to receive coins or money (*denarius vel pecuniam*) through themselves or through an interposed person. However for the necessities of the infirm and for the clothing of the other friars, the ministers and even the custodes are to conduct a solicitous care, by means of spiritual friends, according to places and seasons and cold regions, as they see expedites necessity; with this always preserved, that, as has been said, they receive neither coins nor money’.

⁵²⁶ Cf. Lambertini, “*Pecunia, possessio, proprietates* alle origini di Minori e Predicatori: osservazioni sul filo della terminologia”, p. 20.

⁵²⁷ This point was stressed in particular by the Franciscan theologian Pierer de Jean Olieu (1248-1298), who wrote that if poverty was adopted as a conscious life-style and as an economic organization, then it could not be fixed once and for all. The meaning of poverty, according to him, depended on the circumstances, the people and the occasions. It must be remembered, though, that Olieu was condemned by the church and he is not to be considered as the representative of the Friars’s general opinion. Cf. Todeschini, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114 and Le Goff, *La borsa e la vita. Dall’usuraio al banchiere*, pp. 96-99.

⁵²⁸ Cf. Le Goff, *Lo sterco del diavolo*, pp. 21-22.

society was not as permeated with Christian belief as it would be two centuries later.⁵²⁹ However, with the advent of feudalism between the 11th and 13th centuries the situation began to change. The economic recovery, whose most striking phenomena were the urban development and the resumption of commerce, produced a change both in life conditions and in the mentality of the Christendom. Thus, those trades that were considered as illicit (*negotia illicita*), due to the taboo on money and the contempt for the phenomenal world (*contemptus mundi*), started to demand esteem appropriate to their status.⁵³⁰ This mentality shift found its institutional basis and developer in the Scholasticism, whose scholars created a casuistry that disrupted the former classification of trades and professions, the notorious tripartite scheme, and changed it for a more flexible one that distinguished occupations illicit in themselves (*de sui natura*), which were condemned unconditionally, from those condemnable according to the case (*ex occasione*).⁵³¹ Along with the growing attention toward new categories, propagated also a civic feeling in which the idea of the common good (*publicum commodum*) became predominant.⁵³² The terminology referred to the good of the community or the city (*civitas, patria*) and, then, thanks to the growing importance of the urban community, the merchants found the perfect tool to unhinge the door that trapped their trade within the uncomfortable realm of the *negotia illicita de sui natura*.

It is possible to track down this process through the penitential handbooks, booklets composed by those members of the mendicant orders particularly active in the scholastic debates, where took place the (re)discovery of Aristotle and his economic thought.⁵³³ According to Aristotle stated that there are two kinds of exchange: one natural and necessary, whose purpose is to satisfy need; the other blameworthy, because its purpose is to satisfy greed for gain, and emerged only when money made its appearance.⁵³⁴ Aristotle put the activity of merchants in the latter kind. Yet, although he

⁵²⁹ In the Early Middle Ages, the church demanded the strict observation of its rules only to the clergy, whereas laymen's superficial belief was tolerated as long as the religious institution was respected. Cf. Le Goff, *La borsa e la vita*, pp. 59-60.

⁵³⁰ Cf. Le Goff, *Time, Work, & Culture in the Middle Ages*, pp. 58-70.

⁵³¹ *Ivi*, p. 62 and pp. 111-112.

⁵³² See Todeschini, *I Mercanti e il Tempio*, p. 312.

⁵³³ The penitential handbooks were manuals outlined for the confessors that became necessary after the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), which made annual confession obligatory for all Christians. They are valuable as evidence in dealing with professional consciousness because they reflect the pressure brought to bear on the church by men engaged in given types of work. Cf. Le Goff, *Time, Work, & Culture in the Middle Ages*, p. 112.

⁵³⁴ Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 3: 1257a-b. Thomas Aquinas related to Aristotle when writing about the lawfulness of commerce. See Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II^a II^{ae}, article 77, *corpus*.

considered commerce as an unnatural occupation, nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary and even honourable end, and thus business becomes lawful. Aristotle conceived his economic thought as a way to acquire the necessary material goods needed for the sake of the good life in the *polis*.⁵³⁵ There is a lot of the Stagirite's thought in the Ignatians attempts to justify their meddling in secular trades. They orientated their apologies towards the necessity of the Christendom, therefore interpreting the silk trade not as a commercial activity, but as 'remedio para a conversão das almas'.⁵³⁶

The first Scholasticism adopted part of the Stagirite's philosophy on justifications to the merchants' business. As we saw, in fact, along with the urban development, the need for merchants soon became evident.⁵³⁷ Therefore, although also in a fundamental compilation as the *Decretum Gratiani*⁵³⁸ was reasserted that commerce was to be avoided because it lured sin,⁵³⁹ the needs of the Christendom influenced the Christian canons themselves, a fact that is readable in Raimundo de Peñafort's *Summa de Paenitentia* (or *Summa Raimundi*),⁵⁴⁰ a manual for the confessors drafted around 1225 but published for the first time only in the 17th century. It is important to us because it presents one of the first analyses of the lawfulness of trade in general.⁵⁴¹ Raimundo, in fact, first presented those activities dishonest by nature – such as simony and usury – that were forbidden to anyone, be it clerics or laymen.⁵⁴² He, then, quoted the old adage that trade is a dubious activity in which it is difficult to avoid

⁵³⁵ Cf. Langholm, *The Merchant in the Confessional – Trade and Price in the Pre-Reformation Penitential Handbooks*, p. 56 and Baeck, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁵³⁶ See BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-56*, f. 21.

⁵³⁷ What a city lacked, in fact, some other settlement might have in abundance and a merchant could provide the transport to move those necessities. About the concept of *publicum commodum* and the utility of the merchants see Todeschini, *op. cit.*, Chapter VII – *Investire: Proteggere*, pp. 311-392.

⁵³⁸ A collection of nearly 3'800 texts touching on all areas of church discipline and regulation compiled by the 1140s.

⁵³⁹ Cf. *Decretum Gratiani Emendatum et Notationibus illustratum, Gregorii XIII Pont. Max. Ivssu editum*, pars II, causa XXXIII, quaestio III - *De paenitentia*, distinctio V, 2, pp. 1680-1681: '[...] quia difficile est inter ementis vendentisque commercium non interuenire peccatum.' See also Langholm, *The Merchant in the Confessional*, pp. 234-235.

⁵⁴⁰ Raimundo de Peñafort was born near Vilafranca del Penedés in Catalonia and died at Barcelona in 1275, at almost a hundred years. He was already a noted scholar when he entered the Dominican Order in 1222. Pope Gregory IX called him to Rome in 1230 and commissioned him to put together the collection of *Decretals* that bears the name of that pope. He was canonized in 1601. See Langholm, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

⁵⁴¹ See Peñafort, *Symma Santi Raymuvndi de Peniafort Barcinonensis Ord. Praedicator de Paenitentia, et matrimonio cum glossis Ioannis de Fribvrgo, liber secundus, 8th part, De negotijs secularibus & utrum de illicite acquisitus possit fieri eleemosyna & de aleatoribys*, pp. 244-256.

⁵⁴² *Ivi*, p. 244: 'Ista omnibus sunt prohibita indistincte, tam clericis, quam laicis, cuiuscumque sexus sint, vel conditionis, vel ætatis, dummodo sint doli capaces'.

sin,⁵⁴³ but he did not include it in the category of *negotia prohibita de sui natura*. Yet, he admitted, it may be easily rendered so, unless certain conditions were strictly observed as to why (*ex causa*), if it was motivated by avarice and not out of necessity;⁵⁴⁴ when (*ex tempore*), if it was conducted on holidays or in night-time;⁵⁴⁵ by whom (*ex persona*), if engaged in by the clergy;⁵⁴⁶ and where (*ex loco*), if conducted in holy places, such as a church, or suspect and solitary places.⁵⁴⁷

This schema would be largely quoted throughout the centuries and, in fact, the Franciscans accused the Jesuits of violating three out of the four conditions conceptualized by Raimundo. Namely:

- *ex causa*: since, the Franciscans promoted an evangelization based on poverty, they could not recognize the Society's necessity to present themselves as high prelates, to move around in *norimono*,⁵⁴⁸ to give presents or to make use of *dōjuku* and other servants;
- *ex persona*: meddling in secular occupations went not only against the fundamental theology but was at odds with the vow of holy poverty of the mendicant orders and of the Society itself;
- *ex loco*: Franciscan theologians in their accusatory treatises compared the *procuratoria* of Macao and Nagasaki to the *Casa de Contratación* in Seville, the central trading house and procurement agency for Spain's overseas empire. The first to use such expression was probably Fray Martin de la Ascención in 1597, but it was really catchy since it continued to appear at least until the 1620s. To be precise, the Friar wrote that 'quando viene la nave, toda la mercaderia assi suya [of the Fathers], como agena, la atravessan y la llevan a su conviento de

⁵⁴³ *Ivi*, p. 248: 'difficile est inter ementis vendentisque commercium non interuenire peccatum'. Cf. Langholm, *op. cit.*, p. 40 and *Decretum, ibid.*

⁵⁴⁴ Peñafort, *op. cit.*, p. 244: 'Ex causa sunt hæc inhonesta, quando fiunt cum intentione corrupta, videlicet propter cupiditatem, vel alium malum finem'. Regarding *cupiditatem* John of Freiburg wrote that it is the 'voluntas habendi diuitias temporales, non ad vsum necessarium, aut ad vtilitatem, sed ad curiositatem, vt scilicet animus delectet in talibus, sicut delectatur pica, vel cornicula in numis, quos repertos abscondit'.

⁵⁴⁵ *Ivi*, pp. 244-245: 'Ex tempore sunt hæc inhonesta, si fiant in tempore festiuo, & feriato, quia tunc non est vacandum, nisi oronibus, & diuinis officijs, & alijs operibus spiritualibus, & ab oi seruili opere est cellandum [...]. Item [...], si exercentur in tenebris'.

⁵⁴⁶ *Ivi*, p. 245: 'Ex persona sunt hæc inhonesta, quia clerici sunt, vel personæ religiosæ, qui exercent; talibus enim regulariter sunt prohibita talia negotia'.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ivi*, pp. 246-247: 'Ex loco dicuntur inhonesta, quia in lupanari, vel alio loco vili, vel inhonesto talia tractantur; & maxime si iudicia in talibus locis tractentur. Item quia locus est solitarius, uel aliter suspectus [...]. Item [...], ipsius loci excellentiam, puta quia in ecclesia talia fiunt, quæ teste ueritate non debet esse domus negotiaionis, sed orationis'. Cf. Langholm, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-40.

⁵⁴⁸ 乗り物, the Japanese palanquin.

manera que el Conviento de Nangasaqi, es como la caza de Aduana de Sevilla aonde se registran las mercaderias, que vienen delas Indias’.⁵⁴⁹ It would seem that although the Franciscans forged the reports on the incomes the Japan Jesuits received from the silk trade,⁵⁵⁰ they had solid proof upon which base their critics. In 1603, Bishop Cerqueira, wrote from Nagasaki that ‘no colégio se fizerão muitas e muitas consultas dos mercadores sobre o dar da pancada; no colégio se fez a repartição da seda e entendimento por escrito, polos mercadores e Senhores Japoes’.⁵⁵¹ Soon after, however, the Nagasaki *procuratoria* was moved next to the arts seminar and the press.⁵⁵² In Macao, on the other hand, the *procuratoria* was built in front of the church, hence within the confines of the college. Both the *procuratorias*, then, were not separated from the main structures of the mission, but were buildings dedicated solely to that purpose, probably both for practical and religious reasons. Valignano in 1598, Carvalho in 1617 and Francisco Vieira in 1618, in fact, made sure that this point was clear.⁵⁵³ They knew that the procurator needed a space to bargain with Portuguese, Chinese and Japanese merchants and for the storage of the goods and the money of the province. These duties, however, required his whole attention.⁵⁵⁴ Hence, in order to facilitate his tasks, the procurator was exempted to eat at the established hours with his confrères and, while busy preparing the dispatches his superiors were not allowed to burden him with extrinsic duties. Furthermore, he was excused to take part in the common offices. The *procuratoria*, in fact, was built on consecrated ground and Valignano granted the possibility to provide it with a small chapel ‘para dizer nella Missa livremente quando lhe parecer’.⁵⁵⁵ Therefore, also in this case the *ex loco* condition applied.

Valignano’s shrewdness, however, was not enough to cancel the core of the matter, i.e. men of the cloth who acted as traders. As a matter of fact, Raimundo made this distinction clear. According to the Catalan, although commercial activities were granted

⁵⁴⁹ Cf. *Apologia*, ff. 89-89^v.

⁵⁵⁰ Fray De la Ascención accused the Jesuits of having a fixed capital in Japan of 160’000 ducats and that they earned between 50 and 60’000 ducats per year. Cf. *Apologia*, f. 90^v.

⁵⁵¹ *Apud Cooper, Rodrigues, O Intérprete*, p. 259.

⁵⁵² Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [II], f. 303^v.

⁵⁵³ Cf. *Apologia*, f. 89^v, Carvalho, *Apologia*, pp-95-96 and ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, ff. 154-154^v.

⁵⁵⁴ Cf. *Couzas que podem servir para os Procuradores*. § 2.º - Deve dar-se tudo ao officio deixando outras occupaçoens, BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-8, f. 635^v.

⁵⁵⁵ Cf. *Regimento para o Procurador de Jappão que Reside na China*, BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-66, ff. 11^v-12.

laymen,⁵⁵⁶ the clerics should not get involved in regular business activities, unless between the buying and the selling a certain craftsmanship is included.⁵⁵⁷ We can see here how the revaluation of manual work pushed the clergy and the commerce together, yet the direct participation of clerics in business activities was still seen as inappropriate and to be avoided; a constant that would never change.⁵⁵⁸

It was in the first years of the 14th century, however, that the merchants found the definitive acknowledgment by the theologians. It was a Franciscan, John Duns Scotus, who took the ecclesiastical justification of the merchants to another level: they were no longer only useful tools to take goods from a place to another, rather they became the safeguards of the Christian community, since they were the only ones to know the real value of the merchandise and, thanks to their knowledge, they could assure equity in the exchanges and the consequent enrichment of the city.⁵⁵⁹ Yet, despite the undeniable improvement of the social condition of the merchants, in the penitential handbooks on the eve of the Reformation, exchange activities were still exposed to the risk of being illicit and the circumstances by which they could be rendered so remained the same.

* * *

In conclusion, we saw that after the breakdown of the tripartite scheme and the integration of the merchants within the main categories of the European society, in the 1220s the circumstances that rendered trade illicit were established by Raimundo of Peñafort. The fact that, with only few differences they were still considered valid in the 15th century, makes us think that they were established once and for all, the prohibition against the clergy, above all. Nevertheless, it appears clearly that the high social status reached by the merchants over the centuries entailed serious modification to the general attitude. As a matter of fact, except for the prohibition against the clergy, in the

⁵⁵⁶ See Peñafort, *op. cit.*, p. 245: 'Laici vero sunt ista concessa'. Cf. Langholm, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵⁵⁷ Also in the Rule of Benedict (chapter 57) we see how this point was accepted, although with a restriction in order to prevent avarice to creep in: 'If any of the work of the craftsmen [of the Order] is to be sold, those responsible for the sale must not dare to practice any fraud [...]. And in the prices let not the sin of avarice creep in, but let the goods always be sold a little cheaper than they can be sold by people in the world'. See Todeschini, *I Mercanti e il Tempio*, pp. 36-38.

⁵⁵⁸ This scheme substantially represents the theologians' common attitude regarding commerce and it was drawn on also by Tommaso d'Aquino. Essentially, Tommaso d'Aquino affirmed that, as hard as it may be, it was possible to commerce without committing any sins, unless commercial activities were carried out by the clergy, during holidays and without fraud. Cf. Langholm, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁵⁵⁹ Cf. Todeschini, *op. cit.*, pp. 351-358.

literature of the 15th and 16th centuries it is hard to find the same animosity and aversion against commercial practices.⁵⁶⁰ In the canons and decrees of Council of Trent (1542-1563), for instance, we find only a brief mention to commerce. Namely, in the second chapter of the 21st session (July 1562) – we read that it is not suitable for ‘those who are enrolled in the divine ministry to beg or to exercise any sordid trade, to the disgrace of their order’.⁵⁶¹

What was considered a strict prohibition during the Middle Ages, in the 16th century became an advice to prevent shame to fall on the religious body. Hence, also the theologians were slowly migrating towards less orthodox points of view. This mentality shift is even more evident if we take a look to the Society’s literature regarding the silk trade. Although the third and fourth general strongly opposed the participation in the *armação*,⁵⁶² in 1582 Acquaviva wrote to Valignano a letter that exemplifies how the ecclesiastics’ attitude towards trade was versatile to the point of accepting such loathed activities:

‘Quanto al trato dela seda con que se sustenta el temporal de Japon y la duda que en ello havia parte por su natural del trato, parte por la prohibicion de N. Padre Everardo de Santa Memoria, vimos aqui la larga informacion que V. R. nos dio del modo dela sustentacion delos nuestros, y nos hizimos muy bien capaces delas dificultades que en el ay por muchas partes, y aviendo muy bien cosiderado todas la cosas que V. R. nos escribe como testigo de vista, y consultando con estos Padres, jugamos todos, ser uno de aquellos casos en el qual la necessidade dispensa sobre toda Ley, especialente pareciendo sin duda que en tal negocio aya lugar aquel axioma, *quod pro charitate introductum est, non debet contra charitatem militare*. Lo qual fuera si por falta dela sustentacion necessaria, para la qual no ay otro remedio, si ubiesse aora de dexar, o menguar una empresa tan provechosa y accepta a Dios’.⁵⁶³

Similarly to what stated Valignano in 1579 with regard to *ius politicum* and *ius naturalis*, both Acquaviva and Pope Gregory XIII acknowledged the silk trade as necessary evil to be endured out of pure necessity and for a good cause. Valignano revisited the subject also in the 29th article of the *Regimento* for the procurator of Japan, where he stated that the silk trade ‘não he para mais se não para suprir a necessidade da

⁵⁶⁰ Cf. Tenenti, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-214.

⁵⁶¹ ‘Those who have not wherewith to live, are excluded from sacred Orders’. See Waterworth, *The canons and decrees of the sacred and oecumenical Council of Trent*, pp. 140-152, in particular p. 145.

⁵⁶² Cf. BPE, *Cód. CXVI/2-II*, n.º 44, p. 7.

⁵⁶³ See General Acquaviva to Visitor Valignano, Rome, 10 February 1582. BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-56*, ff. 198-198^v.

Companhia e Christandade destas partes, que não tem por agora outro remedio, se ha grandemente de guardar que nisto não se tome mais licença de que Sua Santidade e N. P. nos dão e pede a necessidade de Jappão'.⁵⁶⁴ General Acquaviva, of course, would not go as far as to allow excessive participation in the trade and illicit behaviours due to this meddling in secular activities. As we saw above, the Macao-Nagasaki trade was an exception within the missions of the Society of Jesus, yet even so it needed to be constantly controlled. The Iberian crowns, on their part, allowed the Jesuits to trade in silk and a new concession was issued just a few months after Spinola's appointment as procurator.⁵⁶⁵ Finally, by 1620 the Jesuits' participation in the trade was commonly accepted. In that year, in fact, a conference of the most important Fathers of the mission gathered in Macao,⁵⁶⁶ and about their *picols* of silk in the *armação* wrote that 'não ha que fallar, porque tambem ninguem falla, nem fallara nelles, e he trato ou contrato ja tam canonizado e com tantas licenças, e no modo com que se faz, que não ha nelle nenhum modo de indecencia, nem escandalo'.⁵⁶⁷ By that time, however, Spinola had already spent two years in captivity. His economical activity had already ended, yet he was every day close to end his life as a brilliant martyr of the Roman Church.

IV. 3. The Province of Japan in 1612: an economic spiral and the first signs of the persecution

As we saw earlier, by the end of 1611 Carlo Spinola substituted Sebastião Vieira as procurator of Japan in Nagasaki. He was appointed by Visitor Francesco Pasio following Provincial Valentim Carvalho's recommendation. Soon after, on 22 March 1612, Pasio left Japan for Macao. Two reasons in particular led him to bid farewell to Japan. First, his appointment as visitor of China and Japan required his presence also in the Asian continent. Second, Tokugawa Ieyasu entrusted him with a *chapa*, an official patent, most likely a *shuin-jō*, to reestablish the commercial thread between Nagasaki and Macao.⁵⁶⁸ The first attempt to do that, in fact, sank along with Rui Barreto off the Fujian coast.

⁵⁶⁴ See *RPJ*, ff. 39^v-40.

⁵⁶⁵ The *alvará* was issued on 6 February 1612. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], ff. 234-234^v.

⁵⁶⁶ Jerónimo Rodrigues, Celso Confaloneri, Valentim Carvalho, Manoel Dias, Gabriel de Matos, Manoel Lopes, Jerónimo Rodrigues Junior and Sebastião Vieira.

⁵⁶⁷ See *Informação do trato que temos da China Japão*, ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], f. 235^v.

⁵⁶⁸ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [III], f. 178 and RAH/Cor. 9/2666, ff. 267^v-268. According to Mateus de Couros, Hasegawa Sahyōei and Murayama Tōan plotted to obtain Ieyasu's *shuin-jō* and to have it

Pasio arrived at Macao in April, but he could not accomplish personally his official mission. In July, in fact, he got sick and only a month later he died.⁵⁶⁹ A few days before Pasio's death, in mid-July, Macao dispatched an official ship escorted by the 'Galeão Almeirante' or 'Galion de Armada' *São Felipe e Santiago* with Pedro Martins Gaio as Captain Major and Horatio Nerete, the 1600 Captain Major, as ambassador. Nerete went to visit Tokugawa Hidetada, who, although received him with courtesy, stated also that Japan was no longer reliant only Portuguese vessels, thanks to the established trade with Manila, the Hollanders and, although only from 1613 onwards, the English. Nevertheless, the ambassador obtained the *shuin-jō* allowing the Great Ship to make the annual voyage and, thus, the Macao-Nagasaki trade was officially renewed by the end of summer of 1612.⁵⁷⁰

Spinola's appointment as procurator, then, roughly corresponds with the resumption of the trade. Already in the first year of his procuratorship, however, he had to cope with the serious financial situation inherited from the past years. As discussed above, the sinking of André Pessoa's carrack cost dearly to the Japanese Province. The Jesuits lost 30'000 *cruzados* in the ship and were overburden with 22'000 *cruzados* of debts.⁵⁷¹ The reopening of the trade seemed to be the only solution to pay off those debts, yet the money needed to participate in the *armação* had to be borrowed and, even with the highest *pancada* price, it was almost impossible for the Japan Jesuits to escape from the vicious circle they were in. Carlo Spinola was not new to this situation. As we saw, he filled the office of procurator also in Macao from spring 1601 to July 1602. Of the several letters which he probably wrote during that time, only three of them survive: one written on 12 November 1601, and two copies of a second letter dating 25 and 27 January 1602 respectively, sent in two *viæ*.⁵⁷² The copy dated 27 January is more interesting for our purposes, as in this letter the Italian Jesuit discussed for the first time his office and examined the role of the principal agents involved in the Macao-Nagasaki trade.

entrusted to Pasio, in order to finally achieve the Italian's expulsion. The Portuguese father, in fact, stated that Pasio was planning on leaving Japan only in March 1613. See Mateus de Couros to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 8 October 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 3.

⁵⁶⁹ Cf. *Ivi*, f. 204.

⁵⁷⁰ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [II], f. 191, *Ibid.*, f. 204, RAH/Cor. 9/2679, f. 12^v and Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 70-71.

⁵⁷¹ Cf. Cooper, *Rodrigues, O Intérprete*, pp. 272-273 and ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [II], ff. 333^v-335.

⁵⁷² Back then, correspondence was usually dispatched in several copies, which were marked as "routed" by different ways (*viæ*). These ways were distributed among different ships to counter the risk of the mail being lost.

In this letter, Spinola mentioned his predecessor as procurator of Japan in Macao, Miguel Soares, the *Padre Visitador* Alessandro Valignano, who stipulated the *armação* contract, and the *Capitão-mór*, the *fidalgo* appointed by the crown or by the viceroy at Goa, who also acted as Governor *ad interim* of the city.⁵⁷³ In addition to the role played by these important figures, Spinola introduced the main problems characterizing the Jesuit mission in Japan: faulty expenses, debts, and lack of economic help from the Iberian crowns or the Vatican See:

‘Escrevo a o Padre Geral sobre a falta que temos de dinheiro pera aviar Jappão, que por isso nos vamos endividando, e se não acodirem com hum a boa pancada de dinheiro, forçadamente se ha de menguar o cabedal o coal está ja muy delgado; e a causa he porque neste Collegio se gasta muyto, a coal he perda dobrada, porque se perde o proprio, e os ganhos, e come este anno não houve viagem, o dinheiro ficou em mortorio, e se perderão mays de 7 mil cruzados de ganhos, e de Portugal nos acodirão este anno com 3300 cruzados,⁵⁷⁴ e de Jappão mandarão somente 6000, porque cuidavão que aqui estivessem ja da esmola do Papa mays de dez mil, de modo que este anno tudo he tomar emprestado, e se hum a nao nos faltar, encomendar a Deos’.⁵⁷⁵

In the early 1610s, the situation Spinola had to deal with differed more in quantitative terms, i.e. the amount of debts, than qualitative. According to Spinola, between 1610 and 1612, the capital of the province had been depleted by the debts the Society went into owing to the André Pessoa incident and to the sinking of the ship with Rui Barreto on board, which was carrying also money for the Japanese province. In October 1613, he quantified those debts 9’000 *escudos* only in Japan.⁵⁷⁶ Nevertheless, in 1612 Spinola had to keep on with the same methodology that caused the debts in the first place: the *respondência* bonds, i.e. the high interests on loans.⁵⁷⁷ As he confessed to Acquaviva, ‘ficamos sem a fazenda, e com obrigação de pagar o que tomamos

⁵⁷³ The *Capitão-mor* was governor *ad interim* of Macao from the foundation of the Portuguese trading post in 1555 until 1623, when the Viceroy of India, Dom Francisco da Gama, appointed Dom Francisco de Mascarenhas as the first Captain General of Macao. He was the only one with jurisdiction on military matters, but was allowed also to mingle in civil affairs. With the creation of this office, the captaincy of Macao was finally separated from the Japan voyages. Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, p. 94.

⁵⁷⁴ The origins of these 3’300 *cruzados* are not clear. Most likely, Spinola was summing up the royal endowment of 2’000 *cruzados* to the revenue of the four communities in the Province of the North in India.

⁵⁷⁵ See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal João Álvares. Macao, 27 January 1602. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 149.

⁵⁷⁶ See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 5 October 1613. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 161. The simple *escudo* was worth 470 *réis*, but there was also the *escudo dobrado* that was worth 940 *réis*.

⁵⁷⁷ For this kind of contract see Oka, “A Great Merchant in Nagasaki in 17th century: Suetsugu Heizō II and the System of Respondência”, in *BPJS* 2, pp. 37-56.

emprestado; pera remediar esta falta, e por não termos outra prata, que mandar no junco, em que foy o Padre Visitador, tomamos muyto dinheiro a responder'.⁵⁷⁸ Fortunately, the province received also 5'000 *cruzados* without the high interests of a *respondência* bond by two Japanese lords and a Portuguese.

Despite the borrowed and lent money, however, the Japan Jesuits could not rely upon the incomes of the silk trade as they had wished after two years of interruption. The lack of the official voyage from Macao, probably rekindled Chinese and Spanish initiative in Japan. Both the procurator and the bishop of Japan, in fact, reported to Rome that owing to the great quantity of silk imported by Chinese merchants and Spanish ships from Manila, the *pancada* price was lower than expected.⁵⁷⁹ Afterwards, Valentim Carvalho acknowledged that due to Spanish, Japanese and Chinese competition, the Portuguese had irretrievably lost their pre-eminence in front of the Japanese.⁵⁸⁰ Moreover, it must be stressed that Spanish competition was difficult to defeat. Although the Portuguese had access to the top quality silk sold at the Canton fair, in fact, the Spaniards were not bound by the *pancada* price and therefore were the ones who could actually inflate or deflate the value of the Chinese textiles.⁵⁸¹

In any case, the incomes for the province were sufficient to pay the *respondências* due in Japan, but not enough to sustain the mission for a whole year. Consequently, 'foy necessario este anno tambem tomar prata a responder, para mandala a Macao a buscar provimento, e comprar a seda ordinaria'.⁵⁸² Spinola was conscious that they were spinning in a spiral and that the only solution to pay off their debts was to receive a substantial economic aid from Europe. Having in mind all the ups and downs regarding the pensions granted by kings and popes, we can imagine that Spinola was

⁵⁷⁸ See Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 21 March 1613. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 159^v.

⁵⁷⁹ See Bishop Cerqueira to Filipe II, Nagasaki, 20 March 1613. RAH/Cor. 9/2666, ff. 257-257^v: 'O commercio da cidade de Macao com Jappão [...] ficou mediocrementemente entavolado de novo com a vinda da Nao do trato, a qual ia he tornada para a China deixando as fazendas vendidas em preço arrezoadado, posto que a pancada da seda, que he a principal fazenda, foi mais baxa do que se desejava e esperava, mas não foi possivel mais polla muita seda que alem da da nao tem esta monção passada vindo da Manilha'.

⁵⁸⁰ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], f. 221: 'Ajuntase a todos estes inconvenientes a grande cantidade de fazendas que de todas as partes vão oje a Japão, que he a principal causa de os Japões não sentirem tanto a falta da nossa não, como sentião antigamente [...]. Porque os anos de 1600 e de 1602, não navegavão ainda os Japões livremente, e só algumas somas de Portuguezes levavão farinhas a Manila, mas no anno de 1612 não levando a nossa nao mais que mil e trezentos picos de seda se ajuntarão em Nagasaki melhora de sinco mil afora outras muitas fazendas, que levarão as somas de Japões, que navegarão aquelle ano, e as embarcações que vierão de Manila e muitas somas de Chinas. E esta he a causa principal de não serem os portugueses estimados como dantes'.

⁵⁸¹ Cf. Takase, "十七世紀初頭におけるわが国のスペイン貿易について", pp. 11-18.

⁵⁸² ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 159^v.

also aware that receiving such aid was a utopian dream. Moreover, the problems for the Japan Jesuits were not confined to their economy.

In inverse proportion to the piling up of the debts, their political weight was fading. In the letter by Spinola we quoted before, in fact, a feeling of powerlessness towards the situation in Kyūshū, the Jesuits' last stronghold, is patent:

‘[O]s Tonos, que nos ajudavam, ou sam falecidos, ou ficaram desterrados nesta perseguição, com a qual perdemos todos os socorros, que davam os christãos de Arima, e as rendas que ahi tinhamos, que não heram poucas, e havemos de sustentar a mesma gente recolhida aqui em Nangasaqui, onde os mantenimentos valem hum terço mais, que em Arima, por se ajuntarem muytos navios, e pessoas de toda parte neste porto’,⁵⁸³

Although the Tokugawa persecution of Christianity actually broke out in 1614, as early as 1612 there had been an incident related to the Western faith that could be considered a symptom of what eventually happened in 1614, but was the direct cause of the situation described by Spinola.

The procurator was referring to the capital execution of Arima Harunobu João, owing to the Okamoto Daihachi-incident in 1612, a court intrigue involving the Southern *daimyō* and Okamoto Paulo Daihachi, Honda Masazumi's secretary. Harunobu, eager to obtain the restitution of some lands in Hizen, which his family lost in the chaos of the *Sengoku Jidai*, bribed Okamoto, who was supposed to forge some documents regarding those territories. The plot, however, was promptly revealed by Arima's son, Naozumi, who was apparently in league with Hasegawa Sahyōei against the head of the family. Ieyasu was furious when the matter came to his knowledge, in particular because the culprits were all followers of the Western faith. Harunobu was promptly dispossessed of his fief in 1612, and executed the following year, whereas Okamoto was burned alive for forging Ieyasu's letters.⁵⁸⁴ It is in this year that Ieyasu started to envisage the expulsion of the Christian faith from Japan. In effect, it would seem that during the visit of the Manila ambassador, Domingo Francisco de Leca, William Adams confided to the Spaniard that no Fathers would be left in Japan within

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁴ Cf. Boxer, *The Christian Century*, pp. 314-315.

three years.⁵⁸⁵ Although the Jesuits remained in Japan a little longer, Adams's prediction turned out to be true.

The Okamoto Daihachi-incident caused numerous problems to the Jesuit province, political, as we will see later, but for the most part economical: they not only lost a precious revenue, as well as housing and protection, but the gathering of Christians in Nagasaki caused simultaneously the increase of the general expenses of the province, because of the price difference between Arima and Nagasaki, 'onde os mantenimentos valem hum terço mais [...] por se ajuntarem muytos navios, e pessoas de toda parte'.⁵⁸⁶

We can translate this situation into numbers. As we saw, in October 1613 the debts of the province in Japan already amounted to 9'000 *escudos*.⁵⁸⁷ Spinola estimated the loss in Arima to be as high as 12'000 *cruzados*,⁵⁸⁸ although this number might be intentionally exaggerated to provoke a determined reaction in the reader. The procurator, in fact, was complaining with Acquaviva about the attitude in Arima of squandering the province's capital with pointless waste, an attitude that, Spinola stated, rebounded negatively on the image the Japanese had of the Ignatians, since 'vendo que estamos cheos de dividas, e não nos podemos çafar dellas, e por outra parte nem diminuimos gente, nem moderamos os gastos, ficam pasmados, e nos notam de pouco avisados, e muytos tem para si que temos poços de prata, e a tomamos emprestada para encubri-la'.⁵⁸⁹ Be that as it may, in 1613 there was no official voyage to Japan, hence there had been no income either.⁵⁹⁰ Although the arrival of the Great Ship – the *Nossa Senhora da Vida* – was only delayed until July 1614, it has to be noted that a missing voyage not only translated into a period of economic hardship, but also into augmentation of debts, because the procurator based in Macao was still supposed to provide the Japanese colleges and residences with their needs and, since there was no income from selling the silk, he was forced to borrow.⁵⁹¹ As we will see in the next paragraph, however, the Fathers had found another way to earn money in addition to

⁵⁸⁵ Cf. Carvalho, *Apologia*, p. 223, Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, p. 72, note 162 and Gil, *Hidalgos y Samurai*, p. 250.

⁵⁸⁶ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 159^v.

⁵⁸⁷ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 161.

⁵⁸⁸ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 159^v.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁰ Cf. Frison, "«El officio de Procurador al qual aunque tengo particular repugnancia.» The Office of Procurator through the Letters of Carlo Spinola S.J.", pp. 54-55 and Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

⁵⁹¹ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 159^v.

their *bague* in the *armação*. Yet, this way excited strong critics both in Asia and in Rome, since it was a typology of trade which went directly against the *armação* and had not receive permission either by secular or temporal powers. In the next section, moreover, we will also look into details how the post of procurator of Japan was conceived and how different it was during Spinola's procuratorship.

IV. 3. 1. An easier task to carry out: changes in the management of the procurator office

Previously we stated that the equivalent of the *Varias Lembranças Pera hum Procurador* for the Japanese Province does not survive. There are other sources, however, that help us compensate for this lack. In Lisbon's Biblioteca da Ajuda, for instance, it is possible to consult the 18th-century copy of the *Regimento do Procurador que està em Jappão*.⁵⁹² This text, written by Valignano in 1591, includes 34 articles defining the tasks and duties of the procurator in Nagasaki. Since it was part of the visitor's duties upon taking office to revise the rules and decrees left by his predecessor, Francesco Pasio reviewed Valignano's text between 1611 and 1612 and so did Father Francisco Vieira in 1617. The *Regimento* was basically meant to define the work of the procurator in all of its aspects, such as how many records he had to keep; whether or not he could be assisted in his duties, by whom, to what extent and how; what to do when the annual ship from Macao arrived in Japan, and so forth.

The main tasks of the procurator were essentially two: in the first place, he was responsible for collecting all the mail and goods (sacramental wine, clothes, crosses, books, glasses, etc.) shipped to Japan from Europe, Goa and Macao.⁵⁹³ In the second place, the procurator was responsible for supplying the missionaries, colleges, houses and seminars with all the things they needed, such as rosaries and veronicas but also more practical things, like sugar, vinegar and cheese.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹² BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 37-41. Published in Frison, *op. cit.*, Appendix G, pp. 61-68. The original manuscript is still available in the Roman archive of the Society of Jesus. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 2, ff. 114-118^v, yet the original does not comprehend later emendations.

⁵⁹³ For a detailed list see *Estas são as couzas que o P. Vizitador manda trazer cada anno de Goa para Japão*, 1580, BA/JA, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 19-19^v.

⁵⁹⁴ See *RPJ*, f. 37: 'O seo officio consiste principalmente em duas couzas a primeyra he com toda fidelidade, e diligencia arecadar quando os Navios da China [*in the margin*: chegarem] todas as couzas

Valignano composed the *Regimento* soon after the convening of the second general conference in Nagasaki, on 13 August 1590. As was customary, several matters were faced during the consultation. The 7.^a *Pregunta* helps us clarify the main duties of the procurator and, at the same time, shows that the decision taken by Valentim Carvalho and Francesco Pasio to appoint Spinola as procurator was probably rooted in the proceedings of this conference:

‘O 2.^o ponto em que tãobem concordarão todos, que tãobem açerca da união dos mesmos nossos assi Europeos como Iapoens avia em Japão mui frequentes occasioens pera padeçer detrimento e esfriarçe na charidade fraterna, pollas seguintes resoens. A 1.^a porque o modo de vida que tem nesta provincia quanto a sua sustentação he tão singular que por ventura em toda a Christandade não ha outro, porque todas as cazas e collegios, igrejas etc. hão de ser providos não somente de dinheiro mas de todas as miudezas e minimas cousas pollo procurador de Japão quee reside em Namgasaque, conforme a ordem que lhe der o supremo superior de Japão, porque como os collegios e cazas não têm nenhuma renda em Japão, e todo o provimento assi de dinheiro como das mais couzas lhe ha de vir na nao que vem da China, e necessario que em Nangasaque aja hum monte commum pera delle se proverem todas as Cazas, as quaes como tãobem não tem sempre o mesmo numero de gente, mas hora cressem hora mingoão conforme as necessidades e ocasião que ha para isso, o mesmo ordenado e provimento se varia e muda a cada passo, e não pode ser serto, e assi alem do dinheiro que se manda a todas as cazas pera o gasto de Namgasaque lhe hão de mandar vinho, azeite, vinagre de Portugal, pano, cangarias, pessas pera proviento de suas igrejas, e athe o calçado, fio, agulhas, cadeados, candeas, e adubos, e finalmente todas as mais minimas meudezas, porque nos lugares aonde estão não se achão a comprar, e como no repartimento de tantas meudezas he impossivel contentar a tantos, daqui se azão facilmente occasioens de quexumes parecendo-lhes que ou os Superiores não são iguaes no repartimento o tem mais affeição a hum lugar que a outro, ou se detem mais em huma caza que em outra, ou provem melhor de Padres a hum Senhorio que a outro, e das fabricas e cousas necessarias pera as cazas e Igreyas de suas terras, de que nascem tão bem agravos nos mesmos Senhores parecendo-lhes que o Superior quer mais a outros Senhores que a elles, e aiuda e provem melhor a Christandade de outras terras, que a sua, e folga de estar mais nas outras terras. A segunda rezão porque a mesma maneira extraordinaria de vida ha quasi em todos os particulares da Companhia pera com os Superiores das cazas sob cuya iurisdicção estão, porque como os Padres e Irmãos andão como esta dito em huma continua peregrinação toda a vida, e hão de ser providos de

que nellas vem da Companhia assim pertencentes a Provincia como a pessoas particulares della se fazer vender a seo tempo as couzas que hão de vender, e juntamente comprar o que faltar assim para o provimento da Provincia como para as Igrejas, e presentes que se fazem. A 2.^a couza he prover de todas as couzas, Collegios e Rezidincias, e Seminarios da Companhia que houver nessa Provincia conforme ao que pelloos Superiores se ordenar’. For a complete list of the merchandises sent from Macao to Japan in 1618 see BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-V-7*, ff. 187^v-142, transcribed in: Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 163-168.

dinheiro e de todas as couzas meudas pollos superiores das mesmas casas, e fora com as condiçoens dos mesmos Superiores, e hora dos Padres que vivem debaxo delles, e hora por falta de não aver tanta abudancia das couzas, sempre se azão occasioens de mil diferenças'.⁵⁹⁵

The theoretical fundaments upon which the office of procurator was built reckoned on the equity of the Jesuit delegated to fill the office. In other words, the procurator was not supposed to be biased by nationalistic passions and had also to be able to provide each of the Society's establishment throughout Japan with the same amount of furnishings.⁵⁹⁶ A discriminatory distribution, in fact, was detrimental to the very Christendom, since it could create discontent among the common believers and the mighty patrons. As is known, the Jesuits' research for sophisticated yet immediate systems of communication to attract the Japanese and to make accessible to them concepts otherwise difficult led the Society of Jesus to the implementation of different instruments.⁵⁹⁷ The application of liturgical aids and supplements was included at a lower level of the methodology of proselytization that involved the use of science and visual arts. In effect, Valignano conceived the first item of the *Regimento* as an admonition: 'em todos os negocios que tratar de seo officio se lembre do institudo da Companhia que he buscando a gloria de Deos, trabalhar para ajudar as almas, e procure com palavras, e exemplo de edeficar a todos aquelles com quem tratar e de fazer, e conservar benevolos aquelles de quem tem necessidade'.⁵⁹⁸

This point was accepted by Carlo Spinola himself. Although the Italian criticized the commercial implications of the office, he conceded that being a procurator was a huge undertaking and that providing all the houses of Japan meant working for the great goal of evangelization anyway.⁵⁹⁹ An apology of Spinola's displacement from his high-profile role in Miyako to the secular activities in Nagasaki was stressed by a later confrère of him, the Abbott François Besson:

⁵⁹⁵ See *Segunda Consulta Geral feita pello Padre Alexandre Valignano Visitador da Companhia de Jesus em Jappão em 13 Agosto do anno de 1590*, 7ª Pergunta - *Do modo que se ha de ter pera se conservar a devida união, asi entre os nossos Padres e Irmãos, como entre os Senhores Christãos*, ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 51, ff. 151^v-152^v.

⁵⁹⁶ Cf. *Sumario*, pp. 309-310.

⁵⁹⁷ Regarding the importance of the use of images in the church and the mission of the Counter-Reformation see Maiorana, *La Gloriosa Impresa*, pp. 18-21.

⁵⁹⁸ See *RPJ*, f. 37.

⁵⁹⁹ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 154^v: 'Yo no recuso el trabajo de prover toda las casas de Japon, aunque es muy grande, que huelgo mucho de poder scriverles, pues con esto participo del fruto, que todos hazen'.

‘Ainsi les desseins du Seigneur s’accomplissaient encore quand, après sept ans passés dans le collège de Méaco, Spinola fut nommé procureur de la province du Japon. Le voilà sorti de l’obscurité et remis sur le chandelier. Il faut habiter Nangazaki, entretenir des relations avec tous les peuples européens, accueillir les missionnaires, pourvoir à leurs besoins, diriger leurs travaux, montrer partout cet esprit large, ce cœur magnanime, ce grand caractère, qui conçoivent, qui commencent et qui achèvent les nobles entreprises’.⁶⁰⁰

We have also a detailed description of the duties of the procurator of Japan in Macao left by João Rodrigues *Tçuzu*, which informs us on the circulation of goods between Macao and Japan, the material necessities of the Japan Jesuits and shows how the scope of the job of the procurator in Macao was wider than that of the procurator in Japan:

‘Direi aqui brevemente que couza seja este officio aqui, e quam differente dos Porcuradores ordinarios das Provincias, e collegios, porque na verdade he Procurador, e alem disso comprador, e despenseiro, e todos os mais officios tocantes ao temporal, e ainda mercador na forma concedida. Porque busca o comer, e sustento de toda a Provincia, com o que vem da India, com trato de Japão, e com empréstimos, e esmolas, avia para fora os que vão, e vem, e os prove de todo o necesario assim de suas pessoas, como de couzas espirituais para a Christandade de rosaios, nominias, imagens, ornamentos por cada sacerdote com que possa dizer missa que levão consigo, e avia a gente de serviço que levão. Aqui avia para Japão para os nossos roupa branca, camizas, calções brancos, frontas, lenços, panos da cabeça para provimento, calçado vestido, louças, conservas, vinho de passa para os doentes, [...] azeite, candieiros, fechaduras, cadeados, agulhas, linhas, vinho das missas, e cera, que là não há. Nominas em comum, tres e quatro mil cada anno, rozarios de contas para os Christãos, veronicas, imagens estampadas, e livro de sua letra, e lingoa, para o que tem o Procurador aqui imprensa, e de Japão manda vir papel, manda sabam para roupa, que vem da India, toda a sorte de canga [and] de algodão para roupa, pretas, azuis, brancas, e todas as mais miudezas, que se podem imaginar para huma caza que là não há, alem de couzas accommodadas para presentes, conforme ao costume da terra. Ornamentos, missaes, breviarios de provimento, e livros nossos, e para tudo isto tem aqui officiaes, ou os aluga de fora, ou em caza manda fazer tudo isto tem moços para o meneio de tudo isto, embarcar, e desembarcar, e cozinha para elles particulares, e em caza fora alfayates, sirgueiros, sapateiros, carpinteiros, orivez e brosladores de ornamentos gente para imprensa, e officinas, e materias para ella. E como aqui he como centro da India, tem varias encomendas de ornamentos e vario provimento para Goa, do Collegio, e casa professa, Cochim, Malaca, athe de Maluco, Bengala e das Filippinas, que mandão buscar todo o genero de couzas de China ate retabulos dourados, e torcheiros grandes dourados para sus Igrejas, e este mesmo anno para todas estas partes aviou varias cousas, e

⁶⁰⁰ See Besson, *Panegyrique du Bienheureux Charles Spinola, de la Compagnie de Jésus*, p. 13.

outras está aviando para quando ouver navios. Tem obras de cazas, e boticas de aluguer que rendem para Japão. E finalmente como Pay da Provincia, no que toca a temporal, tudo porem com ordem da obediencia, e muy miuda conta ao Superior de todas as couzas miudas. E tudo o que digo não se pode escuzar, sob pena de padecerem as missões e os que nellas andão'.⁶⁰¹

We deem it relevant to underline *Tçuzu*'s last passage, specifically when he defined the procurator as the province's father, 'Pay da Provincia'. It would seem that Rodrigues borrowed this expression from the lexicon of the Spanish court. In the court, the monarch was not only the head of the household, but of several other organisms, such as the *Conselhos*, the court itself and, generally speaking, the whole monarchic body, which the king administrated as if they were his own home and he acted as a *pai de família*. In order to virtuously govern this many-sided home, the king was supposed to be both a good politician and a good *ecónomo*, since the two domains were not distinguished at all.⁶⁰²

Similarly to the Spanish king, the procurator in Japan, in order to make the best out of his position of intermediary in financial operations, was forced also to handle silver or gold owned by laymen outside the Society, namely Japanese and Portuguese merchants and, as used to happen frequently, Japanese lords, mostly to obtain political favours and support. Obviously, the more powerful the *daimyō*, the stronger the patronage. This was an issue that affected the mission right since the first years after the admission in the *armação*. As early as 1585, in fact, information about a parallel trade carried out by single members of the Vice-province of Japan reached Rome. Claudio Acquaviva received such news in a moment when he was planning on terminating the participation in the silk trade, due to the increase of the papal pension to 6'000 *cruzados* per year. The general had been informed that some fathers sent other people's silver to Macao to be invested in silk, thus he ordered Valignano 'no permitta a nadie esto ni otro genero de trato por ningun titulo de necesidad de Iglesia, o otro qualquiera'.⁶⁰³ The previous year, the general wrote the instructions for the procurator of the Portuguese

⁶⁰¹ See Procurator Rodrigues to General Vitelleschi, Macao, 28 January 1624. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-6, ff. 156-157. We have also the list drew up by Procurator Manoel Borges in July 1618. The procurator of Japan in Macao enumerated all the goods sent to Japan as requested by Carlo Spinola. Cf. *Fato da Companhia, que em Julho deste prezente anno vay embarcado para Japão, nas Galeotas da viagem todas seis que deste porto partem, e de que he capitão mor Antonio de Oliveira Moraes*, BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-7, ff. 187^v-192. Edited in Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 163-168.

⁶⁰² Cf. Arroyo, "A Função Integradora da Casa Real Portuguesa de João I a D. Filipe I (1385-1598)", pp. 23-24 and bibliography cited therein.

⁶⁰³ General Acquaviva to Visitor Valignano, Rome, 25 November 1585. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, ff. 12-12^v.

Assistancy in the Spanish Court. In more than some ways, it is similar to the guidelines Valignano left for the procurators of Japan in Macao and in Nagasaki, yet it is the 27th item of Acquaviva's instructions that interests us. It reads:

'No se encargue de negocios de seglares sino en algun caso a juizo del Provincial de Castilla el qual no dara licencia sino en caso que *sin offension de persona de gran cuenta*, no se pueda escusar, y que con decoro dela Compañía se pueda tratar, y por ningun caso tome diñeros de seglares ni aun delos nuestros para guardar sin licencia de sus superiores, ni pueda recibir de nadie nada como premio de su solicitud'.⁶⁰⁴

In 1589, Valignano answered Acquaviva's order, basically stating that for the Society it was very difficult to refuse to handle outsiders' silver, in particular when such requests came from influential nobles, because the Jesuits needed to gain and to keep their favour.⁶⁰⁵ Having in mind Acquaviva's words we have underlined, we suppose that this was a defense the general could not refuse. Evidently, however, Acquaviva was receiving complaints not only from clergymen, who saw the matter as another infraction of the sacred canons, but also from Portuguese officers, who were reporting protests by the Macanese community. The general, in fact, in 1593 reminded the Vice-provincial Pero Gomez that according to the *armação* charter, it was prohibited to introduce Japanese silver in China to buy the same merchandise exported by the Portuguese, since it would have inflated its value. Moreover, Acquaviva ordered Gomez to forbid 'alos nuestros que de ningun modo embien diñeros de algunos Japones juntamente con los nuestros al Padre Procurador de Macan para los emplear, de que se sigue escandalos y murmuracion hechando nos la culpa de sus daños'.⁶⁰⁶ Despite the justification, Valignano tried to at least limit the problem. Firstly, in the 12th article of the *Regimento*, he made sure that the procurator kept track of all the capitals received,⁶⁰⁷ then, in the 16th, he followed Acquaviva's example and established that eventual handling of

⁶⁰⁴ Cf. *Instrucion para el Procurador de las Provincias de Portugal, Brasil, India oriental que reside en corte de Valladolid Catolica hecha en Enero de 1584*, BNCR/FGes. 1255, f. 21^v. The underlining is ours.

⁶⁰⁵ Cf. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 251 and ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 11*, f. 140. Later, in 1612, also Valentim Carvalho and Francisco Pires wrote similar things. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 15 [II]*, f. 148 and f. 215^v.

⁶⁰⁶ See General Acquaviva to Vice-provincial Gomez, Rome, 20 October 1593. ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 3*, f. 27.

⁶⁰⁷ See *RPJ*, f. 38^v: '12. Tera outro livro de lembranças, no qual [...] estará o dinheiro que se recebe dos Tonos que mandão a China, e como vier a nao e se lhes entregar o dinheiro se borrara escrevendo o que lhes veyo a conta de sua prata'.

outsiders' silver should first be confirmed by the Father Superior.⁶⁰⁸ Finally, in 1592, he gave more detailed information:

'Daimyos want to have their silver sent to Macao through the Fathers [...] and to get it exchanged for raw silk or gold. In ordinary cases, they want only gold. The practice [...] was carried out at first on a small case by [a certain Christian daimyo] [...]. Later, as [...] [their] number increased, [...] [others] wanted to profit from this practice. When I visited Macao last year [1591], I was given permission by the municipality [...] to send up to 6'000 ducats of silver to Macao to exchange [...] for gold. But this [...] is not sufficient to meet even half the demand for gold by the daimyo [...] and I am afraid that it will increase day by day.'⁶⁰⁹

The matter reached an even more delicate point during Rodrigues's procuratorship, when those who wanted the Fathers to handle their silver were called Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu. *Tçuzu*'s involvement was harshly criticized by Bishop Luís Cerqueira, who pointed out that during the negotiations over the *pancada* price Rodrigues got too much involved in it, with a consequent as well as unsuitable loss of religious care and prudence.⁶¹⁰ It was this point in particular that resulted unacceptable to Claudio Acquaviva.

Whilst in other occasions, like the very silk trade, he passed from prohibition to permission after having being better informed, in this case he acted differently. He noticed that writing to Valignano was not always useful, since the visitor always found a justification and, even without one, eventually took the decisions he deemed preferable despite Acquaviva's opposition. Hence, with regard to the Fathers' handling of Japanese silver, he took the matter on his hands. In 1604, he wrote both to Alessandro Valignano and Francesco Pasio to remedy to the situation and stated that 'de nenhuma maneira convinha que pessoa alguma da Companhia se meta em o dar da pancada da seda em Japão; nem se fação em nossa casa semelhantes contratações ou repartições da dita seda'. In the letter to Pasio, he warned the vice-provincial that 'ainda que eu estou cuidando que dirão que fomos cá mal informados, e que querem propor suas rezões, todavia eu em cargo a V. R. que ponha em execução o que se lhe aqui

⁶⁰⁸ See *RPJ*, f. 39: 'Não se encarregar a nenhum dinheyro de fora, hora seja de Jappãos, hora seja de Portuguezes para mandar a China sem ordem do Superior e da mesma maneira não se encarregara de fato de fora, o qual venha da China, para elle o vender ca em Jappão nem recolherão emcaza dinheiro, ou fato depositado de pessoas de fora sem ordem particular, ou geral do Superior pellos muytos inconvenientes que dahy se seguem.'

⁶⁰⁹ *Apud* Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, p. 536.

⁶¹⁰ See *ARSI, Jap. Sin.* 21, ff. 135-137^v.

escreve e que não deixe de o comprar assi'.⁶¹¹ Eventually, João Rodrigues himself acknowledged that getting so close to political matters and secular lords was too dangerous. In his personal memorandum on the procurator office, in fact, he firmly stated that a Jesuit should not take responsibility for the money of rulers in the course of trade.⁶¹² Opposition to the handling of laymen's silver came also from Jesuits in Japan. One of them, Father Nicolao da Costa, severely criticized both Valignano and Pasio for allowing and fostering such practice.⁶¹³

Before leaving for Macao in March 1612, after having being reproached by the general, the bishop and by his confrères and after having experienced personally the consequences of getting too involved in the export of silver, Pasio compiled the *Obediencias dos Visitadores feito para os Padres das Residencias e mais Padres de Iapam*,⁶¹⁴ where he declared:

'Guardese [...] em particular de não se encarregarem os nossos das fazendas alheas que os seculares de dentro ou de fora de Japão lhes encomendarem, pello que se manda em virtude de Santa Obediencia a todos os desta Provincia assi Padres como Irmaãos assi Europeos como Japoens ainda aos mesmos Superiores e Reitores, e ao Procurador da Provincia que se não encarreguem de nenhum fato alheyo para o vender ou feitorizar, nem por outros'.⁶¹⁵

Carlo Spinola was quite relieved when he came to know about this order *in virtute de Sanctæ Obedientiæ*. According to him, being dispensed from taking on laymen's silver made the post of procurator 'mais leve'.⁶¹⁶ The procurator confided his relief both to Acquaviva and to António Mascarenhas and to the former revealed also that in 1612

⁶¹¹ General Acquaviva to Vice-provincial Pasio, Rome, 13 December 1604. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, f. 32^v. Acquaviva ordered to stop the involvement in the *pancada*'s negotiations also on 9 December 1608. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, f. 35^v.

⁶¹² See *Couzas que podem server par os Procuradores*, § 35 – *Convem que haja sempre a obbediencia contra a mercancia ainda para com o Tenca Dono*, BA/JA, *Cód.* 49-V-8, ff. 646^v-647. Cf. Oka, "A Memorandum by Tçuzu Rodrigues: The Office of Procurador and Trade by the Jesuits in Japan", p. 87.

⁶¹³ Cf. Father Nicolao da Costa to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Japan, 26 February 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [I], ff. 118-122, in particular ff. 118^v-119^v.

⁶¹⁴ In RAH/Jes. *Legajo* 21, 9/7236 [I], ff. 40-54^v.

⁶¹⁵ Cap. 13 – *De algumas cousas que em comum se prohibem*. *Ivi*, f. 48^v. Probably not much later Pasio finished writing the *Obediencias*, Acquaviva sent another letter to the visitor inviting him to stop the involvement in the handling of Japanese silver. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, f. 41. Later in 1618, Visitor Francisco Vieira reported that even after Acquaviva's prohibition had reached Japan, some of those who got involved in this forbidden trade found it quite difficult to abandon it. He referred in particular to Pasio, whom he accused to having taken with him to Macao more than 35'000 *taéis* of silver to be invested in China, and although Spinola warned him that it was something against Acquaviva's order, Pasio allegedly answered 'he verdade, mas isto he candeia que se vai ja apagando e eu não soube negar isto a estas pessoas'. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 154^v.

⁶¹⁶ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 158^v and f. 159.

they sent to Macao silver to the value of 18'000 *cruzados* belonging to laymen. Spinola described the amount of work he had to carry out when the ship came back in August:

‘Quantas vezes dessejei que V. P. vira esta casa do procurador quando veu a nao o anno passado, e nella o retorno da prata dos Japões, [...] porque foy trabalho de muytas semanas o repartir a cada hum o seu, dandolhe diversas layas de peças; e foy tal o labirinto de contas, e occupação minha, e de muytas pessoas, que me pareçera exageração o que dixee hum Padre que o tinha provado, que os superiores não podiam obrigar, a feitorizar prata alhea, por ser cousa mera secular, depois experimentando a diffculdade, que nisso ha, entendi que o dixeram com grande fundamento, e casi toda a repugnancia, que algunos tiveram de aceitar este officio, foy esta’.⁶¹⁷

He used almost the same words in the letter to Mascarenhas,⁶¹⁸ and was not alone in his appreciation of Acquaviva’s order. Geronimo de Angelis⁶¹⁹ and João Rodrigues Giram⁶²⁰ expressed similar ideas in 1613.

In these letters, Spinola wrote about what used to happen when he distributed the results of the investment of Japanese silver. Yet, in 1612 he had to deal also with an investigation regarding two ‘paens douro de dez taeis cada pam’, which in 1606 a Portuguese merchant in Macao, Francisco Vaz, entrusted to the Procurator of Japan in Macao Manoel Gaspar to be sold in Japan.⁶²¹ Basically, Francisco Vaz accused the Japan Jesuits of being guilty of losing his gold and demanded the repayment of the total sum. For the province’s defense, Spinola had to provide official documents for the investigation, which included the sworn statements of three Portuguese *moradores* of Nagasaki, and deliver them to the Captain Major Pedro Martins Gaio aboard the *Nao S. Philippe e S. Tiago*. According to these documents, when the Great Ship arrived in

⁶¹⁷ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 159.

⁶¹⁸ See Procurator Carlo Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas [?], Nagasaki, Spring 1612. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 158^v: ‘[...] o Padre Visitador fez huma ordem *in virtute obedientiae*, que não mandassemos prata de pessoas de fora a Macao, nem a feitorizassemos, mas porque o Padre se hia, e muytos lhe pidirão, que levasse sua prata, foy muyta em nosso nome, e credo ha de ter trabalho em negocia, e empregàla toda, e depois de vindo ca o emprego, não pode cuidar V. R. o trabalho, que tem o procurador, e as queixas, porque não se pode contentar a todos, e sempre vem muyta perda à Companhia, e basta homem correr com o nosso fato para estar demasiadamente occupado, sem feitorizar o alhes; pello que se houvera de fechar esta porta com obediencia de N. Padre, para que nos escusassemos de tantos enfadamentos bem alheos de nossa profissão, e assi esta carga ficaria mais leve, e os jappões entenderião, que de nos não hão de esperar se não o seu proveito espiritual’.

⁶¹⁹ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 34, f. 21.

⁶²⁰ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [II], f. 235.

⁶²¹ The original official documents regarding this topic are in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [II], ff. 159-161. Cf. also the letter that the fathers of the province sent to Acquaviva by way of explanation of the event on 29 January 1616. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [III], ff. 293-294^v.

Japan in 1606, Hasegawa Sahyōei confiscated all the gold, sealed it and had it stored in the *procuratoria*, probably because it was a safe warehouse and only the procurator and the Father superior were in possess of the keys.⁶²² Since the gold could not be invested or recovered, Francisco Vaz asked Procurator João Coelho to sell it whenever it was possible and ‘lhe ariscasem⁶²³ o proçedido do ouro da contenda [...] por sua concta na dita nao por modo licito, uzado e praticado comunmente nestas partes da India, entre mercadores e pessoas que tem com que ho possa pagar no lugar onde se manda dar o dinheiro ou levem fazendas sufisientez na mesma Nao em que se toma o risco pera com ellas pagar em cazo que lhe falte en terra’.⁶²⁴ Once Hasegawa finally released his seal, then, Coelho managed to sell all the gold and started to distribute the silver among the investors or their procurators. However, Francisco Vaz’s share was loaded onto André Pessoa’s *Nossa Senhora da Graça*, whose story has already being told.

The Japan Jesuits conducted their defense by stating that they loaded Vaz’s gold in the ship according to the way other traders did and that the other merchants who lost their capital in the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* did not file any complaint against their procurators in Japan. Eventually, the matter was settled in favour of the Society of Jesus, yet although for the Japan Jesuits everything ended up positively, this case clearly shows that handling outsiders’ capital might have bad implications for the mission. Only during Spinola’s procuratorship, in fact, the prohibition was enforced again by Acquaviva on 25 March 1614 and at least three times by General Vitelleschi, in 1616, in 1617 and in 1619.⁶²⁵ The last one was necessary in order to answer to Visitor Francisco

⁶²² See *RPJ*, f. 37: ‘Sua Residencia será em Nangasaque onde terá a curas, e gudoems [storehouses] suficientes com suas chaves seguras, e bem guardadas para agazellar todo o fato que arecada da Nao’, and f. 39, where it is specified that out of necessity and convenience the procurator had a crate which only he could open: ‘Terá o Procurador em sua cura dous ou trez caixoens da India em que estará a prata, cada hum dos quaes terá duas chaves dos quaes huma terá-a elle, e outra o Superior da Caza, e dentro estará hum livro em cada caixão em que se escreve a prata que se mete e a que se tira escrevendo o dia, e anno e porque será muyto trabalho cada vez que o Procurador tiverà necessidades de prata ajuntar as chaves avera outro caixão ou escritorio onde estará alguma somade prata para o gasto do qual o Procurador terá a chave’.

⁶²³ The *risk* (*rischio* in Italian, *risco* in Portuguese, *riesgo* in Spanish, from the Latin *risicum*) started to be considered an object with an intrinsic and quantifiable value in particular from the 16th century onwards, although in the monastic area the debate over the topic can be traced back to the second half of the 13th century. The Dominican Domingo de Soto (1495-1560) was one of the first theologian-philosophers to postulate the idea that in the insurance contracts also the assumption of the risk in the transportation had to be paid. For a good historical analysis on the *risicum* from its inception until the 16th century refer to Ceccarelli, *Il Gioco e il Peccato: Economia e Rischio nel Tardo Medioevo*, pp. 20-36.

⁶²⁴ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [II], ff. 159-159^v.

⁶²⁵ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, f. 44 for Acquaviva and f. 53^v and f. 54^v for Vitelleschi.

Vieira, who had asked Vitelleschi to cancel Acquaviva's order, yet the general remained adamant.⁶²⁶

By that time, however, the state of the Christendom had been already irremediably compromised by the latest occurrences in Japan. In 1613 the Tokugawa *bakufu* welcomed another European country on its territory – the English of the East India Company,⁶²⁷ and in 1615 had to face the last obstacle to an undisputed supremacy that would last until the second half of the 19th century – Toyotomi Hideyori and his retainers gathered at Ōsaka. Furthermore, between the two events, the *bakufu* issued the expulsion order for all the Roman missionaries. Almost all of the 114 Jesuits present in Japan left the country, yet 18 Fathers and nine Brothers were selected to remain in captivity.⁶²⁸ Among them, there was also Carlo Spinola, who had to thank his loathed office for that:

‘Eu quando recusei este officio, não soubi o que fazia, e agora vejo que foy particular merçe de Deus, porque se não o tivera nesta conjunçam, como me faltão as partes que se requerem pera quem ha de andar entre tantos perigos, não me ouvera o Padre Provincial de deixar em Japam, o que fora pera mim de grande afliçam, porem como faço nisto algum serviço a Companhia, e procuro de ajudar os christãos, estou muy consolado, ate que Deus nos dee paz, e venha outro que o faça melhor’.⁶²⁹

IV. 4. The procurator of Japan during the Tokugawa's persecution of Christianity

February 1614 was a watershed in the history of the evangelization in early modern Japan. In that month, in fact, the abbot of Nanzenji, the Zen monk Ishin Sūden,

⁶²⁶ See General Vitelleschi to Visitor Vieira, Rome, 15 January 1619. BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-IV-56*, ff. 199^v-200: ‘Considererey devagar o que V. R. me dis acerca da patente e preceito do Padre Claudio, e com assas dezejo dever se podia dar a V.R. alguma satisfação nesta parte, mas em nenhuma maneira posso alargarme nesta materia, pois o preceito se poz para dar satisfação assim a El Rey, como ao Papa das muitas queixas que havia de nos mercadejarmos’.

⁶²⁷ The English ship *Clove* reached Hirado on 11 June 1613. After a friendly reception by the local daimyo Matsuura Shigenobu and a delay until Adams arrived, Saris went up to visit Tokugawa Ieyasu at Shizuoka and his son Hidetada at Edo. With the help of Adams the English obtained permission to settle at Edo and to trade throughout Japan. Regarding the English presence in Japan we followed in particular Farrington, *The English Factory in Japan 1613-1623*, 2 vols.

⁶²⁸ Cf. Procurator Spinola to Cardinal Filippo Spinola, Nagasaki, 29 March 1615. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, ff. 177-177^v.

⁶²⁹ Procurator Carlo Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 18 March 1616. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 181^v.

was summoned into Ieyasu's presence at Edo castle and ordered to produce a statement on the expulsion of the Roman missionaries. From 1608 onwards, Sūden had been dealing with the drafting of the *bakufu*'s foreign correspondence, like the letter Ieyasu sent to the viceroy of New Spain in 1612, and other important documents, such as the *Kinchū narabi ni Kugechū shohatto* of July 1615.⁶³⁰ In the first days of February 1614, anyway, Sūden delivered the statement to Ieyasu and Hidetada. The text was issued over Hidetada's *shuin-jō* and instructions were given to disseminate it throughout the country.⁶³¹

The reasons that led Tokugawa Ieyasu to the issue of the anti-Christian edict are two in particular. The first one – the Okamoto Daihachi incident – has already been dealt with. The second one, on the other hand, regarded the Japanese Christianity and the worship of those punished by the Tokugawa's laws.⁶³² Two cases in particular provoked Ieyasu's indignation. As we saw, after Arima Harunobu's attempt to recover the coveted territories was exposed, the *daimyō* was executed and the lordship passed to his son, Naozumi, a former Christian who soon turned out to be a persecutor of the Western faith. In effect, Naozumi, soon after having taken possession of the fief, condemned to death eight Japanese Christians. Arima Christians visited the execution site to pray for the martyrs and to collect relics, yet their actions were interpreted by the Japanese officers as acts defiant of Naozumi's orders.⁶³³ Only a month later, in November 1613, the *bakufu* ordered the crucifixion of six Japanese, among which there was a notorious counterfeiter from Nagasaki, a Christian named Jirobioye. The

⁶³⁰ 禁中並びに公家中諸法度, the Code for the Imperial Court and Court Nobility was issued shortly after the Ōsaka campaigns against Hideyori along with the *Buke Shohatto* 武家諸法度. They were rules consolidating the *bakufu*'s power both over the *bushi* and the aristocracy. Although these instructions were not as restricting as historians had been claiming, in particular those regarding the court, it is a fact that the *shōgun* considered within his prerogatives to regulate and control both the domains of the military houses and the nobility. For a thorough analysis of Ieyasu's regulations for the Imperial court see Butler, "Tokugawa Ieyasu's Regulations for the Court: A Reappraisal", pp. 525-538. Butler provides also an English translation of the text. Cf. also Asao and Jansen, "Shogun and *Tennō*", p. 263 and De Palma, "L'interpretazione della sovranità giapponese da parte delle diplomazie occidentali nel XIX secolo", pp. 178-179.

⁶³¹ Cf. Elison, "The Evangelic Furnace: Japan's First Encounter with the West", pp. 148-149 and Boxer, *The Christian Century*, pp. 317-318.

⁶³² As summarized by Valentim Carvalho: '[A] ley dos Christãos era tal que ensinava e persuadia a adorar não só aos que seus Senhores mandavão matar por lhes não obedecerem, mas também aos malfeitores que erão iusticados por quebrantarem as leis do reino'. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [II], f. 44.

⁶³³ See Father Gabriel de Matos to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 21 March 1614. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [II], f. 56: '[R]everencião os Christãos aos que seus Senhores cortão, e quejmão, fundase no fervor, que mostrarão o Outubro passado os christãos de Arima, quando por ordem de Arimadono, e conselho do mesmo Safioye forão assados vivos os oito martyres [...], porque não estavam seus corpos ainda quejmados de todo, quando alguns Christãos entrarão polo meyo do fogo aos tomar'.

counterfeiter was accused of having bought ‘prata fundida sem cunhos’,⁶³⁴ which was illegal, and having taken it to Nagasaki. Once again, Japanese Christians gathered in the execution site to pay their homages to the dead and the *bakufu* accused them of worshipping men punished by the law of the country. Valentim Carvalho, however, objected that those Christians who were at the execution ‘quando virão morrer o Christão que estava crucificado, com a lançada que se custuma dar a semelhantes, se posarão de joelhos e encomendarão a Deos sua alma, tomarão daqui os gentios ocasião pera dizer que os Christãos adorão os malfeitores e isto forão contar a el Rei por cousa muito certa e verdadeira’.⁶³⁵

João Rodrigues Giram and Carlo Spinola, however, thought that those were just pretexts and the real motive for the persecution was to be found elsewhere. As the Portuguese wrote to Claudio Acquaviva, the blame was to be put on the Spaniards, the Hollanders and the English:

‘[A] principal causa, segundo corria entre nos e alguns christãos mais entendidos [...] foi rezam de estado; por vim em sospeitas vendo tantos Castelhanos assi religiosos como seculares vir a Japam por tantas vias, que pollo tempo multiplicandose mais os seculares europeos lhe viriam a não obedecer, e se alevantar contra elle, e ainda a tomar o reino. Estas sospeitas lhe fomentarão os Oladeses e Engrese hereges, que ca estam e vem quasi todos os annos dizendo-lhe que por via da dilataçam da nossa Santa Ley tomavamos os reinos, e terras, ao que se aiuntou o sondar dos portos do Capitam Castelhana⁶³⁶ que veo os annos atras da Nova Hespanha direito a este Japam, o qual lhe acrecentou mais estas sospeitas, confirmou mais nellas, e fez grandemente agastar contra nos, e nossa Santa Ley’.⁶³⁷

Be that as it may, Ieyasu and Hidetada drew their own conclusions, which were by no means favourable for the Japanese Christendom. The *ōgosho* and the *shōgun* sent orders to the governors of Miyako, Fushimi, Ōsaka and Sakai to draw a list of all the papist missionaries (Fathers, Brothers, *dōjuku* and servants) in their zone. In the Miyako area,

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁵ Provincial Valentim Carvalho to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 19 March 1614. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [III], f. 44.

⁶³⁶ Sebastián Vizcaíno.

⁶³⁷ Father João Rodrigues Giram to General Acquaviva, Macao, 23 December 1614. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [III], f. 122^v. For Spinola’s opinion see ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 162.

the order was put into effect in mid-February, but the Jesuits had already been informed that something heinous was in motion by the Nagasaki *bugyō* in December 1613.⁶³⁸

On 14 February, the Jesuits were expelled from the capital city and sent to Nagasaki.⁶³⁹ The persecution aimed not only to the Christians as a group, but also as a cultural establishment. The intransigence of the *bakufu*'s decree is evident also in the letters from the English factory at Hirado. Richard Cocks,⁶⁴⁰ the cape-merchant of the trading post, in March 1614 told that he was forced to remove the English flag they used to put out on Sunday because it had a cross in it, which although 'was not made in forme of the crose of Christ but rather for a badge or toaken wherby the English nation was knowne from all others [...]. Yet all would not serve, but downe it must [...], [since] it was the Emperor's will it should be soe, only we might put out any other mark we wold, a crose only excepted, & that ships cominge might beare a crose upon the water nut not on land'.⁶⁴¹

Only three days after the Jesuits expulsion from Miyako, Bishop Luís Cerqueira died. Consequently, it was necessary to designate a vicar and on 22 February Valentim Carvalho was chosen to fill the vacant post.⁶⁴² In October, Provincial Carvalho convened the first Provincial Conference of Japan in order to elect a provincial procurator destined for Europe to brief Paul V and the Hapsburg Crown on the new Japanese status quo. Having in mind what we have written about the division among the Fathers, it is important to stress that also after the *bakufu* had issued the edict of expulsion, there were still room for disunity in the mission. According to Spinola and another Italian, Giovanni Battista Zola, in fact, Carvalho delayed the call of the conference because he was afraid that the votes of Italians and Spaniards could result in the defeat of the Portuguese candidate.⁶⁴³ However, Spinola wrote that he himself

⁶³⁸ See the translation of Hasegawa's letter in the *Petição, e mais papeis apresentados Pelo Padre Carlos de Espinola Procurador da Companhia de JESUS da Provincia de Jappam*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-5, f. 533^v.

⁶³⁹ Provincial Carvalho to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, March 1614. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [II], ff. 323-323^v.

⁶⁴⁰ Richard Cocks (c1565-1624) was an English man from Stafford. He was employed by the East India Company probably thanks to his knowledge of the cloth trade and the Spanish language. He was part of the crew that reached Japan in 1613 and was chosen as head of the new factory at Hirado. His first years at Hirado were spent in organizing the factory and its sub-agencies and in fitting out voyages for South-East-Asia. However, as early as 1621, he was strongly advised to wind up the factory but he ignored the order. In May 1623 the Council at Batavia sent the Bull on a special voyage to close the factory. He reached Batavia on 27 January 1624 and died in March. Cf. Farrington, *op. cit.*, p. 1550.

⁶⁴¹ Richard Cocks to Richard Wickham, Hirado, 7 March 1614. In Farrington, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

⁶⁴² Cf. RAH/Jes. *Legajo* 22/9/7239 [I], f. 277.

⁶⁴³ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 172 for Spinola and f. 249 for Zola.

reassured Carvalho that for the province's sake the first choice should be a Portuguese.⁶⁴⁴ Thus, the procurator interceded on behalf of the whole mission in order to maintain peace and union at least during the first days of persecution, as Francesco Pasio wished when he appointed Spinola to the post.⁶⁴⁵

It is important to stress how this early chauvinism seems to take almost no interest in the consequences the delay might have caused to the missionaries. Two days before the conference ended, on Sunday 26 October, the fathers started to pack up to leave Japan. Differently from what happened with Toyotomi Hideyoshi and his expulsion decree, in this case it was soon clear that the *bakufu* was posing a serious threat to their lives and to the Japanese Christianity. During the conference last day, in fact, the fathers were driven out of Nagasaki.⁶⁴⁶ Most fathers concentrated at Fukuda – ‘duas legoas nossas de Nangasagi’,⁶⁴⁷ whereas a small part remained in a *quinta* which belonged to the province near Nagasaki. During those days they were rigorously guarded from all contact with the Japanese Christians. They had to remain there only for a while, since on 6 November the *Nao do Trato* and a small ship set sail for Macao, whereas the small ship for Manila sailed on 19. Before November 1614, there were 116 Jesuits in Japan between fathers and brothers, a month later only 27. As for the numbers of those who left, Provincial Carvalho wrote that ‘viemos de Japam desterrados a este Collegio de Macao treinta, e tres Padres, e vintanove Irmãos, os mais delles Japões [...], e sincoenta, e tres dojucos [...]. E por quanto no Collegio de Macao nem podia caber

⁶⁴⁴ See Procurator Carlo Spinola to General Acquaviva [SOLI], Nagasaki, 27 March 1615. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 172. ‘não havia de ser primeiro loco se não portugues, e com muytas rezões persuadi aos Padres Italianos, e Castelhanos que *pro bono pacis* [...] não convinha fazer procurador de outra nação que portuguesa, e assi os que tiverão mais votos forão portugueses’. Spinola’s intervention nonetheless, the election of the provincial procurator took a lot of time, since there was disagreement also among the Portuguese fathers. Giovanni Battista Porro, indeed, wrote Acquaviva that to elect the procurator nine ballots were necessary, because two Portuguese, Gabriel de Matos and Francisco Pacheco had received the same number of votes. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [III], ff. 149-150. Eventually, Pacheco changed his vote because he saw that Valentim Carvalho was obstructing his election and Matos was chosen to go to Europe along with Pedro Morejón, the former through Macao and the latter through Manila. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [III], ff. 95-95^v.

⁶⁴⁵ It has to be added that between Spinola and Carvalho there was a particular hostility. We can be pretty sure about that, since we have confirmations from other Jesuits, too. For example, we have an anonymous letter written to the Visitor of the Province, which states that ‘a paixão que o padre [Carvalho] tem em materia de nações, e a pouca união que tem com estrangeiros elles o digão, e se ha quem o não saiba; e ainda com alguns portugueses esteve mal por isso, e quebrou com elles; hum dos seus queixumes he que falo com o Padre Carlos, e com italianos; [...] nesta eleição de nosso Padre Geral [Muzio Vitelleschi] disse, que fora a meis não poder, e por o Papa o querer fazer, e que la levavão os italianos o general da Companhia, como o Papado da Igreja; com outras cousas bem desnecessarias’. Anonymous Father to Visitor Francisco Vieira, Nagasaki, 1617. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 5.

⁶⁴⁶ See Vice-provincial Jerónimo Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Japan, 4 November 1614. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [III], f. 103. Cf. Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-327.

⁶⁴⁷ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [III], f. 103.

mais gente, e os Chinas tem grandes sospeitas dos Japões [...], mandei de Japam à Manila oito Padres, sinco delles Hespanhoes, hum Italiano e dous Portugueses’.⁶⁴⁸

Despite the great number of Jesuits who left Japan, it must have been perfectly obvious to the Japanese officials that a considerable portion of missionaries had stayed. Those European missionaries who had remained camouflaged themselves as Iberian traders domiciled at Nagasaki, whereas the Japanese brothers and *dōjuku* had no problem in going unnoticed. Provincial Mateus de Couros in 1618 gave a detailed description of the disguising practices of the Fathers:

‘E porque as feições dos Europeos são muy diferentes das dos Japões, posto que de ordinario somos conhecidos, todavia com nos disfarçarmos e andarmos de noite, procuramos de acudir a nossos ministerios. De tres maneiras se disfarção os nossos Europeos. Aqui em Nangasaqui, como he porto aonde cada anno vem os navios de Macao, e das Philippinas, dous ou tres Padres e dous Irmãos andão em trajos de Portuguezes honestos. Dos demais Padres assi aqui, como nas outras partes de Japam, huns andão com a barba e cabeça rapada e com trajos compridos como andão em Japam os que ia profissão vida quieta, deixadas as armas, ou a renda que possuhiam a seus filhos morgados. Outros andam com o cabello crecido e atado a uzo de Japam, com hum terçadinho na cinta como andam os seculares, conformandose cada hum aos lugares per onde descorre e a gente com quem trata. Dos Padres Irmãos Japões quasi todos andão ou como rapados ou como seculares. O traje de todos he honesto e limpo, sem uzarem de seda, tirando os que aqui em Nangasaqui se vestem como Portuguezes, os quais trazem alguns vestidos de tafeta, que he os mesmos de que nestas partes uza a gente Portugueza. Os que tratão como Japoens comumente se vestem de algodão, porque que alguns por respeito dos lugares onde estam uzão de certo pano feito de borra de seda, chamado tçumugui⁶⁴⁹ de que se veste a gente honrada ordinaria. Em todos estes trajos não há cor certa, como tambem a não ha nos de Japam, posto que sempre os nossos uzam da mais honesta’.⁶⁵⁰

This letter, however, was written only two months before Spinola was captured. By the end of 1614, in fact, the persecution had barely started, yet the missionaries had no more powerful *daimyō* to count on, the last of them being Takayama Ukon who went to

⁶⁴⁸ See Provincial Carvalho to General Acquaviva, Macao, 30 December 1614. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [I], f. 131. Differently from what stated by Carvalho with regard to the fathers sent to Macao, other sources affirm that the number of those sent to China was 73. Cf. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-55, p. 50 and p. 313. Another document, on the other hand, states that the Jesuits were actually 65. Cf. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-5, f. 191.

⁶⁴⁹ 紬 *tsumugi* nowadays it translates “taffeta” into Japanese.

⁶⁵⁰ See Provincial Mateus de Couros to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 8 October 1610. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 84.

Manila together with the missionaries.⁶⁵¹ Furthermore, as reported by Valentim Carvalho and confirmed by the English, Japanese soldiers started to destroy Jesuits' buildings in Nagasaki even before the missionaries set off for Macao.⁶⁵² Before the final decision to leave Japan was taken, however, the Jesuits tried one last thing 'para abrandar o Rey', as Carvalho put it.

In 1614, in fact, Macao arranged to send the *Nossa Senhora da Vida* with Captain Major João Serrão da Cunha to Nagasaki. Since Ieyasu made it perfectly clear that his prohibition was aimed solely at the missionaries, and that the traders from Macao would continue to be warmly welcomed, provided that they confined their activities to commercial matters, the Japan Jesuits asked Serrão to plead personally with Ieyasu for the retention of one solitary church in Nagasaki for the use of the Portuguese, as had been implicitly permitted in Hideyoshi's time. The Captain Major was willing to do what was asked of him, but the project was abandoned as Nagasaki *bugyō* refused to countenance it.⁶⁵³

The missionaries in Japan had realized that the state of the country was changing for the worse even before Arima Naozumi sentenced the eight Christian to death. In March 1613, in fact, Luís Cerqueira gave to Claudio Acquaviva a concise account of the conditions of the Christian missions throughout Japan. Although he had no negative news to report, he ended the letter with a statement that foreshadowed the future persecution: 'eu não estou com o curacao reposaudo'.⁶⁵⁴ Exactly one year later, that is a month later the Fathers were driven out of Miyako, Carvalho already described the forthcoming storm as 'a mais brava perseguição que ategora ouve em Japão [...], agora

⁶⁵¹ See Father Andrea Caro to General Acquaviva, Manila, 16 July 1615. ARSI, *Philipp.* 11, f. 69: 'Vino con los nuestros [exiled] a esta Provincia el famoso Capitan Justo Ucondono desterrado con su mujer, hija, et cinco nietos. Fue recebido de todos, como merecia'. The Governor of the Philippines Juan de Silva granted to the group of Japanese who seek refuge in Manila 1'000 *pesos* per year. Cf. AGI, *Contaduria* 1210, f. 339^v.

⁶⁵² Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [I], f. 131 and Farrington, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137.

⁶⁵³ Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, p. 74 and ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [I], ff. 131-131^v. Carvalho specified that before asking the Captain-major, Macao's ambassador went to Ieyasu's court in order to deliver 'certos apontamentos, e petiçam que fizemos pera apresentar a El Rey [...]; com tudo nada aproveitou, porque vendo os privados d'El Rey que estava muito indiniado contra os Christaos, nenhum delles ouzou a interceder por nós por mais meyo, que pera isso buscou, e applicou o dito Embaixador'. ARSI, *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁴ See Bishop Cerqueira to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 20 March 1613. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [III], f. 264.

está tão asanhado o rey que determina não deixar pedra sobre pedra e arrancar de raiz o nome Christão e desterrar os pregadores do Evangelho'.⁶⁵⁵

Although the shape of things to come had been clearly shown by the Arima martyrs in 1613 and the *bakufu*'s attitude in 1614, then, a temporary reprieve was granted to the Christendom by the outbreak of the Ōsaka campaign⁶⁵⁶ and to the province by the arrival of the *Nossa Senhora da Vida* in summer. For the English at Hirado it was the first time they saw the Great Ship arriving at Nagasaki. Richard Cocks left some interesting words about it and how the silk price was inflated by its arrival:

'Ther came a great gallion or ship of Portingalls from Amacau in Chyna this year to Langasaque in Japan, very ritchly laden w'th silke and China stuffes. Shee brought but 300 pecull raw silke, w'ch is butt little in respect other ships wear wont to bringe heartofore, and yett hath sould none of it to this hower. Silke was worth 270 taies the pecull before she came in, but now worth but 230, and yet no vent at that price for everyone keepeth ther mony by them by meanes of the brut of thease warrs till thay see what it will com unto; for other sortes Chyna stuffes, as velvets, sattines, damasks, taffaties and sucklike, thay ar sould accordineg to ther goodness, as thay ar w'th yow'.⁶⁵⁷

We do not know whether in 1614 the *pancada* price met Portuguese expectations. Yet, even if it did and if we are to believe Richard Cocks, the amount of silk the *Nossa Senhora da Vida* took to Japan was too small to yield a great income.⁶⁵⁸ On his part, in the surviving letters from 1614 and 1615, Spinola did not spend a lot of words related to the silk trade. This was probably due to Acquaviva's *ordem in virtute Sanctae Obedientiae* of abstaining from handling outsiders' capital, which basically brought back the post of procurator to a normal state and reduced Spinola's engagement in the silk trade. He limited to write to António Mascarenhas that he was unable to write earlier owing to the 'muyta pressa que derão aos nossos em fazelos embarcar para Macao, e Luçon, e as muytas occupaões que tиви em por em cobro o fato da Companhia, e aviar

⁶⁵⁵ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [II], f. 44.

⁶⁵⁶ In March 1615, Carlo Spinola wrote to his uncle Filippo that after the new persecutions in Arima that cost the life of 45 Christians, he was waiting for the same to happen in Nagasaki, yet 'con la nuova che venne delle alterationi d'Ozaca, et guerra che cominciava tral figlo di Taicosama, el'Imperatore che perseguita li christiani; i capitani, et soldati deputati per il martyrio, si partirno di pressa, et restò questa città libera dal furore gentilico, et perciò non hebbi occasione di offerirme al martyrio'. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 177.

⁶⁵⁷ See Richard Cocks to John Jourdain, Hirado, 10 December 1614. In Farrington, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

⁶⁵⁸ Moreover, the Great Ship was forced to leave before all the return cargo had been taken aboard and consequently the Captain Major's share was insufficient to discharge his load of debt, and he returned to India a bankrupt man. Cf. Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.

os navios'.⁶⁵⁹ However, this substantial lack of first-hand data on the 1614 and 1615 trade at Nagasaki⁶⁶⁰ gives us the chance to deal closely with the basic occupations of the procurator both when the Great Ship berthed at Nagasaki and when was about to set off.

Valignano's *Regimento* dedicated only an article – the 18th –to the duties of the procurator on the returning voyage. The *Regimento* stated that before the ship left, the procurator had to submit to the provincial the list of goods to be bought at Canton and the quantity of silver in the procurator's possession, so that the provincial 'ordene a cantidade da prata que poderá hir a China'.⁶⁶¹ Although, then, the procurator was the one in charge with the management of the finance of the province, it was up to the provincial to establish the amount of silver to send to Macao.

The departure of the Great Ship for Macao was placed halfway along the year of a procurator. The procurator of Japan, in fact, had his own calendar. His account books started with the arrival of the ship from Macao, usually in August, and ended by the time a new ship arrived.⁶⁶² Within two months from the arrival of the ship, the procurator was supposed to have finished compiling his books and presented them to his superior. The books were normally two. In the first one, in addition to the transcriptions of Valignano's *Regimento* and the list of 'todas as Rendas que Japão tem, assim em Espanha do Summo Pontifice, como na India, Malaca, e China, e em Jappão e juntamente o que costuma arendar cada couza destas',⁶⁶³ the procurator had to compile the list of the provisions and goods shipped from Macao. Although Spinola's version of the first book does not survive, in order to understand its meticulousness we can rely upon the book used and composed by João Coelho in 1609 entitled *Narração Breve do Número das Casas, da Gente, da Renta, e Gastos da Companhia de Jappão*.⁶⁶⁴ The former procurator divided the *Narração* into twelve *títulos* (sections), each one of them dedicated to the description of the possession and the expenses of the vice-province in Japan and Macao. Coelho's *Narração* ends with schematic summaries of the total

⁶⁵⁹ See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 25 March 1615. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 170.

⁶⁶⁰ Richard Cocks makes an exception. On 20 December 1615, he wrote to a colleague of him in Siam that the Great ship 'brought som 900 picos of Canton silke, w'ch they have sould at 165 taeis the pico'. Cf. Farrington, *op. cit.*, p. 361. If on the one hand the quantity of silk diminished compared to the Japan voyage of 1612, when the cargo of silk amounted to 1'300 *picols*, on the other hand it increased threefold with respect to 1614, when the price consequently decreased of 105 *taéis* per *picol*.

⁶⁶¹ Cf. *RPJ*, f. 39.

⁶⁶² *Ivi*, ff. 37^v-38.

⁶⁶³ *Ivi*, f. 37^v.

⁶⁶⁴ Edited in *TCJ*, pp. 515-539.

expenses of the vice-province as established by Valignano in the 6th and 7th articles of the *Regimento*.⁶⁶⁵

Resume-se o número dos Collégios, Casas, Residências, Padres, Irmãos, collegiaes, moços, Christãos, e prata que se gasta, da Companhia de Jappão.

# Tres Collégios, hum dos quais hé o de Macao	03
# Huma casa de Noviciado	01
# Hum Seminário	01
# Oito Casas, das quais sam duas reitorais	08
# Quinze Residências	15
# Oytenta e tres Padres	83
# Sento e sincoenta Irmãos	150
# Quatrocentos e oitenta e sinco moços de serviço	485
# Duzentos e vinte e dous mil Christãos	222 000
# Gasta-çe nas casas ettcc. em prata, deixando outros gastos, de que abaixo farei menção, 15'670 cruzados de Portugal, que são taeis de prata da China 14'494, 7 mazes, 5 condorins, os quais feitos em pardaos de reales vem a fazer 19'774, 4 mazes	19 774, 4 mazes, 0

Receita da prata que tem Jappão das suas rendas

# Tem que paga Sua Santidade na Coletaria de Madrid, seis mil Cruzados de Cámara, que são pardaos de reales a 773, como valem na China	06539-5-7
# Tem em Salcete de Goa, que deu Sua Magestade, pardaos de reales	00886-5-5
# Tem n'alfândega de Malaca, que deu Sua Magestade, pardaos de reales	00650-0-0
# Tem na renda de Caranja e aldeas do norte da Índia, tyrados os gastos que nellas se fazem, pardaos	01000-0-0
# Tem na cidade de Macao da China de alugares de casa, pardaos	00650-0-0
	09726-3-2

Despeza de todo o gasto que faz a Companhia de Jappão em hum anno

# Pagão-sse de fretes e direitos na China aos Capitães das Naos da Índia e de Malaca de trazerem os 9000 pardaos a 7 por 100	00630-0-0
# Faz-sse de gastos na Índia com os sogeitos que vêm do Reino pera Jappão, e com o Padre Procurador de Jappão que reside em Goa, hum anno por outro, pardaos	00700-0-0
# Conforme ao que fica dito, gasta-çe com as Casas, Collégios, e Residências, pardaos	19 774-4-0
# Gasta-sse com pobres e desterrados, hum anno por outro 800 Cruzados – são pardaos	01009-4-0
# Monta o gasto comum da Viceprovincia, hum anno por outro, pardaos	00650-0-0
# Gasta-sse em presentes, quando se manda visitar o Emperador e outros senhores de Jappão, pardaos	01100-0-0
# Gasta-sse em se fazer edifícios, e em algumas obras que se fazem de novo, hum anno por o outro, pardaos	01500-0-0
# Gasta-sse com os homens que têm cuidado de vigiar e alimpar as igrejas, pardaos	00300-0-0
# Gasta-sse em viáticos dos nossos que vão de huma parte pera a outra, e em correos, pardaos	00250-0-0
	25 914-1-0

⁶⁶⁵ See *RPJ*, f. 37^v.

Contas resumidas

Tem Jappão de suas ordinarias	09 726-3-2
Faz de gasto em hum anno	25 914-1-0
Fica-lhe faltando, em que pasa a despeza pela receita	16 187-4-2

Source: *TCJ*, pp. 537-538.

In the second book, the procurator had to write the supplies bought in China thanks to the alms collected in Japan, the profits from their selling and the statement of expenses for the current year. This book was supposed to contain also the list of goods sent from Europe and the total amount of capital belonging to the Province of Japan both in coin and in silk.⁶⁶⁶

After having fulfilled those notarial deeds, the procurator passed to deal with the principal tasks outlined by Valignano in the second article of the *Regimento*, in other words providing colleges, houses and residences of their needs. In this duty, the procurator was freed from the strict subordination to his superior. In order to quicken the distributive process, in fact, the procurator ‘terà licença de prover sem outra nova licença do Superior todas as cazas, e Residencias de Jappão’.⁶⁶⁷ With respect to the necessities of the single colleges, houses or residences, it is important to stress out that the goods provided by the procurators of Japan in Macao and Japan were not put on the province’s account. The procurators bought the merchandises in advance and then sold them to the fathers superiors ‘pello mesmo preço que vem da China computados os fretes, e direitos que se pagão dellas’.⁶⁶⁸ Consequently, the procurator had also to keep up to date about variations on the prices due to tax increment or decrease and it goes without saying that the fathers superior had their own capital to invest in order to purchase what they needed. Visitor Francisco Vieira wrote about this point to Muzio Vitelleschi while explaining the causes and consequences of handling laymen’s silver. Although his letter is marked with harsh criticism against the commercial customs of his confrères, it sheds some light upon the matter:

‘[O]s mais dos Superiores de Japão, Reitores de Nangasaqui, e do Miyaco e outros alguns Padres Superiores das Residencias e Vigairos das Inacas⁶⁶⁹ (assi chamão cá as Igrejas que nas outras Christandades da Índia chamamos freguesias nas aldeas) mercadejavão, e chatinavão quanto podião, e tinham todas estas casas seus particulares peculios *negotiatione aquiridos*,

⁶⁶⁶ *Ivi*, f. 38.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁸ *Ivi*, f. 39^v.

⁶⁶⁹ 田舎, *inaka*.

que cá se chamavão cabedais, *Verbi Gratia* cabedal do Collegio de Nangasaqui, da casa do Miyaco etc. de sorte que esta casa do Miyaco quando se desfez por razão desta perseguição tinha mais de quatro mil taeis de seu cabedal [...]. Além destes cabedais avia cabedal para a casa dos Pintores, para os gastos da imprensa, até o Irmão Vicente Carruba torneiro tinha cabedal para a sua officina. E todos estes mercadeiavão não somente na terra, mas huns para Macao, outros para Philippinas, e outros para outras partes de Cochinchina, Cambodja etc. E estas mercancias se fazião com permissão dos Superiores maiores, e Superior maior ouve que encomendava aos nossos acrecentassem seus cabedais'.⁶⁷⁰

If Vieira is to be trusted, we may infer that each house managed its own capital outside the *armação* in order to increase the purchasing power and to have no problem in paying the procurator when the merchandises were delivered. In effect, in 1616 Spinola wrote that more than some Fathers started to sell the supplies provided by the procurator in order to increase their capital and to buy things without the superiors' knowledge.⁶⁷¹ In any case, both Spinola and Vieira's letters referred to activities that had been interrupted by Acquaviva and Pasio years before.

However, we should keep our focus on Vieira's last words, namely 'Superior maior ouve que encomendava aos nossos acrecentassem seus cabedais'. We cannot be certain, but it is highly probable that Vieira was referring to Alessandro Valignano, more specifically the last article of the *Regimento*, whose *incipit* reads: '[t]enha toda via summa diligencia de conservar, e acrescentar este cabedal de Jappão, se fosse possível até contía de sincoenta mil taeis'.⁶⁷² The same topic was coped with also during the Second General Conference in 1590. The fathers unanimously decreed that keeping a good capital in Japan was necessary to the point that 'della depois de Deos depende a comservação da Companhia e Christandade de Japão'.⁶⁷³ In order to deal with potential emergences, such as missing voyages or military conflicts, the Japan Jesuits calculated minimum capital assets of 40'000 *cruzados*.⁶⁷⁴ João Coelho's *Narração* ends with three brief statements, which represent his general considerations and advices in the light of

⁶⁷⁰ See Visitor Vieira to General Vitelleschi, Japan, 19 September 1618. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, ff. 154-154^v.

⁶⁷¹ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 180.

⁶⁷² See *RPJ*, f. 40^v.

⁶⁷³ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 51, f. 150.

⁶⁷⁴ *Ivi*, f. 150^v. In addition to this capital held in Japan, Valignano suggested to amass other 8 – 10'000 *cruzados* to be held in Macao 'assi pera se fazer a tempo e mais barato a compra das cousas que cada año se hão de mandar a Japão, antes de esperar o dinheiro que lhe vai na nao, como tambem porque perdendose a nao desta carreira a ida, ou a vinda, aja pera o ano seguinte na China cabedal pera se mandar o emprego ordinario a Japão, e não pareça a Companhia sem remedio gastando o que aqui lhe ficou, e da China não lhe vindo nada'. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 51, f. 173^v.

the counts he had listed. In the third and last point he wrote that ‘a Companhia está emdividada de presente em mais de vinte mil cruzados’.⁶⁷⁵ Coelho signed and closed the book on 12 November 1609, namely two months before André Pessoa drowned in Japanese waters along with the cargo of his ship, a fact that dramatically boosted the Society’s debts. In 1615, Procurator Spinola sent to Goa a summary of all the overdue debts the Japan Province accumulated only in the *Estado da Índia*, which means that debts the province had in Portugal and Spain were not included.⁶⁷⁶ Spinola declared that the debts amounted to ‘dezoito mil trezentos setenta, e hum taeis, dous mazes e tres condonins de prata de seda’.⁶⁷⁷ Thus, it was objectively impossible for the procurator to maintain a capital devoured by amounts overdue, not to mention to increase it. The only solution he could possibly have was to reduce expenses and waste.

IV. 4. 1. A solution to the problem: slimming the ranks

As we said, in Spinola’s surviving letters from 1614 and 1615 there are only a few mentions to the silk trade. During that couple of years, in fact, Spinola was much more worried about the widespread waste that was affecting a mission already in danger. Spinola proposed several solutions to reduce expenses, first of all the need to be rid of useless brothers and *dōjuku*.

Generally speaking, the *irmãos* had been extremely useful elements for the evangelising process in particular during the first period of the mission, when the majority of Ignatians believed that the Japanese Christianity ought to be self-sufficient. But then the project of creating a native clergy stopped. Owing to this change in the programs of the Society, with the brothers who were no longer considered apt for the priesthood, there was an overlapping of positions, namely *irmãos* and *dōjuku* shared the same tasks, even though the former considered themselves more important than the

⁶⁷⁵ See *TCJ*, p. 539.

⁶⁷⁶ Cf. *Dividas que ao presente está a dever a Provincia de Japão que necessariamente se han de pagar alem de outras que deve no Reyno*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, ff. 95-95^v. The debts of the Japan Jesuits in Lisbon were practically extinguished in 1616, when they owed only 54’700 *réis*, more or less 140 *cruzados*. Yet, it should be noted that the sum was this low only because the debts had been paid with the papal pension in April 1616. Cf. *ARSI, Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 145.

⁶⁷⁷ *Ivi*, f. 95^v: ‘Ao todo montão as dividas que ao presente está a dever a Provincia de Japão dezoito mil trezentos setenta, e hum taeis, dous mazes e tres condonins de prata de seda, que fazem pardaos Reales trinta e nove mil seis centos setenta e nove, e vinte cinco rez, que fazem patacas vinte e cinco mil e secenta 25060 pardaos de Realez’.

latter.⁶⁷⁸ According to Spinola, the problem with the Japanese brothers lay in their lack of humility and abnegation and in the fact that by being officially admitted in the Society ‘tem por baixeza fazer os officios de casa, tanto que nem ajudar huma Missa querem, e [...] não fazem mais que hir a comer, e estar todo o dia ociosos’.⁶⁷⁹ On the contrary, the *dōjuku* ‘se contentão com menos no comer, e vestir, e [...] fazem até os officios de moços [...], e [...] he cousa que espanta ver os dojicos mais zelosos das almas, e que nunca cansão de pregar, e trabalhar como bois de carga, e os Irmãos com huma pregação logo abafam’.⁶⁸⁰ Spinola added also that the teaching of Latin both to brothers and *dōjuku* should be erased for several reasons. As he explained to Acquaviva, that kind of study was quite demanding and took a lot of time, hence slowing down their preparation as workers for and in the Christendom. Even though Spinola conceded that in order to help the fathers out in their offices it was necessary that the Japanese were acquainted with Latin, he pointed out that ‘isto pouco latin requer, e com o uso se aprende mais que com o estudo’.⁶⁸¹ Furthermore, differently from the first years of the mission, now there were a lot of Fathers fluent in Japanese and thus it was not necessary for the Japanese to learn Latin. The Italian Jesuit compared the study of Latin for the Japanese to the study of Theology for the Europeans. According to him, in fact, similarly to a European father who once had finished the Theology course demanded to pray and to become professed without applying anymore to confessions and similar tasks, the Japanese brothers ‘querem ser tratados como letrados [...]; assi aos dojicos se que V. P. tirarlhes o aspirarem a ser Irmãos, e sacerdotes, ha mister tirarlhes o latim’.⁶⁸² Thus, Spinola concluded that it was detrimental and counter-productive to keep that kind of brothers, since they were just a great source of expense in a time when the procurator kept requesting the aid of the Divine Providence, since ‘estamos desamparados de todo humano socorro’.⁶⁸³ It would seem that eventually Acquaviva responded to Spinola’s plea, since in 1615, he wrote to Valentim Carvalho ordering him to stop teaching Latin to the *dōjuku* ‘por isso lhe servira de fomentar tentações’.⁶⁸⁴

At any rate, Spinola thought that the situation could get even worse if the number of Japanese fathers increased. With respect to this point, in 1614 he wrote that

⁶⁷⁸ Cf. Costa, *O Cristianismo no Japão*, pp. 503-505.

⁶⁷⁹ See Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 23 March 1614. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 165.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸¹ *Ivi*, f. 165^v.

⁶⁸² *Ibid.*

⁶⁸³ *Ivi*, f. 165^v.

⁶⁸⁴ See General Acquaviva to Provincial Carvalho, Rome, 1 February 1615. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 3, ff. 77^v-78.

the very permanence of European missionaries was in danger if the Japanese clergy surpassed the European in number:

‘[H]a mister pola conservação dos Europeos em Japam, que não haja muytos sacerdotes da Companhia, nem clérigos se não poucos aqui em Nangasaqui para ajuda dos officios pontificaes; porque [...] sem falta se hão de unir, e como forem muytos hão de querer serem superiores, e governar a seu modo, e com alguma occasião como esta de perseguição, facilmente alcançarão elles de ficar em Japam, e que todos nos vamos’.⁶⁸⁵

Consequently, then, Spinola did not want them to take part in the general conferences of the province, when important matters were discussed. Although the expulsion had not yet started, in this letter Spinola showed all of his mistrust in the Japanese people, which he saw as a strongly cohesive group. Still, it must be said that there were several cases of Japanese believers who chose the Christian religion over their own country, then we cannot consider Spinola’s version as completely objective.

In a letter dated 25 March 1615 to Acquaviva,⁶⁸⁶ in which the general tone is definitely more worried about the finances, Spinola reinforced the point expressed the year before by adding some data quite interesting for us. He did not write the amount of debts as he did in the summary sent to Goa, but he summed up the situation with few but eloquent words: ‘esta provincia de Japam [...] não somente não tem cabedal, mas antes muytas dividas sem modo pera pagalas’.⁶⁸⁷ Although we know that the main cause that led the province to get into debt was the necessity of buying supplies and the participation *at all cost* in the *armação*, Carlo Spinola blamed also the custom of the fathers superiors of Japan of not determining the expenses according to the incomes, which was also a topic Valignano dealt with in 1590.⁶⁸⁸

Spinola also wrote something about his office, which takes us back to the *Regimento*’s 6th article, where Valignano suggested that the procurator ‘tera huma lembrança da qual por experiencia conhece que pode gastar cada anno de cangaria, e

⁶⁸⁵ Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 23 March 1614. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 165.

⁶⁸⁶ The information on Acquaviva’s death and the election as sixth general of the Italian Muzio Vitelleschi reached Japan only in June 1616. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 1.

⁶⁸⁷ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 168.

⁶⁸⁸ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 51, f. 173: ‘Tambem encomendo encarecidamente e encarrigo a consciencia da parte de N. Padre a qualquer que for supremo superior de Japão que [...] procure sempre de medir os gastos com a renda e ganhos que lhe vem cada ano na nao, de maneira que nunca gaste mais em quanto for possivel do que vier de renda aquele año’.

fato cada Padre, cada Irmão, cada Dojucu, cada Tonobara,⁶⁸⁹ cada mosso de casa'.⁶⁹⁰ As we have said, Spinola was aware of the surplus of brothers and *dōjuku* and that he considered their removal as the first move to turn around the economy of the province. However, he was also conscious that, differently from the *dōjuku*, they could not dismiss the brothers on account of the mission's finances. Yet, they could not send Japanese to Macao either, due to the Chinese prohibitions. The situation was so serious that he arrived to the point of interpreting the persecution as a way God was trying to help them, since he had not the means to sustain the destroyed estates and the servants they were forced to dismiss.⁶⁹¹

Nevertheless, despite the impossibility of getting rid of all the unnecessary members, he had to keep track of the expenses of each one of his confrères anyway, as it was stated in the *Regimento*:

'[A]tè agora cada Padre tem hum dojucu, e hum moço particular, e alem destes ha mister outros pera os officios de caza, e os Irmaos que poderão servir em algunos officios, querem antes ser servidos, e estão de ordinario ociosos os que residem em cazas grandes; e assi ainda que hum Padre não gaste mais que 18 ducados cada anno em comer, e com o vestido, e outros gastos extraordinarios de hospedes, alfayas, concerto de casa etc. 25 ducados, toda via com o dojucu, a que cabem 14 e hum moço que gasta 9 ducados monta cada anno 48 ducados; que se estivessem os dojucus, e moços em comunidade, muyto menor numero delles seria necessario pera huma caza, porque todos ajudarião nas officinas, e os dojucus acudirião aos ministerios, para os quaes alem dos que servem aos Padres, são necessarios outros, e com isto não queiro dizer que não aja em caza mais dojucus, dos que respoudem a cada Padre hum, pois forçadamente ha de aver algunos catequistas de mais, porem não serão necessarios tantos, quantos forão até agora assinando a cada Padre hum, que não faça mais que servir a o seu Padre sem entender em outra cousa, e os Irmãos podem ser sãcristães, sotoministros, refeitoreiros, despenseiros etc. como o são nas outras partes da Companhia'.⁶⁹²

In 1614, there were 63 fathers and 53 brothers in Japan,⁶⁹³ so if we suppose that they received the same amount of money from the procurator and we calculate the annual expenses for each of them at 48 ducats we have an annual expenditure of 5'568 ducats.

⁶⁸⁹ 殿原, *tonobara* were Japanese hired to carry out duties in the residences of the Society. The *Vocabulario* defined a *tonobara* as a 'homem escudeiro menos que fidalgo, e cavaleiro'. Cf. *VLJ*, ff. 510^v-511.

⁶⁹⁰ See *RPJ*, f. 37^v.

⁶⁹¹ Cf. *ARSI, Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 168.

⁶⁹² *Ivi*, ff. 168-168^v.

⁶⁹³ Cf. *TCJ*, pp. 579-609.

Yet, when Spinola wrote this letter (March 1615), the most part of the missionary contingent had already left for Macao and Manila. Fortunately for the province's coffers, only 18 fathers and nine brothers had been selected to stay in Japan,⁶⁹⁴ which meant an annual cost of almost 1'300 *cruzados*. Another thing that can be deduced by Spinola's letter is that although the fathers had been expelled one year before, the situation in Nagasaki was still as quite as to let him taking care of personnel's surplus, instead of focusing on the basic survival of the province. Furthermore, we can compare these expenditures with those of 1598, when Valignano informed that a father or a brother received no more than 20 *taéis* per year – i.e. 30 *cruzados* – for food and clothes, yet if there was no voyage they would receive only 16 *taéis*. The *dōjuku* and the *moços*, on their part, received only four *taéis* and a half per year – roughly 7 *cruzados*.⁶⁹⁵ In 1598 there were 43 fathers and 67 brothers, for a total annual expenditure of 3'330 *cruzados*. By 1616, however, due to the persecution and cutbacks in the management of the mission, it was established that a father could not have more than one *dōjuku* and one *moço*.⁶⁹⁶ Accordingly, in October 1618, Mateus de Couros wrote that:

'Cada Padre traz consigo hum doiuco, que lhe ajuda a missa, e nos mais ministerios da Christandade com hum moço de serviço, que compra e faz o que se ha de comer, lava a roupa e entende nos demais officios desta sorte [...]. Para sustentação de cada Padre e do dojucu e moço que o acompanhão se dão cada anno cinquenta cruzados. Dam-se-lhe mais oito cruzados para alguns presentesinhos que conforme ao estillo da terra sempre se dão ou aos cazeiros, ou a certas pessoas de obrigação'.⁶⁹⁷

Until 1614, however, the Japan Jesuits had numerous churches and houses, colleges and seminars throughout Japan, which had required money to be built, like the 7'000 *cruzados* for the church of Nagasaki, and kept requiring money to be kept in order. As an example we can quote what João Coelho wrote in 1609 about the Jesuits' belongings in Nagasaki:

⁶⁹⁴ Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 163.

⁶⁹⁵ Cf. *Noticias da Província de Japão da Companhia de JESUS, escritas pelo P. Visitador Alexandre Valignano no Japão em 1598 e remetidas a Roma*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, f. 100.

⁶⁹⁶ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 179^v.

⁶⁹⁷ See Provincial Couros to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 8 October 1618. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 84^v.

for the college	3'200	<i>cruzados</i>	per year	
alms for the exiled Japanese	800	“	“	“
for the novitiate	1'130	“	“	“
for the hospital	800	“	“	“
for the Santa Clara Residence	95	“	“	“
TOTAL	6'035	“	“	“

Source: *TCJ*, pp. 517-522.

Only from this example it is easy to understand why and how Spinola, in his accountant capacity, was able to find the silver lining in the persecution. Yet, even during a time when Christian edifices were taken down everywhere in Japan, there was still someone who thought that keep building was not such a bad idea.

In his personal considerations on the matters faced during the Kazusa's conference in 1590, Valignano invited all the future superiors in Japan to keep looking for ways to save money and to avoid 'de fazer fabricas e outros gastos extraordinarios, posto que lhe pareção de muito serviço de Deos, em quanto exederem ao que lhe vem de renda e ganhos cada año'.⁶⁹⁸ Father Valentim Carvalho apparently did not see fit to respect Valignano's advice. In 1613, before the persecution officially broke out, yet in a year without ship from Macao and with several estates expropriated by Hasegawa, the father provincial ordered, against the opinion of the other fathers, to take down the rectorate in Todos os Santos and to join together the seminar and the college of Nagasaki. In order to do that, however, he ordered to build 'hum lanço de dous ou 3 sobrados pera agasalhar mais comodamente ao seminario, e mais gente que se ajunta de diferentes Residentias que se desfizerão'.⁶⁹⁹ Father Afonso de Lucena, who never held back critics against Carvalho, added that before he ordered that construction, he made also great improvements to his residence.⁷⁰⁰

Carlo Spinola, on his part, criticized Carvalho also for another habit of him, namely the aptitude for wasting money. In 1615, he was chosen to be Carvalho's consultant (*admonitor*). We know that obedience to the direct superior is one of the pillars of the Society and Valignano stressed that the procurator should always be

⁶⁹⁸ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 51, f. 173.

⁶⁹⁹ See Father Pires to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 6 October 1613. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 15 [III], f. 312. See also the letter Diogo de Mesquita sent to Acquaviva on 6 October 1614 in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, ff. 36-38.

⁷⁰⁰ See Father Afonso de Lucena to General Acquaviva, Ōmura, 9 February 1614. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 16 [III], f. 11^v: 'Não falo na habitação, porque as casas e paços (que elle chamava quando era subdito) do Padre Francesco Pasio tem acrescentado muitas obras de dentro e lhe fez hum forro de pao precioso da terra e tem esteirado esteiras das melhores de Japão de que se servem os tonos principais'.

subject to the father superior of the residence where he resided, except for the duties belonging to his office.⁷⁰¹ Spinola did abide by this order, but, as it was customary in the Society of Jesus, he did not hesitate to express his own opinion about the Portuguese, in particular regarding the fact that he had a reserved capital of his own:

‘[T]utto quello che danno i secolari à i nostri s’intende dato alla Compagnia, et che non vi è superiore che gli vada alla mano, et finito il suo governo non vi è costume d’essere visitato dal socessore, et dare conta del dinaro administrato, il quale costume si s’introducesse, andariano li Provinciali più allerta, et non è dubbio che tenere il Padre Provinciale quando sta in Nangasachi borsa particolare, è causa di moltiplicarsi le spese, et quando il Procuratore vedesse che spende molto, avisaria l’admonitore, et i consultori’.⁷⁰²

What clearly emerges from this passage is that the procurator was not in a position to interfere or to have a saying in how the provincial managed part of the funds reserved for the mission, but he could forward his complaints to Rome nonetheless. Owing to the Tokugawa’s decree of expulsion, from 1614 onwards the provincial of Japan moved to Macao, while the procurator served as his substitute in Kyūshū, to all extents and purposes becoming the highest position in the south of Japan.⁷⁰³ This change gave Spinola the confidence to criticize more freely the provincial at Macao. He then urged Acquaviva to command Carvalho to dismiss superfluous *dōjuku*, since their sustenance was paid off the capital arrived from Europe, which was meant to be invested in silk and would yield revenue of at least 50%.⁷⁰⁴ Further on in this letter, Spinola wrote that when Carvalho embarked for Macao said to those who were abandoning Japan to leave all their properties with the procurator in order to be sold. Yet, without Spinola’s knowledge, Carvalho commanded to one of his *dōjuku* to:

‘[D]epositarè à diversi luoghi, non solo i suoi libri, scritti, et l’altre cose del vestito, et uso particolare, ma anche molti scrittorij, et cascie piene di corone, *Agnus Dei* coverti di seta, vasi de vetro, et cose curiose di varie sorti per dare di presente alli christiani, et alli Signori gentili in maggiore quantità di quelle che io teneva per provvedere la Provincia tutta; ma ancora molti

⁷⁰¹ Cf. *RPJ*, f. 37.

⁷⁰² See Procurator Spinola to General Claudio Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 18 March 1616. *ARSI, Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 180.

⁷⁰³ See *ARSI, Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 174: ‘il Padre Provinciale mi lasciò per suo Vicario nel Scimo, che sono questi nove Regni di giù’.

⁷⁰⁴ *Ivi*, f. 179^v.

vasi di varie confetioni di zuccaro, barili di vino Europeo, et dell'India, et altre cose comestibili, che erano della sua dispensa particolare'.⁷⁰⁵

Carvalho's questionable behaviour leads us to a matter closer to the office of procurator in Japan, namely the habit of offering (expensive) presents to local lords and other personalities in accordance with the Japanese etiquette. In addition to his aforementioned distrust towards the Japanese people, Spinola felt quite uncomfortable also with their customs.⁷⁰⁶ Moreover, he belonged to that group of Jesuits who believed that the predicaments contained in Valignano's *Cerimoniale* were not to be applied. In his code of conduct for the fathers in Japan, Valignano illustrated what kind of compromises the evangelical perfection had to make in order to gain Japanese favour. We do not know what Spinola used to think about the *accomodatio* before the procuratorship, but times had changed and already in 1615 he wrote to Acquaviva that:

'[O] que se gasta em presentes, assi os que faz o Padre Provincial, como os que dão os outros superiores, e Padres particulares, os quaes nada luzem, e não servem se não de ternos por ricos, e nos somos bem pobres, e pois se vee que com darmos tanto até agora não nos podemos conservar em Japam, creio que he vontade de Deos que mudemos modo, e procedamos como Religiosos pobres, e nesta ocasião nos escusemos com dizer que não temos que dar; e pois que conforme a o costume de Japam não se pode deixar de dar alguma cousa, agora he tempo de nos por em bom foro, e fazer o que fazem os mesmos Bonzos graves, e que tem boas rendas em Japam, os quaes a os Tonos, e a Tencadono não offerecem mais que huma resma de papel, e hum abano, e os Religiosos de Filippinas humas candeas de cera branca, dizendo que são pobres; e me parece que he grande erro cuidamos que a Christandade se ha de fazer, e conservar com presentes, mas antes com guardarmos nossa pobreza, e insituto, e confiarmos em Deos, que os Apostolos assi fazião, e até que em Japam não percamos o nome de ricos, pouco avemos de medrar, porque tenho visto por experiencia, que muytos se fazem christãos, e se chegão a nos, e nos chamão a suas terras, pera que os socorramos em suas necessidades, lhes emprestemos prata, e negociemos seda, e peças de laya nova quando vem a nao; isto bem entende o Padre Provincial, mas como esta posto em costume, he cousa dificultosa de se reformar, e não ha outro remedio que determinar V. P. que da qui por diante se tirem os presentes que ate agora se costumarão, e somente se dem os que se costumão, e quando muyto ao Tencadono, e a os Tonos principaes se dee algum brinco,

⁷⁰⁵ *Ivi*, ff. 179^v-180.

⁷⁰⁶ See, for instance, the letter Father Mateus de Couros sent in the aftermath of Spinola's seizure by the Nagasaki *bugyō* in ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 96: '[O] bom Padre [...] depois que veo a Japam sempre uzou de nossos comeres, e não se podia acomodar aos costumes e modo Japonico [...]. A verdade he que homens tam pezados e que não podem viver sem tantas commodidades não sam pera Japão neste tempo. Ate semente de funcho confeitada com asucar, que elle mesmo fazia por sua mão trazia consigo'. Cf. Pacheco, 鈴田の囚人 カルロ・スピノラの書簡, pp. 15-16.

vinho, e doce feito chara Europa, porque em começando desta maneira, tudo será facil, e Deos N. Senhor concorrera com nossa pobreza'.⁷⁰⁷

Although it was Valignano who formalized the offering of gifts, the former visitor was conscious that they were a drain on the finance of the mission. For instance, when the Hollanders caught the Great Ship right in Macao's harbour in 1603, Valignano sent orders to cut all the expenses in building and gifts-offering, so that the general expenditure could diminish from 12'000 ducats per year to 5-6'000.⁷⁰⁸

Where Alessandro Valignano failed, however, Carlo Spinola succeeded, although in completely different conjunctures. His appeals, in fact, were pleasantly heard in Rome. In effect, his suggestion of limiting mission members to a number the finances could afford was welcomed and in 1618 the new rules issued by Vitelleschi in accordance with Spinola's suggestions reached Japan.⁷⁰⁹ Yet, in 1616 the reality was still very hard to contemplate and, as we will see in the next paragraph, there was good news neither from the state of the Japanese country nor from the finances of the province.

IV. 4. 2. *Pax Tokugawa and respondência bonds*

When, three years after the victorious battle of Sekigahara, Ieyasu assumed the title of first *shōgun* of the Tokugawa dynasty, he knew that he had still one last battle to fight before he could affirm with absolutely no doubts that he was the undisputed overlord of Japan. The last foe to take down, Toyotomi Hideyori, in 1603 was only ten years old, but by 1614 he had already passed the *genpuku*,⁷¹⁰ he was then a grown man capable of gathering around him all the discontent against the *bakufu*.

⁷⁰⁷ See Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 25 March 1615. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, ff. 168-168^v. Cf. also f. 172.

⁷⁰⁸ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 14 [I], f. 137.

⁷⁰⁹ See Procurator Spinola to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 8 October 1618. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 191: 'A ordem de não se fazerem mais cazas, nem sostentar mais gente do que abrange o nosso cabedal, he de grande importancia, e se viera muytos annos ha, não estaria esta Provincia carregada de tantas dividas, e porque o nosso cabedal não bastava pera sostentar a maquina que avia, e cada Padre queria ter a sua caza provida, se forão entroduzindo muyos abusos contra a Santa pobreza de cada hum vender, e comprar, e faze peculio com tratos indecentes, que estão ja de todo tirados'.

⁷¹⁰ 元服, this rite of passage represented the passage to adulthood. In the Tokugawa period, commoners came of age at fifteen but samurai at eleven. However, the ceremony of coming of age was generally held at the age of seventeen when those members of families entitled to a rank or title were invested in it.

After his ascent to military leader of Japan, Ieyasu granted to Hideyoshi's heir an income of 650'000 *koku* and, in particular, he left him the impregnable fortress of Ōsaka, 'the most famous Castle that the Emperor hath, or that is within the Empire; it is of an extraordinarie bignesse and compassed round with three severall walls', as described by the English Arthur Hatch.⁷¹¹ Soon after Sekigahara, Ōsaka became the rendezvous for two parties in particular, namely those defeated or damaged by Ieyasu and the supporters of the *tennō*, who saw in Hideyori the last chance to bring back real power to the imperial court.

Most likely, it was the stormy relationship between the Tokugawa and the *tennō* that led Ieyasu to organize the Ōsaka campaigns. As early as 1606, in fact, Ieyasu started to meddle in court affairs. In that year he not only forbid the *kuge* to accept the Christian faith, but presented also an order that hobbled the political movements of the *tennō* and weakened his influence. With this directive, the *ōgosho* prohibited the court from granting rank to warriors without *bakufu* recommendation. Ieyasu's intent in issuing this was exactly to keep the court and *daimyō* from forming ties.⁷¹² Moreover, be it noted that in the 1600s Ieyasu was not the only one who could grant ranks or the status of samurai. He shared this prerogative with Toyotomi Hideyori, who had the same rank as the *shōgun* at court.⁷¹³ In any case, the first open contrast between the *bakufu* and the court took place in 1609, when an affair involving five concubines of Go-Yōzei *tennō* ended with the emperor requesting the heads of all the people involved to the *bakufu*. The *tennō*, however, put forward his request without respecting the common law, a fact that caused Ieyasu's refusal to issue a death sentence and limited the punishment to the banishment of both the concubines and their lovers. Ieyasu, moreover, seized the opportunity provided by the scandal to intrude into court affairs by placing the investigation in the hands of the *shoshidai*⁷¹⁴ in Miyako.⁷¹⁵ The last contrast between *bakufu* and *tennō* that led to the Ōsaka battles took place in 1614, when the court ignored the verbal order passed by Ieyasu in 1606 and granted rank to a number of Toyotomi men, probably urged upon it by Hideyori's retainers.⁷¹⁶ Ieyasu's response

⁷¹¹ *Apud* Cooper, *They Came to Japan. An Anthology of European Reports on Japan, 1543-1640*, p. 138.

⁷¹² Cf. Butler, "Tokugawa Ieyasu's Regulations for the Court: A Reappraisal", p. 519.

⁷¹³ Cf. Asao and Jansen, "Shogun and Tennō", p. 259.

⁷¹⁴ 所司代, it was the *bakufu* representative in Miyako with respect to matters regarding security, enforcement of the laws and the *kuge*.

⁷¹⁵ Cf. Ferretti, "La coscienza della sovranità negli Imperatori giapponesi del '600", pp. 353-354 and Asao and Jansen, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

⁷¹⁶ Cf. Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

was delivered by the end of autumn in the shape of the gathering of a large army of 300'000 men, according to Richard Cocks,⁷¹⁷ but probably did not exceed the 100'000 units.

The Ōsaka campaigns took place during winter 1614 and spring-summer 1615.⁷¹⁸ Hideyori's fortress, in fact, was too strong to be taken only by force. Ieyasu's delay in defeating the enemy gave some hope to the fathers in Nagasaki, who knew that among Toyotomi's retainers there were also Christian captains,⁷¹⁹ although they were aware that Hideyori had no intention of accepting the Christian faith.⁷²⁰ Yet, Spinola's optimism was soon blew out by Ieyasu during the summer campaign, which led Hideyori and his inner circle to retreat first and then to commit suicide. With this victory the fate of the empire was definitely decided, since there was no opposition left, and all remnants of the Toyotomi's cause were very thoroughly and systematically exterminated.

Still, the defeat of Hideyori did not lead to outright persecution. Ieyasu was a 73-year old man and died soon after the seizure of the fortress. As soon as the news of Hideyori's fall reached Nagasaki, however, the Jesuits were sure that Hasegawa would start a new and stronger persecution. As a matter of fact, if we exclude the destruction and expropriation of Christian buildings and estates, by March 1616 there had been executions of Christians only in the Takaku area, whereas in Nagasaki the situation was relatively quite.⁷²¹ Spinola, then, could turn his attention to the finance of the province, whose situation kept worsening:

⁷¹⁷ Cf. Farrington, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-258.

⁷¹⁸ Cf. Totman, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-178 and Sadler, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-234.

⁷¹⁹ See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 25 March 1615. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 170: 'Depois de partidos os navios em Novembro se ouviu a revolta de Vozaca, com a qual ficamos algum tanto mais desabafados, e ainda que socederão as pazes, entendese que Fideyorisama ficara com a Tenca, e nos deixará viver quietos, pois hum dos cinco capitães principaes que o ajudarão nesta guerra [Akashi Kamon no Suke Morishige João], e o mais querido delle, he muyto bom, e devoto christão, e como Irmão da Companhia'. Spinola showed even more optimism in a letter he sent to the Assistant of Italy Muzio Vitelleschi. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 174: 'Habbiamo adesso buone nove, che la guerra comincia di nuovo, et Findeyori figlo di Taicosama sarà Tencadono, o Imperatore, et che i Signori principali l'aggiutano quanto possono, per scuotere da se il governo tyrannico di Daifusama, che è odiato da tutti; et credo che di qui a due mesi, o prima staremo più liberi, et del tutto cessarà la persecutione, si bene adesso non ha Tono che dia molestia alli christiani'.

⁷²⁰ Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 109: 'Ainda que Findeyori Sama ficara de riba, por hora ficamos livres, com tudo como elle e sua may forão sempre tão dados aos Camis e Fotoques sempre estes ouverão de ser venerados, como quem lhe dera a Tenca, e este era o conceito comum de todos, que esta guerra tocava aos Camis e Fotoques'.

⁷²¹ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 177 and f. 179.

‘Per non venire due anni adietro [1614] dinaro dall’India a Macao, et un’anno [1613] non venire la nave al Giapone, si è speso tutto quello che havevamo, et havemo piglato molte miglaia di ducati a cambio per havere con que comprare la seta, i quali essendosi spesi parte in sostentare i molti soggetti, et dogichi che adesso stanno nel Collegio di Macao, parte in provvedere li padri della Missione della Cina, parte in cominciare la nuova missione di Cocincina, et parte in pagare i debbiti, che lasciò fatti il Padre Procuratore passato di Macao, mandò il Padre Procuratore⁷²² l’anno passato à Giapone puoca seta, che non bastò a pagare i cambij, et perciò si sono moltiplicati li debbiti, i quali giongono già a deciottomila, et novecento ducati,⁷²³ nel quale numero entrano cinque mila del Vescovo di Giapone,⁷²⁴ senza i quali non so come havria io potuto rimediare le grandi spese, che si fecero gl’anni adietro’.⁷²⁵

As we saw, the piling debts of the Province of Japan were due also to the necessity of borrowing money with the *respondência* bonds, whose interests oscillated between 40 and 50%. Moreover, as Spinola explained, the incomes of the province were often used as start-up capital for new missions or to help confrères in other regions. The Japan Jesuits financed the China mission in more than one occasion, and by the end of 1615 the China Jesuits owed to their brethren already 1’600 *cruzados*, which were to be repaid in instalments of 100 *cruzados* per year.⁷²⁶ Furthermore, Spinola had to provide also the money for those fathers, brothers and *dōjuku* who went to Manila in 1614, an expenditure that between 1615 and 1616 amounted to 700 *cruzados*.⁷²⁷ In order to curb this unstoppable outflow of capital, Spinola was forced to borrow 2’000 *cruzados* to be repaid in Portugal to write off some of their debts and managed to send more than 11’000 *cruzados* in silver to Macao to buy silk. He borrowed six of these 11’000 *cruzados* with a *respondência* bond hoping to earn enough capital in the next voyage to repay the interests.⁷²⁸ Yet, his plans were thwarted by the historical juncture. In 1615, in fact, the Macanese ‘não quiserão arriscar prata nas caravellas, as quaes nestes tempos de

⁷²² Manuel Barreto.

⁷²³ In another letter, he explained that these were the debts the province had only in Japan. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 181.

⁷²⁴ In 1615, the Japanese Province owed to the bishop the sum of ‘1423 taeis quatro mazes, e quatro condinins’. Cf. BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-V-7*, f. 95.

⁷²⁵ See Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 18 March 1616. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 179^v.

⁷²⁶ See Procurator of China João da Costa to General Acquaviva, Macao, 8 December 1615. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 34, f. 247. Either the instalments were not paid or the Vice-province of China borrowed more money than what it had been repaying, since in 1636 the debts amounte to 2471 *cruzados* and 142 *réis*. Cf. BA/JÁ, *Cód. 49-V-11*, f. 513.

⁷²⁷ See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 18 March 1616. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 181^v.

⁷²⁸ *Ivi*, f. 181.

corsarios são mais seguras que as naos'.⁷²⁹ In any case, the silver Spinola managed to send in March 1615 was spent almost entirely to repay debts in Macao and, consequently, the investment in the silk trade was lower than other years. Spinola, in fact, wrote that 'mandarão para Japam tam pouco emprego que depois de tudo vendido fiz nelle 4400 cruzados, e ouve de pagar mais de 5500 cruzados das respondencias, e ainda passei por letra outros 3400 que ficava devendo, pera que venhão de la empregados na viagem que vem'.⁷³⁰ He concluded that he would not send silver to Macao in that year firstly because he did not have any and secondly because he feared the Portuguese ship could fall in the hands of the North Europeans.

Indeed, although it was not because of the Dutch or the English yet simply adverse meteorological conditions, in 1616 there was no official voyage from Macao,⁷³¹ a fact that was a tragedy for the Ignatians,⁷³² but a fortune for the English.⁷³³ Nevertheless, the Japan Jesuits received an unexpected help from two ships from New Spain bounded for Manila, which ended up in Japan due to a typhoon. In this ship, in fact, there were 800 *pardaos de reales* (around 1'000 *cruzados*) which Father Pedro Morejón collected in Acapulco 'de certa esmola que deixou a esta Provincia hum Capitam Castelhana que os annos passados veyo a Japam, e morreu ali'.⁷³⁴ Still, the sum of debts found by Visitor Jerónimo Rodrigues in Macao in January 1617 was simply bewildering: 30'000 *cruzados* for an annual expense of around 10'000.⁷³⁵ Sympathy towards the financial situation of the Japan Jesuits arrived also from Goa,

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.* The menace brought by the Hollanders in the *Estado da Índia*'s seas, caused the Portuguese to change their shipping methodology. Previously, in fact, the *Carreira da Índia* and the *Carreira do Japão* were customarily served by galleons that reached the tonnage of 1'500 or 2'000. This huge tonnage was one of the principal causes for several wrecks. Those galleons, in fact, were difficult to manoeuvre and then were easy preys for pirates and privateers. The Dutch, in order to avoid such problem, instead of the great ships, opted to make use of smaller boats not surpassing the 500 tonne. Starting from 1615, the Portuguese decided to follow their examples, although the Great Ship for Japan made its last trip on 1617 and was substituted by six galliots only from 1618 onwards. Cf. Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial*, pp. 288-289, Guinote, Frutuoso and Lopes, *Naufrações e outras perdas da "Carreira da Índia" Séculos XVI e XVII*, pp. 47-48 and 152 and Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 82-83.

⁷³⁰ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 181.

⁷³¹ Cf. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-3, ff. 15-15^v: 'Este mesmo anno não houve viagem a Japão porque veo da India Luiz de Souza pera a fazer com embargos que fez a João Serrão [da Cunha]. Vendeo-se e com prova Lopo de Sarmiento não foi a Japão por falta do vento'.

⁷³² Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 12^v: 'Este anno não ouve viagem e a principal causa foi a muita cobiça e muitos odios inimizados e desavenças que ha nesta cidade e com a não aver ficamos nos mais perdidos mais que todos'.

⁷³³ Cf. Farrington, *op. cit.*, p. 499: 'The Amacan ship is not yet come this yere & therefore past expectation, w^{ch} wilbe a meanes wee shall have the better sale for our marchantdize'.

⁷³⁴ See Procurator Spinola to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 15 March 1617. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 186.

⁷³⁵ See Vice-provincial Jerónimo Rodrigues to General Vitelleschi, Macao, 5 January 1617. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 56. Cf. also f. 100 and f. 125.

whence Father Bartolomeu de Siqueira wrote that ‘se com o meo sangue pudera remediar necessidade tam grande sempre teria as veas abertas’.⁷³⁶

It was clear then and it is even clearer now, that the economy of the mission was gravitating ineluctably toward bankruptcy. The papal and royal pensions continued to be paid tardily and, even when they did arrive, they were curtailed by taxes and exchange rates. In Japan, the time for patronage by powerful lords had inexorably ended and every commercial activities external to the silk trade was interrupted for good.⁷³⁷ The silk trade, on its part, was not as profitable as it was before. Although in 1617 the Portuguese sold goods for 400’000 *cruzados*⁷³⁸ and 600’000 in 1618,⁷³⁹ Jesuit sources tell us that the profits from the selling of Chinese textiles were getting lower every year.⁷⁴⁰

Yet, it was exactly between 1617 and 1618 that Carlo Spinola started to show a little confidence about the proceeds of the *trato da seda*, maybe thanks to the arrival of the new Visitor Francisco Vieira. The Portuguese, in fact, managed to send to Japan a good quantity of silk in 1617, with which Spinola could write off 4’725 ducats of debts.⁷⁴¹ In 1618, the bargains had been even better, but they could have been really remarkable if two of the six galleys dispatched by Macao would not have been lost. Spinola calculated that the silk loaded in those two ships, would have yielded an income of a total of 8’000 ducats, since in 1618 the silk was sold at ‘setenta ducados mais do preço ordinario’.⁷⁴² According to the procurator, if all the six galleys would have arrived safely to Nagasaki, he would have been able to extinguish all the debts the provinces had with people outside Japan. Nevertheless, he was still able to repay 2’000 ducats.

Spinola’s confidence in the silk trade, however, did not come from the earnings of those two years. In a long letter he wrote only two months before being arrested, he explained to Muzio Vitelleschi that actually there was a way of earning enough money

⁷³⁶ See Father Bartolomeu de Siqueira to Visitor Francisco Vieira, Goa, 3 May 1617. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-5, f. 222^v.

⁷³⁷ See Father Francisco Pacheco to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 5 March 1618. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 114^v. Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 34, f. 63.

⁷³⁸ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 101.

⁷³⁹ *Ivi*, f. 242.

⁷⁴⁰ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 34, f. 152 and *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 113^v.

⁷⁴¹ See Procurator Spinola to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 8 October 1618. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 191^v.

⁷⁴² *Ibid.*

to both erase debts and sustain the whole mission, including the expensive College of Macao:

‘Costumão os Portugueses que morão em Japam, e os Japões que ou não querem, ou não podem embarcarse pera Macao, e outras partes, pera terem ganhos certos dar a sua prata a ganhos de 30, 40, e 50 por 100 segundo os lugares para onde vão os navios, e conforme a o risco mayor, ou menor do mar, Olandeses etc., e tomando elles o risco, em tornando o navio a Japam a salvamento esta obrigado quem tomou a prata, a pagar o proprio, e ganhos, ou ganhe pouco, ou muito e porque as vezes não veyo dinheiro de Portugal, e na India não se pagarão as ordinarias, fomos forçados a tomar prata deste modo a ganhos, ou a responder que he o mesmo, e a achamos mais barata que os outros, por serem nossos devotos, e estar a prata mais segura em nossa mão, pera mandar a Macao a prata necessaria pera comprar a seda, e deste modo sem nosso risco ganhamos as vezes 40, e 50 por 100 mais dos ganhos que pagamos, e com esses nos remediamos muitas vezes, e este anno ganhamos 140 ducados por cento, e pagando o proprio com 40 de ganhos, nos ficarão cento de ganhos limpos, e este modo he melhor que tomar prata emprestada, porque perdendose o navio sempre ficamos obrigados a pagala, e a outra se perde por conta de quem a da, e assi nos não perdemos este anno mais de quinhentos ducados nossos que vinhão no navio que desapareceu, e o demais perderão os donos da prata que nelle tomarão o risco, mas se viera, ouveramos de ganhar o que tenho dito a cima; e disto vera V. P. claramente quam enganados estão os que cuidão, e por ventura escrevem que o trato da seda pouco rende, e que com calquer ajuda que tiveremos, o podemos deixar,⁷⁴³ porque o menos que até agora ganhamos na seda foy a 80 por cento, e em outros a cento por cento, e alguma vez como este anno, e outros a 140 por cento, de modo que quando meno ganhamos quatro mil, duzentos, e corenta taéis, e ordinariamente cincomil, e trezentos, e que cousa nos pode dar el Rey que renda tanto cada anno, e que não seja mais arriscado vindo da India até Macao, e quem pode cuidar que se nos pague na India o que el Rey determinar em tanta contia, avendo tantos annos que se não nos paga a esmola ordinaria que he muito menos?’⁷⁴⁴

We have already mentioned a few times the *respondência* bonds without entering into details. We shall try to explore this kind of contracts through Spinola’s words and other sources. The *respondência* bond was a type of contract very much alike the European *commenda*. In our case, the Japanese *commendator* delivered silver into the possession

⁷⁴³ Most likely this is a reference to Father Valentim Carvalho. In 1617, in fact, Mateus de Couros wrote that Carvalho ‘era de opinião [...] que largariamos os sincoenta picos de seda que podimos embarcar na Nao de Macao, se em troco disse el Rey nos confirmase as doações do Padre Brandão e de Dona Maria de Castro, mas achamos que de nenhum modo vem bem a esta Provincia largar por ora aquelles picos visto o estado em que ficamos, e os muitos riscos que ha de Portugal até a India, e da India até Japam. O Padre Carlo Spinola Procurador da Provincia informa a V. P. miudamente deste particular’. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 63.

⁷⁴⁴ ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 191.

of the procurator who probably added silver of his own to invest in silk. As was customary in the *commenda* contract, the procurator bore no liability for loss of capital. In other words, as explained by Spinola, the *risco* was assumed entirely by the *commendator*, who decided to charge costs in accordance to the contingences of time and space. This was the main reason why Spinola deemed the *respondência* as the most secure way of earning capitals, since if the worst was to happen, the loss was kept down. The *respondência* was even more secure thanks to the substitution of the Great Ship with smaller galleys, which enabled the merchants to share out among the ships both merchandises and the *risco*, as demonstrated by the following contract:

‘Digo eu Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes cazado e morador em Macao que he verdade que eu tomei a responder ao Senhor Suyetçugu Sotucu morador em Facata sete mil e quinhentos taes de prata de barras por preço de trinta por cento, os quais vão correndo daqui pera Macao, o Risco no navio Capitania Nossa Senhora da Guia a metade, e a outra a metade no navio Conceição em que vai o feitor do povo repartido yualmente e de Macao para esta cidade de nangasaque vira o risco repartido yualmente em todos os navios em que se fizera viagem seginte que do porto de Macao partirem iuntos em hum dia, e lhe farei ou mandarei fazer pontual pagamento do proprio e respondencia’.⁷⁴⁵

As said by Spinola, the Japan Jesuits had been forced to resort to take silver ‘a responder’ at times of shortage, when the official voyage from Macao did not come or when the missing payments piled up. It would seem that the *ordem in virtute de Sanctae Obedientiae* sent years before by Acquaviva of not handling outsiders’ silver was directed exactly against the *respondência* bonds and their great employments. In 1629, in fact, João Rodrigues, thanks to the experience acquired during his procuratorship in Japan, adviced the future procurators to not take ‘prata a responder para Macao, pelo pelo pouco proveito, que della tiramos, e ficamos sendo Feitores do homens de fora; e como nada empregamos por nos, nos arriscamos a perdas, como ja perdemos em algumas respondencias’.⁷⁴⁶ We saw that Spinola received cheerily Acquaviva’s instruction and, in effect, in this letter he was not proposing to the new general to go back to negotiating others’ capital. He emphasized that they were forbidden to negotiate and to intervene in the *pancada* price, but there was a substantial difference with the past situation. Once again Spinola demonstrated to follow as best as he could

⁷⁴⁵ *Apud* Oka, “A Great Merchant in Nagasaki in 17th Century. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of *Respondência*”, pp. 40-41.

⁷⁴⁶ Cf. *Couzas que podem servir para os Procuradores*, § 5.º - Não hé bom tomar prata a responder. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-8, ff. 637-637^v.

Valignano's *Regimento*, namely the 5th item, where it is suggested that in order to avoid scandal in the bargains, the procurator should rely on 'pessoas [...] devotas nossas pellas quaes faça as compras e vendas que se houvem de fazer'.⁷⁴⁷ Accordingly, Spinola wrote to Vitelleschi that he was not personally dealing with the *respondência* agreements, but he was only acting as a supervisor:

'[C]om a obediencia da boa memoria do Padre Claudio se tirou o negocearmos prata de Japões, e outros, e tambem por outras ordens nos esta prohibido metermonos na pancada da seda, e com isto cessarão os inconvenientes de concurso, e trafego em nossas cazas, e pera negociar só o nosso por pessoas de fora, só com a direção do Procurador se pode fazer facilmente, e onde eu estou nada se vende'.⁷⁴⁸

The available sources do not allow us to go any further into the matter. The only piece of information we could gather about it comes from the *Carregaçam de Macao para Japam no anno de 1617*.⁷⁴⁹ From this source we learn that Spinola was implementing this practice from 1616 at least, which is probably the reason why Visitor Vieira wrote to Vitelleschi about considering the idea of restoring the handling of laymen's silver,⁷⁵⁰ and we also find the names and the goods of those who gave to him silver 'a responder' for Macao:

'Do procedido de toda a seda assima ditta, fina, e de Sipeo,⁷⁵¹ se hão de pagar em Japam do proprio e respondencia a corenta por cento, tres mil e quinhentos setenta e nove, e sinco mazes e nove condorins de prata corrente que na ditta Nao forão daqui para Japam, deram a responder para Macao a ditta quantia de prata ao Padre Carlos Spinola, a qual elle lá gastou passando lettras para que de cá lhe mandassemos o emprego della; hindo correndo o risco para Japão por conta das pessoas que em Japam lhe derão a responder, que são as seguintes: por conta dos nettos de Minaminabo⁷⁵²: 2000 taeis. Por conta de Ruefaconjin: 1400 taeis. Por conta de Justa de Arima, e Luiza de Bungo, e pobres de Firando: 179 taeis, sinco mazes, e nove condorins'.⁷⁵³

⁷⁴⁷ See *RPJ*, ff. 37-37^v.

⁷⁴⁸ See *ARSI, Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 192.

⁷⁴⁹ In *BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7*, ff. 108-109. Reproduced in Annex E.

⁷⁵⁰ Cf. *BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-56*, ff. 199^v-200.

⁷⁵¹ We were not able to identify this word. According to Boxer, who transcribed it as *sifeo*, it is a mistake made by the copyist and most likely is the name of a Chinese city or district. Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, p. 164, n. 3.

⁷⁵² Takayama Ukon adopted the name Minaminobō 南坊 when, according to Japanese custom, he shaved his head in sign of retirement from public affairs. Cf. Laures, "Takayama Ukon. A Critical Essay", p. 88.

⁷⁵³ *BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7*, ff. 108^v-109.

As we said, however, we do not have other sources that may lead us to a better understanding of Spinola's use of *respondência* bonds. But it is not a lack due to missing documentation. The last quote by Spinola, in fact, is taken from one of the last letters he wrote as a free man. Certainly it is the last one dealing with economic matters and the duties of the procurator. Also in a letter dedicated to financial issues, we detect a feeling of uncertainty in Spinola's words that leads us to almost believe he was foreseeing his forthcoming future. The Italian Jesuit, in fact, wrote that he wanted to fill the post until all the debts were extinguished and there was enough capital for the needs of the province, 'e confio em Deos que em poucos annos, se tiver vida, o ajuntarei'.⁷⁵⁴ God, however, had other plans for him.

* * *

The second *shōgun* Tokugawa Hidetada, in fact, proved to be much more intolerant than his father toward the Christian faith. In comparison to Hidetada's attitude with regard to the Western preachers, Ieyasu's enactments were rather mild. As early as 1617, in order to eradicate the fathers from his country, the second Tokugawa *shōgun* issued the death penalty not only against the missionaries but also against those who hid them and their closest neighbours.⁷⁵⁵ In May 1617, in Ōmura the first European Jesuit – João Baptista Machado – was executed along with his *dōjuku*, the Franciscan Pedro de Assunção, the Dominican Alonso Navarrete and the Augustinian Fernando Ayala.⁷⁵⁶ In that year, the Society of Jesus had 31 agents in Japan,⁷⁵⁷ a number that augmented to 33 in 1618: 25 fathers (ten Portuguese, eight Italians, two Spaniards and five Japanese) and 8 brothers.⁷⁵⁸ Each and everyone of them carried on his duties 'disfarçados, e escondidos de czinha em czinha dos pobres Christãos e nella de noite ensinando, convertendo, baptizando, sacramentando, e conservando na fé aos ditos Christãos'.⁷⁵⁹ In Nagasaki, in effect, the situation was not getting any better. In February, Hasegawa Sahyōei died and his place was taken by his nephew Gonroku, who, although frequently

⁷⁵⁴ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 192.

⁷⁵⁵ Cf. Visitor Vieira to the Archbishop of Braga Dom Frey Aleiro de Menezes President of the Counsel of Portugal in Madrid, Macao, 10 December 1617. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-5, ff. 216-216^v.

⁷⁵⁶ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 65.

⁷⁵⁷ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 59, f. 47^v.

⁷⁵⁸ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 84.

⁷⁵⁹ See Visitor Vieira to Vice-roy Dom João Coutinho, Nagasaki, 22 October 1618. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-5, f. 267.

gave evidence of his desire to avoid bloodshed, was compelled to enact the *bakufu*'s directives. Gonroku's leniency notwithstanding, there was still Murayama Tōan who was acting against the Ignatians. In effect, it would seem that he bribed a *dōjuku* and convinced him to reveal to the shogunal officers how many Jesuits were now in Nagasaki and their hiding places. Carlo Spinola was among those named by the apostate *dōjuku*.⁷⁶⁰ In order to track down the hidden missionaries, the *bugyō* ordered each street of Nagasaki to compile a thorough list of its inhabitants and monetary rewards were publicly offered for anyone who found a father.⁷⁶¹ Sebastião Vieira used eloquent words to describe in what condition the Ignatians kept on with their work: 'nos todos cada dia esperamos polla Catana, ou polla Cruz, que com ella se acabarão e nos acabaremos com tantas cruces'.⁷⁶²

In the night between 13 and 14 December, while in the house of the Portuguese Domingos Jorge, Carlo Spinola was seized by the guards of Gonroku together with his companion Ambrosio Fernandez and 600 *cruzados* belonging to the province. Apparently, Provincial Mateus de Couros warned Spinola that during that night there would be guards searching in that house, but he decided to stay there nonetheless. The father provincial later, in February 1619, revealed to Nuno Mascarenhas that Spinola decided to remain in Domingos Jorge's house due to the fact that he never got used to Japanese food, whereas 'tinha naquella casa todas as commodidades juntas, e afora a molher do Portuguez cazeiro, dous moços que servião ao mesmo Padre muito bons cozinheiros de nossos comeres'.⁷⁶³ Although we are unable to ascertain whether Spinola remained there only out of gluttony, Couros's testimony is to be believed with regard to Spinola's taste for European food. While in prison, in fact, he wrote to a Portuguese woman, Agnese Correa, that 'se VS. havesse fatto azuccaro rosado, e me ne vuole mandar' un poco, mi fora molto caro'.⁷⁶⁴ Be that as it may, whilst Ambrosio Fernandez died after two years of imprisonment, Spinola, as we saw, endured the prison two years

⁷⁶⁰ See Provincial Couros to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 20 February 1619. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 94.

⁷⁶¹ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, ff. 94^v-95 and RAH/Jes. *Tomo 112*, 9/3659, f. 206^v. A symptom of the importance attached to the anti-Christian persecution is given by the fact that the reward for turning in a father was the same as for the pyromaniacs. In Japan, where buildings were traditionally made out of wood, the pyromaniacs were always exemplary punished and still today the death penalty is applied for this crime.

⁷⁶² See Father Vieira to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 15 October 1618. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 38, f. 278.

⁷⁶³ See Provincial Couros to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 23 February 1619. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 35, f. 96.

⁷⁶⁴ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 200.

more and was eventually executed on 10 September 1622, twenty years after his arrival in Japan.

CHAPTER V

THE PROCURATOR IN BRAZIL: A COMPARISON FOR A BETTER UNDESTANDING

Introduction

Although the present work is dedicated to the analysis and comprehension of the procurator of the Japanese Province of the Society of Jesus in the 16th and 17th centuries, it has been already showed that a comparative approach represents one of the more profitable ways to understand that particular office. As a matter of fact, even if comparisons are susceptible to subjective interpretations, it is undeniable that by comparing João Rodrigues's procuratorship to those who followed him and, in particular, to Carlo Spinola's own management, we were able to ascertain the duties, the tasks, the expectations, the shortcomings, the perks and the dangers of the procurator in Japan in a time when the Japanese country passed from being a jumble of battling fiefs to a unite empire that eventually expelled the Western preachers from its lands.

Nevertheless, even if the post of procurator in Japan by now should be clear in all of its aspects and endeavours, we have seen how Spinola and Rodrigues underlined the fact that their duties were extremely different from those carried out elsewhere in the world covered by the Society of Jesus. We have given a little space to the procurator in Évora, yet through the previous pages another province of the Society of Jesus had already peeped out: the Province of Brazil.

In this final chapter, we will evaluate the post of procurator in Brazil and the financial side of the Society of Jesus in Brazil in a period of time that basically begins with the appointment as provincial of Pêro Rodrigues⁷⁶⁵ and ends some years after the siege of *Salvador da Baía de Todos os Santos* – ‘cabeça de tudo o estado do Brasil’⁷⁶⁶ –

⁷⁶⁵ The Portuguese Pêro Rodrigues (1542-1628) filled the post of provincial from 1594 to 1603.

⁷⁶⁶ Cf. ARSI, *Bras. 15 [III]*, f. 473^v.

by the Dutch in 1624, when a powerful West India Company fleet easily captured the Portuguese settlement. In order to offer a concise yet valuable outline of the procurator in Brazil, the chapter has to move from macro-analysis of the economic features of the Society in Brazil, since the beginning of the mission, to the micro-analysis of the *Procurador da Companhia*, because we are going to face an environment completely diverse from Japan in all aspects (Portuguese and missionary presence), and thus it would be meaningless to speak of the procurator without introducing the mission and vice versa.

V. 1. The Portuguese and the Jesuits settled in *Salvador da Baía de Todos os Santos*

In the chapter dedicated to Carlo Spinola's biography, we saw that in 1596 the ship he was travelling in, the *São Francisco*, broke the rudder near the Cape of Good Hope and was forced to pull back towards the Brazilian coast,⁷⁶⁷ although an *alvará* issued by the Portuguese Crown in 1565 expressly forbid *Carreira's* ships to winter in Brazil (mostly for economic reasons), rather they were requested to go back to Lisbon.⁷⁶⁸ At any rate, Spinola and his fellows, in the early morning of 16 July 1596, entered in Salvador, where it was built the *Collegio da Baya*, namely the principal geographic site we are going to deal with, whose foundation went back almost fifty years.

In 1549, an expedition of 920 men leaded by the first Governor-General – the civil and military chief – Tomé de Sousa (1503-1579, Governorship 1549-1553), an experienced soldier from a great Portuguese house, was sent out to erect a large and strong town on the shore of the bay, as the capital of colonial Brazil and of the captaincy of Baía in particular, because it was the most convenient place in terms of accessibility and easiness of sending aids to other towns; however, it was also due to the fact that there was no previous proprietor there anxious to defend his privileges.⁷⁶⁹ Along with

⁷⁶⁷ Cf. Frison, ““La piu difficile, e la piu disastrosa via, che mai fino allora niun altro” - Carlo Spinola and His Attempts to Get to the Índias”, pp. 72-73.

⁷⁶⁸ See “Provisão sobre as náos, que inverão, arriabarem a esta cidade”, in *Boletim do Conselho Ultramarino* – Legislação Antiga, vol. I (1446-1754), pp. 169-170.

⁷⁶⁹ Cf. Boxer, “Portuguese Society in the Tropics. The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda, 1510-1800”, p. 72 and Schwarz, “Cities of Empire: Mexico and Bahia in the Sixteenth Century”, p. 630.

the Governor expedition was also the founder of the Brazil Jesuit mission, Father Manoel da Nóbrega. Four years later, in 1553, Brazil turned *sui iuris* an autonomous province of the *Companhia* and in the same year began the edification of the city of Salvador da Baía, as well as the work for the *Igreja de Nossa Senhora da Ajuda*.⁷⁷⁰ Although the evangelization process started right away, Nóbrega was aware that the lack of incomings and sustentation was a deterrent to the mission; therefore in 1556 he wrote about this concern to his Superior in Portugal:

‘Na Baía, se El-Rei ordena de fazer colégio da Companhia, deve-lhe de dar cousa certa e dotar-lho para sempre, que seja manutenção, para certos estudantes da Companhia, e não deve aceitar V. P. dada de terras com escravos, que fação mantimentos para o colégio, senão cousa certa, ou dos dízimos, ou tanto cada ano de seu tesouro, salvo se lá acharem maneira com que nós em nada nos ocupemos nisso, o quel eu não sei como possa ser’.⁷⁷¹

As a consequence of Nóbrega’s letter, on 7 November 1564 Dom Sebastião issued the *padrão* for the foundation of the College of Salvador da Baía. The aim of the royal precept was ‘a conversão dos infieis e gentios e instrução dos novamente convertidos’, basing the royal subventions on the ‘redizima de todos os dizimos e dereitos, que tenho e me pertencem e ao diante pertencerem nas ditas partes do Brasil’,⁷⁷² or a part to be taken from the royal sugar tithe.

Although this grant was officially issued by the King himself, the Fathers soon discovered that obtaining the *padrão* was not as difficult as collecting the money they were meant to receive. This way to acquire economic helps took the Jesuits so close to secular power both in the kingdom and in the colonies; there, in the *ultramar*, the Society had to deal with the public officials who were to pay the *redizima*. Similarly to what happened to the Japan mission, where, as we know, royal and papal alms arrived often tardily and, if so, curtailed by customs issues,⁷⁷³ in Brazil each Jesuit was granted 20\$000 *réis* per year, but initially they received not even 10’000.⁷⁷⁴ Moreover, again similarly to the Japan mission of the Society of Jesus, despite the *redizima* could cover the yearly expenses of the colleges, those missing payments caused the mission to pile

⁷⁷⁰ See *HCJB*^I I, p. 47. We had to use both the first edition (Lisboa/Rio de Janeiro 1938-1945) and the second (São Paulo 2004), which in the footnotes are differentiate respectively by [I] and [II].

⁷⁷¹ See *HCJB*^{II} I, p. 42.

⁷⁷² See *Padrão da fundação do Colégio da Baía por D. Sebastião, Rei de Portugal*, in *MB IV 1563-1568*, pp. 94-99. See also *Alvará da fundação Régia do Colégio da Baía*, *MB IV 1563-1568*, pp. 100-106

⁷⁷³ Cf. *ARSI, Jap. Sin. 21 [II]*, ff. 227-227^v.

⁷⁷⁴ Cf. *HCJB*^{II} I, p. 43.

up a lot of debts, from 5'000 *cruzados* in 1593 to 18'000 in 1601,⁷⁷⁵ and from the 1570s on, the Jesuits complained that the stipends derived from tithes were invariably paid tardily.⁷⁷⁶ In response to Jesuits protests, D. Sebastião directed that Baía's royal subvention be paid out of customs receipts instead of tithes, but his order provoked sharp protests from the Governor-General, who insisted that these revenues were needed for other purposes. In 1573, Sebastião issued another *alvará* in which he exempted the colleges from paying both income and expenditure fees. Eventually, in 1604, the crown adopted what would become the standard practice: each of the three colleges was authorized to collect its stipend in tithable sugar from plantations of its choice.⁷⁷⁷

With the 1564 *alvará* the Portuguese Crown assumed for itself the obligation to provide the necessary economic supply for three colleges in Brazil, namely Baía (1564), Rio de Janeiro (1568) and Olinda (1576).⁷⁷⁸ The *redizima* for the Society was to be given to a fixed number of Fathers (130 in total: 60 for Bahia, 50 for Rio and 20 for Olinda), but, as we might expect, the mission was growing fast and in 1600 the Jesuits in Brazil were already 172.⁷⁷⁹ Furthermore, the problem was not confined to the contingent of Jesuits in Brazil. As the number of Ignatians grew, so did the cost of living and in the early 1580s 'a renda que se deu pera 60, agora não basta mais que pera 30, e isto para vestido e mantimento não entrando livros, obras e igreja e quebras de pagamentos mal e tarde'.⁷⁸⁰ As a consequence, it was necessary for the missionaries to find other ways to make a living.

⁷⁷⁵ See Provincial Pêro Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Salvador da Baía, 24 April 1601. ARSI, *Bras.* 8 [II], f. 30^v: 'Ha tres años que os officiaes da fazenda de S. Majestade não pagão a renda deste Collegio que são tres mil cruzados, pello que as dividas vão crescendo tão que chegão oje a dezoito mil cruzados'. See also 1598 *Catalogus Provinciae Brasiliae - Collegium Bayense*, ARSI, *Bras.* 51, f. 35: '[D]ebita huius Collegii sunt septem aut octo millia aureorum nec habet undesit solvendo'. Cf. *HCJB*^I I, p. 47.

⁷⁷⁶ It is true, however, that by getting custom fees exemption on goods throughout the Portuguese America, the Jesuits could receive whatever they needed from each side of the Portuguese Empire and, in particular, they could send their own goods with a lesser value, which makes them able to balance their finances. See Assunção, *Negócios Jesuíticos: A Administração dos Bens Divinos*, pp. 115-116.

⁷⁷⁷ Cf. Alden, *The Making of the Enterprise*, p. 467. About the relationship between Jesuits and *Governadores Gerais*, in the 16th century the Society had problems in particular with the Governor Manuel Teles Barreto, who was the first to be appointed during the Philippine period. Barreto had been showing that he was not eager to accomplish his commitments towards the Society already when he was *Vereador da Câmara* in Lisbon. Once in Brazil, he did not change his behaviour and kept demonstrating his unwillingness to pay the Fathers. Cf. *HCJB*^I II, p. 156.

⁷⁷⁸ The royal subsidies were 1'200'000 *réis* for Baía, 1'000'000 for Rio de Janeiro and 400'000 for Olinda, which were to be paid on the first day of each year 'em frutos de açucars dos dizimos que a dita Capitania rende'. Cf. ANTT/CJ, *Maço* 86, ff. 1-3^v.

⁷⁷⁹ Cf. *HCJB*^I I, pp. 578-584.

⁷⁸⁰ See *Memorial do Procurador do Brasil pera V. P.*, ARSI, *Lus.* 68, f. 416. Despite this memorandum does show neither a sign nor a date, Serafim Leite states that it was written in 1584 by Procurator António

As early as June 1561, then before D. Sebastião's *alvará*, Nóbrega, writing to Lisbon, outlined on what economic basis a college in Brazil should be founded. According to the founder of the Brazilian mission, the easiest way to survive was:

‘[G]rande criação de vaquas, porque nesta terra custa pouco criá-las e multiplicação muito [...]. Esta hé a melhor fazenda sem trabalho que cá há; e dam carnes e couros e leite e queijos que, sendo muitas, poderão abastar a muita gente. Se me a mim derem licença que tome a esmola d’El-Rey en gado, estes annos que se dará, ellas multiplicarão tamto que abaste a prover ho Collegio, ainda que não aja outra cousa d’El-Rey’.⁷⁸¹

As we already saw, despite this hint – alms in cattle⁷⁸² – the *redizima* granted in 1564 was a portion of the income that the Crown received from tithes paid in sugars in accordance with the *padroado* real agreements.⁷⁸³ In 16th and 17th-century Brazil, the local economy was still based on the *commutatio rerum* system and in this system cane sugar played the coin role.⁷⁸⁴ The plantation of sugar, introduced to Brazil perhaps as early as 1526, became that colony's leading staple only in the 1550s.⁷⁸⁵ Cane sugar industry definitely flourished after 1570 and dominated European market until the middle of the 1600, but the Jesuits did not become directly involved in it until the start of the 17th century.⁷⁸⁶ The flourishing production of Brazilian sugar was due to features of the land, which allowed a better production, both in quantity and in quality, with respect to the sugar produced in Madeira and in particular allowed the producers to sell their sugar at a lower price than the competitors.⁷⁸⁷ We can have an idea of how fast this industry grew by comparing the number of the *engenhos de açúcar* (sugar mills) in 1570 – 60 (of which 23 were in Pernambuco e 18 in Bahia) – and in 1629 when in the colony were working 346 *engenhos*: in less than 60 years an augmentation of 476%!

Gomes. Actually, this text is one of the decrees of the *Congregação da Provincia do Brasil* of December 1583. Before the *Memorial*, in fact, we find *O que se pede na congregação da provincia do Brasil em dezembro de 83* and the *Memorial do Padre Provincial*, all three written by the same hand. Regarding who was the procurator at that time, it is almost certain that in 1583 was António Gomes, since the following year he wrote the *Primus Catalogus Sociorum qui in Brasilia vaunt missus per Padrem Antonium Gomez Procuratorem*. In ARSI, Bras. 5 [I], ff. 20-25^v.

⁷⁸¹ Cf. MB III 1558-1563, pp. 347.348.

⁷⁸² In Salvador da Baía, Rio and Pernambuco cattle turned out to be a very profitable activity for the Jesuits, also if compared to cane sugar production. The reasons are quite simple: higher economic revenue with lesser capital investment and labour. Cf. Assunção, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-264

⁷⁸³ Cf. Alden, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

⁷⁸⁴ Also the manioc used to play a similar role, for the troops of the Governor General of Baía in 1684 received part of the stipends in manioc flour.

⁷⁸⁵ Although the constructions of sugar mills started in the mid-1540s, the first *engenho* appeared in 1553 in the *Ilha de S. Vicente*, not far from nowadays Santos. Cf. Mauro, *Portugal, o Brasil e o Atlântico 1570-1670*, p. 254.

⁷⁸⁶ Cf. Alden, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

⁷⁸⁷ Cf. Mauro, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

	Salvador da Baía	Pernambuco
1570	5	23
1583	46	66
1610	50	90
1629	80	150

Source: Mauro, *Portugal, o Brasil e o Atlântico 1570-1670*, pp. 257-258.

High demands from Europe made the prices of *açúcar branco* (white sugar) grow from 500 *réis* per *arroba*⁷⁸⁸ in 1570 to almost 1660 *réis* in 1613. Besides, the truce signed by Spain and the United Provinces after 1609 lead to a period of general prosperity and expansion in the Atlantic. The Brazilian economy, with sugar as its leading product, was a fast growing system with possibilities of high revenues, and then it goes without saying that also the Ignatians were aiming to get involved in the sugar industry, whether with lucre or not is still an open debate. The interesting part of their involvement is that they administrated their estates following the dynamics of the colonial economy: increase the productivity and gain better results from that.⁷⁸⁹

V. 2. The post of procurator in Brazil between *engenhos* and Portuguese officers

In May 1587, Claudio Acquaviva addressed a letter to Provincial Rodrigues, in which the general shortly explained the main purposes and commitments of each capital figure of the Society's hierarchy. Regarding the *Rectores* he wrote that:

‘Por esto digo que el principal cuidado del Superior e nel qual conto da diligencia y solicitud, se ha de exercitar, deve ser que los nuestros se adelanten en las verdaderas y solidar virtudes, para lo qual es summamente necessario que attendam a su officio, dando de mano a todas las de mas cosas que lo pueden impedir; y que ni las visitas, ni el trato con el proximo ni aun el mismo predicar los tengan ocupados, y distraigan deste intento, y mucho menos el cuydado de las cosas temporales en las quales veo nuestros Rectores tan solícitos, y tan del tudo dados aellas que apenas pueden respirar. Bien veo que las necessidades delos collegios, su pobreza, y la multitud delos subiectos, dela qual no se puede descargar es cauza de semeiante incomodidad, pero viendo tambien el gran daño que dello se sigue desseo grandemente que los Rectores sean proveidos de buenos procuradores que atiendan a lo temporal y los descarguen deste cuidado de manera que puedan atender a lo que mais importa, y quando los nuestros [...] hizieren lo que pueden, y deven assi en lo proprio aprovechamiento spiritual

⁷⁸⁸ 1 *arroba* [@] corresponded to 14, 7 kg.

⁷⁸⁹ Cf. Assunção, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

como en la ajuda de los proximos podemos esperar que la divina providencia remediara estas necesidades'.⁷⁹⁰

In addition to the emphasis on the obedience of the college procurator to the rector, which we already saw in Valignano's *Regimento*, Acquaviva drew on a *leitmotiv* concerning the procurator presents also in the *Constitutiones*, which we have already saw earlier: 'para que a Companhia possa mais exclusivamente dedicar-se às coisas espirituais a que está destinada, deve evitar, *tanto quanto possível*, todos os negócios seculares [...]. E se ocorrerem negócios destes relacionados com os Colégios, estes devem ter procurador que se ocupe deles e defenda os seus direitos'.⁷⁹¹ Both in Japan and Brazil, in order to keep up appearances the Society of Jesus in its fundamental text decreed that the office of procurator was filled preferably by laymen fellows of the Society. This suggestion was drawn on throughout all the provinces of the Society between 16th and 17th century. In the previous chapters, we have shown that the Jesuits were torn between the vow of holy poverty and the need of tangling up with secular matters, which was the reason why the visitors were specifically committed to look after the economy of the missions and their financial means and this is also an evidence of how the capillary structure of the *Companhia* actually worked despite the distance it had to cover. Even the lexicon used by the Ignatians was similar, although they were separate by expanses of sea and waves of time.

In 1611, for instance, Francesco Passio wrote that 'para que este trato [the silk trade] que não se poda escuzar se faça com mayor modestia o respeito que puder ser procure *emquanto for possível* de comprar por mão de outro, e não por sy mesmo'.⁷⁹² Some twenty years before, the Visitor of the Brazilian Province Cristóvão de Gouvêa wrote that 'procure-se com toda a diligencia, que aja sempre hum feitor homem fiel, e de recado, que va fora de casa arrecadar açuquar, farinha e mais cousas, necessarias e

⁷⁹⁰ See General Acquaviva to Provincial Rodrigues, Rome, 19 May 1587. ARSI, *Bras.* 2, ff. 97-97^v. Cf. also what is stated in *Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinæ Et Hispanicæ Cum Earum Declarationibus*, Ninth Part, Cap. VI, p. 275: '[T]ambém os Superiores Provinciais, Reitores de Colégios e Superiores particulares de Casas devem ter as suas ajudas, mais ou menos conforme a necessidade e importância das coisas que lhes são encomendadas'.

⁷⁹¹ Cf. *Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinæ Et Hispanicæ Cum Earum Declarationibus*, Sixth Part, Cap. III, p. 199.

⁷⁹² See *Regimento para o Procurador de Jappão que Reside na China. Este deu aqui o P. Vizitador Francesco Passio quando veio de Jappão*, BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-IV-66, f. 10. The italic is ours.

não se mandem os nossos a isso *quanto for possível*'.⁷⁹³ Additionally, there is also the aforementioned questionnaire sent by Father Ludovico da Fonseca to Acquaviva in 1594, to which the general categorically answered to dismiss all professed Fathers in charge of the procuratorship of colleges or probationary houses.⁷⁹⁴

Despite this widespread feeling, we saw that the suggestion was difficult to be respected. According to Spinola's last letter quoted, it would seem that he found a way to keep on financing the persecuted province without creating any scandal and, in particular, abiding by the Constitutions and Valignano's *Regimento*. Nevertheless, we know that not only internal members of the Society took care of the office in Japan and China, but they were also professed Fathers. Also in Brazil the post of procurator was bestowed neither laymen nor to simple Brothers, rather to Fathers like Francisco de Lemos,⁷⁹⁵ who did not consider himself worthy to accept the third vow but eventually was granted the fourth too and climbed up the Society's hierarchy in the Brazilian colony up the top.⁷⁹⁶ The case of Father de Lemos is quite meaningful, since it discloses that for the Society's sake, provincials and rectors were almost obliged to rely on Fathers they really trusted, in particular when it came to cope with the delicate matters belonging to the post of procurator. Provincial Rodrigues himself explained that he removed 'P. Manoel de Saa'⁷⁹⁷ do officio de procurador, não por erros da muito momento, mas para tirar materia do queixumes, pus em seu lugar ao P. Francisco de Lemos que trouxe de Pernambuco aonde era ministro'.⁷⁹⁸ The sources we just quoted

⁷⁹³ See *O que pareceo ao Padre Visitador Christovão de Gouvea ordenar na visita destes Collegio da Baya – 1.º de Janeiro de 1589 veo confirmado pelo Padre Geral*. ARSI, Bras. 2, f. 148^v. The italic is ours.

⁷⁹⁴ Cf. *Responsiones ad proposita a Patre Ludovico da Fonseca, procuratore Brasilia anno 1594*. ARSI, Bras. 2, f. 86.

⁷⁹⁵ The Portuguese Francisco de Lemos (1563-1628) turned Jesuit on 1 February 1578. He was in the *Armada da Conquista do Rio Grande do Norte* in 1597 helping 'ao exército com os acostumados exercícios da Companhia, com muita edificação de todos, prégando, confessando e fazendo amizades e não se negando a nenhuns trabalhos'. Then, he went back to Pernambuco and eventually reached Baía, where he was appointed college procurator. He taught grammar, Brazilian language and worked also in the villages. He passed away while he was serving as father superior in São Paulo. Cf. *HCJB*^I, p. 516

⁷⁹⁶ See Provincial Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Salvador da Bahia, 15 September 1602. ARSI, Bras. 8 [II], f. 16^v: 'Tambem o Padre Francisco de Lemos teve ao principio grande repugnancia em aver de aceitar a profissão de tres votos, mas ainda que magoadado finalmente a aceitou por se sojeitar à ordem de V. P. tem nesta provincia trabalhando com edificação, ouvio tres anos de Theologia, nas ocupação no muitos anos em o officio de procurador deste collegio que oje faz. A resignação com que se venceo com outras razões ne obrigão a pedir a V. P. o admitta aos 4.º votos. E assi pareceo aos consultores da provincia'.

⁷⁹⁷ Manuel de Sá (1552-1625) was born in Braga and entered the Society in December 1572. He was appointed procurator twice, in Baía first and then Pernambuco, where he eventually died.

⁷⁹⁸ See Provincial Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Salvador da Baía, 5 January 1600. ARSI, Bras. 3 [II], f. 169.

regarding the Province of Brazil were written six years away one from the other (1594 and 1600), but they can still stand as examples of how, also in Brazil, the office of procurator was so important to bend the limitations imposed by the *Curia Generalizia* by being a substantial part of that bureaucratic instinct for survival, which Nicholas Cushner's wrote about.⁷⁹⁹

As we know, the procurator in the Society of Jesus coped with the preservation of the mission or the college's belongings and estates and with the conservation of the monetary capital. According to the texts of the Ignatian Order, each house should have one or more officials who were concerned with its internal management, with the purchase of commodities that it required, with the keeping of its fiscal and legal records, and with the representation of its interests before civil authorities. At the beginning, all these tasks were often carried out by one person but in larger institutions there were separate house managers (*ministros* or *æconomi*), buyers (*compradores*) and procurators. All three offices were derived from the old Benedictine office of cellarer or steward. According to the Benedictine Rule, his duty was to take care of everything but to undertake nothing without the consent of the abbot and, as we already saw, the same was true in the Society. The procurators bore primary responsibility for the receipt and expenditure of funds belonging to the house, as well as for the keeping of financial and legal records, including the texts of all bequests, royal licenses, decrees and instructions from the generals and congregations decrees. Whenever necessary, they utilized such materials in the preparation of documents they submitted to crown authorities in defence of their colleges' property rights or directly to the crown, although in this case it was the duty of the mission procurator.⁸⁰⁰ In Brazil, copies of privileges, contracts, *livros* or *rol de contas* (registrations of estates' transactions and the economic incomes of those sales) were to be sent to the college procurators, since they had also the responsibility of analysing that material and, again, save it for furthering documentation.⁸⁰¹ Thanks to those papers, it was possible to verify all the operations accomplished, such as production of sugar, rice and tobacco, or to keep under control the quantity of slaves and animals belonging to the college. Yet, this analyse was important also because it

⁷⁹⁹ Cushner used this expression while dealing with Jesuits' conception of slavery, but it seems a concept useful to describe the whole secular commitment of the Society of Jesus. See Cushner, *Jesuit Ranches and the Agrarian Development of Colonial Argentina 1650-1767*, p. 100.

⁸⁰⁰ Cf. Alden, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-309 and bibliography cited therein.

⁸⁰¹ See, for instance, the request for these papers made by the Procurator of the College of Rio de Janeiro Francisco da Costa in 1621 in ANTT/CJ, *Maço 90*, doc. n.º 96.

was a secure way to determine whether the colleges, houses and other estates were running well and without loss – both economic and religious – for the Society. In case of loss, obviously, the procurator was supposed to find a way to balance the budget. We saw how Carlo Spinola tried but could not accomplish his duty. He inherited a province that owed money in Japan, Macao and Portugal and still had to find incomes to maintain it. Father André de Gouvêa, the procurator of Lisbon's college of Santo Antão in Salvador da Baía,⁸⁰² expressed a similar concept to Spinola's when he was appointed procurator in Nagasaki, yet he added a touch of spite Spinola's words lack:

'Não tenho tempo para informar a V. R. do modo que achei estas cousas deste Collegio, nem he bem que se digão, porque não servira mais que dar a V. R. pena sem proveito [...]. Tratando de lançar este engenho azucar, o que não ouvera de fazer se eu não ficara, mas que animo que V. R. que eu tenha, ver-me com hum occupação tão trabalhosa em terra que eu não conheço ninguém e tão desbaratada [...], afligido com dividas Deus acuda que serto me he necessario pacienciar e V. R. na instrução que me deu, dis-me que lhe mande o dinheiro que eu qua achar. Se V. R. tivera a esperiencia que eu oje tenho, V. R. me dera la dinheiro, e não esperar fosse de qua, e a graça foi que vindo hum armada tão grande, senão embarcou para estes engenhos, hum vinte de fornecimento, e eu tenho agora necessidade de bons 3'000 cruzados per acodir as cousas precisas deste engenho [...]. [E] assim confesso a V. R. que senão vira o desemparo que qua achei, me ouvera de voltar e quem emmarantou as cousas, as viesse desembaraçar'.⁸⁰³

Gouvêa was appointed procurator during a particular time, i.e. after the Dutch invasion of Salvador and its recovery by the Portuguese in 1624. Consequently, his duties were even more urgent. In April 1627, in fact, he compiled a list of the people the college owed money to and, although the sum of debts was almost 3'500'000 *réis*, the procurator managed to diminish it by one million.⁸⁰⁴ Differently from the Japanese Province, which ran into debt in order to secure the participation in the silk trade, the Brazilian Province was a victim of circumstances. Gouvêa, in fact, found the *engenho* in terrible conditions due to the Dutch invasions, which caused also the production halt. Nevertheless, the problems of the *engenho* were not caused only by the invasion, but

⁸⁰² The Portuguese André de Gouvea (1583-?) was born in S. João de Mondim (S. João de Tarouca) and entered the Society when he was 22 years old. He was first appointed procurator of the college of Terceira in the Azores and then, from 1625 to 1630 circa, he was sent to Baía as S. Antão's procurator in the *Engenho de Sergipe do Conde*. Cf. *HCJB¹ VIII*, pp. 278-279 and Magalhães, "A Relação do Engenho de Sergipe do Conde em 1625", pp. 237-238.

⁸⁰³ See Procurator André de Gouvêa to Rector of the College of S. Antão Luís de Morais, Salvador da Baía, 25 July 1625. ANTT/CJ, *Maço* 69, f. 1

⁸⁰⁴ Cf. *Rol das dividas que achei feitas e a que pessoas se devião*, ARSI, *Bras. 11 [I]*, ff. 382-382^v. The exact amount of debts was 3'473'094 *réis*.

were inscribed within a general crisis of the *economia açucareira* during the 1620s. Procurator Gouvêa wrote that ‘não vejo por qua Senhor de engenho rico, antes todos pobres’.⁸⁰⁵ It was not uncommon for *senhores de engenho* to get heavily into debt and to see their fortune turned out to nothing over a few *safras* owing, in particular, to administrative incapacity and to the increase in the slave prices.⁸⁰⁶

In any case, at this point we can say that the college procurator was at the same time the accountant of the mission, who bore on his shoulders a heavy system of fiscal control, and its provider, who had to make sure there always was enough capital to keep the engine going.⁸⁰⁷

In order to outline the tasks of the procurator in Brazil, we can rely upon on primary and secondary sources, such as the procurators’ letters, official documents regarding purchasing and selling of *engenhos* and their *receitas*. Within the primary sources, however, falls also the *Memorial somente do Procurador do Brasil pera V. P.*, a three-page text written in 1583 by the Procurator of the College of Baía António Gomes.⁸⁰⁸ In this text we find some of the commitments that grieved the procurators and the first one is the insufficiency of financial resources in relation to the number of missionaries residing in the College of Baía.⁸⁰⁹

It is remarkable to find in Brazil almost exactly the same problems as the ones faced by Spinola in the other side of the world thirty years later. António Gomes, in fact, was not asking for an increase of the *renda* or for further aids from the kingdom, rather he considered a better solution to limit the number of the residents in the college to an affordable number proportionate to the incomes, which although might have been a negative solution for the mission in general, at least would grant sufficient means to the Ignatians who were already there. The idea of stopping the arrival of other missionaries, instead of earning much money, was as common as it was the awareness of how hard was to obtain financial support and, even harder, to collect it.⁸¹⁰ As a

⁸⁰⁵ *Apud* Magalhães, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

⁸⁰⁶ Cf. Schwartz, *Segredos Internos: Engenhos e Escravos na Sociedade Colonial, 1550-1835*, p.228 and Magalhães, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-246.

⁸⁰⁷ Cf. Assunção, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-54.

⁸⁰⁸ António Gomes (ca. 1549-1589) was born near Braga, entered the Society in 1570 and was the *Procurador do Colégio da Baía* for seven years. He died in Salvador.

⁸⁰⁹ See ARSI, *Lus.* 68, f. 416.

⁸¹⁰ Cf. *Visitas dos Padres Visitadores depois de serem aprovadas pelo Padre Geral – Franciscus de Borgia Societatis Iesu Prepositus Generalis*, ARSI, *Bras.* 2, f. 143: ‘Parece que conviere no receberse en la Provincia mas delos ciento, y treinta que estan ordenados en las fundaciones de los tres Collegios, en

matter of fact, we saw that Nóbrega, instead of wanting the king to take royal help to a higher economic level, asked to be allowed to receive the alms from other sources (cattle).

At any rate, further on in the *Memorial* we find the statement that the amount of work a college procurator had to handle in Brazil is not as much as in Portugal, but he was oppressed by his obligations nonetheless. Then, Gomes indirectly informs us about one of the principal tasks the procurator had to deal with: payments. As we have already seen, the debts of the mission, as well as daily expenditures, were ceaselessly growing and it was the Procurators' job to extinguish them. According to Gomes, both the procurator of Rio de Janeiro and Baía used to sell cows and 'farinha biscoutada' to the Royal Fleet both to earn something but also to repay the *armada* for its service.⁸¹¹ Although the college of Baía used to sell its goods at the 'preço justo da terra',⁸¹² this fact created some frictions between the Fathers and the Governor of Rio, and this goes against the 6th item of the *Memorial*:

'6. Taobem me parece mas importante que se avia de fazer todo o possivel por conservar a benevolencia do Bispo, Governador e mais pessoas do governo assi ecclesiastico, como secular, por que agora mais creem os do governo e conselho de Portugal, a huma carta destes, que a nossos papeis e instrumentos publicos e sempre vi que nos ficamos com o trabalho, perda e desgosto e sem fundir nada, assi foi do Governador Luis de Brito na Baya, e com Antonio Çallema Governador no Rio de Janeiro⁸¹³ e agora deste não sei como sera. E alem

quanto las dotaciones no fueren mayores con que se puedan mejor sustentar, o no uviere otras nuevas residencias para las quales sera necessario aver mas subjectos. No se quita con esto porderse recibir algunos buenos coadiutores temporales siendo necesarios con orden del Padre Provincial con tanto que no passen mucho del dicho numero. Lo mismo se entender quando se offrecieren algunos para estudiantes de mas de mediocres partes para la Companhia'.

⁸¹¹ Cf. ARSI, *Lus.* 68, f. 416^v: '9. O Collegio do Rio de Janeiro parece que vendeo algumas vacas e farinha biscoutada a esta armada que foy a Magalhaes, e bem creo que foi arrogo da mesma armada, mas contudo agora vindo dezião que muitas vacas e roças tinham os padres pois vendião pera a armada de sua Magestade. 10. Ouvi que pagavão aos officiaes das obras algumas vezes em pano, vinho e azeite pello preço iusto da terra, mas alguns destes o tornão a revender pelo preço que querem, e day naceo que tendo nos differenças com o Governador Çallema, tirou devassa que nos vendera mas huma botija grande de vinho por 3 cruzados. E na Baya algumas vezes fizemos ja isto per falta de dinheiro digo dar pano, vinho e azeite aos officiaes e lavradores a quem devemos em pagamento'.

⁸¹² The concept of *justum pretium* was strictly connected to that of usury for the Roman theologists and the scholasticism. The ecclesiastical authority, in fact, deemed to be the only one to have the instruments to recognize usury in commercial exchanges, since it was in its powers to establish the right price for any merchandise. Everything that did not respect the *pretium* as it was established by the Roman Church was accused of usury, thus the usurer was someone outside the ecclesial society of the believers. Cf. Todeschini, *I Mercanti e il Tempio – La società cristiana e il circolo virtuoso della ricchezza fra Medioevo ed Età Moderna*, pp. 100-101.

⁸¹³ Dom Luís Brito de Almeida was granted the title of fourth Governor General of Baía on 10 December 1572 and held the title until 1578. It happened that, after Mem de Sá's death, Brazil was divided in two separate jurisdictions: the north, with the governorship in Baía, was under the command of Luís Brito de

disso val nos mais la o mal destes, que os favores que ja não ha em Portugal, porque nunca se negão a Padre nem Irmão nosso [...] e comumente fazem aquillo em que por boa rezão são convencidos’.⁸¹⁴

Then, the procurator in Brazil not only had to take care of economic issues without creating scandals for the Society there in the colony and in the kingdom, a common trait within the Society of Jesus, as we know, but he had also to care about how the royal officers reacted to his way of handling the Society’s affairs. Playing a part in the economy of the captaincies, in fact, meant also to influence its trend, therefore the procurator had to act – and was perceived – as a common agent of the crown, although he dressed differently. However, critics always work on both directions. In 1628, in fact, Procurator Gouvêa complained that the economic competition with Governor Diogo Luís de Oliveira was a great deterrent for the college’s affairs:

‘O engenho vay moendo com grandes esperanças de muito e bom asucar, que tanto me tem custado [...]. Se o Senhor Governador não fora mercador, tiveramos mais praças e o asucar valera muito mas tudo abergua e so seus creados comprão. Antes dis o povo que toma o dinheiro aos mestres com capa de pagamentos a soldados e que lhe pegara em asucares nem pode ser menos aos muitos que seus creados comprão e 2 ou 3 mil @ que agora vendo, nos dá de perder bons mil ducados [...]. E se elle não fora, ouvera de valer a 1100 e já a 800 o não querem seus creados, Deus nos libre deste homem’.⁸¹⁵

Differently from Japan, where for at least a dozen years the Ignatians kept the favour of the tyrants through their services as sales representatives, in Brazil there was competition with the authorities, despite the governor and the Society of Jesus were both agents of the Portuguese, then Iberian, Crown. In conclusion, then, in Brazil the procurators were religious ambassadors dressed as Portuguese merchants who had to forget temporarily about their pious background in order to serve their order in the hostile land of money and bureaucracy.

Almeida, whereas the other one, starting from Porto Seguro southward, was granted to António Salema, who controlled it from 1574 to 1577. Afterwards, with the governorship of the fifth Governor Lourenço da Veiga, the colony turned back to the old situation without divisions between north and south.

⁸¹⁴ See ARSI, *Lus.* 68, f. 416^v.

⁸¹⁵ See Procurator Gouvêa to Father Simão Álvares, Salvador da Baía, 29 October 1628. ANTT/CJ, *Maço* 68, doc. n.º 342, f. 1.

V. 3. Dueling with the devil: *‘um engenho é inferno e todos os senhores deles são perdidos’*

Besides the difference in goods they had to handle – silk and silver in Japan and sugar in Brazil – the absence/presence of a firm and therefore pre-eminent establishment of royal power appears to be one of the big differences between the office of procurator in Japan and in Brazil, even though not only the procurators but the entire Society had to deal with governors and royal officers. Actually, the Society of Jesus in Brazil presented another peculiarity, which we can trace back to Mem de Sá governorship, or better to his death and legacy.

When the third governor general died on 2 March 1572, he bequeathed to his heirs – Francisco and Filipa de Sá – all of his properties, among which there was the *Engenho de Sergipe do Conde*, one of the largest and certainly the most famous of the sugar plantations in colonial Brazil, founded by the same governor in the 1560s.⁸¹⁶

In Mem de Sá's will there was in particular a clause which refers to Sergipe. It stated that if his sons would die without heirs the part of the legacy which included the sugar mill should be split up in three parts: one should go to the College of Santo Antônio, another to the Jesuit college in Baía and the third part to the *Misericórdia da Cidade do Salvador da Baía* (Charitable Brotherhood). This clause would eventually create a harsh dispute because of the following facts. Francisco de Sá died only eight months after his father (19 December 1572), consequently the whole inheritance passed to Filipa and became part of her dowry when she married Dom Fernando de Noronha, count of Linhares – reason why the mill was called Sergipe do Conde or Engenho do Conde –, again in 1572. Upon her death in 1612, the plantation became embroiled in a three-way lawsuit involving the aforementioned colleges and the *Misericórdia*. This dispute

⁸¹⁶ Cf. ANTT/CJ, *Maço 89*, doc. n.º 12, f. 1: ‘Diz o Procurador da Misericórdia pobres e orfãos da Cidade do Salvador Bahia de todos os Sanctos, que no testamento com que faleço mem de Saa, que foy Governador do Estado do Brasil, cuja copia vay no Appontamento mayor a fol. 3 e no outro Appontamento a fol. 113, dispos na verba fol. 5 verso et fol. 155 despois de diser que tinha na Capitania da Bahia tres legoas e meya de costa, e quatro para o sertão com duas Ilhas em Cirigipe aonde fizer hum engenho de assucar que tinha alguns escravos, que tomava o dito engenho com todas suas terras e agoas em sua terça, e que a deixava a Francisco de Saa seu filho, com tudo o mais que nella lhe coubesse vinculado por via de morgado para que elle o lograsse e possuísse em sua vida, e por sua morte ficasse a seu filho mayor legitimo e de legitimo matrimonio, e que não tendo filho varão legitimo, e de legitimo matrimonio veria a sua filha mayor de legitimo matrimonio, e que sendo caso que o dito seu filho falecesse sem descendentes verião os ditos bens a sua filha Donna Phelippa de Saa ou a seus filhos sendo ella falecida’. The *Engenho de Sergipe do Conde* lay in the midst of the Baian *recôncavo*, the lands that encircled the bay (near present day Santo Amaro and São Francisco do Conde). This region, along with its counterpart in Pernambuco, formed the heart of the colonial sugar economy.

dragged through the courts until a final decision in August 1665, when ‘a dita Igreja [Santo Antônio] tomou posse do dito engenho’⁸¹⁷ and turned to be the only Peninsular college to own sugar estates in Brazil.⁸¹⁸

We have already stated that the Society did not get involved into sugar plantation before 17th century, but before going back to that we have to notice that the Generals assumed different behaviours towards this involvement. Diego Laínez, the second General, sanctioned its dispatch in limited quantities; Borgia, on the other hand, ruled that ‘alguna cosa de las que se usan allá le pareciere derechamente contraria a nuestro Instituto’ should be quitted, in particular he told Visitor Inácio de Azevedo to note ‘si se ocupan los nuestros en negocios seglares’.⁸¹⁹ By 1584 the fifth General, Claudio Acquaviva, had been persuaded that neither the Constitutions nor the Institute would be violated if the Brazilian colleges should started growing sugar; hence, by 1590 he authorized the College of Baía to plant canes, provided that two conditions were respected: ‘se puedan hazer canaveales, para que con el açúcar se pueda ir desdevidando, y suplir a lo que la renta no basta, per adiurtasse, que esso se haga si inquietude de los nuestros ni ellos se entremetan a hazer lo açúcar’.⁸²⁰ No anxiety for fathers and brothers and, in particular, no direct participation in the industry.

As we can assume by reading Acquaviva’s words, one of the main reasons that convinced him to allow Jesuits to plant canes was the disturbing reports of the colleges’ mounting debts. Additionally, we know that only few years before, the general received letters by Valignano in support of the silk trade. Then, we can say that the 1580s and early 1590s were years of pronounced tolerance of Acquaviva towards the economy of the Portuguese Assistancy, since he decided to allow both, although reluctantly.

Notwithstanding Acquaviva’s *placet*, we have letters written in 1601 in which we find again the same problems as in the previous decade. In April, Provincial Rodrigues wrote to Acquaviva that, despite he had accepted to plant cane on Jesuit lands as well as building a mill to rent,⁸²¹ ‘nada disto tive effeito, porque em duas partes

⁸¹⁷ Cf. ANTT/CJ, *Maço 15*, doc. n.º 13, f. 1^v.

⁸¹⁸ Regarding the history of Sergipe do Conde see *HCJB*^I V, pp. 243-251; Alden, *op. cit.*, pp. 416-425 and Schwarz, “Free Labor in a Slave Economy: The Lavradores de Cana of Colonial Bahia”, pp. 149-150.

⁸¹⁹ Cf. *Instrução do P. Francisco de Borja ao P. Inácio de Azevedo Visitador do Brasil*, in *MB IV 1563-1568*, pp. 322-329.

⁸²⁰ *Cópia de outra* [letter of General Claudio Acquaviva] de 28 de Julio de 1590. ARSI, *Bras.* 2, f. 61.

⁸²¹ We do not know the sugar mills rental prices, yet we know that the cost of an *engenho* in the early 17th century went from 8 to 10’000 *cruzados*, whereas in the end of the century the average value of a mill in

aonde temos terras achou se que não avia agoas acomodadas para isso. Pello que determino o P. Reitor [Enrique Gomes] deste Collegio usar da licença de V. P. e tomar hum partido de canas iunto a algum engenho'.⁸²² However, it would seem that this resolution did not solve the main problem, for only seven months later he wrote once again to the general to inform him about a conference held with Enrique Gomes, Procurator Francisco de Lemos and other fathers:

'Por vezes tenho significado a V. P. o muito aperto de dividas em que estão os dous Collegios da Bahia e do Rio, por aver tres anos, que nenhuma cousa nos pagão os officiaes da real fazenda de S. Magestade não podendo cessar os gastos ordinarios. E assi foy necessario agora usar este Collegio de industria para se ajudar a sustentar. Tomou hum partido de canas em que pode fazer algum proveito, como fazem todos os homens que tem os taes partidos. E isto sem nenhuma desedificação, porque se faz com escravos de Guine, mandados pelos feitores, como tem em seus canaveaes os Padres do Carmo, e da S. Bento. E as pessoas a quem devemos se edificação de buscarmos remedio para lhes pagar'.⁸²³

The *partido de cana* is a land which the *lavrador de cana* leased from the mill's *feitor-mór* with certain restrictions on its use and the disposal of the produce. These contracts varied from place to place over time, but, basically, mills' owners favoured the *partido de terço* or *partido de quarto* in which the cane grower agreed to pay the *engenho* one-third or one-fourth of his half of the sugar produced from cane. Provincial Rodrigues deemed it a profitable way to earn, and it was indeed. The *partido de terço* placed a heavy burden on the grower since in each harvest (*safrá*) he would receive only one-third of the sugar his cane produced.⁸²⁴ However, on the other hand, the distribution of sugar did not necessarily turn to the grower's disadvantage, since his portion was made of the top quality sugar. In effect, Estevão Pereira, procurator of S. Antão, wrote that 'todos os assucares que hum engenho fas brancos e mascavados a metade são do engenho outra ametade do lavrador; o que não he nos nelles batidos, nem panelas, per que tudo isto he do engenho'.⁸²⁵

Baía was about 15'000 cruzados, 18-20'000 including slaves. Cf. Schwarz, "A «Babilónia» colonial: A Economia Açucareira", p. 222.

⁸²² See Provincial Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Salvador da Baía, 24 April 1601. ARSI, *Bras. 8 [I]*, f. 30^v. The underlining is the provincial's.

⁸²³ See Provincial Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Salvador da Baía, 15 September 1601. ARSI, *Bras. 8 [I]*, f. 28^v.

⁸²⁴ Cf. Schwarz, "Free labor in a slave economy", p. 154.

⁸²⁵ Cf. ANTT/CJ, *Maço 13*, doc. n.º 20, f. 5^v.

Back to Rodrigues's quote, we find him citing a fact the Jesuits in Brazil never got tired of pointing out when seeking some privilege or concessions. According to the Provincial of Brazil, Carmelites and Benedictines fathers were already growing sugar cane, so if they did that with no scandal for their orders, why could not the Jesuits? Furthermore, we know that it was not only Carmelites and Benedictines who turned already cane growers but also the Jesuits in New Spain turned to the production of sugar, almost a decade before their Brazilian colleagues.⁸²⁶

It is curious to see how the Jesuits were always looking for reliable justifications for their behaviour and choices; they had been holding congregations and consults, sending several letters to generals, provincials, rectors and procurators to prove and convince they were not doing anything wrong. This way of handling these kinds of situations can be found especially in Jesuits' apologetic historiography and it is well expressed in this passage of Serafim Leite: 'permitimo-nos simplesmente observar que quando os factos constituem a defesa, esta defesa ainda é história. É mesmo a única história possível para restabelecer o equilíbrio perdido na confusão dos ataques'.⁸²⁷

During the 17th century, the Ignatians acquired five sugar plantations in the captaincy of Baía. Three belonged to the local college, the remaining two to Santo Antão. This situation created the contemporary presence of, at least, two college procurators. From a quantitative point of view, we were able to consult more documents written by S. Antão's procurators than Baía's. In particular, in the Torre do Tombo in Lisbon survive many 17th-century documents written by those procurators, among who for the first half of the 1600 we find in particular the names of Estevão Pereira⁸²⁸ and Simão de Soutomayor.⁸²⁹

Their documents are interesting for two reasons: firstly, because of their peculiarity, since, except for little details, it is quite difficult to tell they were written by

⁸²⁶ Cf. Alden, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

⁸²⁷ See *HCJB* IV, p. 166.

⁸²⁸ Father Estevão Pereira (1589-?) was born in S. Miguel das Marinhas, although in another catalogue we find Alvito. He entered the Society in 1606 and in 1614 he was in the College of Braga. In 1622, he was minister of the College of S. Miguel (Azores). As S. Antão's procurator he was sent to Sergipe do Conde from 1629 to 1633 and then he came back to Lisbon where he eventually died in an indefinite year. Cf. Rodrigues, *História da História do Brasil*, I, p.390.

⁸²⁹ Father Simão de Soutomayor (1585-?) was born in Lisbon and entered the Society of Jesus in Évora in 1604. He spent a lot of years in Salvador da Baía as procurator of S. Antão, but he was in Brazil once before, for he was captured by the Dutch in 1624 and taken to Holland. Back in Brazil, he took an active part during the siege of Baía in 1638. He was still holding the office of procurator of S. Antão in 1652. Cf. *HCJB* IX, p. 141.

men of the cloth. On the contrary, they are almost completely alike to papers written by *fidalgos* or *senhores de engenhos*. Secondly, because they are so thorough about their obligations that it is worth to enlist here the principal items of one of the most detailed record written by Estevão Pereira in 1635, namely *Dase Reção da fazenda que o Collegio De Santo Antônio Tem no Brazil, e de seus Rendimentos*.⁸³⁰ Pereira's list starts with the lands belonging to the mill (*Terras em Ceregipe*), both the *partidos* and the *sobejos* (extra-parcels),⁸³¹ with their corresponding values. Then, the procurator moves to other estate's typology: stockyards (*curraes*) and farms (*fazendas*). After these records, which occupy 5 folios, begins a part directly involved with the harvest process, a part, then, that shows how deep the procurator's knowledge of the sugar industry was supposed to be. Pereira writes about the earnings of the *engenho* coming from the sugar sales by describing the best scenario that could possibly happen: selling white sugar at 800 *réis* per arroba. Then, he calculates all the prices (incomes and expenditures) basing his maths on that optimistic condition to show that, also with the white sugar at 800 *réis*, 'a gananza [is] tam pouca ou nenhuma':

Enserramento destas Contas:

Inporta o que rende o Engenho em tempo que o assucar branco val a dous cruzados.	3.874U000
Inporta a despeza feita em huma çafra, em o dito engenho pondo somente nella as couzas preisamente necessarias e os preços mui correntes, e ordinarios.	3.308U633
Abatida a despeza da Receita restão quinhentos sessenta, e sinco mil tresentos e sesenta e sete réis.	0.565U367

Source: ANTT/CJ, *Maço 13*, doc. n.º 20, f. 10.

Afterwards, Pereira pointed out which counter-measures a procurator should take when the selling prices were not that high. First of all, it was not convenient to sell the sugar in Brazil, instead 'embarcado para o Reino aonde sempre tem muita valia, e se ganha mais de cento per cento'. Still, the profit came not only from the prices difference. As we saw, one of the most enviable privilege enjoyed by the Society was the exemption of paying taxes and it was especially for this reason that 'nos aproveita mais que os mercadores'.⁸³² In accordance to what stated by Estevão Pereira in 1633, we have a the

⁸³⁰ The document in ANTT/CJ, *Maço 13*, doc. n.º 20, ff. 1-10^v.

⁸³¹ 'Afora as terras sobre ditas, há outras a que chamamos sobeios que são humas sobras, que os lavradores possuem de mao titulo sem pagarem dellas couza alguma'. See also Schwarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161.

⁸³² Cf. ANTT/CJ, *Maço 13*, f. 10^v.

receipt of Sergipe of 1608, which clearly shows that it was customary for the procurator back then to send half the sugar to Portugal and sell the other half in Brazil, yet also the exported sugar was previously sold in Brazil according to price of the colony, which was lower than in Portugal.⁸³³

As briefly pointed out before, we are forced to rely upon secondary sources in order to grasp the duties of the procurator in Brazil. An example of this situation is provided by the following quotation of Claudio Acquaviva. The general, writing to Provincial Rodrigues about some mishaps in the novitiates the provincial was supposed to set right. Among these mishaps ‘es una que los Novicios no vayan por conpanheiros del Procurador, y otros del Collegio a negociar pollas haziendas (y ingenios de asucar, ny tan poco a estar en las aldenas)’.⁸³⁴ Acquaviva, although briefly and while writing about the peregrination the *novicios* were supposed to do during the novitiate, pointed out one of the most demanding obligations of the procurator in Brazil. We have to concentrate, in particular, on the word ‘negociar’, since it is common to meet this verb and its derivatives when working on sources regarding the procurators of the Society. We saw before that João Rodrigues *Tçuzu* wrote that ‘o officio de Procurador de Japão por ser hum puro negociador, he muito differente do das outras Provincias’.⁸³⁵ It was indeed different from the procurator in Brazil. The different political situations obliged the procurators to develop along totally dissimilar paths. Whilst during Rodrigues’s procuratorship, the procurator was definitely a negotiator, both for the missionaries and for the rulers of Japan, in Brazil the procurator was more an administrator and an accountant.

Acquaviva’s passage joins in the already mentioned Visitor Cristóvão de Gouvêa’s subject, namely the effort to keep the fathers away from secular and commercial matters, which, evidently, was not a successful one.⁸³⁶ At the present state of the research, we did not find a document that defines what Acquaviva meant by ‘negociar’, but in Lisbon’s Torre do Tombo is stored an interesting manuscript by Estevão Pereira that clarifies what kind of negotiations were to be accomplished by the

⁸³³ See Annex F – *Receita do açuquar que fes o engenho de Sergipe o anno de 1608*.

⁸³⁴ See *Alguns capitulos de huma do mesmo Padre* [Acquaviva] *pera o mesmo Padre* [Rodrigues] *de 15 de fevereiro de 1595*, ARSI, Bras. 2, f. 88.

⁸³⁵ See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-8, f. 635.

⁸³⁶ Cf. *HCJB*^{II} I, p. 53.

Procurator of S. Antão and also gives an idea of what kind of relationship there was between the Jesuits and laymen:

‘O Padre Simão de Soto Maior meteo a este homem [Manoel Maciel Aranha] em humas terras desta fazenda, que tinha tirado a outra, para que as beneficiasse (como fes plantando as de novo de cana, por que estavam perdidas, e cheas de mato).⁸³⁷ Não lhe fes arrendamento, porque o homem o queria por mais largo tempo, do que o Padre lho queria, e podia faser. Pediu-se licença a nosso Reverendo Padre mandou a para se lhe faser por 9 annos. Foi avisado disto, e o Padre Gouvea se lhe offereceo para faser o arrendamento; com tanto que lhe pagase a renda dos 7 o 8 annos que esta na terra, sem pagar cousa alguma. Nunca ia ouve remedio querer chegar a conclusão. Cheguei eu fis lhe o mesmo offerecimento; disseme estava prestes para tudo o que eu quisesse’.⁸³⁸

We already saw how Acquaviva allowed the Brazil Jesuits to own estates, but he did not allow them to actually produce sugar. Thus, to exploit economically its own lands the Society, through the *Procurador of the Igreja Nova* of S. Antão Simão de Soutomayor, and by the present and future procurators of S. Antão in Sergipe,⁸³⁹ André de Gouvêa and Estevão Pereira, needed to lease them. In this case we see how the *negócio* did not come to an end because of disagreement about the leasing terms. Those agreements could extend for indefinite periods, lease in perpetuity not excluded. In 1600 Provincial Inácio Tolosa wrote:

‘[E]l Padre Provincial com sus consultores, procurador del Collegio trató si se arrendavão en Emphiteosi unas tierras que tiene el Collegio em Paze siete leguas desta ciudad por mar para hazer, en ellas um ingenio, porque pera este effecto ninguno quiere agoas ni tierras sino afforadas *in perpetuum*, porque como la fabrica del ingenio es cosa grande, y gusta mucho dinero en hazerlo no querem tomallo de otra manera’.⁸⁴⁰

The *emphyteusis* was profitable for both for the landowner and the tenant, but especially for the former. For him there were both social and economic advantages, but since the

⁸³⁷ In another letter, Pereira returns on this specific arguments writing how detrimental the bushes were for the harvest. See ANTT/CJ, *Maço 13*, doc. n.º 20, ff. 1^v-2: ‘Todas estas terras dos partidos podem hoje valer em seu comum, e isto preço quarenta mil cruzados bem pagos em 3. ou 4 anos. Daqui em diante podem render os ditos partidos em cada hum anno quinhentos arrobas de assucar branco e 250 de mascavado. Digo daqui em diante, per que em meu tempo não chegarão a dita contia por alguns dos partidos starem em mato, do 4 p.º dos framengos, os quais fis reformar e plantar de novo’.

⁸³⁸ See ANTT/CJ, *Maço 71*, doc. n.º 12, f. 1.

⁸³⁹ We have a letter of Gouvêa dated 14 March 1628, in which the procurator begged the Rector of S. Antão, Father Simão Alvarez, to quickly send a substitute for his pos, because of his critical health conditions, which impeded him to carry on his duties. Cf. ANTT/CJ, *Maço 68*, doc. n.º 338, f. 1.

⁸⁴⁰ See Provincial Inácio Tolosa to undisclosed recipient, Salvador da Baía, 5 September 1600. ARSI, *Bras. 3 [II]*, f. 191. According to Tolosa, the *emphyteusis* was endorsed both by General Mercuriano and by Pope Gregory XIII with the brief issued on 23 August 1578.

Jesuits did not have to preserve their social status in the colonial society, we can focus on the economic side, which is quite simple. The Ignatians, in fact, although they were forbid to grow sugar cane, they were allowed to possess land and did not want to lose control and incomes of those lands. Then, the only possible solution, or compromise, turned out to be the lease in perpetuity, yet with restrictions based on land conditions. The owners found that some lands because of not excellent location could not be leased on the fraction basis of the *partido*. Tolosa expressly wrote that ‘la qualidad de las tierras del Brasil es gastarse en breve años y despues es menester dexallas descansar muchos años y por esto quedan sin provecho despues que las dexan los primeiros arrendadores; y ansi se allague a lo menos para ingenios es mas provechoso arrendallas *in perpetuum* com foro competente’.⁸⁴¹ Tolosa’s words are a good way to show how the Jesuits – not only the procurators – moved in the colonial economy exactly as laymen did. This passage briefly demonstrates how the *emphyteusis* worked: the *lavradores de cana* could lease these lands for prices below their real value, with the perpetual obligation to provide cane to the *engenho* and a symbolic charge (*foro competente*) to symbolize the continuing attachment of the land to the *engenho*. In this way the cultivator acquired virtual ownership but the cane remained a perpetual “captive” of the mill.⁸⁴²

Back to the aforementioned passage regarding Manoel Aranha’s affair, we see that the procurator in Brazil had also to take care also of legal problems derived from those *arrendamentos*, a feature that reminds us of the paperwork about the gold lost in the sinking of the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* which Carlo Spinola had to deliver. In this specific case, Gouvêa and Pereira were trying to get rid of Aranha, who was not eager to lease the land on Jesuits terms, although he was already renting a land owned by the Society of Jesus. Estevão Pereira wrote that he went back to Baía along with Gouvêa looking for two judges (*louvados*) to legally determine the real value of the ameliorations (*bemfeitorias*) Maciel Aranha did and ‘para se lhe descuentarem dos rendimentos’. But, the two procurators had to face the resistance of the tenant:

‘Elle agora pernea e da muitas resoís para se lhe não averem de tirar as terras. E são as seguintes. 1.^a que foi movido das ditas terras com proposta de se lhe faser novo arrendamento, que se lhe não fes. Responde se que sua foi a culpa, pois se lhe offereces por veses, que elle

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.* Cf. also Alden, *op. cit.*, pp. 403-406.

⁸⁴² Cf. Schwarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158.

não quis. 2.^a que elle deu muito proveito a fazenda, tomando a huma das boas que ha no Brazil, metendo muito cabedal &c. Respondeu que tem tirado muito, e bom proveito de fructuando em todo este tempo sem nos vermos della nem hum real, ou pão d'assucar em tantos annos. Quanto mais que estamos prestes (feitas contas) a lhe pagar suas bemfeitorias, que nesta terra tem preços certo, trentas mil reis por tarefa de cana.⁸⁴³ 3.^a que ha amigo da Companhia, parente de algun della [Father Manoel Fagundes], e tem bom cabedal para cultivar a dita fazenda'.⁸⁴⁴

We should briefly focus on the second and third point, for they are examples of how the *arrendamentos* normally evolved. We do not know what kind of leasing was signed between the Society and Aranha before this one, but it seems that the tenant did not respect the terms of the agreement. Nevertheless, he was trying to stipulate a new one and it is important what he picked out in his third point. The mill owners usually rented their best lands in rather large parcels at the “third” rate. In Sergipe do Conde the lands along the bay or well-situated on rivers where the soil was good and transport easy were rented at the *terço*, whereas lands without access to water transport were leased at the *quarto*.⁸⁴⁵ Due to heavy rent obligations, only farmers of some substance accepted a large *partido de terço*. The mill owners encouraged this situation, because they wished to place their prime lands in the hands of those who could exploit them best. In fact, the records of Sergipe do Conde indicate a definite reluctance to conclude a “third” contract with poor cane growers.⁸⁴⁶ We cannot ascertain from Pereira's letter whether the procurator was about to stipulate a *partido de terço* or *de quarto* with Aranha, but it is worth to note that the Portuguese layman underlined the fact that he could easily get economic aid. Though Maciel Aranha presented good conditions to exploit the land at its best, then, what Pereira wrote afterward lets us infer that the *negócio* did not end well for the tenant:

‘Tudo isto he verdade, mas tem contra si que he homem terribel, grandissimo demandão, trapasseiro de vantagem, misto que he demandas. He terribel de condição, e bellicoso. Sendo

⁸⁴³ One *tarefa* in Baía corresponded to 30 square *braças*, i.e. 4'352 metres (1 *braça* = 2,20 metres).

⁸⁴⁴ See ANTT/CJ, *Maço 71*, doc. n.º 12, f. 1^v.

⁸⁴⁵ Cf. ANTT/CJ, *Maço 13*, doc. n.º 20, f. 1^v: ‘Das terras que estão longo do mar ou de rios navegaves, se paga a fazenda de renda em cada hum anno a 3.a parte do assucar, que se faz da cana do tal partido, que pertença ao lavrador. Verbi g. Deu a cana do dito partido 600 arrobas de assucar destas são 300 do engenho onde se fez, as outras trezentos (que he a metade) pertencem ao lavrador. Destas tem a fazenda cem arrobas que he a 3.a parte. A estes chamão partidos de 3.º. Ha outros partidos de quarto, de que se paga so a quarta parte do assucar pertencente ao lavrador, e são os daquellas terras que ficão afastadas de pertos de mar, ou rios. Das quais per razão da serventia mais trabalhosa, em se levar a cana a carregadouro, se abate a renda’.

⁸⁴⁶ Cf. Schwarz, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

como he obrigado a cortar cana para este engenho, elle dis que fara seu assucar aonde, e quando quiser. Melhor nos vem que os nossos Padres tenham este partido, que em fim são nossos irmãos, e mui pobres. Tem mais fabrica, que o Maciel; devem ser mais bem avindos que elle, e moerão sua cana a tempo mais necessario, que he quando se acaba a cana dos mais lavradores. E se em algum tempo acharmos convem a esse Collegio meter fabrica sua na dita fazenda a largarão os Padres sem demanda, o que não fara o Maciel. Por tanto V.R. tenha maõ. Não nos convem este homem por caseiro'.⁸⁴⁷

S. Antão's procurator, and probably Baía's too, had to carry out a very demanding work. He not only had to look after the finances of the mill and to arrange agreements with *lavradores de cana*, but was directly responsible of the *safra* and of its succeeding. Obviously, what the procurator really did care about was the economic side of his appointment. In 1630, for example, Pereira wrote to Soutomayor that he could not properly dry the sugar because of lack of suitable instruments; moreover, not only he had to look after the whole *safra*, he also had to cover the expenses of the mill, which included several purchases, from the copper needed for the bottom of the kettles to the foodstuffs to feed the negros and the negros themselves.⁸⁴⁸ Furthermore, among all of these expenditures, Pereira could not help reminding that:

'Pois entenda V. R. que tudo quanto os engenhos vão rendendo não dão para os gastos delles (como vera das contas, que ey de mandar, e não vão agora, porque ainda não esta acabado de secar todo o assucar desta çafra. Pello que não posso dar inteira conta de toda a receita, nem despesa) so de cobres tenho comprado perto de mil, e quinhentos cruzados val cada arratel⁸⁴⁹ hum cruzado. O ferro val a 8 e a des mil réis o quintal [...]. Comprei hum barril de aseite de 4 em pipa por quinze mil réis. Os coadouros a seis vinteí. Veja V. R. agora como se podem aturar tantos gastos? Eu não faço milagres, mas faço de mim pedaços por faser assucar'.⁸⁵⁰

Basically, the outflows of the mills were higher than the revenues. We know that the sugar farm in Brazil grew around the production of white sugar (*açúcar branco*), which

⁸⁴⁷ Cf. ANTT/CJ, *Maço 71*, doc. n.º 12, f. 1^v.

⁸⁴⁸ *Ivi*, f. 7^v: 'De cobre são necessarios huma çafra per outra ou menos 3 fundos de caldeiras per raro he o fundo que fique de huma çafra, para poder servir em outra. E muitas vezes se furão em menos de hum mes, costuma a valer hum fundo o preço do aratel de cobre a 360 (que foi o mais ordinario em meu tempo) setenta pera oitenta mil réis montasse nos 3 fundos 220U000. São mais necessarios pello descurso do anno seis pastas de cobre, para reparar os panos das caldeiras remendar os fundos, e para pregos, com que se remenda os quais pezão asolibras cada huma a 280 84U000. De mãos de officiaes, em fazer do cobre velho fundos das tachas, ramenda caldeiras, e fazer todas as obras miudos ou menos 40U000'.

⁸⁴⁹ 1 arratel = 1 pound = 454 grams.

⁸⁵⁰ Cf. *Estevão Pereira ao Padre Simão de Soto Maior da Companhia de JESUS, procurador da Nova Igreja do Collegio de S. Antam; ou a quem seu cargo servir*, Salvador da Baía, 24 September 1630. ANTT/CJ, *Maço 71*, doc. n.º 14, f. 1.

was the best both in quality and in value.⁸⁵¹ Nevertheless, low quality sugar, like *panelas*, was produced at the same time and from its molasses *cachaça* or *geribita* were distilled. The interesting thing about this is that the *senhores de engenho* used to state that during times of economic difficulties, sugar production sufficed only to cover the expenditures, whereas selling alcohol was the real source of incomes.⁸⁵²

To have a precise idea of which were the expenditures of a Brazilian mill in the 17th century's first half, we can take a look to an account drew up by Procurator André de Gouvêa in which he enlisted item by item all the mill's expenses and makes also an interesting comparison between the prices of the goods in the kingdom and in Salvador da Baía. Let us quote some of the several items enlisted, because they are helpful to observe the price difference between the colony and the kingdom, but also to show us in what terms the procurator was supposed to take care of his bookkeeper duties:

<i>Preços no Reino</i>		<i>Preços na Bahia</i>
20'000 réis	40 mileiros de preguos para caixois	48'000 réis
16'000 réis	de azeite doce para tempera ho asucar	40'000 réis
30'000 réis	guasto de caza e doentes, huma pipa	60'000 réis
2'000 réis	de vinho para os ofesiaais hospedes e	12'000 réis
	negros doentes e guastos de caza, 3 pipas	
	de sal para caza e negros so alqueires ⁸⁵³	
	chegou a valer este ano a tre palaquos	

Source: *Memoria dos guastos que fas todos os Annos ho Engenho de Seregippe mais 200 menos 200*, ARSI, Bras. 11 [1], f. 381.

Although the document is not dated, it is likely that it was written by the end of the 1620. Nevertheless, it was not the first time Gouvêa touched this topic. In a letter he sent to Lisbon in June 1626, in fact, first he complained about being appointed to be procurator, an office that he described as one 'negra ocupação', then he wrote that 'o bem desta fazenda está em vir dellá [from Lisbon] o forneçimento para o Engenho e de qua ir todo asucar, não avendo isto he melhor não moer, porque se a de consumir este

⁸⁵¹ *Açúcar branco* was also more practical to produce, for it was not supposed to be refined afterwards. Nevertheless, Brazilian *engenhos* used to produce also *açúcar mascavado*, *batidos brancos* and *panelas pintos*, which did not share the same quality as the *branco*. The ratio of quality/price is expressed in another letter of Pereira in ANTT/CJ, *Maço 13*, doc. n.º 20, f. 5^v: 'O preço do assucar não he certo nem fixo no Brazil, mas varia, conforme a saca, que ha de assucare. De ordinario corre de oito tortois ate mil réis. Algumas vezes sobe ate mil e duzentos outras abaixa a quatro, e sinco tortois. Os mascavados correm a respeito dos brancos valendo huma @ de mascavado ametade menos, que a de branco, e ainda dessa ametade so lhe abate hum e dous vinteis. Meles batidos brancos valem como assuqares brancos somenos, e os mascavados como assucar mascavado somenos. Panellas como ametade do preço do assucar mascavado'.

⁸⁵² Cf. Schwarz, "A «Babilónia» Colonial", p. 221.

⁸⁵³ 1 *alqueire* = 36,27 liters.

Collegio de dividas’.⁸⁵⁴ Gouvêa, then, expressed the same concept as the table above, namely goods in Brazil ‘valem qua 4 vezes mais que no Reino’.⁸⁵⁵ Gouvêa wrote this letter almost a year after his arrival in Salvador, yet it was already clear for him that being procurator demanded a lot of attention to the market and so, to his chagrin, he admitted his fellow in Lisbon that ‘se nos avemos de tratar de fazenda, he necessario por os olhos nestas cousas, e ver a renda que se segue’.⁸⁵⁶

With regard to expenditures, however, if we scroll down Gouvêa’s account we notice that the major expense of the mill was the combustible: woods. It is known that deforestation that today afflicts Brazil so much, it is a problem born with the development of the sugar industry during 16th and 17th century. At any rate, the *Memoria* ends with Gouvêa conveying to the addressee is basic idea of the *engenhos*:

‘Por aqui julgue V. P. que couzas são engenhos o nome lhe baste o guasto he sempre certo e com tanto exsesos o interese mais duvidoso, ha risquado e basta meterce ho diabo na cabeça de hum negro para lançar a perder tudo ho asucar que se fas [...], nem pessoa alguma poderem avirtir no dano se não depois que não tem remedio deixo outras couzas muitas que não relato porque so Deus noso Senhor as pode remedear e não he posivel permanecerem engenhos porque he hum retrato do Inferno e não se guoarda neles a lei de Deus permita o Senhor livrarnos sedo deles’.⁸⁵⁷

This passage of Gouvêa, a Jesuit who evidently loved to convey his feelings with vivid metaphors, needs to be read in relation with the words he used in another occasion: ‘um engenho é inferno e todos os senhores deles são perdidos’,⁸⁵⁸ Jesuits, and their procurators in particular, not excluded.

The production of sugar needed not only farm activity, but also a process close to the industry. Therefore, an *engenho* was at the same time a farm *where to grow* the *cana-de-açúcar* and a factory *where to produce* the sugar. Then, it looks clear that the whole process needed not only a previous capital investment and a large availability of

⁸⁵⁴ See Procurator Gouvêa to Father Manoel Fagundes, Salvador da Baía, 10 June 1626. ANTT/CJ, *Maço* 68, doc. n.º 164, f. 1.

⁸⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁶ *Ivi*, f. 1^v.

⁸⁵⁷ ARSI, *Bras. II [II]*, f. 381^v.

⁸⁵⁸ See Procurator Gouvêa to the Rector of S. Antão Simão Alvares, Salvador da Baía, 2 January 1628. ANTT/CJ, *Maço* 68, doc. n.º 334, f. 1^v.

workers but also a skilled supervisor.⁸⁵⁹ We just saw that the procurator was supposed to be a good and observant bookkeeper, but his duties did not end only with that:

‘Vai-se ca fazendo muito, e bom assucar seia Deus louvado, ambos os engenhos vão moendo. Ja hoje V. B. tera suas mais de duas mil, e quinhentas arrobas; que he boa esmola. Vão começando a secar. Mas o mal he, que de presente não posso mandar muito, porque de necessidade ey de vender logo do primeiro alguas mil e quinhentas arrobas para me livrar de dous embargos, que achei feitos neste engenho quando vi aelle, ambos por contia de algum 3. mil cruzados afora, outras muitas dividas, a que de necessidade ey de acodir. E são as que o Padre Gouvea me deixou em rol de 4 contos, a fora muitas que vão saindo’.⁸⁶⁰

The following year (1630), Pereira confirmed that he was still 11’000 *cruzados* in debts,⁸⁶¹ and, although he stated that he had paid ‘boa cantidade de dividas, e destas as que mais ne apertavão’,⁸⁶² extinguishing them all remained one of his most important tasks and, in order to accomplish that, he thought it would have been easier to start from decreasing expenditures, both the problem and the solution reminding us of Spinola in Japan. We know that on certain conditions selling sugar directly in the kingdom granted the Society an income as twice as if it would have been sold in Brazil. As a result, it was true as well that buying merchandise in Portugal was way cheaper than in Brazil, as Gouvêa’s list demonstrates, therefore Pereira, as did Gouvêa before him, wrote several times to Portugal to urge fathers to provide goods to the Brazilian mission:

“E muito mais se de la nos ajudarem com mandar as cousas que tenho pedido, ainda que seia tomando dinheiro a cambio. Entenda V. R. que dusentos mil réis, que mandem empregados nas cousas do rol, nos rendem aqui mil cruzados e estes mandados em assucar, valem la dous mil ao menos. Podem se segurar em Castella, como muitos fazem, se se temem os perigos do mar”.⁸⁶³

We already know what Pereira was asking to be send – ‘ferro, cobres, lona, azeite, sardinhas, sal &c.’,⁸⁶⁴ then we should focus on the last statement by linking it to the following:

⁸⁵⁹ See Schwarz, “A «Babilónia» Colonial”, p. 213.

⁸⁶⁰ See ANTT/CJ, *Maço 71*, doc. n.º 12, ff. 1^v-2.

⁸⁶¹ Pereira complained with Simão de Soutomayor that it was impossible for him to balance the accounts of the *engenho* if he was not provided from the kingdom of the necessary goods, such as iron, copper, oil, sardines, salt and so on. If he was forced to buy such products in Brazil, ‘tudo quanto os engenhos vão rendendo não dá para os gastos delles’. Cf. ANTT/CJ, *Maço 71*, doc. n.º 14, ff. 1-1^v.

⁸⁶² *Ibid.*

⁸⁶³ See ANTT/CJ, *Maço 71*, doc. n.º 12, f. 2.

⁸⁶⁴ See ANTT/CJ, *Maço 71*, doc. n.º 14, f. 1.

‘Confesso a VR tenho todo este tempo, padecido as mores angustias, e afflicção, que em toda minha vida. Daqui me nasceo por não aver outro remedio passar la algumas letras, advirtindo porem em cada huma dellas, que não desse molestia a VR. E assi não sei com que rezão VR. se queixa de que eu passo muitas letras; sendo que por nenhuma podem avexar a VR. Agora vai huma de 600U- outra de cento, estes ande ficar na mão de VR [...]. Aquelles, se não ouver ordem de paga, tambem ficarão a VR na forma de carta de aviso. Mas doulhe por nova para que cobre animo, que ja daqui em diante vou tomando algum folego, e alento. [...] Ja agora poderei ir mandando assuquares, para que VR la se desendivide’.⁸⁶⁵

In order to pay Society’s debts Pereira felt obliged to send to Soutomayor ‘algumas letras’ and to understand what kind of letters they were it is enough to go back to the previous Pereira’s quotation when he proposes to take up money at interest.⁸⁶⁶ The part we should highlight is the following: ‘[p]odem se segurar em Castella, como muitos fazem, se se temem os perigos do mar’. If we link this passage to the *letras* he sent to Soutomayor we can understand that they were bills of exchange, means of transferring funds and making payments over long distances without physically moving bulky quantities of precious metals. Bills of exchange circulated as money substitutes, partially playing the role of paper money, and economizing on the need to move specie between countries. As the college procurator, Pereira needed to be aware of what were the cheapest ways to save the finances of his enterprise, but it appears clearly from his words that back in Europe Fathers using bills of exchange so lightly were still considered shameful.

To conclude, we shall finally let the procurator describe how a *safra* was supposed to develop:

‘Costuma o engenho a moer em cada çafra 9 mezes. A saber de dia de S. Tiago a 25 de Julho, ate 20 ou 25 d’Abril, no qual tempo se moe huma tarefa de cana em cada 24 horas, de dias de trabalho; e nalgumas semanas solteiras, se entremete mais huma tarefa, de modo que se moem nella sete tarefas: o que não he sempre. Nesta forma vem a moer o engenho em huma çafra ate 220 tarefas pouco mais ou menos. Pera se fazer o assucar de huma tarefa de cana são necessarios quanto menos da lenda (per que dado que ate meada çafra em que a cana esta

⁸⁶⁵ *Ivi*, f. 1^v.

⁸⁶⁶ After signing the present letter, there is a further paragraph in which Pereira wrote he was finally repaid by the rector of the Baía. *Ivi*, f. 2: ‘[D]epois de ter esta feita, acabei com o Padre Reitor deste Collegio me pagare 2’000 cruzados que devia a Igreja nova, quisendo moverlhe o coração, a que mos entregase hoje tenho feito muitos pagamentos de dividas, e com isso libertado muitos assuquares, que estavam sentenceados a queima, para pagamento das ditas dividas. Ja nestes navios que ficão a carga poderei mandar ate 50 caixas’.

mais sazoadada, se gaste menos das duas tarefas; no fim da çafra, que a cana esta enchar cada em agora não bastão duas. Aconteceo-me mandar a tarefa a lenda que gastou huma so tarefa de cana, e passou de quatro tarefas, e assim vem a ser 480 tarefas [...]’.⁸⁶⁷

* * *

In conclusion, this last quote adds yet another feature to the procurator of the Society of Jesus in Brazil. In addition to those facets that he shared with the procurator of Japan, such as bookkeeper and supplier, here we see that he was supposed to have also the requirements of a harvest supervisor. Differently from the procurators of Japan both in Macao and Nagasaki, who were extremely busy in particular during the dispatch and reception of the Great Ship, it is evident that the duties of the procurator in Brazil, as harvest supervisor, were much more demanding, at least from the point of view of working-time. In any case, although Spinola complained about the amount of work embraced with the post, it was the moral implications to disturb him and others who had experience years as procurators. In Brazil, on the other hand, it would seem that also the quantity of work caused several complaints. The father who more dramatically than anyone explained his loath for the post was without doubt André de Gouvêa. In 1626, one year after his appointment, he wrote that ‘eu não me ei de matar como tenho feito ategora, e poucos ainda que tivessem o talento, que V.s R.s la achão nesses seus mimosos, ouverão de sofrer o que eu tenho sofrido’.⁸⁶⁸ In the same way as Gouvêa, Estevão Pereira wrote almost as a justification that ‘[e]u não faço milagres, mas faço de mim pedaços por faser açúcar’.⁸⁶⁹ Similar pragmatic words have been written also by Alessandro Valignano when he was trying to convince Claudio Acquaviva to allow the visitor’s own way of handling the mission, the *accomodatio*: ‘Dio Nostro Signore non concorre già con miracoli et doni di profetie, et quelle genti si muovono tanto con queste cose esteriori, e necessario accomodarsi loro et entrar con la loro per uscir poi

⁸⁶⁷ See ANTT/CJ, *Maço 13*, doc. n.º 20, f. 7. For a thorough and comprehensive description of an *engenho* in 17th century Brazil, including schedule, costs and distribution of the product see Mauro, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-317. Cf. also Ferlini, “Os Negócios do Açúcar: Rotas, Mercados e Mercadores (Bahia, século XVII)”, p. 241-270.

⁸⁶⁸ See Procurator Gouvêa to Father António de Moraes, Salvador da Baía, 27 October 1626. ANTT/CJ, *Maço 69*, f. 2.

⁸⁶⁹ See ANTT/CJ, *Maço 71*, doc. n.º 14, f. 1.

con la nostra'.⁸⁷⁰ In other words, the time to rely on God had ended and it came the moment to turn the attention to those material things which really could help.

However, the procurators in Brazil had no reason to complain about the moral implications of their office. It is true that through the management of an *engenho* they were not spreading the Gospel, but at least they were not breaking any dogma, as their confrères in Japan. As we saw, the critics of the mendicant orders against the Ignatians' participation in the *armação* were based on solid theology. Yet, they did not apply to Brazil. The Brazil Jesuits, in fact, were involved in an activity that verged only marginally towards trade. The Roman Church, in fact, allowed men of the cloth to buy and sell a product for a dearer price, provided that they improved it somehow. In other words, the improvement, the handicraft, was deemed worthy to be paid for.⁸⁷¹ Accordingly, the historian of the Society of Jesus in Brazil, Father Serafim Leite, wrote:

'Só uma coisa está vedada ao Jesuíta, e em geral a todo o eclesiástico, por menos decoroso ao seu estado: é o comércio propriamente dito. Já dissemos o que se entende por mercatura ou comércio: comprar objectos para os tornar a vender. Com lucro, naturalmente. Não é comércio vender o produto do próprio trabalho ou das próprias terras. Não há Instituição, nem Ordem, que o não tivesse feito ou faça ainda, quando a caridade alheia não basta para sustentar os religiosos e suas obras'.⁸⁷²

Yet, although theologians and philosophers could not condemn the Brazil Jesuits and their involvement in the production and selling of sugar, Procurator André de Gouvêa felt his duty as a punishment and begged to be dismissed, since in comparison to all the procurators in Portugal, none of them 'sofre a albarda como eu'.⁸⁷³ The pack-saddle (*albarda*) in the religious domain was used as a metaphor of penance and was associated to someone who sinned. Thus, even if Gouvêa or Soutomayor were carrying out duties accepted both by pontiff and their general, they still felt to be meddling in a forbidden domain. In any case, it seems that although the Jesuits in the Portuguese Assistancy, specifically in the provinces of Japan and Brazil, embraced materialism, it was only to fuel the evangelization and keep the provinces alive. Moreover, they had not only evangelical duties, but also civic ones. Not only they had to repay debts, but they also aided their flock through alms and donations.

⁸⁷⁰ *Apud* Prosperi, "Il Missionario", p. 198.

⁸⁷¹ Cf. Langholm, *The Merchant in the Confessional*, pp. 39-40.

⁸⁷² See *HCJB*^I IV, pp. 165-166.

⁸⁷³ Cf. ANTT/CJ, *Maço* 69, doc. n.º 38, f. 2^v.

Finally, we saw that the office of procurator was the bond that linked the Society of Jesus with the remaining agents of the Portuguese/Iberian Crow. It is most likely that the office of procurator was one of the most flexible positions within the ranks of the Ignatian Order. As a matter of fact, the tasks of the procurator and the way he was supposed to handle them changed in accordance with the dynamics of the Portuguese expansion. Hence, in Brazil, where the Portuguese became the actual owners and administrators of the territory, the Ignatians and their procurators became involved in what was soon considered as a promising business, the *industria açucareira*. In China and Japan, however, the Portuguese had to play according to the rules of the Asiatic empires and became part of pre-existent yet inefficient commercial routes, as the one between China and Japan. Consequently, even though the Society of Jesus gathered incomes also from the territory (the *aldeias* in India and the *ryōchi* in Japan), the office of procurator of Japan developed entirely around the silk trade and its timing. The unreliability of the kingdom's economical resources in financing the Christian mission forced the Society of Jesus to search for further aids elsewhere and the procurator needed to act in accordance with the situation that showed up.

In the end, to conclude this chapter, and with it the whole work, we have borrowed Dauril Alden's interpretation of Jesuits economic involvement: 'the notion that Jesuits in this assistancy fled from the embraces of the virtuous Lady Poverty to the seductive arms of that vile, base slut called Materialism is unsupported by any available evidence. To the best of their abilities, the Jesuits served only one master. It was not the devil'. The duel was won.⁸⁷⁴

⁸⁷⁴ See Alden, *op. cit.*, p. 650.

CONCLUSIONS

Around five years ago, when we visited Nagasaki, we were naïvely surprised by the lack of Christian icons and Portuguese memorabilia in the local shops. The gadgetries were overwhelmingly Dutch-fashioned, whereas one of the main honours paid to the South-European cultural presence in Japan before the Meiji Restoration was undoubtedly the monument and the museum dedicated to the 26 Martyrs of Nagasaki. Differently from the Hollanders, who were eventually confined on the artificial island Deshima, 25 years after the anti-Christian decree, also the Portuguese merchants were eventually expelled from Japan. Yet, even if the Tokugawa *Bakufu* actually attained the expulsion of the Iberians from the Japanese country,¹ it could not erase the cultural seeds Portuguese, Spaniards and Italians had been planting since the mid-16th century.

During the first decades following the expulsion, in fact, the Japanese Christendom managed to survive almost completely on its own. Pursuing the goal of purging Japan of Christians, in 1640, the third Tokugawa *shōgun* Iemitsu, established the *Shūmon Aratame Yaku*,² a sort of inquisition. In the 1660s more than 2'000 Christians were discovered and imprisoned. Nevertheless, communities of people who considered themselves Christian and were willing to suffer for their beliefs remained in existence in remote regions of Kyūshū, namely the Gotō archipelago, Amakusa and in Urakami.³ They were called *kakure kirishitan*,⁴ the crypto-Christians, and were still there as the anti-Tokugawa activists overthrew the *bakufu* in 1867. Few years after the Meiji Restoration, the new Japanese government adopted new measures with regard to “foreign” beliefs in its ground. In 1873, the prohibition of Christianity ended and the following year also the period of iconoclastic aggression against Buddhism sects called *haibutsu kishaku*,⁵ was put to an end. Today, the Japanese Christians are a tiny minority, only 2% out of an estimated population of around 127'000'000 people.⁶ Though small,

¹ The Spaniards were officially forbidden the country in 1624, whereas the Portuguese in 1639, two years after the Shimabara Rebellion, a large-scale disturbance that reinforced in the bakufu the conviction that Christianity was a subversive faith.

² 宗門改役

³ Cf. *CHJ IV*, pp. 368-370 and Boxer, *The Christian Century*, pp. 368-374.

⁴ 隠れ切支丹

⁵ 廃仏毀釈, abolish Buddhism, destroy Shakyamuni

⁶ Estimation made in July 2013. The other religions's percentages are: Shintoism 83.9%, Buddhism 71.4% and other 7.8%. The total of adherents exceeds 100% because many people belong to both

this number testifies how the first evangelization of Japan reached the depths of the Japanese people. The Christendom that found its own ways to survive without its shepherds and politically relevant figures like Takayama Ukon, who abandoned his country instead of his faith, are elements that have to be taken into account in the general evaluation of the Japan's encounter with the Roman faith and the Society of Jesus.

Could the Japan Jesuits have reached such results without their *bague* in the *armação*? The outcomes of the Society's undertaking would have been the same even in the absence of the *trato da seda*? We think it could have been hardly so. During the early stage of the evangelization, the participation in the trade turned out to be profitable both economically and politically, due to the Southerner *daimyō*'s desire of harbouring the *kurofune*. Nevertheless, we saw that in a second stage, in particular from the 1560s onwards, once the Jesuits had secured their situation, they started to look for other sources of revenue, such as royal and papal pensions, the *aldeias* in the Province of the North, alms from wealthy merchants and of course the coveted patronage from local *daimyō*. Still, with the just a few exceptions, abandoning the silk trade was never an option.

The fathers assembled in the First Provincial Conference in 1614, in fact, submitted to the Curia a proposal to allow 'ad Christianæ rei emolumentum' to trade also in gold amber and musk, in addition to silk.⁷ The answer from Rome, however, urged the Japan Jesuits to limit their trade to the customary Chinese textiles.⁸ In 1620, another conference of fathers in Macao went back to this topic and expanded upon the practical and religious reasons why it was advisable to trade also in gold. Yet, also in this year, the fathers decreed that the *armação* was not to be abandoned, even though it was a risky and unpredictable venture.⁹ What specifically matters to us is that, between

Shintoism and Buddhism. Cf. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html#People> consulted on 6 December 2013.

⁷ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [II], f. 234.

⁸ *Ibid.*: 'Totum id genus mercatura quod Pontifices & Reges permisere ad sublemandum eius inopiam admittimus, reliqua neque admittere possumus, neque Societatem decere arbitramur, tum tanto pere ejus bono nemini officiat'.

⁹ *Ivi*, f. 235^v: 'E he tão limbo [*sic*, limpo] este trato que dizia huma pessoa bem intelligente que se os Anjos neste mundo tratassem e fizessem mercancia, a farião em ouro e seda [...]. Porque o que aqui chamão pão de ouro, tem doze onças e meya de nosso pezo, e hum destes paes custa aqui na China setenta cruzados, as vezes oitenta e oitenta e cinco, de modo que o seu preço he entre sesenta e noventa cruzados, porque ha nelle abaixar e alevantar, como nas mais cousas de mercadoria. E conforme ao que se vende em Japão, se ganhara no ouro a cincoenta ou sesenta por cento, pouco mais ou menos. E assi os ganhos do ouro poderão ser como os da seda, e tem outros bens mayores, porque avulta muito pouco, e

1614 and 1620, the Japan Jesuits were still relying on the same system of procurement, the commercial thread between Macao and Nagasaki, in which, as we now know, the procurators of Japan represented the obligatory terminuses.

In 1618, the last year of Spinola's procuratorship, the Jesuits embarked silk and textile piece goods to a total value of 11'573 *taéis*:

'Por todas seis Galeotas da viagem em titulo da Companhia. E com a marca a margem assinada vão embarcados oitenta, e seis sestos com trez cayxoens mais por cincoenta e dous picos vinte, e oito cates toda seda boa, e fina. Vinte e cinco picos, e onze cates, e meyo desta seda acima forão comprados nesta feira de Japão a rezão de cento, e dezasseis taeis, sette mazes o pico, com fretes, e direitos, dous picos, e dezasette cates na mesma feira a rezão de cento, e dezasette taeis, cinco mazes, como os mesmos fretes, e direitos. Oitenta, e cinco que restão forão dantes comprados na feira da India com fretes, e direitos cento, e trez taeis hum maz o pico. Monta toda a seda da Companhia acima, cinco mil sette centos sessenta, e dous taeis, nove mazes, nove condorins, cinco cayxas'.¹⁰

As we know, Spinola had to spend almost all of the 1618 revenue in writing off debts, but it is important to note that even four years after the burst of the persecution, the Japan Jesuits were still investing their average yearly share in the trade. That year, moreover, was a rather prosperous one both for the city of Macao and the Jesuits there, since the proceeds of the *pancada* amounted to more than 600'000 *cruzados*, 'com que esta terra [Macao] ficou muito restaurada das muitas perdas passadas, e assi derão a este Colegio boas esmolos, homem ouve que deu duzentos taeis, outros cento, outros a cincoenta e dahi para baixo'.¹¹ Although Carlo Spinola was the one who ordered and received this opulent cargo, he was no longer in charge of the *procuratoria* when the ships sailed back to Macao. As we saw, he was caught by Hasegawa Gonroku's guards and took to prison.

After him, the role of procurator was assumed by Father Christovão Ferreira, later known as Sawano Chūan, undoubtedly one of the most controversial figures in the

em pouco se emprega muita prata, pois com cincomil cruzados se comprão sesenta pães douro, e as vezes mais, e estes se mettem em hum escritorio bem pequeno, tanto que se se comparasse com a seda ou com as peças, no lugar que occupão cem cruzados empregados em seda ou peças, se podem metter largamente vinte mil cruzados empregados em ouro. Como este ouro occupa tão pouco lugar, he facil de meneyar com pressa, vende-se, embarcar-se desembarcar-se quasi sem ser sentido'.

¹⁰ See *Fato da Companhia, que em Julho deste prezente anno vay embarcado para Japão nas galeotas da Viagem todas seis, que deste porto partem, e de que he Capitão Mor Antonio de Oliveira Moraes. Em Julho de 1618*, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, f. 187^v. Cf. also Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, p. 163 and *idem*, *The Christian Century*, pp. 366-367.

¹¹ See Father Francisco Pires to the Assistant of Portugal Nuno Mascarenhas, Macao, 2 April 1619. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, f. 242.

history of Jesuit mission work in Japan.¹² In the late 1610s, Ferreira was serving as secretary of the Provincial Mateus de Couros, but due to lack of reliable fathers, he was burdened with the management of the province's finance nonetheless.¹³ On 12 October 1620, he wrote to Nuno Mascarenhas that the College of Macao represented the main financial expenditure of the Japanese Province and that had been asked to Mercurian to ascribe the college to the Chinese Vice-province. The China Jesuits, moreover, still owed 5'000 *cruzados* (3'000 borrowed in Macao and 2'000 in Lisbon) to Japan and were unwilling to pay back.¹⁴ All issues that were well known to Spinola. Not even two months later, on 30 November 1620, a great fire destroyed six districts of Nagasaki along with the fathers' principal storehouse, mishap that cost dearly to the hidden fathers.¹⁵ The heydays of the Japan enterprise, however, had already passed and would never come back.

* * *

Carlo Spinola was a many-sided missionary who had the intellectual preparation that enabled him to fill possibly every role within the mission, provided that he controlled his bad-temper.¹⁶ He helped the evangelization in many and different ways: he designed the plan of Macao's church, he took advantage of his scientific knowledge to approach the Japanese aristocracy and finally he served as accountant, bookkeeper, treasurer and provider, i.e. as procurator of the province both in Macao and Nagasaki. Consequently, in our view, he deserves to be included among the *giants* of the *nanban* century.

With regard to the financial context of the mission, we think that the fact that Spinola took on the office of procurator in a time of great changes in the Japanese status quo represents the perfect circumstance to elect him to be the hub around which several

¹² The Portuguese Ferreira (1580ca-1650) is famous in particular for his apostasy in 1633 which shocked Catholic Europe and Jesuits from many provinces volunteered to sail to Japan and die there in expiation. Cf. Cieslik, "The Case of Christovão Ferreira", p. 1.

¹³ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 37, f. 202 and Cieslik, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁴ See Procurator Christovão Ferreira to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 12 October 1620. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 17, ff. 263-263^v.

¹⁵ Cf. Cieslik, *ibid.*

¹⁶ This concept was expressed by Father Pedro Morejón, who knew Spinola well, in a catalogue drew a couple of years after Spinola was appointed procurator in Nagasaki. See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 25, f. 107 'P. Carlos Spinola Professo ano de 1598. Fue seis anos ministro en Miaco Procurador dela Provincia em Macao y Japon. Mediocres letras buen predicador, buena lengua de Japon, y zelo dela conversion, y buen trato. Es colerico y no sta accepto, de algunos por esto. Si tuviere mas madureça y spiritu blando podra hazer qualquier officio de superior, entiende bien las cosas de Japon no parece por agora para superior mayor aunque si tuviere lo que digo lo podia ser bien que tiene buenos partes'.

terms of comparison gravitate. Trying to remain true to the principle that a unique experience is powerless to discriminate its constituent factors and to give its own interpretation,¹⁷ we analysed the office through time, space and situations. We saw that Spinola personified all the contradictions of his post: he was not only a man of the cloth taking care of secular matters – at once financial and political, but he was also a father professed of the fourth vow, which should have exempted him from being appointed, yet the necessity of the enterprise won repeatedly over the laws of the men. As a matter of fact, that one of the last procurators – Christovão Ferreira¹⁸ – would later apostatize tragically personifies the image of the procurator we have depicted in our work: a religious man who had to cope with sinful activities in order to provide for his confrères. Carlo Spinola, in fact, turned Jesuit to follow his faith but also to flee from the dirty commercial world.¹⁹ Yet, ironically, it was that very world that allowed him to remain in Japan after 1614 and to die as a martyr eight years later.

To conclude, then, we can say that Spinola was the last and the first procurator. The last to carry out his duties while the Tokugawa *Bakufu* was still showing its tolerant face and the first who acted under overt hostility. By then, however, the situation was compromised and the province's physical and organizational structures had already collapsed under the blows and the fires of the Tokugawa persecution.

¹⁷ Cf. Bloch, *Apologia della Storia o Mestiere di storico*, pp. 35-36.

¹⁸ According to our sources, Christovão Ferreira filled the office probably until 1621 or 1622. After him, we know that the office was assumed by Manuel Borges in 1626 but after that we did not find any other information, therefore we cannot ascertain when the last procurator actually left Japan, although it is probably that the last Jesuit to fill the office was Borges.

¹⁹ Cf. ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 36, f. 154^v: 'Yo no recuso el trabajo de prover toda las casas de Japon, aunque es muy grande, que huelgo mucho de poder scriverles, pues con esto participo del fruto, que todos hazen; solo lo que siento es haver de ser mercader, y procurar de acrecentar el cabedal con continuos tratos, y cuydados de buscar dinero, que es la cosa, que nunca en mi vida hize, y por huyr della entre en Religion'.

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AGS	<i>Secretaría de Estado 401, 410, 931</i>
AHU	<i>MACAU_cx. 1, Cód. 1659</i>
ANTT/AJ	<i>Livro 3, 13, 13^a, 15, 28</i>
ANTT/B	<i>Maço 37</i>
ANTT/CJ	<i>Maço 4, 11, 13, 14, 57, 58, 68, 69, 80, 86, 89, 90</i>
APTCJ	<i>Caja 101, 102</i>
ARSI	<i>Archivio della Postul. Gen. (Santi e Beati)</i> <i>Bras. 2, 5 [I]</i> <i>Goa 12 [I], 22 [I], 24, 31, 38 [I], 47</i> <i>Hisp. 69</i> <i>Hist. Soc. 61</i> <i>Jap. Sin. 2, 3, 7 [I], 7 [II], 7 [III], 8 [I], 10 [I], 11 [I], 12 [I], 12 [II], 13 [I], 13 [II], 14 [I], 14 [II], 15 [I], 15 [II], 16 [I], 16 [II], 17, 18 [I-II], 20 [I], 20 [II], 21, 23, 25, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39c, 40, 45 [I], 46, 50, 51, 57, 60, 121</i> <i>Lus. 2, 32, 58, 66, 68, 70, 106</i> <i>Med. 22 [I], 47</i> <i>Neap. 3, 80</i> <i>Philipp. 9, 10</i> <i>Rom. 53</i>
BA/JÁ	<i>Cód. 46-VIII-35, Cód. 49-IV-54, Cód. 49-IV-55, Cód. 49-IV-56, Cód. 49-IV-58, Cód. 49-IV-59, Cód. 49-IV-66, Cód. 49-V-3, Cód. 49-V-4, Cód. 49-V-5, Cód. 49-V-6, Cód. 49-V-7, Cód. 49-V-8, Cód. 49-V-11, Cód. 51-VIII-18</i>
BAV	<i>Barb. Or.</i> <i>Vat.estr.or.</i>

BL/Add.	9852, 9856, 9857, 9858, 9859, 9860, 20915, 24217, 28432
BMA	<i>MS 568 D. Piece 001</i>
BNCR/FGes.	1053, 1114, 1139, 1159, 1246, 1249, 1255, 1274, 1309, 1384, 1482
BNP	<i>F. 2521</i>
BNP/FG	4254, 6590
BPE	<i>Cód. CXVI/2-5, Cód. CXV/2-7, Cód. CXV/2-8, Cód. CXVI/2-11</i>
RAH/Jes.	<i>Legajo 21 9/7236 [I], Legajo 21 9/7236 [II], Legajo 22 9/7239 [I], Tomo 84 9/3657, Tomo 86 9/3659, Tomo 112 9/3685, Tomo 114 9/3687, Tomo 116 9/3689, Tomo 129 9/3702, Tomo 185 9/3758</i>
RAH/Cor.	9/2663, 9/2665, 9/2666, 9/2667, 9/2679

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Map 1 - Japan in the 17th century

Map 2 - Kyūshū in the 17th century

Map 3 - Principal destinations of *shuin-sen*

Map 4 - Brazilian coastal outline

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Table 3 – Jesuits in Japan 1600-1618

Table 4 – Fathers Professed of the Fourth Vow in Japan

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
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Chart 3 – Number of Jesuit Fathers in Japan and number of Professed of the Fourth Vow


ANNEXES

MAPS

Map 1



Map 2



Map 3



Principal destinations of *shuin-sen* based on the information found in Péri, “Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l’Indochine aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles”, pp. 3-35.

Map 4



GLOSSARY

Alvará - (Port.)

A decree issued by either king, viceroy or government official and valid for a term of one year without royal confirmation.

Assistancy

It was an administrative unit within the Society based generally upon national considerations and consisting of provinces and vice-provinces. The assistancies were organized along linguistic lines. By 1558 there were four: *Italiae*, *Lusitaniae*, *Hispaniae* and *Germaniae*. *Galliae* (The French assistancy) was added in 1608 and *Poloniae* in 1755. The Portuguese assistancy included the provinces of Portugal, Brazil, Goa, Cochin and Japan and the vice-provinces of China and Maranhão.¹

Assistant - (also assistant general)

It was a Father elected by the General Congregation to advise the general. He was in charge of taking care of one *assistancy**, upon which he have not a jurisdiction, but just a remarkable influence with regard to the decisions the general wished to make. His mandate lasted as long as the general lived. Whenever replacements were necessary, the general was empowered to name them with the concurrence of a majority of the provincials of the affected *assistancy**. According to the *Constitutions* the assistants should be persons of discretion and zeal for the good of the Society. Although there was no constitutional requirement that assistants be natives of the *assistancy** they served, all but two of the Portuguese assistants identified were of Lusitanian origin, reflecting the Society's deference to the Portuguese crown's nationalistic sensibilities.²

Bakufu - (幕府 Jap.)

Literally tent government, it is the name given to the military dictatorships headed by the Minamoto, Ashikaga and Tokugawa families which ruled Japan from the end of the 12th until the 19th century. The *b.* as a parallel and actual form of government was established when Minamoto Yoritomo gained military hegemony over Japan in 1185 and, seven years later, he assumed the title of *shōgun*. After the collapse of the

¹ See *Provincie Nostre, e sotto qvali Assistenze*, in BNCR/FGes. 1114, f. 3^v.

² See Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise*, pp. 234-235.

Kamakura shogunate in 1333, Ashikaga Takauji established a second line of shogunal succession that ruled much of Japan from 1338 until the mid-16th century, although there was no effective power in Japan the 1470s. The last *b.* government was established by Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1603 and lasted until 1867, when the last *shōgun*, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, was forced to yield the administration of civil and military affairs to the *tennō** during a period rightly called *bakumatsu* 幕末, the end of the *bakufu*.

Kamakura *Bakufu* 1192-1333

Ashikaga *Bakufu* 1338-1573

Tokugawa *Bakufu* 1603-1867

Bakuhau Taisei - (幕藩体制 Jap.)

The *bakuhau* system, it is a term coined by historians to refer to the Tokugawa system so called since it allowed the *han** to survive alongside the *bakufu**, permitted the *daimyō* to rule their own domains so long as they observed fundamental laws of the shogunate.

Baque (also bague) - (Port.)

The share of silk allotted to each person in the *armação** contract. Also, tickets or certificates of ownership, which might be held by one person only or by several conjointly. The distribution of the *b.* was organized by the Senate of Macao until the system was abolished in 1784.

Bugyō - (奉行 Jap.)

A Japanese administrative official (literally ‘bringer of gifts’) appointed either by a *daimyō* within his own territory or by the shogunate. The Tokugawa appointed *machi-bugyō* or ‘city commissioners’ to exercise direct control over the leading commercial centres of Nagasaki, Ōsaka and Sakai. The *Vocabulario* of 1603 defined it as ‘Vqetamauari, voconô. O que preside, ou tem cuidado de alguma cousa. Item, Offiçial del rei, ou de outro senhor’.³

Buke - (武家 Jap.)

The warrior estate.

³ *VLJ*, f. 48.

Carrack – (Eng., *Kraak* in Dutch)

The large, round sailing vessels that evolved during the 16th century from late medieval merchant vessel (cogs). Carracks were broad-beamed and heavily constructed with square and lateen sails and had as many as five decks at the stern and a prominent forecastle. The Portuguese version (*nau da Índia* or *nao do trato*) was the largest vessel of the 16th and 17th centuries.

Casado - (Port.)

Married settlers.

Cate - (*kāti* Mal.)

Weight unit used in China and Malesia equaled to 625 grams. 12 *taéis** made for 1 *c.* and it was the hundredth part of the *picol**.

Daijō Daijin - (太政大臣 Jap.)

Grand Chancellor of State, the highest ministerial rank in the imperial hierarchy.

Daimyō - (大名 Jap.)

Regional military lord. During the *Sengoku Jidai*, this name was often applied to *shugo**, and then to the families who supplanted them. After the establishment of the Tokugawa *bakufu**, the term was applied to those lords whose domains were assessed at 10'000 *oku** or more.

Dōjuku - (同宿 Jap.)

Nowadays pronounced *dōshuku*, literally means 'lodge in the same place'. It is a word used in Buddhism to denote the youngsters who worked for the monks in the temples.

Feitor - (Port.)

Translated *factor* in English, was the person in charge of a trading establishment or agency in an Asian port.

Haidao Fushi - (海道副使 Chi.)

It was the deputy maritime envoy with jurisdiction over the foreigners. It was also called simply *Haidao*.

Kami - (上 Jap.)

Kami literally means “above”, “superior” but in the 16th and 17th century, the Jesuits used this word as a metonymy to indicate the Kyōto, Ōsaka and Nagoya region, nowadays Kinki 近畿.

Kangō Bōeki - (勘合貿易 Jap., *Kanghe Maoyi* in Chinese)

The tally trade was the licensed trade between Ming China and Japan from the early 15th century until mid-1500. *Kangō* (tallies) held by Japanese merchants certified them to Chinese officials as licensed merchants or as official Japanese tribute missions, distinguishing them, therefore, from *wakō**.

Kanpaku - (関白 Jap.)

Imperial regent who exercised the ruling power for a *tennō** who had reached adulthood. The *k.* assisted the *tennō** in the fulfillment of general government obligations. This title was created in 882 jointly with the one of *sesshō* 摂政, regent during the sovereign’s minority. The *k.* yielded his power over the *dajōkan* 太政官, the Great Counsel of State. The *k.* was supposed to counsel the *tennō*, but, differently from the *sesshō*, he could not act in the *tennō*’s stand. Initially, both titles were privilege of the Fujiwara family. The bestowing on Hideyoshi of the title in 1585 meant the legitimation of Toyotomi’s military and civil powers over Japan. With Hideyoshi the title of *k.* reached the zenith, since with him the *k.* could reign in the *tennō*’s stand and had also the final decision about the assignments of courts titles and dignities.

Koku - (石 Jap.)

A Japanese measure of capacity used for rice but also for other grains, *sake* or salt. Now corresponds to 180,4 litres.

Kokujin - (國人 Jap.)

Provincial warrior, subordinate to a *shugo** as a *bakufu** vassal. More common in central Japan than eastern Japan, it was a lord with strong ties to the local area. A *k.* was a factual proprietor with tax rights to part of a village, an entire village, or a group of villages. Some banded into leagues whose leaders emerged as *daimyō**. Others built slowly from their bases, destroying weaker peers to form sizeable domains and might become *shugo**. They were also called *kokushu* 国衆.

Kuge - (公家 Jap.)

Court aristocrats resident in the capital city.

Kurofune - (黒船 Jap.)

Literally *blackship*.

Miudezas

A heterogeneous grouping consisting of special items of furniture and accessories. Shipments of such items were common in the Cape trade and usually were bound up in bundles called *trouxa*. These *m.* mainly included rolls of taffeta, satin and damask.

Nanbokuchō Jidai - (南北朝時代 Jap.)

Literally, the Era of the North and South Courts, spanning from 1336 to 1392, was a period that occurred during the early years of the Ashikaga *bakufu*. During this period, there existed a North Imperial Court, established by Ashikaga Takauji in nowadays' Kyōto, and the South Imperial Court, established by Go-Daigo *tennō* in Yoshino. The two courts fought for 50 years, with the South giving up to the North in 1392.

Picol

Weight unit normally equaled to 100 *cates** or to 1600 *taéis**. João Rodrigues *Tçuzu*, however, wrote that the ships from Macao were loaded with *p.* of 1'500 *táeis*.⁴ In 1620, a gathering of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus wrote that a *p.* 'tem cento e vinte arrates⁵ de Portugal',⁶ i.e. 55,2kg. In the decimal system, however, one *p.* normally amounts to 61,199kg.

Sengoku Jidai - (戦國時代 Jap.)

Japan at the time of Javier's visit was a land that had fallen to the nadir of *gekokujo*, a seemingly anarchical condition in which those below endeavored, with considerable success, to overthrow the ones who were above them.

Shimo - (下 Jap.)

Literally "under, below, bottom". Father Gaspar Coelho defined *s.* as 'toda a parte de Japão que contem como esta dito nove reinos, toda via nos outros chamamos Ximo as

⁴ Cf. Rodrigues, *Arte da lingua de Iapam composta pello Padre Ioão Rodriguez Portugues da Companhia de Iesu*, f. 219.

⁵ 1 *arratél* = 459 grams.

⁶ See ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 45 [I], f. 235.

partes adonde vem a nao a differença de Bungo, e asi contem o Reino de Figem, e as Ilhas de Amacussa e alguns outros lugares’.⁷

Shugo - (守護 Jap.)

Province-level military governors of the Kamakura and Muromachi *bakufu* who succeeded in gaining control of a region during the late 14th and early 15th centuries by adding to their landholdings and attracting local warriors as their direct vassals. In the latter sense they are referred to as *s. daimyō*, a retroactive definition created by contemporary historians.

Tael - (tahil or tail Mal.)

According to Alessandro Valignano one *tael* ‘val aqui pelo menos pela moeda de Goa onze tangas, que são seis centos e cesenta reis de Portugal. De maneira que mil taeis são seis centos mil e seis centos reis e assi vem hum tael a ser mais de hum cruzado e meio, de maneira que o gasto de Japão quando he oito mil taeis são mais de doze mil cruzados de Portugal, quando he de dez mil são mais de quinze mil’.⁸ João Rodrigues wrote that one *t*. Corresponded to the *cruzado* of 400 *réis*.

Wakō (Wokou in Chinese) - (倭寇 Chi.)

The *wakō* were raiders, pirates, or smugglers active in East Asian waters between the Kamakura and early Edo periods, the phenomenon peaking in the 16th century. The Chinese term dates back from the 4th or 5th century and although it was sometimes equated with the Japanese *per se* – *wa* [倭] was the ancient Chinese character used to denote Japan – the majority of all *wakō* were Chinese.

Yakata - (屋形 Jap.)

Originally referred to the residence of an official of *shugo** rank (during Muromachi era). Came to refer to the *shugo** or lord himself

⁷ Cf. *Carta annua de Japão do anno de 80 pera nosso padre geral em Roma*, ANTT/AJ, Livro 28, f. 123.

⁸ See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Macao, 2 July 1598. BPE, *Cód. CXV/2-7*, n.º 4, f. 51^v.

ANNEX A

PROCURATORS OF JAPAN AT NAGASAKI AND MACAO


1580-1636

	AT MACAO	AT NAGASAKI
1580	André Pinto	?
1581	André Pinto	?
1582	André Pinto	?
1583	André Pinto	João de Castro
1584	André Pinto	João de Castro
1585	André Pinto	João de Castro
1586	André Pinto	João de Castro
1587	André Pinto	João de Castro
1588	André Pinto / Miguel Soares	João de Castro
1589	Miguel Soares	João de Castro
1590	Miguel Soares	João de Castro
1591	Miguel Soares	João de Castro
1592	Miguel Soares	João de Castro
1593	Miguel Soares	João de Castro
1594	Miguel Soares	?
1595	Miguel Soares	Bartolomeu de Siqueira
1596	Miguel Soares	?
1597	Miguel Soares	Rui Barreto
1598	Miguel Soares	Rui Barreto/João Rodrigues
1599	Miguel Soares	João Rodrigues
1600	Manoel Dias	João Rodrigues
1601	Manuel Dias / Spinola	João Rodrigues
1602	Carlo Spinola	João Rodrigues

1603	João Coelho [companion: André Kusano]	João Rodrigues
1604	Manuel Gaspar	João Rodrigues
1605	Manuel Gaspar	João Rodrigues
1606	Manuel Gaspar	João Rodrigues / João Coelho
1607	Manuel Gaspar	João Coelho
1608	Manuel Gaspar / Sebastião Vieira	João Coelho
1609	João Coelho	Sebastião Vieira
1610	João Coelho	Sebastião Vieira
1611	João Coelho / Manuel Barreto	Sebastião Vieira / Carlo Spinola [companion Ambrosio Fernandez]
1612	Manuel Barreto	Carlo Spinola
1613	Manuel Barreto	Carlo Spinola
1614	Manuel Barreto	Carlo Spinola
1615	Manuel Barreto	Carlo Spinola
1616	Manuel Barreto / Manuel Borges	Carlo Spinola
1617	Manuel Borges	Carlo Spinola
1618	Manuel Borges	Carlo Spinola / Christovão Ferreira
1619	Manuel Borges	Christovão Ferreira
1620	?	Christovão Ferreira
1621	Sebastião Vieira	Christovão Ferreira
1622	Sebastião Vieira	?
1623	António Leite / João Rodrigues	?
1624	João Rodrigues	?
1625	João Rodrigues	?
1626	João Rodrigues	Manoel Borges
1627	João Rodrigues	?
1628	João Rodrigues	?

1629	João Rodrigues / João Baptista Bonelli	?	
1630	João Baptista Bonelli	?	
1631	João Baptista Bonelli	?	
1632	João Baptista Bonelli	?	
1633	João Baptista Bonelli	?	
1634	João Baptista Bonelli	?	
1635	João Baptista Bonelli	?	
1636	João Baptista Bonelli	?	

ANNEX B - Counts of Tassarolo Family Tree



ANNEX C – JAPANESE ANTHROPONIMS

Akechi Mitsuhide	明智 光秀	Oda Nobukatsu	織田 信勝
Arima Harunobu	有馬 晴信	Oda Nobunaga	織田 信長
Arima Naozumi	有馬 直純	Ogasawara Ichian	小笠原 塙案
Arima Yoshisada	有馬 義貞	Ōgimachi <i>tennō</i>	正親町 天皇
Ashikaga Yoshiaki	足利 義昭	Ōmura Sumitada	大村 純忠
Gamō Ujisato	蒲生 氏郷	Ōtomo Yoshiaki	大友 良鑑
Gotō Shōzaburō	後藤 庄三郎	Ōtomo Yoshimune	大友 義統
Go-Yōzei <i>tennō</i>	後 陽成 天皇	Ōtomo Yoshishige Sōrin	大友 義鎮 宗麟
Fujiwara	藤原	Ryūzōji Takanobu	竜造寺 隆信
Harada Magoshichirō	原田 孫七郎	Sawano Chūan	沢野 忠庵
Hasegawa Gonroku	長谷川 権六	Shimazu Takahisa	島津 貴久
Hasegawa Sahyōei	長谷川 佐兵衛	Shimazu Yoshihisa	島津 義久
Honda Masazumi	本田 正純	Takayama Ukon	高山 右近
Ichijō Kanesada	一条 兼定	Terazawa Hiromasa	寺沢 広正
Ishin Sūden	以心 崇伝	Terazawa Hirotaka	寺沢 広高
Katō Kiyomasa	加藤 清正	Tokugawa Hidetada	徳川 秀忠
Kobayakawa Hidekane	小早川 秀包	Tokugawa Iemitsu	徳川 家光
Konishi Yukinaga	小西 行長	Tokugawa Ieyasu	徳川 家康
Maeda Toshiie	前田 利家	Tokugawa Yoshimune	徳川 吉宗
Matsudaira Hirotada	松平 広忠	Tomonaga Tsushima	朝長 対馬
Matsudaira Takechiyo	松平 竹千代	Toyotomi Hidetsugu	豊臣 秀次
Matsuura Takanobu	松浦 隆信	Toyotomi Hideyori	豊臣 秀頼
Mōri Terumoto	毛利 輝元	Toyotomi Hideyoshi	豊臣 秀吉
Murayama Tōan	村山 答案	Uesugi Takekatsu	上杉 景勝
Nagasaki Jinzaemon Sumikage	長崎 甚左衛門 純景	Ukita Hideie	宇喜多秀家

ANNEX D – ASIATIC TOPONYMS

Amakusa	天草	Isahaya	諫早	Saga	佐賀
Arie	有家	Kami	上	Sakai	堺
Bungo	豊後	Kazusa	上総	Sanchuan	上川
Pusan	부산	Kinai	畿内	Satsuma	佐津間
Buzen	豊前	Kinki	近畿	Sekigahara	関ヶ原
Chikugo	筑後	Kuchinotsu	口之津	Seoul	서울
Chikuzen	筑前	Kyūshū	九州	Shikoku	四国
Edo	江戸	Lampacau	浪白窟	Shimabara	島原
Ezo	蝦夷	Mikawa	三河	Shimo	下
Fukuda	福田	Miyako	都	Sunpu	駿府
Funai	府内	Mogi	茂木	Suō	周防
Fushimi	伏見	Nagasaki	長崎	Takaku	高久
Gotō Rettō	五島列島	Nagashino	長篠	Tanegashima	種子島
Guangdong	廣東	Nagato	長門	Tosa	土佐
Guangzhou	廣州	Negoro	根来	Tōtōmi	遠江
Hakata	博多	Ningpo	宁波	Urado	浦戸
Higo	肥後	Ōmi	近江	Urakami	浦上
Hirado	平戸	Ōmura	大村	Yamaguchi	山口
Hizen	肥前	Ōsaka	大阪	Yokoseura	横瀬裏
Honshū	本州	Ōsumi	大隅	Zhaoqing	肇庆
Hyūga	日向	Owari	尾張	Zhejiang	浙江

ANNEX E – *Carregaçam de Macao para Japam no anno de 1617*⁹

This is the list of the merchandises loaded in the 1617 Great Ship drew by the Procurator of Japan in Macao Manoel Borges. This unpublished text precedes chronologically a similar list yet richer in details already published by Charles Boxer.¹⁰ We decided to include it in the annexes, because, although it is not as detailed as the list edited by Boxer, it contains types of data that fit correctly within our work. Here we can see the kinds of Chinese textiles the Japan Jesuits used to sell in the late 1610s, their purchasing and marketing prices and the goods the missionaries needed in their daily life. Moreover, differently from the 1618 list, here we find interesting details with regard to the *respondência* bonds concluded by Spinola in Japan.

[f. 108] Por emprego e mais couzas de provimento que neste anno de 1617 embarcamos da Companhia pera Japam em nosso titulo e com nossa marca na nao Nossa Senhora da Vida, na qual foi por Capitam fazer sua viagem Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho, he o seguinte.

Sincoenta cestos de seda fina, que tinhão pello pezo de Cantão trinta e seis picos, e trinta e tres cates e meyo, e assim amis tres caixoens tambem de seda fina, nos quaes hum pello pezo de Cantam dous picos e oitenta e oito cates; em hum dos quaes caixoens hião mais oito cates de seda batida de cores, e oito caixões de retros¹¹ tambem de cores.

Mais corenta fardos de seda grosse de Sipeo,¹² que pezarão pello pezo de Cantão dezanove picos e secenta cates, a secenta e dous taeis o pico.

A seda fina custou a noventa e quatro taeis o pico, afora os fretes, e direitos de Cantão.

Mais quinze fardos de Cangas¹³ em que hião 614 Cangas sorteadas entre pretas, brancas e a Luis.

⁹ The original in BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-7, ff. 108-109.

¹⁰ *Fato da Companhia que em Julho deste prezente anno vay embarcado para Japão nas galeotas da viagem todas seis que deste porto partem, e de que he Capitão Mor Antonio de Oliveira Moraes em Julho de 1618.* Cf. Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, pp. 163-168.

¹¹ 'Seda que é fiada e transformada em fio, que os portugueses chama *retrós*', as explained by Jan Huyghen van Linschoten. *Apud* Boxer, *O Grande Navio*, p. 164, n. 4. Cf. also Bluteau, *Vocabulario Portuguez & Latino*, vol. 7, p. 310: 'Retrôz. Fios de seda torcidos. Pluribus filis, ou liciis intortum sericum'.

¹² We were not able to identify this word. According to Boxer, who transcribed it as *sifeo*, it is a mistake made by the copyist and most likely is the name of a Chinese city or district. Cf. Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 164, n. 3.

Mais hum caixão de agulhas, seis cestos de asucar, hum fardinho com meyo pico de pimenta. Quatro jarras de vinho de missas, huma jarra de passas da China.

Doze, ou quinze picos de pao de China, posto que já velho do anno passado.

Dous fardos, em hum delles cem camizas, e no outro, cem calçoens brancos.

Mais outro fardo com algumas camizas, e calçoens, lenços, carapuças, e toalhas &cetera.

Hum caixão com couzas de buticas para doentes.

Hum fardo de alcasûs, e hum pouco de ruibeiro.

[f. 108^v] Oito caixas de peradas, quatro buyoens grandes de persolana de conserva.

Mais quatro buyoens amarelhos de conserva de gengibres.

Huma jarra de mangas de achar, e dous buyoens.

Huma quantidade de sapatos achar secular, chinelas de curtaça.

Hum caixão pequeno cheyo de contas, nominas e outras para os Christaons.

Hum buyãozinho de almiscar, que de câ tinha hido, e o Padre Carlos tornou a mandar per ser roim.

No Junco do filho de Toan,¹⁴ onde foi embarcado para Japão o Padre Manoel Barreto embarcamos oito paens e meyo de ouro entregues ao Padre Manoel Barreto, para em Japão os entregar ao Padre Carlos Spinola, dos quaes hé hum pão e meyo do Padre Vizitador.

O preço que se comprou foi a setenta e tres e a setenta e sinco.

No Navio de António Ferreira,¹⁵ que deste porto partio para Japão alguns dias depois da Nao, embarcamos setenta e sinco sayas, das quaes as secenta e sinco eram

¹³ Cf. *Glossário Luso-Asiático*, vol. I, p. 421: 'Tecido de algodão mui conhecido, que vem da Asia e de lá trouxe o nome'.

¹⁴ It is not clear to whom Father Manoel Borges was referring. We know of the third son of Murayama, Francisco, who was baptized in 1601 and took care of one of Nagasaki's parishes, but was exiled in 1614. Yet, thanks to his father's intervention, he was brought back to Nagasaki where he remained hidden for a while but eventually died in the siege of Ōsaka. Another son of Tōan, was entrusted with the command of a ship sent to Formosa by Murayama on the *bakufu*'s order in 1616. Most likely, it is the same son who went to Macao the following year. Cf. Peri, *Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l'Indochine*, p. 57.

¹⁵ A Portuguese merchant living in Macao, precisely in the *freguesia da Sé*, which includes him in the circle of influence of the Society of Jesus. In 1620, he took part in Macao's council meeting as part of the

carmizin, *scilicet* que custaram a tres pardaos a cada huma, e des de cores que custou cada huma a hum tael e seis mazes, e foram entregues ao Capitam no mesmo navio por nome Pero Correa Craveiro, de que passou conhecimento que mandei a Japão no mesmo navio.

Do procedido de toda a seda assima ditta, fina, e de Sipeo, se hão de pagar em Japam do proprio e respondencia a corenta por cento, tres mil e quinhentos setenta e nove, e sinco mazes e nove condorins de prata corrente que na ditta Nao forão daqui para Japam, deram a responder para Macao a ditta quantia de prata ao Padre Carlos Spinola, a qual elle lá gastou passando lettras para que de cá lhe mandassemos o emprego della; hindo correndo o risco para Japão por conta das pessoas que em Japam lhe derão a responder, que são as seguintes: por conta dos nettos de Minaminabo:¹⁶ 2000 taeis. Por conta de Ruefaconjin: 1400 taeis. Por conta de Justa de Arima, e Luiza [f. 109] de Bungo, e pobres de Firando: 179 taeis, sinco mazes, e nove condorins. E assim mais se hão de pagar em Japam do procedido da sobre ditta seda, nove centos, corenta e dous taeis de prata corrente às Capellarias dos Clerigos de Japão que se hão de pagar por conta da fazenda do Senhor Bispo de Japão e nos havemos de descontar esta ditta quantia nas dividas que aqui em Macao estamos à dever ao Successor do ditto Senhor Bispo, por quanto ja de aqui para Japam foi esta ditta quantia de prata das Capellarias correndo risco por conta das memsas Capellarias na Nao Nossa Senhora da Vida, que partio deste porto para Japão este anno de 1617.

[signature] Manoel Borgez’.

Povo (the people). Cf. BA/JÁ, *Cód.* 49-V-4, f. 22^v. He is included in the *Lista de la gente Efetiua que Ay Em esta Cidade Assy, Vesinos Como Estrauagantes forasteros e gente De lla tierra*, BPE, *Cód.* CXVI/2-5, f. 226^v. See also Penalva and Rodrigues, *Fontes para a História de Macau no Século XVII*, p. 176 and p. 344.

¹⁶ Takayama Ukon adopted the name Minaminobō 南坊 when, according to Japanese custom, he shaved his head in sign of retirement from public affairs. Cf. Laures, *Takayama Ukon. A Critical Essay*, p. 88.

ANNEX F – *Receita do açuquer que fes o engenho de Sergipe o anno de 1608*¹⁷

Similarly to the ANNEX E, this receipt was drawn by the procurator of Sergipe. It discloses the annual production of different qualities of sugar, their prices in Brazil and in the kingdom, the revenues and the resultant balance quantified through expenditures and selling. As for the ANNEX E, it is yet unpublished.

‘[f. 1] # fes o engenho a sua parte neste dito anno de branco tres mil duzentas e sete @
de mascavado a parte do engenho veio coatro centas e noventa e huma @
de batido brancos cento e sincoenta e coatro @
de panelas pretas cento e oitenta e coatro @

Soma todo este açuquer que veio a parte do engenho coatro mil e trinta e seis @

deste açuquer caregou para o reino de branco mil e oito centos e vinteseite @ que valem a dinheiro a rezão de mil e oitenta réis @ preço que este anno valia no Brazil hum conto novecentos setenta e tres mil sete centos réis.

carregue mais coatro centas e sinco @ de mascavado a seis centos e corenta @ preço do Brazil que naquele anno valeo enporta duzentos e sincoenta e nove mil e duzentos réis.

carregue mais de panela preta sincoenta e coatro @ que a trezentos e oitenta réis que foi o preço que valeo aquele anno no Brazil, monta vinte mil quinhentos e vinte réis.

de maneira que enportou todo o açuquer caregado este anno para o Reino duas mil duzentas oitenta e seis @ que redozidas a dinheiro pelos preços do Brazil monta dous contos, duzentos e sincoenta e três mil coatro centos e vinte réis.

[f. 1^v] # açuquer que vendeo neste dito anno de 1608 no Brazil

de branco, mil e cento e oitenta @ e nelas fes a dinheiro hum conto duzentos e oitenta e coatro mil e trinta réis.

vendeo sincoenta e duas @ de mascavado e nelas fes a dinheiro trinta e tres mil duzentos e oitenta réis

vendeo cento e coatro @ de batidos e neles fes a dinheiro oitenta e tres mil seis centos réis

¹⁷ The original in ANTT/CJ, *Maço 14*, doc. n.º 53, ff. 1-2^v.

vendeo centro e trinta e sinco @ de panelas e nelas fes a dinheiro sincoenta e hum mil e trezentos réis

vendeo mais trinta e sinco pipas de meles e nelas fes a dinheiro corenta e dous mil réis.

De maneira que enportou o açuquer que se vendeo este anno no Brazil mil e coatro centos e setenta e huma @ e nelas fes a dinheiro hum conto, coatro centos noventa e coatro mil duzentos e des réis.

Val o que despendeo tres contos, cento e noventa e coatro mil, centro e trinta réis entrando nestes fastos huma divida que pagou do Conde que está en gloria, de cento e trinta e coatro mil réis e gastou nos escrávos que se forão buscar a Pernambuco que tãobem entrarão na dita contia coatrocentos corenta e sete mil trezentos réis, entrou tãobem nesta dita contia oito peças que dis que comprou e custarão duzentos sesenta e tres mil e quinhentos réis [f. 2] de modo que tirando hum conto, coatro centos e noventa e coatro mil duzentos e des réis que fes a dinheiro nos açuques que vendeo no Brazil, fica-lhe a dever segundo ele dis por seu libro hum conto seiscentos noventa e nove mil nove centos e vinte réis’.